' For ouo-Mv it u iiecesMry to read mrtciv.
92 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK II.
If then beings are many, and in such a manner many, as we have men- tioned from the beginning, so that the one is not any where to be found, many absurdities will happen to be the result, or rather all the nature of beings will at once from the firsts be destroyed, as there will immediately be nothing which is capable of participating the one. For it must be admitted that every being is either one certain thing,, or nothing. And that indeed which is a certain being, is also one; but that which is not even one being, has not any existence whatever. Hence, if many things have a subsistence, each of the many is. something or a certain one.. But if each of them is nothing, or not even one thing, neither is it possible for the many ta exist; for the many are many so far as each individual of the multitude exists. If, therefore, the many alone have a subsistence, and the one in no respect is, rieither will the many exist. For things which are in no respect one have not any existence whatever. But if the one is not, by a much greater priority neither have the many an existence. For it necessarily follows that none of the things from which the many consist will have a subsistence.
Farther still, if the many alone have a subsistence (as has been said) all things will be infinitely infinite; and if you receive any one of the in* finites whatever, this also will be immediately infinite. And with respect to the tilings from which this consists and which are infinite, each of these likewise will be infinite. For let something of the many be assumed, which we say is not one, this therefore will be multitude according to its own nature, since it belongs to beings, but is not nothing. If however it is multitude, this ako will consist of many things, and will be many. And if you assume something of these manys, this will immediately appear to you not to be one, but many. There will likewise be immediately the same reasoning in these, and in a similar manner each, (because we falsely speak of each) will be multitude in energy. And each, as I may say, will be infinite, or rather will be infinitely infinite. For there is nothing which will not be something of this kind; since a part is many, and in a similar manner the part of a part; and this to infinity. For multitude proceeding will never stop, nor infinity, in consequence of being deprived of the nature oUhe one. To make beings however, to be infinitely infinite, is impossible both with respect to truth, and to the thing proposed by us.
CHAP. L OF PLATO. 93 For if being is infinitely infinite, being can neither be known, nor disco- vered; since the infinite is entirely incomprehensible and unknown. If also- being is infinitely infinite^ there will be something more infinite than the infinite. But if that something is more infinite, this will be less infinite. That, however, which is less infinite, since it is not perfectly infinite, will evidently be finite, so far as it falls short of the nature of the infinite. Jf, therefore, there is something which is itself according to multitude more infinite than that which is infinite in multitude there will be something more than the infinite, and the infinite will be less, yet not according to multitude. This however is impossible. Hence there is not the infinitely infinite; Again therefore, according to this hypothesis, the same things will be acconling to the same, similar and disimilar. For if all the manys are notonci and each thing according to all things is not one, that which is not one will evidently suffer the same passion in consequence of the pri- Tation of the one. AH thrngs* therefore being deprived of the one^ after the same manner, they will on this account subsist similarly with respect to each other. But things which subsist similarly, so far as they thus sub- sist, are evidently similar to each other. Hence the many will be similar to each other, so far as they are deprived of the one. They will likewise acconling to this privation of the one be perfectly dissimilar. For it is necessary that things- which are similar should suffer the same passion; so that things which do not suffer any thing that is the same, will not be similar. But things which suffer any thing that is the same, suffer also one thing. Hence things which are deprived of every one, will not suffer an}" thing that is the same. The many therefore will be similar and dis- similar according to the same. But this is impossible; Hence it is im- possible for the many to exist which are in no respect one.
Moreover, the many will be the same with and different from each other according to the same. For if all things are similarly deprived of the one^ so far indeed as all of them are similarly deprived they will be the same according to this privation; since things which subsist after the same manner according to habit are the same, and also things which are after the same manner deprived according to privation. Bu t so fajr in 94 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK 11.
short, as each of them is deprived of every one, so far the many will be different from each other. For if the one in the many is the same, that which is in no respect one, will in no respect be the same. The many therefore will be the same and not the same with each other. But if they are the same and not the same it is evident that they are different from each other. For that which is the same and not the same, so far as it is not the same, is not the same, by nothing else than the different. Farther still therefore, these many will be moveable and immoveable, if the one is not. For if each of them is not one, they will be immoveable accord- ing to the privation of the one. For if that which is not one should be changed, each of them would have the one; since privations being changed, entirely lead into habits the things that are changed. It is necessary however that what is not one should remain immoveable according to the privation of the one, though this very thing is itself impossible, viz. that the many should stand stilL For every thing which stands still is in something which is the same, viz. it is either in the same form, or in the same place. But every thing virhich is in the same, is in one thing which is the same. For the same in which it is, is one thing. Every thing therefore which stands still is in one thing. The many, however, do not participate of the one. But it is perfectly impossible that things which do not participate of the one, should be in one certain thing. And things which are not in one thing cannot stand still, since things which stand still are entirely in one and the same thing. It is impossible there- fore, that the many should stand still, and remain immoveable. It has been demonstrated however, that the many must necessarily stand im- moveable. The same things therefore, and the same passion, (I mean the privation of the habit of the oni,) are moveable and immoveable. For things immoveable, and things which stand still, so far as they are unstable, so far they must necessarily appear to be moveable.
