the psychical gods, and circulating according to temporal periods; and participating of sameness and at the same time a stable condition of forms from the intellectual gods;' but receiving into themselves the presence of anion, of measure, and of the distribution of good from the first Gods. It is necessary, therefore, either that the Gods should know that a provi- dential care of their own offspring is natural to them, and should not only give subsistence to secondary beings, and supply them with life, essence and union, but also previously comprehend in themselves the primary cause of the goods they contain, or, which it is not lawful to assert^ that being Gods, they are ignorant of what is proper and fit.
For what ignorance can there be of beautiful things, with those who are the causes of beauty, or of things good^ with those who are allotted an hyparxis defined by the nature of the goodf But if they are Ignorant, neither do souls govern the universe according to intellect, nof are intellects carried in souls as in a vehicle, nor prior to these do the unities of the Gods contractedly comprehend in themselves all know-» ' It it necessarj b^re to supply the wordi, ix rm yof^y fiwy.
Ftoc. Vol. L G 50 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK T.
ledge^ which we have acknowledged they do through the former demonstra- tions. If, therefore, they are not deprived of knowledge, being the fathers,. leaders and governors of every thing in the worlds and' to them as being such a providential care of the things governed by, and following them, and generated by them, pertains, whether shall we say that they knowing- the law which is according to nature, accomplish this law, or that through imbecility they are depri\ ed of a prdvidential attention to their possessions or progeny, for it is of no consequence as to the present discussion which, of these two appellations you are willing to adopt? For if through want of power they neglect the superintendence of wholes, what is the cause of this want of power? For they do not move things externally, nor. are other things indeed the causes of essence, but they assume the government oC Ae things they have produced, but they rule over all things^ as if from the 9tera of a ship, themselves supplying being,, themselves containing the neasurea c^ life> and themsdres distributing to things their respective energies.
Whetlmr aho^ are they mnable to provide at once for all things, or they do not leave each of the parts deititute of their providential careF And if they are not curators of every thing in the world, whether do they pro- videatiaUy superintend greater things,, but neglect such as are less? Or do they pay attention to the less, but neglect to take care of the greater ^ For if we deprive them of a providential attention to all things similarly^ through the want of power, how, while we attribute to them^ a greater thing, viz. the production of all things^ can we refuse to grant that whick 18 naturally consequent to this^ a providential attention to their produc- tions? For it is the province of the power which produces a greater thing,, to dispose in a becoming manner that which is less. But if they are curators of less things, and neglect such as are greater, how can^this mode of providence be right? For that which is more allied, and more similar to any thing, is more appropriately and fitly disposed by nature to the participation of the good which that thing confers on it. If, however, the Gods think that the first of mundane natures deserve their providen- tial care, and that perfection of which tliey are the sources, but are unable CHAP. XIV. DP PLATO. Si to extend tbdr regard to the last of things, what is it whidi can restrain the presence of the Gods from pervading to all things? What is it which can impede their unenvying and exuberant energy? How can those who «re capable of effecting greater things, be unable to govern such as are less? Or how can those who produce the essence even of the smallest things, not be the lords of the perfection of them, through a privation of power? For all these things are hostile to our natural conceptions. It remains, there* fore, that the Gods must know what is fit and appropriate, and that they must possess a power adapted to the perfection of their own nature, and to the government of the whole of things. But if they know that which is according to nature, and this to those who are the generating causes of all things is to take care of all thin^, and an exuberance of power, — if this be the case, they are not deprived of a providential attention of this kind. Whether, also, together with what has been said, is there a will of providence in them? Or is this alone wanting both to their knowledge and power? And on this account are things deprived* of their providential aire? For if indeed knowing what is fit for themselves^ and being able to accomplish what they know, they are unwilling to provide for their own offspring, they will be indigent of goodness, their unenvying exuberance will perish, and we shall do nothing else than abolish the hyparxis ac* cording to which they are essentialized. For the very being of the Gods is defined by the good, and in this they have their subsistence. But to provide for things of a subject nature, is to confer on them a certain good. How, therefore, can we deprive the Gods of providence, without at the same time depriving them of goodness? And how if we subvert their goodness is it possible, that we should not also ignorantly subvert their hyparxis which we established by the former demonstrations? Hence it is necessary to admit as a thing consequent to the very being of the Gods that they are good according to every virtue. And again, it is con* sequent to this that they do not withdraw themselves from a providential attention, to secondary natures, either through indolence, or imbecility, or ignorance. But to this I think it is also consequent that there is with ' For uwfwfir^i it is requisite to read, ir^pgij/roi.
5« ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK h them the most excellent knowledge, unpolluted power, and unenvying and exuberant will. From which it appears that they provide for the whole of things, and omit nothing which is requisite to the supply of good.
Let, however, no one think that the Gods extend such a providence about secondary things, as is either of a busy or laborious nature, or that this is the case with their exempt transcendency, which is established re- mote from mortal difficulty. For their blessedness is not wilKng to be de»- filed with the difficulty of administration, since even the life of good men is accompanied with facility, and is void of tnolestation and pain. But all labours and molestation arise from the impediments of matter. If, however^ it be requisite to define the mode of the providence of the Gods, it must be admitted that it is spontaneous, unpolluted, immaterial, and ineffable. For the Gods do not govern all things either by investigating what is fit, or exploring the good of every thing by ambiguous reasonings, or by looking externally, and following their eflects as men do in the pro- vidence which they exert on their own afiairs; but pre^assuming in them* selves the measures of the whole of things, and producing the essence of every thing from themselves,, and also looking to themselves, they lead and perfect all things in a silent path, by their very being, and fill them with good. Neither, likewise^ do they produce in a manner similar to nature, -energizing only by their very being, unaccompanied with deli- berate choice, nor energizing in a manner similar to partial souls in con- junction with will, are they deprived of production according to essence; but they contract both these into one union, and they will indeed such things as they are able to eflfect by their very bdng, but by their very essence being capable of and producing all things, they contain the cause of production in their unenvying and exuberant will. By what busy energy, therefore, with what difficulty, or with the punishment of what Ixion, is the providence either of whole souls, or of intellectual essences, or of the Gods themselvea accomplished, unless it should be said, that to impart good in any respect is laborious to the Gods? But that which is according to nature is not laborious to any thing. For neither is it labo- rious to fire to impart heat, nor to snow to refrigerate, nor in short to CHAP. XIV. OF PLAXa. 53 ^odies to energize according to tl^eir own proper powers. And prior to bodies, neither is it laborious to natures to^nourish, or generate, or increase* For these are the works of natures. Nor again, prior to these, is it labo- rious to souls. For these indeed produce many energies from deliberate choice, many from their very befng, and are the causes of many motions by alone being present. So that if indeed the communication of good is according to natiire to the Gods, providence also is according to nature. And these things we must say are accomplished by the Gods with facility, and by their very being alone. But if these things are not according to nature, neither will the Gods be naturally good. For the good is the sup- plier of good; just as life is the source of another life, and intellect is the source of intellectual illumination. And every thing which has a primary subsistence in each nature is generative of that which has a secondary subsistence.
That however, which is especially the illustrious prerogative of the Platonic theology, I should say is this, that according to it, neither is the exempt essence of the Gods convierted to secondary natures, through apro« vidential care for things subordinate, nor is their providential presence with all things diminished through their transcending the whole of things with undefiled purity, but at the same time it assigns to them a separate subsist-^ ence, and the being unmingled with every subordinate nature, and also the being extended toall things, and the taking care of and adorning their own progeny. For the manner in which they pervade through all things is not corporeal, as that of light is through the air, nor is it divisible about bodies, in the same manner as tn nature, nor converted to subordinate natures, in the same manner as that of a partial soul, but it is separate from body, and without conversion tait, is immaterial, unmingled, tmre-^ strained, uniformi pMrimary and exempt. In short, such a mode of the providence of the Gods as this, must at present be conceived. For»it is evident that it will be appropriate according to each order of the Gods. For soul indeed, is said to provide for secondary natures in one way, and intellect in another. But the providence ot divinity who is pnor to intel- lect is exerted according to a transcendency both of intellect and souK And of the Gods themselves^ the providence of the sublunary is different from that of the celestial divinities. Of the Gods also who are beyond the 54 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I.
world, there are many orders, and the mode of provideooe is<lifferent according to each.
CHAPTER XV.
