maiiy adone, and by no means one. Hence, neither will that which con- sists from them be a whole. For there beifig no one, that which consists of all of them will not be one. But if each of the parts participates of something of this kind, and there is something which is the same in all of them, a thing of this kind must necessarily be incorporeal, and impar- tible according to its own nature. For if this also is itself corporeal^ it is either wholly in each of the parts, or not wholly. If therefore, it is in-^ deed wholly in each, it will itself be separated from itself. For the parts in which it is are separate from each other. But if it is not wholly in each of \he parts, this also will be divisible, and will have parts after the same manner as the^above mentioned parts; and there will again be the same inquiry concerning these, viz. whether in these also there is something common, or nothing; since if there is nothing common, we shall place the many separate from the one.
Let us however consider the whole; for every body is a whole, and has parts. What therefore will that be which is connective of the parts, since they are many? For it is necessary to say either that the whole is tmific of the parts, or the parts of the whole, or that some third thing prior to both, which is neither a whole, nor has any part, connects and unites the whole with its parts, and the parts with the whole. But if the whole indeed is connective of the parts, the whole will be incorporeal and impartible. For if it is a body, this also will be partible, and will b^ in- digent of a nature which is capable of connecting the parts; and this will be the case to infinity. But if the parts are c6nnective of the whole, how can the many be connective of the one; and things divided, of that which consists from them? For on the contrary, it is necessary tliat the one should have the power of uniting the many^ and not the many of uni-? ting the one. And if that which connects both, is neither a whole nor has parts, it will be perfectly impartible. But being impartible, itis also necessarily without interval. For every thing which has interval has parts, and is divisible. But being witibout interval it is incorporeal; for every body possesses interval..
Farther'still, it is necessary that the principle should be perpetual; for every being is perpetual or corruptible. Hence it must be admitted that th^ principlet:of Jbejipgs is perpetual or corruptible. But if we should grant; that CHAP. n. OF PLATO. 103 this may be corrupted, there will be no being/incorruptible. For the princi- ple being destroyed, it will neither be itself generated from any thing, not will another thing be generated from it. For it can neither be able to ge^ nerate itself (since it is not, if it is not perpetual) nor can another thing be able to generate it, if it is the principle of all things. But if it is incorruptible, it will have the power of not being corrupted, and this power will be infinite, in order that it may exist to infinity through the whole of time. For every finite power of existence pertains naturally to that which is Corruptible. But an infinite power pertains to perpetual natures, the existence of which continues to infinity. This infinite there- fore, I mean the infinite according to power, is either impartible or partible* But if it is partible indeed, there will be the infinite in a finite body. For the principle is finite; since if it t^ere infinite, there will be nothing else besides itself. But if it is impartible, the power of infinitely existing will be incorporeal. And the principle of beings is incorporeal,' so far as it is this power through which the subject of it always is. That it is impossible therefore^ the principle of beings can be corporeal is from these things evident.
If however it is incorporeal, it must either be separate, or inseparable from bodies. But if inseparable indeed, it will have all its energies in bodies, and subsisting about them. For that is inseparable from body which is not any where naturally adapted to energize except in and with bodies. But if the principle is a thing of this kind, it is evidently ne-^ cessary that none of the things which subsist according to it should be more powerful, or possess greater authority than the principle of all beings. If however, nothing is more excellent in bodies than the power which subsists in and energizes about bodies, and a corporeal essence, there will not any where be intellect and the power which energizes according to in^* tellect. For every such like motion [i* e. energy] proceeds from a power, which is entirely in its energies independent of body. But it neither was, nor is lawful for generated natures to surpass the power of their causes. For every thing which is in the things begotten is from primary natures^ * The wonU mow^iMros mti are omitted ia the original.
t04 ON THE THEOLOGY fiOOTt M.
