objects of inteUection through difference; and in short, it is intellectual motion about the intelligible. But it is necessary that divine faith should be uniform and quiet, being perfectly established in the port of goodness. For neither is the beautiful, nor wisdom, nor any thing else among beings, so credible and stable to all things, and so exempt from all ambiguity, divisible apprehension and motion, as the good. For through this intellect also embraces another union more ancient than intellectual energy, and prior to energy. And soul considers the variety of intellect and the splendour of forms as nothing with respect to that transcendency of the good by which it surpasses the whole of things. And it dismisses indeed intellectual perception, running back to its own hyparxis; but it always pursues, investigates, and aspires after the good^ hastens as it were to embosom it, and gives itself to this alone among all things without hesitation. But why is it necessary to speak of the soul? For these mortal animals, as Diotima somewhere says, despise all other things, and even life itself and being, through a desire of the nature of the good; and all things have this one immoveable and ineffable tendency to the good; but they overlook, consider as secondary, and despise the order of every thing else. This, therefore, is the one secure port of all beings.
This also is especially the object of belief to all beings. And through this the conjunction and union with it is denominated faith by theologists, and not by them only, but by Plato likewise, (if I may speak what appears to me to be the case) the alliance of this faith with truth and love is proclaimed in the Laws. The multitude therefore are ignorant, that he who has a conception of these things, when discoursing about their contraries, infers the same thing with respect to the deviations from this triad. Plato then clearly asserts in the Laws that the lover of false- hood is not to be believed, and that he who is not to be believed is void of friendship. Hence it is necessary that the lover of truth should be worthy of behef, and that he who is worthy of belief should be well adapted to friendship. From these things therefore, we may survey divine truth, faith and love, and comprehend by a reasoning process their stable com- munion with each other. If, however, you are wilUng, prior to these things we will recall to our memory that Plato denominates that virtue CHAP. XXVI. OF PLATO. Qi fidelity which coDciliates those that disagree, and subverts the greatest of wars, I mean seditions in cities. For from these things faith appears t9 be the cause of union, communion and quiet. And if there is such a power as this in us, it is by a much greater priority in the Gods themr selves. For as Plato speaks of a certain divine temperance^ justice and science, how is it possible that faith which connectedly comprehends the whole order of the virtues should not subsist with the Gods? In short, there are these three things which replenish divine natures, and which are ihe sources of plenitude to all the superior genera of beings, vi^. good«> ness, wisdom and beauty. And again, there are three things which collect together the natures that are filled, being secondary indeed to the former, but pervading to all the divine orders, and these are feith, truth and love. But all things are saved through these, and are conjoined to their primary causes; some things indeed, through the amatory maniai others through divine philosophy, and others through theurgic power, which is more excellent than all human wisdom, and which comprehends prophetic good, the purifying powers of perfective good, and in short, ^11 such things as are the effects of divine possession. Concerning these things therefore, we may perhaps again speak more opportunel^\ CHAPTER XXVI.
Again, let us, if you are willing^ from other dialogues investigate the common dogmas of Plato about divine natures. Whence therefore, and what dogmas shall we assume, while we proceed in our search according to najture? Are you willing that we should in the next place recall to our memory what is written in thePhaedo.^ Socrates therefore says in the demonstrations of the immortality of the soul which are derived from its similitude to divinity, that the essence which is superior to the soul, Proc. Vol. I. L 83 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK L (and to which the soul is naturally simtkr, and being similar participates of an immortal allotment) is divine and immortal, intelligible and uniform^ indissoluble and possesses an invariable sameness of subsistence; but that the essence which is inferior to the soul, is entirely the contrary, to which also it pertains to be corrupted and to be passive. For a thing of this kind is sensible and multiform, and is dissoluble because it is a composite; and he predicates among these all such things as pertain to a corporeal subsistence. Let us therefore direct our attention to these common dog- mas, and examine after what manner each of them pertains to the Gods.