Moreover, there is no number of beings if the one in no respect is; but all things and each thing will be not one. i^or the particle of number, the monad, is one, and every number itself is one. For if there are five monads, there is also the pentad; and if three monads, the triad. But the triad itself is a certain unity, and so is the pentad. So that if there is no one, there will neither be any part, nor the whole of numbers. For CHAP. 1. OF PLATO. p5 how can there be any number the one not existing? "For the one is the principle of numbers. But the principle not existing, neither is it pos- sible that the things which proceed from this principle should exist. Hence the one not existing, neither will there be any number.
Again, therefore, neither will there be any knowledge of beings if the one is not. For it will not be possible either to speak or think of any being. For each thing itself, and every thing of which we can speak, and in which we impress the nature of the one^ will have no existence, because neither does the one exist. Hence neither will there be any discourse nor any knowledge. For discourse is one thing consisting of many things, if it is perfect. And knowledge then exists, when that which knows be- comes one with that which is known. But union not existing, there will at the same time be no knowledge of things, and it will be impossible to speak about things which we know. To which we may add, that the in- explicable in the several infinites, will necessarily always fly from the bound of knowledge. For immediately each apparent infinite which he who possesses knowledge desires to understand, will escape the gnostic power hastening to come into contact with, and adhere to it^ since it is incapable either of contact or adhesion. If, therefore, the many alone have an existence, the one having no subsistence whatever, so many ab- surdities, and a still greater number must necessarily happen to those who adopt such an hypothesis.
But if the one which is the one itself dlone has a subsistence, and there is nothing else (for if there were there would not only be one but many things; since one and another thing are more than one, and are not one thing only) if this be the case, there will neither be among all things either whole, or that which has parts. For every thing which has parts is many, and every whole has parts. But the one is in no respect many. Neither therefore will there be a whole, nor that which has parts. Farther still, neither is it possible that there should be a beginning,Lor end of any tiling. For that which has a beginning, a middle, and an end, is divisible. But the one is not divisible, because neither has it any parts. Hence, neither has it a beginning, nor a middle,nor an end. Again, if the one alone has a subsist- ence, no being will have figure. For every thing which has figure is either rectilinear or circular, or mixt from these. But if indeed it is rectilinear, g6 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK IL it will have for its parts, the middle, and the extremes^ If it is circular, there will be one thing m it as a middle, but other things as extremes, to which the middle extends. And if it is mixed from the right and circular line, it will consist of many things, and will not be one.
Moreover, neither will any being be in itself, nor in another thing. For that which is in another thing is different from that in which it is. But the one alone existing and nothing else (for it will by no means be in another thing) there will be no being which is in another thing. But that which is in itself will at the same time comprehend and be compre- hended; and in this^ to comprehend will not be the same thing as to be comprehended; nor will there be the same * definition of both. There will therefore be two thiijgs, and no longer the one alone. Again, neither will any being be moved. For being moved indeed, it must necessarily be changed. But being changed it must be in another thing. If the one however alone has an existence, it is not possible for any thing to appear to be in something else. Hence it is not possible for any^ being to be changed. But every thing which stands still is necessarily in the same thing. And that which is in the same is in a certain same thing. The one however is in no same thing. For that which is in a certain thing, is either in itself, or in something else. But it has been demonstrated, that It is neitlier in itself^ nor in another. Hence neither is it in a certain same thing. Neither therefore does any being stand stilL Moreover, it is impossible for any thing to be the same with, or different from any thing. For if there is nothing besides the one itself, there is not any thing which will be either the same with, or different from another thing. For there will not be any other being. And the one itself will not be different from itself; for it would be many and not one. Nor will it'be the same with itself. For this thing which is same is in another, and same is not the one itself. For the one is simply one, because it is not many. But that which is same is the san^e with another thing. Again, neither is it possible for any thirtg to be similar or dissimilar to any thing. For every thing similar suffers a certain same passion; but every ' For ovTo^ it is neceiiaiy to read at^ro^ CHAP. 1. OF PLATO.
