And the divine cause indeed of goods is established eternally in itself,- extending to all secondary natures, an unen vying and exuberant partici- pation of good. Of its participants, however, some preserve the partici- pation with incorruptible purity, receiving their proper good in undefiled bosoms, and thus through an abundance of power possess inevitably an al- lotment of goods adapted to them. But those natures which are arranged in the last of the whole of things, entirely indeed enjoy according to their nature the goodness of the Gods; for it is not possible that things perfectly destitute of good should either have a being, or subsist at first; but re- ceiving an efilux of this kind, they neither preserve the gift which pervades to them, pure and unmingled, nor do they retain their proper good stably, and with invariable saipeness, but becoming imbecil, partial and material, and filled with the privation of vitahty of their subject, they exhibit to order indeed, the privation of order, to reason irrationality, and to virtue, the contrary to it, vice. And with respect indeed to the natures which r$ink as wholes,' each of these is exempt from a perversion of tliis kind^ things more perfect in them always having dominion according to nature.
But partial natures through a diminution of power always diverging * into multitude, division and interval, obscure indeed the participation of good, but substitute the contrary in the mixture with good, and which is van* quished by the combination. For neither here is it lawful for evil to subsist immingled, and perfectly destitute of good; but though some particular thing may be evil to a part, yet it is entirely good to the whole and to the universe. For the universe is always happy, and always consists of perfect parts, and -which subsist according to nature. But that which is preter- natural is always evil to partial natures, and deformity, privation of sym- metry, perversion, and a resemblance of subsistence are in. these. For that which is corrupted, is indeed corrupted to itself, and departs from its proper perfection, but to the universe it is incorruptible and inde- structible.
' For aXXon it is necessary to r^d oX^v. * For efji^fiaivovra read eK^aivovra.
60 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I.
And every tiling which is deprived of good, so far indeed as pertains to itself, and its own subsistence, is deprived of it through imbecility of na- ture; but it is good to the whole, and so far as it is a part of the universe* For it is not possible that either a privation of life, or deformity and im* moderation, or in short privation can be inserted in the universe; but its whole number is always perfect, being held together by the goodness of wholes. And life is every where present, together with existence, and the being perfect, so far as each thing gives completion to the whole. Di- vinity therefore, as we have said, is the cause' of good; but the shadowy subsistence of evil does not subsist from power, but from the imbecility of the natures which receive the illuminations of the Gods. Nor is evil in wholes^ but in partial natures, nor yet in all these. For the first of partial natures and partial intellectual genera are eternally boniform* But the media among these, and which energize according to time, con* necting the participation of the good with temporal mutation and motion, are incapable of preserving the gift of the Gods immoveable, uniform and simple; by their variety obscuring* the simplicity of this gift, by their multiform its uniform nature, and by their commixture its purity and incorruptibility. For they do not consist of incorruptible first genera,, nor have they a simple essence, nor uniform powers, but such as are compK)sed of the contraries to these, as Socrates somewhere says in the Pheedrus. And the last of partial natures and which are also material, in a much greater degree pervert their proper good. For they are mingled with a privation of life, and have a subsistence resembling that of an image, since it is replete with much of non-entity, consists of things hostile to each other, and of circumstances which are mutable and dispersed through the whole of time, so that they never cease to evince in every thing that they are given up to corruption, privation of symmetry, deformity^ and all-various mutations, being not only extended in. their energies, like the natures prior to them, but being replete both in their powers and energies with that which is preternatural, and with material imbecility. For things which become situated in a foreign [^ace, by co-introducing whole together ' Iii$ necessary here to supply the word amov.
* For irafaa-xguafyrra it i$ requisite to read wipi^xiafyvra.