In the first place then what is that which we look to when we speak of that which is said to be divine? From what has been jsaid therefore, it is evident that every God subsists according to the highest union of beings. For to us ascending from bodies, the Gods have appeared to be superessential unities, the generators, perfectors and measurers of essences, and who bind all first essences to themselves. But that which is divine, is not only hyparxis and the one in each order of being, but at the same time is that which participates and that which is participated; of which the latter is a God, but the former is divine. Whether however, prior to the participated unities, there is something which is separate and partici- pated will be evident in what follows. But at present we shall define that which is divine to be a thing of this kind, viz. being which partici- pates of the one^ or the one subsisting contractedly together with being. For we assume all things in the Gods except the one^ as suspended from them and secondary, viz. essence, life and intellect. For the Gods do not subsist in, but prior to these, and they produce and contain these in themselves, but are not defined in them. But it is necessary not to be ignorant that these are in reality thus distinguished from each other. In many places, however, Plato magnificently celebrates the participants of the Gods by the same names, and denominates them Gods. For not only the Athenian guest in the Laws calls a divine soul a God, but also Socrates in the Pheedrus. For he says " that all the horses and charioteers of the Gods are good and consist of things good;'' and afterwards still more clearly, " and this is the life of the Gods.'' But this is not yet wonderful. For is it not admirable that he should denominate those beings Gods who CHAP. XXVI. OF PLATO. 83 are always conjaiiied with the Gods, aod who together with them give coBipletioQ to one series? For in many places be calls dsemons Gods^ though they are essentially posterior to, and subsist about the Gods. For in the Pha^rus and Tim^eus, and in other dialogues, you will find him ex- tending the appellation of the Gods even as far as to dssmons. But what is still more paradoxical than these things, he does not refuse to call cer- tain men Gods; for in the Sophkta he thus denominates the Elean guest.
From all that has been said therefore, this must be assumed, that with respect to a God, one thing h simply a God, another according to union, another according to participation, another according to contact, and an- other according to simiUtude. For of super-essential natures indeed, each is priaaiaiily a God; of intellectual natures, each is a God according to union; f^nd of divine souls, each is a God according to participation. But divine daemons are Gods according to contact with the Gods; and the souk of men are allotted this appellation through similitude. lEoLch of tiiese however is, as we have said, rather divine than a God. Since the Athenian guest calls intdlect itself divine; but that which is divine is posterior to the first deity, in ihe same manner as that which is united is posterior to tke om, that which is intellectual, to intellect, and that which is animated, to soul. And always those natures that are more uniform and simple have the precedency; but the series of beings ends in the one itself. Let this, therefore, be the fiefinition and distinction of that which is divine.
In the next place, let us survey the immortal. For with Plato there are many orders of immortality, pervading from on high as fur as to the last of things; and the last echo, as it were, of immortality, is in those visible natures that are perpetual; which the Elean guest, in his discourse about the circulation of the universe, says, are allotted from the father a reno- vated immortality. For every body is allotted a being and a life depen- dent on another cause; but is not itself naturally adapted to connects or adorn, or preserve itself. The immortality of partial souls is, I think, more manifest and more perfect than this; which Plato evinces by many demonstrations in the Phsedo, and in the 10th book of the Republic.
84 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I.
But I mean by the immortality of partial souls, that which has a more principal subsistence, as containing in itself the cause of eternal pefma- nency. We shall not, however, err if prior to both these we establish the immortality of daemons. For the genera of these through which they subsist are incorruptible, and they neither verge to mortality, nor are filled with the nature of things which are generated and corrupted. But I infer that the immortality of divine souls is still more venerable and es- sentially more transcendent than that of daemons; which divine souls wfe say are primarily self-motive, and are the fountains and principles of the life divided about bodies, and through which bodies obtain a renovated immortality. If, however, prior to these you conceive the Gods them* selves, and the immortality in them, and how in the Banquet Diotima does not attribute an immortality of this kind even to daemons, but defines it to subsist in the Gods alone, such an immortality as this will appear to you to be separate, and exempt from the whole of things. For there eter- nity subsists, which is the fountain of all immortality^, and through it all things live and possess life, some things indeed a perpetual life, but others a life dispersed into non*being. In short, therefore, that which is divine is immortal so far as it generates and comprehends in itself a perpetual life. For it is immortal, not as participating of life, but as the supplier of a divine life, and as deifying life itself, whether you are willing to call such a life intelligible, or by any other name.