The third problem after these we shall connect witli the former, and survey how we are to assume the unpervertible in the Gods, who perform all things according to justice, and who do not in the smallest degree subvert its boundary, or its undeviating rectitude, in their providential attention to all other things, and in the mutatiohs of human affairs. I thii^ therefore, that this is apparent to every one, that every where that mhich governs according to natuK, and pays all possiUe attention to the felicity c^the gaverned, after this manner becomes the leader of that which it governs, and directs it to that which is best. For neither has the pilot who rules over the sailors and the ship any other precedaneous end than the safety of those that «arl in the «hip, and of the ship itself, nor does the physician who is the curator of the diseased, endeavour to do all things for the sake of any thing dse than the health of the subjects of his care, whether it be requisite to cut them, or administer to them a purgative medicine. Nor would the general of an army or a guardian say that they look to any other end, than the one to the liberty of those that are guarded, and the other to the liberty of the soldiers* Nor will any other to whom it belongs to be the leader or curator of certain persons, endeavour to subvert the good of those that follow him, which it is his business to pro- cure, and with a view to which he disposes in a becoming manner every thing belonging to those whom he governs. • If therefore we grant that the <7ods ai^ the leaders of the whole of things, and that their providence ex- tends to all things, since they are good, and possess every virtue, how is it possible they should neglect the felicity of the objects of their provi- deotial care? Or how can they be inferior to other leaders in the provi- CHAP. XV. OF PLATOi SS^ dence of sij^rdinate natures^?' Since the Gods indeed always look to* diat which is better, and establish this as the end of all tiieir government, but other leaders overlook the good of men, and embrace vice rather than virtue, in consequence of being perverted by the gifts of the depraved.
And universally, whether you are vrilling to call the Gods leaders, or rulers, or guardians, or fathers^ a divine nature will appear to be in- want of no one of such names. For alF things that are venerable and honor- able subsist in them primarily. And on this account indeed, here also some things are naturally more venerable and honorable than others, because they exhibit an ultimate resemblance of the Gods. But what occasion is there to speak further on this subject ^ For I think that we hear from those who are wise in divine concerns paternal, guardian, ruling and peeonian powers celebrated. How is it possible therefore that the images of the Gods' which subsist according, to nature, regarding the end which is adapted to them^ should providentially attend to the order of ^e things which they govern, but that the Gods themselves with whom tiierek the whole ofgood, true and real vtrttie, and a blameless life, should ^ not direct their government to the virtue and^ vice of men? Aiid how can it be admitted, on this supposition, that they exhibit virtue victorious^ in the universe, and vice vanquished? Will they not also thus corrupt the measures of justice by the worship paid to them by> the depraved, subvert the boundary of undeviating science, and cause the gifts of vice to appear more honorable than the pursuits of virtue? For this mode of providence is neither advantageous to these leaders^ nor to those that follow them# For to those who have become wicked, there will be no fiberation from guilt, since they will always endeavour to anticipate justice, and pervert the measures of desert.. But it will be necessary, which it is not lawful to assert, that the Gods should regard as their fitaal end the vice of the subjects of their providence, neglect thdr true salvation^ and consequently be alone the causes of adumbrant good« This universe also^ and the whole world will be filled with disorder and incurable perturbations- depravity remaining in it, and being replete with that discord which exists * iQ badly governed cities. Though is it not pjerfectly impossible that parts^ 55 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I.
should be governed according to nature in a greater degree than wholes, human than divine concerns, and images than primary causes?
Hence if men properly attend to the weltare of men in governing them, honoring some, but disgracing others, and every where giving a proper direction to the works of vice by the measures of virtue, it is much more necessary that the Gods should be the immutable governors of the whole of things. For men are allotted this virtue through similitude to the Gods. But if we acknowledge that men who corrupt the safety and well-being of those whom they govern, imitate in a greater degree the providence of the Gods, we shall ignorantly at one and the same time entirely subvert the truth concerning the Gods, and the transceadency of virtue. For thi* I think is evident to every one, that what is more similar to the Gods is more happy than those thin^ that are deprived of them * through dissimi« litudeand diversity. So that if among men indeed, the uncorrupled and undeviating form of providence is honorable, it must undoubtedly be in a much greater degree honorable with the Gods. But if with them, mortal gifts are more venerable than the divine measures of justice, with men alsoeartb'bem gifts will be more honorable than Olympian goods, and the bkmdisbments of vice than the works of virtue. With a view therefore to the.most perfect feHcity, Plato in the La w^ delivers to. us through these demonstrations, the hj^parxis of the Gods, their providential care extend* ing to all things, and their immutable energy; which things, indeed, are common to all the Gods, but are most principal and first according to nature in the doctrine pertaining to them. For this triad appears to per- vade as far as to the most partial natures in the divine orders, originating supernally from the occult genera of Gods. For a uniform hyparxis, a power which providentially takes care of all secondary natures, and an undeviating and immutable intellect, are in all the Gpds that are prior to and in the world.