CHAP. XVII. OF PLATO. (J{ tvith fonn, rule over the subject nature; but again receding to that which is partial, from their proper wholeness, and participating of partibility, im- becility, war and the division which is the source of generation, they are necessarily all- variously changed. Neither, therefore, is every being perfectly good; for there would not be the corruption and generation of bodies, nor the purification and punishment of souls. Nor is there any evil in wholes: for the world would not be a blessed god, if the most principal parts of which it consists were imperfect. Nor are the Gods the causes of evils, in the same manner as they are of goods; but evil originates from the imbecility of the recipients of good, and a subsistence in the last of things. Nor is the evil which has a shadowy subsistence in partial natures unmingled with good. But this participates of it in a certain respect, by its very existence being detained by good. Nor in short, is it possible for evil which is perfectly destitute of all good to have a subsistence. For evil itself is even beyond that which in no respect whatever has an existence, just as the good itself is beyond that which is perfectly being. Nor is the evil which is in partial natures left in a disordered state, but even this is made subservient to good purposes by the Gods, and on this account justice purifies souls from depravity. But another order of gods purifies from the depravity which is in bodies. All things however are converted as much as possible to the goodness of the Gods. And wholes indeed remain in their proper boundaries, and also the perfect and beneficent genera of beings. But more partial and imperfect natures are adorned and arranged in a becoming manner, become subservient to the completion of wholes, are called upward to the beautiful, are changed, and in every way enjoy the participation of the good, so far as this can be accomplished by them.
For there cannot be a greater good to each of these, than \frhat the Gods impart according to measures to their progeny: but all thinjjs, each sepa- rately, and all in common, receive such a portion of good, as it is pos- sible for them to participate. But if some things are filled with greater, and others with less goods, the power of the recipients, and the measures of the distribution must be assigned as the cause of this. For different things are adapted to diiSerent beings according to their nature. But the 62 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I.
Gods always extend good> in the same manner as the sun always emits light. For a different thing receives this light differently according to its order, and receives the greatest portion of light it is capaljle of receiving. For all things are led according to justice, and good is not absent from any thing, but is present to every thing, according to an appropriate boundary of participation. And as the Athenian guest says, all things are In a good condition, and are arranged by the Gods. Let no one therefore say, that there are precedaneous productive principles of evil in nature, or in- tellectual paradigms of evils, in. the same manner as there are of goods, or that there is a malific soul, or an evil-producing cause in the Gods, nor let him introduce sedition and eternal war against the first good. For all these are foreign from the science of Plato, and being morfe remote from the truth wander into barbaric folly, and gigantic mythology. Nor if certain persons speaking obscurely in arcane narrations, devise things of this kind, shall we make any alteration in the apparent apparatus of what they indicate. But the truth indeed of those things is to be investigated, and in the mean time, the science of Plato must be genuinely received in the pure bosoms of the soul, and must be preserved undefiled and im- mingled with contrary opinions.
CHAPTER XVIIL In the next place, let us survey the immutability and simplicity of the Gods, what the nature of each of them is, and how both these appear to be adapted to the hyparxis of the Gods, according to the narration of Plato. TheGods, therefore, are exempt from the whole of things. But filling these, as we have said, with good, they are themselves perfectly good; each of them according to his proper order possesses that which is most excellent; and he whole genus of the Gods is at once allotted predomi- nance according to an exuberance of good. But here again, we must CHAP. XVIII. OF PLATO^ gg oppose those who interpret m a divisible manner that which is most excel- lent in the Gods, and who say, that if the first cause is most excellent, that which is posterior to the first is not so* For it is necessary, say they, that what is produced should be inferior to that by which it is pro- duced. And this indeed is rightly asserted by them. For it is necessary in the Gods, to preserve the order of causes unconfused, and to define separately their second and third progressions. But together with a pro- gression of this kind, and with * the unfolding into light of things secon- dary from those that are first, that which is most excellent must also be surveyed in eadi of the Gods. For each of the Gods in his own charac- teristic peculiarity is allotted a transcendency which is primary and per- fectly good. One of them indeed, that we may speak of something known, is allotted this transcendency, and is most excellent as possessing a prophetic power, another as demiurgic, but another as a perfector of works. And Timaeus indicating this to us, continually calls the first de-^ mmrgus the best of causes. For the world, says he, is the most beautiful of generated natures, and its artificer is the best of causes; though the intelligible paradigm, and which is the most beautiful of intelligibfes is prior to the demiurgus. But this is most beautiful and at the same time most excellent, as the demiurgic paradigm; and the maker and at the same time father of the universe is most excellent, as a demiurgic God. In the Republic also, Socrates speaking of the Gods, very properly observes, that each of them being as much as possible most beautiful and most excellent, remains always with a simplicity of subsistence in his own form. For each of them being allotted that which is first and the summit in his own series, does not depart from his own order, but contains the blessed- ness and felicity of his own proper power. And neither does he exchange his present for a worse order; for it is not lawful for that which possesses all virtue to be changed into a worse condition; nor does he pass into a better order. For where can there be any thing better than that which is most excellent? But this is present with each of the divinities according to his own order, as we have said, and &,lso with every genus of the Gods» » For TO it is necessary to read rj.
^ ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I.
It is necessary therefore that every divine nature should be established immutably, abiding in its own accustomed manner. Hence from these things the self-sufficiency, undefiled purity, and invariable sameness of sub- sistence of the Gods is apparent. For if they are not changed to a more excellent condition of being, as possessing that which is best in their own nature, they are sufficient to themselves, and are not io want of any good. And if they are not ^t any time changed to a worse condition, they re- main undefiled, established in their own transcendencies. If also they guard the perfection of themselves immutably, they subsist always with invariable sameness. What the self-sufficiency therefore of the Gods is, what their immutability, and what their sameness of subsistence, we shall in the next place consider.
The world then iasaid to be self*sufficient, because its subsistence is per- fect from things perfect, and a whole from wholes; and because it i^ filled with all appropriate goods from its generating father. But a perfection a.nd self-sufficiency of this kind is partible« and is said to consist of many things coalescing in one, and is filled from separate causes according to participation. The order of divine souls also, is said to be self-sufficient, as being full of appropriate virtues, and always preserving the measure of its own blessedness without indigence. But here likewise the self-suffix ciency is in want of powers. For these souls have not their intellections directed to the same intelligibles; but they energize according to time, and obtain the complete perfection of their contemplation in whole periods of time. The self-sufficiency therefore of divine souls, and the whole perfection of their life is not at once present. Again, the intellectual world is said to be self*sufficient, as having its whole good established ii) eternity, comprehending at once its whole blessedness, and being indigent of nothing, because all life and all intelligence are present with it, and nothing is deficient, nor does it desire any thing as absent. But this, indeed, is sufficient to itself in its own order, yet it falls short of the self- sufficiency of the Gods. For every intellect is boniform, yet is not good- ness itself, nor primarily good; but each of the Gods is a unity, by-* parxis and goodness. The peculiarity however of byparxis changes the progression of the goodness of each* For one divinity is a perfective CHAR XVIII. OF PLATO. ^5 goodness^ another is a goodness connective of the whole of things, and another is a collective goodness. But each is simply a goodness sufficient to itself. Or it may be said, that each is a goodness possessing the self* sufficient and the all-perfect, neither according to participation, nor ilhH&i- nation, but by being that very thing which it is. For intellect is sul]^:ient to itself by 'participation, and soul by illumination, but this universe^ ac* cording to a similitude to a divine nature. The Gods themselves, however, are self-sufBicient through and by themselves, filling themsdves, or rather subsisting as the plenitudes of all good.: ' But with respect to the immutability of the Gods, of what kind shall we say it is? Is it such as that of a [naturally] circulating body? For neither is this adapted to receive any thing from inferior natures, tior is It filled with the mutation arising from generation, and the disorder which occurs in the sublunary regions. For the nature of the celestial bodies is immaterial and immutable. But this indeed is great and venerable, as in corporeal hypostases, yet it is inferior to the natuw of die Gods. Fdr every body possesses both its being, and its perpetual immutability from other precedaneons causes. But neither is the impassive and the immu^ table in the Gods such as the immutability of souls. For these commu*« nicate in a certain respect with bodies^ and are the media of an impartible essence, and of an essence divided about bodies. Nor again is the im- mutability of intellectual essences equivalent to that of the Gods. For intellect is immutable, impassive, and unmingled with secondary natures, on account of its union with the Gods. And so far indeed a& it is uniform, it is a thing of this kind; but so far as it is manifold, it has something which is more excellent, and something which is subordinate, in itself.
But the Gods alone having established their unions according to this trans« cendency of being8,are immutable dominat](H)8,are primary and impassive. For there is nothing in them which is not one and byparxis. But as fire abolishes every thing which is foreign to it and of a contrary power, as light expels all darkness, and as lightning proceeds through all things with- out defilement, thus also the unities of the Gods unite all multitude, and abolish every thing which tends to dispersion and all-perfect division. But Ihey deify every thing which participates of them, receiving nothii^irom Froc. Vol. I. I 60 O^ THE THEOLOGY BOOK f.
their participants^ and do not ' diminish their own proper union by the participation.