In the next place let us direct our attention to the intelligible. It is denominated, therefore, in opposition to that which is sensible and which is apprehended by opinion in conjunction with sense. For the intelligible is first unfolded into light in the most principal causes. For soul is in- deed intelligible, is of this allotment, is exempt from sensibles, and obtains an essence separated from them. Prior to soul also intellect is intelli- gible; for we rather think jt fit to arrange soul in the middle, than to con- numerate it with the first essences. That likewise is denominated intelli- gible, which is more ancient than intellect, which replenishes intelligence, and is itself by itself perfective of it, and which Timaeus arranges prior to the demiurgic intellect and intellectual energy, in the order of a paradigm. But beyond these is the divine intelligible, which is defined according to CHAP. XXVII. OP PLATO. 85 union itself, and a divine hyparxis. For this is intelligible as the object of desire to intellect, as perfecting and comprehending intellect, and as the plenitude of being. In one way, therefore, we must denominate the intelKgible as the hyparxis of the Gods; in another way as true being and the first essence; in another way as intellect and all intellectual life; and in another way as soul and the psychical order. It is likewise neces- sary not to fashion the different natures of things conformably to names. Such, therefore, is the order of this triad; so that what is divine indeed is unmingled and ranks as the first; that which is immortal is the second; and that which is intelligible the third. For the first of these is deified being; the second is life subsisting according to the immortality of the Gods; and the third is intellect, which is denominated intelligible in con- sequence of being replete with union.
CHAPTER XXVIL CHAPTER XXVIL After this, it follows in the next place, that we should consider the uniform, the indissoluble, and that which has an invariable sameness of Subsistence, from the same causes, and these as the precursors of, and pervading through all the divine orders. For the uniform, indeed, has the highest subsistence, is present with the divine monad, and appears to be especially adapted to that which is primarily being,* and in which also every participate genus of unities ends. For the one is prior to these, as will be evident as we proceed. But the indissoluble is the second. For it comprehends and binds the extremes according to divine union; since the dissoluble is such as it is through the want of connexion and of a power which collects multitude into one. And that which has an invari- able sameness of subsistence is eternal, and is full of the perpetuity of the ' For TO ov it is necessary to read to* ovti.
85 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK 1.
Gods; from which also the participation of immortality and eternal samo- ness is derived to other things. The uniform, therefore, pertains to the same thing as the divine; but the indissoluble to the same thing as the immortal; and that which has an invariable sameness of subsistence we must refer to the intelligible.
And do you not see how these wre severally after a manner co-adapted to each other? For the first of tliese, through the first unity which is par* tidpated by being is, as it is fit it should be, uniform. For if a God sub- sists according to the <me^ that which is divine will doubtless be uniform. But that which through one cause of life is immortai, is also similarly in- dissoluble^ For life is the bond of dissoluble natures; which also Timseus indicating to us, opposes the dissoluble to the immortal: ^ for you are not inunortal, says the demiurgus, yet you shall never be dissolved, nor be subject ' to the fatality of death.^^ Every thing mortal, therefore, is dis- soluble; but the immortal is indissoluble. That, however, which has a renovated immortality is for tl^e same reason neither indissoluble, nor mortal. For being in the middle of both it is neither of the extremes, ac- cording to each opposition. But the third of these being established ac- <x)rding to the plenitude of whole intelligibles subsists at once and is in- variably th^ same. For the intelligible is the cause of sameness and of eternal permanency; and intellect through this is entirely eternal. These triads, therefore, proceed from the first and most principal causes, in the same manner as we demonstrated of the before-mentioned triads. But these things, indeed, we shall consider hereafter.