97 thing dissimrlm* a certain different passion. The one^ howeverrcannot ^af« fer any thing, nor can this be the case with any thing else besi^Ies the one; «ince nothing eise^has any existence whatever, if the one alone has a sub- nstence.
FarthOT still, in addition to these things we say that neither is it possible for any thing to be touched, nor to be separate, if there is nothing else besides the one. For liow can things which have no existence be separate^ or come into contact with any thing? But neither can the one either be separate from itself or touch itself. For it would thus be passive to the being touched, and the being separate. But the one suffers no other thing besides itself. It is likewise requisite that no one thing should either be equal or unequal to any thing. For that which is equal to another thing, is said to be so with reference to another thing. And the like may be 6aid of that which is unequaL Another thing, however, has no existence, if the one alone has a subsistence. But neither can the one be equal or unequal tof itself. For if unequal, there will be one thing in it as greater, but another as less; so that it will be two things and not one« And if the one is equal to itself, the one will measure itself. This however is im* possible; for the one will measure and be measured by itself, so that it will not be the one itself. Neither therefore will there be any equality or inequality in beings. If however these things are impossible, neither can any being come into contact with another, and be separate, nor be similar or dissimilar, nor be same or different, nor again, stand still, or be moved, or in short be in any tl^^ng, or have figure, or be a whole, or have parts, if the one alone has a subsistence which is void of multitude, and is without all these things^ Neither however, is it possible for the many alone to have a subsistence, as was before demonstrated. And hence it is necessary that every being should be both many and one.
If this however is the case, either the many must participate of the one^ or the one of the many^ or both must participate of each other, or neither of each other; hut the man^ indeed must be separate, and the one must^ also be separate, in order that the many and the one may subsist, as reason evinces. If, therefore, neither the one participates of the many^ nor the many of theone^ the same absurdities will ensue as we brought together in Troc. Vol. I. N 98 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK H.
the hypoth^is of the many alone having a subsistence. For again there will be the many separate from the one. For if the one subsists by itself, and the many do not in any respect participate of the one^ the manyyiWX be infinitely infinite, they will be similar and dissimilar, same and different, moved and stable, and there will neither be any number nor any know- ledge of the many. For the absence of the one compels all these conse- quences to be apparent in the many. It is impossible therefore, that neither the many should participate of the one^ nor the one of the many.
If however, the one participates of the many^ and the many of the one^ and both these are in each other, it is necessary that there should be another nature besides these, which is neither one nor many. For both these being mingled in each other, it is necessary that there should be a cause of their mixture which conjoins multitude to the one^ and the one to multitude^ For it is necessary that every thing that is mingled, should have a cause of the mixture. For in short, if the one and multitude participate of each other, neither the one is the cause of essence to multitude^ nor multitude to the oney but a certain third thing is the cause of essence to both, and tvhich is prior to these. For what will that be which makes this to be multitude, and that to be one? And what is the cause of this communica- tion and association with each other, the one so far as it is one never having any communication with the many f For the many so far as many, and the one so far as one are different from each other. And so far as neither is from neither, they have no sympathy with each other. What therefore is it which collects these into one, since they fly from and are unmingled with each other? For being thus discordant with each other, they cannot desire each other, or if they did their congress must be fortuitous. For if this should happen to be the case, there was a time when these were separate from each other, since now also they subsist together casually. , It is however impossible for the many to subsist separate from the one. The mixture therefore is not casual. But neither is the mixture from the many^ if nether Mr one is the cause of the many^ nor the many of the one. What therefore is this more excellent thing [which is the cause of the mixture?] For it is either one, or not one. But if indeed, it is the one itself y we must again inquire coficerning this, whether it participates of CHAP. I. OF PLATO. gg multitude or of nothing. For if this participates^ it ia evident that some other thing prior to this, will for the same reason present itself to the view^ and this will be the case to infinity. But if a thing of this kind is entirely void of multitude, again that which was asserted at first will not be true^ viz. that the many do not participate of the oncy nor the one of the many. I mean however that which is the most principal and primarily one. But there is indeed a certain one in the many,' and there is also the imparticipa- ble one, and whfch is simply one, and nothing else. If however that which is prior to both, is not * owe, it is necessary that this not one should be more excellent than the one. All things however are, and are gene- rated what they are, through the one. And together with the one indeed every being is preserved; but separate from the one proceeds to the cor- ruption of itself. The mixture also of the one and multitude^ which the non^^one affords to beings, is communion and union. The one * therefore^ and that which is no^ one^ ' are the cause of nothing else to beings than of their being one. If however the one is the cause of a thing of this kind, that which is not one will not be the cause of that which is more excellent £than union.] But it is every where necessary that what is more excel- lent should be the cause to beings of another more excellent thing, accor* ding to its own power. For thus it will be more excellent as being more good, and as the cause from its own nature of a greater and more excel- lent good to those things to which a less good is the cause of less good- ness. From these things therefore it is necessary, that the many should participate of the one, that the one should be unmingled with multitude^ and that nothing should be better than thf one^ but that this should also be the cause of being to the many. For every thing wiiich is deprived of the one^ flies immediately into nothing, and to its own corruption. But that which is not many, is not at one and the same time not many and nothing. For to the one that which is nothing, or not one, is opposed, and lo the tfiany that which is not many is opposed. If, therefore, ^^ one and the ' Ovx V^ omitted in the original. * Instead of to ov it is necessary to read ro fv.