Hence also the Gods being present every where, are similarly, exempt from all things, and containing all things are vanquished by no one of the things tliey contain; but they are unmingled with all things. and unde* filed. In the third place, this world indeed is said to subsist with inva* riable sameness, so far as it is allotted an order in itself which is always preserved indissoluble. At the same time however, since it possesses a corporeal form, it is not destitute of mutation, as the £lean guest observes. The psychical order likewise is said to obtain an essence always estabUshed in sameness; and this is rightly said. For it is entirely impassive accord- ing to essence; but it has energies extended into time, and as Socrates says in the Pfaaedrus, at different times it understands different intelligii^es, and in its progressions about intellect comes into contact with different forms. Besides these also, much-hoxiored intellect is said both to subsist and to understand with invariable and perpetual sameness, establishing at once in eternity its ^ftence, powers, and energies. Throng the multitude however of its intellections, and through the variety of intelligible species and genera, there is not only an invariable sameness, but also a difference of subsistence in intellect. For difference there is consubsistent with sameness. And there is not only a wandering of corporeal motions, and of the psychical periods, but likewise of intellect itself, so far as it pro- duces the intelligence of itself into multitude; and evolves the intelligible. For soul indeed evolves intellect, but intellect the intelligible, as PloUnus somewhere rightly observes, when speaking of the intelligible subjections. For such are the wanderings of intellect and which it is lawful for it to make. If therefore we should say that a perpetual sameness of subsistence is pri* marily in the Gods alone, and is especially inherent in them, we shall not deviate from the truth, and we shall accord with Plato, who says in the Politicus, that an eternally invariable sameness of subsistence alone per- tains to the most divine of all things. The Gods, therefore, bind to them- selves the causes of a sameness of this kind, ^nd guard with immutablq ^ f u;( b omitted in tht origmal.
CHAP. XIX. OF PEATO. ^ sameness their proper hjparxis establisbed according to the unknown union of themselves. And Such is the immutability of the Gods, which is con*- tained in self-sufficiency, impassivity and sameness.
CHAPTER XIX.
In the next place, let us consider what power the simplicity of the Gods possesses; for this Socrates adds in his discourse concerning a divine nature, not admitting that which is various, and multiform, and whicli appears different at different times, but referring to divinity the uniform and the simple. F4ach of the divinities therefore, as he says, remains simply in his own form. What then shall we conclude respecting this simplicity? That it is not such as that which is defined to be oqe in number. For a thing of this kind is composed of many things, and abun- dantly mingled. But it appears to be simple so far as it has distinctly a common form. Nor is it such as the simplicity which is in many things according to an arranged species or genus. For these are indeed more simple than the individuals in which they are inherent, but are replete with variety, communicate with matter, and receive the diversities of material natures. Nor is it such as the form of nature. For nature is divided about bodies, verges to corporeal masses, emits many powers about the composition subject to it, and is indeed more simple than bodies, but has an essence mingled with their variety. Nor is it such as the psychical simplicity. For soul subsisting as a medium between an impartible essence, and an essence which is divided about bodies, communicates with bot|i the extremes. And by that which is multiform indeed in its nature it is conjoined with things subordinate, but its head is established on hi^, and according to this it is especially divine, and allied to intellect.
Nor again is the simplicity of the Gods such as that of inteUect. For every intellect is impartible and uniform, but at the same time it possesses multitude and progression; by which it is evident, that it has a habitude 6q on the theology, BOOK I.
%o secondary natures, to itself, and about itself. It is aho in itself, and is not only uniform, but also multiform, and as it is said, is one many. It is therefore allotted an essence subordinate to the first simplicity. But the Gods have their hyparxis defined in one simplicity alone, being exempt indeed from all multitude so far as they are gods, and transcending all di- vision and interval, or habitude to secondary natures, and all composition. And they indeed are in inaccessible places, expanded above the whole of things, and eternally ride on beings« But the illuminations proceeding from them to secondary natures, being mingled in many places with their participants which are composite and various, are filled with a peculiarity similar to them. Let no one therefore wonder, if the Gods being essentia alized in one simplicity according to transcendency, various phantasms are hurled fortlj before the presence of them; nor, if they being uniform the appearances are multiform, as we have learnt in the most perfect of the mysteries. For nature, and the demiurgic intellect extend corpo- real-formed images of things incorporeal, sensible images of intelligible, and of tilings without interval, images endued with intervaL For So-