' For ourov it is necessary to read «vr(ir CHAP. XVI. OF PLATO. 57 CHAPTER XVL Again, from another principle we may be able to apprehend the theo* logical demonstrations in the Republic. For these are common to all the divine orders, similarly extend to all the discussion about the Gods, and unfold to us truth in uninterrupted connexion with what has been before said. In the second book of the Republic therefore, Socrates describes certain theological types for mythological poets, and exhorts his pupils to purify themselves from those tragic discipUnes, which some do not refuse to introduce to a divine nature, concealing in these as in veils the arcane mysteries coneeming the Gods. Socrates therefore, as J have said, nar- rating the types and laws of divine fables, which afford this apparent meaning, and the inward concealed scope, which regards as its end the beautiful and the natural in the fictions about the Gods, — ^in the first place indeed, thinks fit to evince according to our unperverted concep* tion about the Gods and their goodness, that they are the suppliers of all good, but the causes of j)o evil to any being at any time. In the second place, he says that they are essentially immutable, and that they neither have various forms, deceiving and fascinating, nor are the authors of the greatest evil lying, in deeds or in words, or of error and folly. These therefore being two laws, the former has two conclusions, viz. that the Gods are not the causes of evils, and that they are the causes of all good* Hie second law also in a similar manner has two other conclusions; and these are, that every divine nature is immutable, and is established pure from falsehood and artificial variety* All the things demonstrated there* fore, depend on these three common conceptions about a divine nature, viz. on the coaceptions about its goodness, immutability and truth. For the first and ineffable fountain of good is with the Gods; together with eternity, which is the cause of a power that has an invariable sameness of subsistence r and the first intellect which is beings themselves, and the truth which is in real beings.
Proc. • Vol. I. H 58 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I.
CHAFfER XVII.
That therefore, which has the hyparxis of itself, and the whole of its^ essence defined in the good, and which bj its very being produces all things,* must necessarily be productive of every good, but of no eviL For if there was any thing primarily good, which is not God, perhaps some one might say that divinity is indeed a cause of good, but that he doe» not impart ta beings every good. If, however, not only every God is good, but that which is primarily boniform and beneficent is God, (for that which is pri- marily good will not be the second after the Gods, because every where^ things which have a secondary subsistence, receive the peculiarity of their hyparus from those that subsist primarily) — thk being the case, it is per- fectly necessary that divinity should be the cause df good,, and of all such goods as proceed into secondary descents, as far as to the last of things. Fof as the power which is the cause of life, gives subsistence to all life, a» the power which is the cause of knowledge, produces all knowledge, as the power which is the cause of beauty, produces every thing beautiful, as well tlie beauty which is in words, ad that which is in the pha^nomena, and thus every primary cause produces all similars from itself and binds to itself the one hypostasis of things which subsist according to one form,— after thesame manner I think the first and most principal good, and uniform hyparxis, es- tablishes in and about itself, the causes and. comprehensions of all goods at once. Nor is there any thing good which does not possess this power from; it, nor beneficeivt which being converted to it, does not participate of tjiis^ cause. For all goods are from thence produced, perfected and preserved'? and the one series and order of universal good, depends on that fountain. Through the same cause of hyparxis therefore, the Gods are the suppliers of all good, and of no evil. For that which is primarily good, gives subsist- ence to every good from itself, and is not the cause of an allotment con- trary to itself; since that which is productive of life, ie not the cause of the privation of life, and that which is the source of beauty is exempt from the nature of that which i& void of beauty and is deformed, and fromt CHAP. XVII. OF PLATO. 59 the causes of this. Hence, of that which primarily constitutes good, it is not lawful to assert that it is the cause of contrary progeny; but the na- ture of goods proceeds from thence undefiled, unmingled and uniform.