and the latter are the lords of the essence of the former. If therefore, the principle of beings is able to generate intellect and wisdom, how is it possible it should not generate it, oii account of and in itself? For one of.two things is necessary, either that intellectual perception per- tains in no respect to beings, or that it is inferior to them; and that if it exists it acts in bodies only. These things however, it is impossible to assert. But if that which is the first of beings, and which is the pria* ciple of all things is separate from bodies, it is perfectly necessary to ad* mit that it is either immoveable or moved. And if indeed it is moved, there will be something dse prior to it, about which it is moved. For every thing which is moved, is naturally adapted to be moved about some- thing else which is permanent. And farther still, besides this, it is moved through desire of another thing. For it is necessary indeed that it should be moved in consequence of desiring a certain thing; because motion itself by itself b indefinite. But the end of it is that for the sake of which it subsists. It desires however, either something else, or itself. But every thing which desires itself is immoveable. For why should any thing that is present with itself want to be in another thing? For of things which are moved, the motion of that is less 4o which the good is nearer, but the motion is greater of that to which the good is more remote. But that which possesses good in itself and for the sake of which it subsists, will be immoveable and stable; since being always in itself, it is in good. That however which is in itself is in same; for each thing is the same with itself. But of that which is in itself we say indeed that it stands still and is immoveable; while that which is not immoveable, is not in itself but in another^ is moved towards another thing, and is perfectly in* digent of good.. LF therefore the principle of beings is moved, but every thing which is moved is moved through the want of good, and towards another thing which is the object of desire to it, there will be something else which is desirable to the principle of beings besides itself, and about which possessing a sameness of subsistence, we must say it is moved.
This however is ieipossible. For the principle is that for the sake of which ^1 things subsist, which all things desire, and which is indigent of nothing. For if it were in want of something, it would be entirely subordinate to CHAP. II. OF PLATO. jo5 that of which it is iq want, and to which its energy is directed as the ob- ject of desire. But if the principle is immoveable (for this is what re- mains,) it is necessary that it should be one incorporeal essence, possessing an eternal sameness of subsistence. After what manner, however, does it possess the one? And how is it one essence I For if essence and the one are the same, it must be admitted that the principle of beings is essence. But if essence is different from the one^ it must be granted that to be the one is not the same thing as to be essence. And if, indeed, essence is better than the one, according to this it must be said to be with the prin- ciple. But if the one is better than essence and beyond it, th^ one is also the principle of essence. And if they are co*ordinate to each other, the many will be prior to the one^ This, however, is impossible as we have before demonstrated. It is evident, indeed, that essence is not the same as the one. For it is not one and the same thing to say one, and that es- sence is one; but the former is not yet a sentence, and the latter is. To which may be added, that if essence and the one are the same, multitude will be the same as that which has no existence^ and which is not essence.
This, however, is impossible. For in essence the many are contained^ and in that which is not essence is the one. But if essence and the one are not the same, they will not be co-ordinate to each other; for if they were co-ordinate there will be some other thing prior to them, if it is ne^ cessary that all things should subsist from one principle. And if one' of these is better than the other, either the one is prior to essence, or essence is prior to the one. But if the one indeed is prior to essence, this and not essence is the principle of all things. For it is necessary that nothing should be better than the principle. And if essence is prior to the one^ the one will be passive to essence, and not essence to the one. But iSthe one is passive to essence, it is necessary that the one and essence should be every thing, and that all such things as are one should be essence, but not that all such things as are essence should be one. There will, therefore, be a certain essence deprived of the one. If, however, this be the case, it ' For essence and the one being two things will participate of the manjf, i. e. of the first manjr, ox two.
Froc. Vot. I. 0 IQQ ON THE THEOIjOGY BOOK II.
wffl be nothing. For that which^s deprived of the me is nothing. Hence the one is prior to essence.
But if that which is first is something which^ is not essence, it is absurd to assert that it is subordinate to essence. For the principle is that which has the greatest power and the most absolute authority, and is most suiSi* cient to itself^ and is not that which is most ignoble, and indigent of the many. And, in short, it is necessary that no secondary nature should be better than the principle; for it is requisite that beings should not be goremed badly. But if, indeed, the principle has an order subordinate to the things which proceed from it, and the things proceeding from it are better than it, all things will be badly confounded, nor will the principle according to nature be any thing else than something which is not the most excellent of things, nor will things which proceed from the principW K>ssess from it a power of ruling over their principle. The principle of beings, therefore, will indeed be fortuitous, and also the beings which arc its progeny. But this is impossible. For things which are fortuitous (if to have a fortuitous subsistence is this, not to exist according to intellect, nor with a view to a definite end) are disorderly, infinite, and indefinite, and are all of them things which have a less frequency of subsistence. But the principle is invariably principle, and other things proceed from it- If however, that which is not essence is better than all essence, it will either be participated by it, or it will be entirely iraparticipable. If, however, ^sence participates of the principle, of what will it be the principle? And how will it be the principle of all beings? For it is necessary that the principle of beings should be no one of beings; since if it were any one of them, it is necessarily not the principle of all beings. But every thing which is participated by another thing is said to be that by which it is participated, and in which it primarily is. The principle, however, is se- parate, and belongs in a greater degree to itself than to other things. Be- sides, every thing which is participated proceeds from another more ex- cellent cause; since that which is imparticipable is better than that which is participable. It is not, however, possible to conceive any thing better than that which is^ most excellent, and which we call the principle. For it is not lawful to asswRrt that things secondary to the principle, and which proceed from it, are in any respect better than their principle. The cause therefore of all beings is above all essence, is separate from every essence, and is neither essence, nor has essence as an addition to its nature. For such an addition as this is a diminution of simplicity, and of that which is one.