These things, therefore, being discussed, let us direct our attention to the unbegotten in divine natures, and unfold what we assert it to be. For we say that all [true] being is without generation, and Socrates demon- strates in the Phaedrus, that souls are unbegotten. Prior to diese, also, the Gods themselves are established above generations and a subsistence according to time. How, therefore, shall we define the unbegotten when applied to a divine nature, and according to what reason? Is it because divinity is exempt from all generation, not only from that which subsists ' For ynwrw^e read rtof fo-Jt.
CHAP. XXVII. OFP5LATO. ^ in the parts of time» mch as we assert the generatioQ of material DAtoics to be, iior from that oolj which is exteiided into the whole of tioG^ suidi as Timseus demonstrates the generation of the cekstktl bodies to be, but also from the psychical generation? Since Timaras denominates this to be unbegotten according to time, but to be the best of generated natures^ And in short, a divine nature is exempt from all division and essentia! separation. For the progression of the Gods is always according to a union of secondary natures, which are uniformly established in the natures prior to them, the things producing containing in themselves the things produced. The indivisible, therefore, the unseparated and the united are in reality unbegotten. So that if certain generations of the Gods are spoken of by Plato in fabulous figments, as in the fable of Diotima, the generation of Venus is celebrated, and of Love at the birth of Venus, it i^ Becessary not to be ignorant after what manner things of this kind are a:^ serted, and that they are composed for the sake of symbolical indication; and that (ables tor the sake of concealment call the ine£&d>le unfi^lding into light through causes, generatiau. For in the Orphic writings, indeed, the first cause is on this account denominated Time; since again, for anotbar reason, it is thus den^nninated, in order that a subsistence according Uy cause may be the same as a subsistence according to time. And the pro» gression of the Gods from the best of causes is properly denominated ge* neration according to time. To Plato, therefore, mytbolc^i^ng, it is adapted to devise things of this kind conformably to theologists; but when he is discoursing dialectically, and investigating and unfolding divine natures intellectually and not mystically, it is then adapted to him. to celebrate the unbegotten essence of the Gods- For the Gods primarily establish in themselves the paradigm of non^generation. But aiTintellec- tual nature is in a secondary degree unbegotten,^ and after this the psy- chical essence. And in bodies there is an ultimate resemblance of unbe-* gotten power; which some posterior to Plato perceiving, have indefinitdy shown that the whole heaven is unbegotten. The Gods, therefore,, are unbegotten. But there is an order in them of first, middle^ and last pro- gressions, and a transcendency and subjection of powers. There are also in them uniform comprehensions o^ causes; but multiform progenies of 88 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I.
tilings caused. And all things, indeed, are consubsistent in each other; but the mode of subsistence is various. For some things as replenishing subsist prior to secondary natures; but others, as being filled aspire after more perfect natures, and participating of their power become generative of things posterior to themselves, and perfective of their hyparxis.
CHAPTER XXVIIL LooKii^G to these things, therefore, we may unfold what is said of pa- ternal causes, and of the prolific powers of mothers in fables. For every where, we may suppose that the cause of a more excellent and more uni*- form nature is paternal;' but we may say that the cause of a more sub- ordinate and partial nature pre-exists in the order of a mother. For with the Gods a father is analogous to the monad, and the cause of bound; but a mother, to the duad, and to the infinite power which is generative of beings. The paternal cause, however, is with Plato uniform, and is es- tablished in a more elevated order than the natures which proceed from it, and subsists prior to its progeny in the allotment of the desirable. Again, the maternal cause has the form of the duad; and at one time presents itself to the view in fables as more excellent than its progeny, but at another time as essentially subordinate to it;. as in the Banquet, Plato calls Poverty the mother of L6ve. And this is not only the case in fabulous figments, but also in the philosophic theory of beings, as is evi- dent in the Timaeus. For there Plato calls being the father, but matter the mother and nurse of generation. The powers, therefore, which are prolific and perfective of secondary natures, and the suppliers of life and causes of separation are mothers, being established above the natures produced by them. But the powers which receive the natures that pro- ' irorpmoy is omitted in the original..