>' The fv in the original which immediately preaedes ou% cv seems 19 be superfluous, and }$ therefore omit(e4 in ibt traoslatbn.
100 ^N THE THEOLOGY BOOK U.
many are not the same^ the not being many wUl not be the same wkk Qotbing. From thus considering the affair therefore, it appears that the (mc is beyond mulutudei and i» the cause of being to the mofitf* CHAPTER 11.
It is necessary howerer^ that discussing the same subject after another manner, we should again see if we can m a certain respect follow what has been said, and refer it to the same end. It is necessary therefore, that there should either be one principle, or many principles; or rather^ we should begin from hence. ' And if there are many principles, they must either possess sympathy with each other, or they must be divulsed from each other, and they. must be either finite or infinite. But if there is one principle, this must dther be not essence,, or essence. And if it is essence, this must either be corporeal or incorporeal. And if ineorporeal, it musfr either be separate from, or inseparable from bodies. And if separate, it roust either be moveable or immoveable. But if it is not essence, it must either be inferior to all essence, or participated by essence, or impartiei pable. If therefore there are many principles, and which have no sympathy with each other, no being will originate from them [conjointly,] nor will they be common to all things, but each will produce by itself. For what commu- nication can there be between things which anj naturally foreign, or what co-operation betMreen things which are entirely of a different kind? In addition also to these things, there will be the many which do not partici- pate of the one. For if there is a certain one common in all of them, they will not be perfectly separated essentially from each other. If therefore they are different, and there is nothing which is the same about them, they are alone many and by no means one^ But if there are many principles^ and which possess^ sympathy with each other, they will have someUiing comiDODy which leads all oi them to sympathy^ and sibiilarly unfolds all of them to the view. For we call those things sympathetic, which happen to be passive to the same thing. But similars are entirely similar from participating one form and one nature. If however this be the case, it is necessary that that all [or universal] which is every where, and in all the principles, should be. of a more principal nature than the many. This therefore gives them the power to generate sympathy with each other, and affords tliem communion. according to nature.
Again, if there are indeed infinite principles^ either the things whicK proceed irom them are infinite,, and there will thus be the infini^te twice, or they are finite, and thus all the principles will not be principles. Foe things finite in number, will entirely proceed from finite principles* llie principles therefore are in vain infinite.. To which may be added, that in* finity makes both the principles to be unknown, and the things which proceed ftom them. For the principles* being unknown, it is necessary^ that the tilings which proceed from them* should be unknown; since we then think that we know any thing when we know the causes and the first principles of it. But if the principles are finite, it is evident that there will be a certaia number of them: for we say that number is a definite multitude. If however, there is a number of the principles,, it is necessary that there should be a cause of the whole number of themi For every number is from one; and this, viz^ the one is the principle of numbers^ This therefore will be the principle of principles, and the cause of finite multitude, since number itself is one, and the end in the many is one, and it hounds the many by that which is one. But the principle being one^ and this being essence, it is necessary if this is admitted to be either cor^- poreal or incorporeal, that it must be acknowledgs^d ta be the principle of other things.
If therefore, body is the cause of the generation of beings,, it is neces^ sary indeed^ that it should be divisible and have parts. For every body IS in its own nature divisible; since every magnitude is a certain whole and that which is a whole consists of parts. These parts therefore^ (but I mean each of them) must either severally participate a certain one, or not participate it. I£ therefore they do not: participate it, they will be: 402 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK 11,