CHAPTER III.
See, therefore, the third argument after these, leading us to the same conclusion with the former arguments. For it is necessary that the cause of all beings should be that of which all beings participate, to which they refer the subsistence of themselves, and which separates itself from nothing that in any respect whatever is said to have an existence. For this alone is the object of desire to beings, which primarily, or in some other way, is itself the cause of their subsistence. And it is necessary that every thing which is produced with reference to, and on account of it, should have a certain habitude with relation to it, and through this also, a similitude to it. For every habitude of one thing towards another, is predicated in a two-fold respect, either from both participating of one thing, which affords to the participants a communion with each other; or from one of them participating of the other; of which, indeed, the one as being more excel* lent, imparts something to that which is subordinate to itself; but the other, as being inferior, is assimilated to the more excellent nature, so far as it participates of it. Hence it is necessary, if all sensible natures pos- sess a habitude to that which is first, aspire afler, and subsist about it, either that there should be a certain third thing the cause of the habitude, or that the principle should impart to the natures posterior to itself, a tendency to itself, and that desire, through which every thing is preserved, and exists. Nothing else, however, is more excellent than that which is first Hence, the habitude of beings, their existence, and their tendency JOS ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK H.
to the first, are derived from thence. And all things participate of tlie principle of themselves, if it is necessary that this which is participated, should from thence become apparent in all beings, since it is tlie principle of all things, and deserts no being whatever. What, therefore, will this nature be, which is every where, and in all beings? Is it life and motion? But there are indeed many things which are deprived of these. Is, there- fore, permanency every where, and in all things? But neither is this true* For motion, so far as it is motion, will not participate of permanency. Is much-honoured intellect, therefore, so far as it is intellect, participated by all beings."^ But this also is impossible. For all beings would have inteU lectual perception, and no being would be deprived of intellect.
Shall we say, therefore, that being itself and essence are participated by all things that in any respect whatever have a subsistence? But how is this possible? For that which is in generation, or passing into existence, is said to be, and is destitute of essence. Nor must we wonder, if it also^ since it ranks among beings, should now participate of essence. For so far as it is in generation, it is not; but it ends in existence and essence xthen it is now actually generated, and is no longer rising into existence. All things, therefore, that have in any respect whatever a subsistence, do not participate of essence. What then will that be which is every where and by all things participated? Let us consider every being, and see what that is to which all beings are passive, apd what it is which is common in all of them, as in essence, sameness, difference, permanency, and motion. Can we say, therefore, that each of these is any thing else than one thing, and not only separately, but this is also the case with the things which subsist from them; and in short, it is not possible in a certain respect to speak otherwise of all things, than this, that all things, and each thing is one. For if any thing should be deprived of the one, though you should speak of parts, or of beings, immediately, that which becomes destitute of the one, will be altogether nothing. Or with what intention do we say that a thing which is not is perfectly nothing, [or not even one thing] un- less the one is the last thing which deserts beings? This it is, therefore, to become that which in no respect is, and to be perfectly deprived of the one. For it is possible for that which is not moved to be, and for that CHAP. III. OF PLATO. 109 ifhich has no being to have an hyparxis; but that which is not even one thing, and which is destitute of the one itself^ will be entirely nothing. Hence the one is* present with all beings; and though you should speak of multitude itself, it is necessary that tliis also should participate of the one; for if it does not become one thing, it is not possible for it to subsist. And if even you divide the whole to infinity, immediately nothing else than one occurs. For either that which is divided does not subsist, or be- coming to be, or subsisting something else, it will be immediately one/ The one^ therefore, which is every' where apparent, and is in all beings, and which deserts no being whatever, is either derived from the one which is simply one, or from that which is more excellent than the one. For it is not possible for the one to be otherwise passive, [i. e. to be consubsistent with something else] than from the first one, to which the one is no longer present, but which is the one itself^ or nothing else thati one.