CHAP. XXIX, OF PLATO. 39 ceed into light, which multiply their energies, and extend even the subor- dinate allotment of the progeny, are also themselves called'mothersr Again, however, thdgprogeny of such like causes, at one time indeed, pro^ ceed according to union from their proper principles, and are filled from both the paternal and maternal cause; but at another time they contain the bond of them, being arranged in the middle, conveying the gifts of the fathers to the maternal bosoms, and converting the receptacles of them to the completions of primary causes. But of the natures which subsist from twofold preexisting principles, some are assimilated to the paternal cause; and such like genera of Gods are productive, defensive, and com- prehensive. For to produce, to contain, and to defend, pertain to the cause of bound. But others are assimilated to the maternal cause, and are prolific, and vivific, and the suppliers of motion, of the multiplication of powers, of variety and progressions^ For all these are thp progeny of ' infinity and the first i^ultitude.
CHAPTER XXIX: CHAPTER XXIX: Thus much therefore may suflice concerning the unbegotten hyparxis of the Gods. It now remains, I think, to speak of divine names. For Socrates in the Cratylus thinks fit to unfold in a remarkable degree the rectitude of names in divine natures. And Parmenides indeed, in the first hypothesis, as he denies of the one every thing else tiiat is known, and all knowledge, so likewise he denies of it name and language. But^ in the second hypothesis, besides all other things he shows that this one may be spoken of and ' that it has a name. In short therefore, it must be admitted that tlie first, most principal and truly divine names are es- tablished in the Gods themselves. But it must be said that the second names, which are the imitations of the first, and which subsist intellectu- ' M14 is omitted in tht originil.
Proc. Vol. I. M 90 ON THE THSOLOGY OF PLATO. BOOK I.
ally, are of a ddemoniacal allotment. And again, we may say that those names wmchare the third from the truth, which are logically devised, and which receive the ultimate resemblance of divine n*ures, are unfolded by scientific men, at one time energizing divinely, and at another intel- lectually, and generating moving images of their inward spectacles. For as the demiurgic intellect estabKshes resemblances about matter of the first forms contained in himself, and produces temporal images of things eternal, divisible images of things indivisible, and adumbrated images as it were of true beings, — after the same manner I think the science that is with us representing intellectual production, fabricates resemblances of other things, and also of the Gods themselves, representing that which is void of composition in them, through composition; that which is simple, through variety; and that Which is united, through multitude; and thus ihsbioqing n&mes, ultimately exhibits images of divine natures. For it generates every name as if it were a statue of the Gods. And as the theurgic art through certain symbols calls forth the exuberant and unenvy- ing goodness of the Gods into the illumination of artificial statues, thus also the intellectual science of divine concerns, by the compositions and divisions of sounds, unfolds the occult essence of the Gods. Very pro- perly therefore, does Socrates in the Philebus say, that on account of his reverence of the Gods, he is agitated with the greatest fear respecting their names. For it is necessary to venerate even the ultimate echos of the Gods, and venerating these to become established in the first para- digms of them. And thus much concerning divine names, which at pre- sent may be sufiScient for the purpose of understanding the theology of Plato. For we shall accurately discuss them when we speak of partial powers.
BOOK II- CHAPTER I.
. Thb most proper beginning however of the theory proposed by m is that from which we may be able to discover the first cause " of all beings. For being impelled from this in a becoming manner, and having our con- oeptions purified respecting it^ we shall with greater facility be able to dis- tinguish other things. About these things therefore we must speak from the beginning as follows: It is necessary that all beings, and all the natures of beings should either be many only, there being no one in them, neither in each, nor in all of them; or that they should be one only, there hemg no multitude, but all things being compelled into one and the same power of existence; or it is necessary that they should be both one and many, and that being should be one in order that neither multitude itself by itself may vanquish beings, nor that we may be forced to bring together into the same thing all things and their contraries at once. These things therefore being three, which of them shall we chuse? And to which of the above mentioned assertions shall we give our suffrage. It is necessary therefore severally to discuss the absurdities which attend these positions, and thus to survey after what manner the truth subsists.