Again, therefore, from another principle we may arrive at the same con- clusion, by speaking as follows: It is necessary either that the causes of beings and things caused should proceed to infinity, and that there should be nothing fii^st or last in beings; or that there should be n/o first, but that there should be the last of things, infinity existing in one part only. Or on the contrary, it is necessary that beings should proceed to infinity from a definite principle, or that there should be a certain first and last, and a boundary of beings each way. And if there are boundaries of beings, things either proceed from each other, and the generation of beings is in a circle; or if they are not from each other, either one of them is from an- other, or the first indeed is one, but the last not one, or the contrary, or both are one, or each is not one. If, therefore, first things, and the causes of beings are infinite, each thing will consist of infinites. For that which proceeds from a certain principle, must necessarily participate of that principle from which it proceeds. But that which derives its subsistence from many causes, will be in its own nature multiform, as participating of many powers. And that which is produced from infinites prior to itself, will have infinite peculiarities derived from the principles, and adapted to ' FcMT oy it is necessary to read ev.
110 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK H.
itself. Every being, therefore, being infinite, and consisting of infinites, will render all things infinitely infinite, and there will neither be a know- ledge of any being, nor any evolution of powers. For the power of the infinite is perfectly unknown, and incomprehensible, by those natures to whom it is infinite.
But if things are infinite in a descending progression, whether is each of them infinite always proceeding most downward, in the same manner as we say all things do, or is each whole indeed finite, but the beings which are produced from these are infinite.^ For if every being according to the beginning of itself is definite, but according to its end is infinite, there will neither be in parts nor in wholes, a conversion of beings to their proper principle, nor will that which is second in order ever have a sub- sistence so as to be assimilated to the extremity of a pre-existent order; though as we frequently say, the sunoimits of inferiors are conjoined with the boundaries of superiors. For where there is no last, by what contriv- ance can such a similitude of progression as this, and such a mutual cohe- rence of beings be left, according to which secondary things are always conjoined to the natures prior to them? But if all things alone ha^'e an infinity of this kind, each being bounded by that which is posterior to it- self, wholes will be subordinate to parts, and the parts of beings will Be naturally more perfect [than wholes.] For wholes, indeed, will be without conversion to the principle prior to themselves; but parts will be converted to it after their progression. By how much the more, however, every being hastens to conjunction with that which is more perfect than itself, by so much the more must it necessarily excel, as it appears to me. And if this whole proceeding to infinity is not convolved to the summit of itself, and circularly converted and perfected according to such a conver- sion [it will not desire its proper good.] If, however, we admit that there is an infinity both ways these things must necessarily happen.
In addition to these- things, also, there will be no common object of desire to all beings,. nor any union nor sympathy of them. For things which are perfectly infinite have not that which is first in them; but not having a first, we shall not be able to say what is the common end of beings, and why some things are more excellent, but others are allotted a CHAP. m. OFPLATa m subordinate nature. For we call one thing better and another less excel* lent, from proximity to that which is best, just as we define the more and the less hot from communion with that which is hot in the first degree. And in short, we form a judgment of the more and the less from a refer* ence to that which is a maximum. It is necessary, therefore, that the boundary in beings should be that which is first and that which is last.
But if, indeed, these are from each other, the same thing will be oIde!r and younger, cause and at the same time the thing caused, and each thing will be first and last. For it makes no difference, whether these are from each other, or the things which subsist between these. For the extremes being indifferent, how is it possible that a mutation according to essence should intervene? But if the one is from the other, whether is the first derived from the last, as some say, who generate things more excellent from things subordinate, and things more perfect from such as are more imperfect.^ In this case, however, must not that which is allotted the power of generating and producing the perfect, by a much greater priority perfect and adorn itself by its present power? And how is it possibk^ that leaving itself to be of an inferior allotment it should definitely assign a more excellent order to another thing? For eyery thing aspires after its proper perfection, and simply desires good; though not every thing is able to participate of a thing of this kind. If, tlierefore, it has the power of producing this most perfect thing, that which is last will energize on account of itself prior to other things, and the whole of good, and all per-