inefiable. First natures therefore, being always entirely united, [to the ineffable] some more remotely, but others more proximately, and receiv- ing through this union their hyparxis, and their portion of good, we en* deavour to manifest through names the progression and conversion of the whole of things. But with respect to their stable comprehension, if it be lawful so to speak, in the first, and their union with the it^effable, this as being incomprehensible, and not to be apprehended by knowledge, those who were wise in divine concerns were unable to indicate it by words. But as the ineffable is primarily concealed in inaccessible places, and is exempt from all beings, thus also the union of all things with it is oc- Troc. Vol. I. Q 132 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK H.
cult) ineffable, and unknown to all beings. For erery being is united to it, neither by intellectual injection, [or projection] nor the energy of essence; since things whidi are destitute of knowledge are united to the first, and things deprived of all energy, participate according to their order of a conjunction with it. That which is unknown therefore in beings according to their union with the first, we neither endeavour to know, nor to bmt nifest by names, but being more able to look to their progression and conversion, we ascribe indeed to the first two names, which we derive as resemblances from secondary natures. We also define two modes of ascent to the first, conjoining that mode which is through analogy with the appellation of the goodj but that which is through n^ations with the appellation of the one; which Plato also indicating, in the Republic in- deed calls the first the goadj and at the same time makes a regression to it through analogy; but in the Parmenides establishing it as the one it$elf^ he unfolds the transcendency of it which is exempt from beings, through negative conclusions. According to both these modes therefi>re, the first principle transcends both gnostic powers, and the parts of speech; but all other things afford us the cause of knowledge and of appellatioti. And the first principle indeed unically gives subsistence to all the unions and liyparxes of secondary natures; but the things posterior to this cause participate of it in a divided manner* These also, as we have before observed, become multiplied by abiding, proceeding and returning; but the one is at once perfiectly exempt from all the prolific progressions, conver- tive powers, and uniform hypostases in beings. What the modes there- fore are of the doctrine about the first, and through what names Plato en- deavours to indicate it, and whence the naifies and the modes of this indica- tion which is unknown to all things are derived, is, I think, through what has been said sufficiently manifest.
CRAP. Vn. OrTLAT0> 123 CHAPTER VII.
It, however, it be tequisite to survey each of the dogmas about it which are scattered in the writings of Plato, and to reduce them to one science of theology, let us consider, if you are willing, prior to other things, what Socrates demonstrates in the 6th book of the Republic, conformably to the before mentioned mode, and how through analogy he teaches us the wonderful transcendency of the good with respect to all beings, and the summits of the whole of things. In the first place therefore, he distinguishes beings from each other, and estabhshing some of them to be intelligibles, but others sensibles, he defines science by the knowledge of beings. But he conjoins sense with sensibles, and giving a twofold division to all things, he places one exempt monad over intelli- ^ble multitude, and a second monad over sensible multitude, according to a similitude to the former monad. Of these monads also, he shows^ that the one is generative of intelligible light, but the other of sensible light. And he evinces that by the intelligible light indeed, all intelligibles are deiform, and boniform, according to participation from the first God; but that by the sensible light, according to the perfection derived from the sun, all sensible natures are solarform, and similar to their one monad. In addition also to what has been said, he suspends the second monad from that which reigns in the intelligible. And thus he extends all things, both the first and the last of beings^ I mean intelligibles and sensibles, to the good. Such a mode of reduction to the first as this, appears to me to be most excellent, and especially adapted to theology; viz. to congregate all the Gods in the world into one union » and suspend them from their proximate monad; but to refer the supermundane Gods to the intelleo* tual kingdom; to suspend the intellectual Gods from intelligible union; and to refer the intelligible Gods themselves, and all beings through these, to that which is first. For as the monad of mundane natures is super- mundane, as the monad of supermundane ftatures is intellectual, and of intellectual natures intelligible, thus also it is necessary that first intelli* 124 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK^IL gibles should be suspended from the monad which is above intelligibles and perfected by it, and being filled with deity, should illuminate secon- dary natures with intelligible light. But it is necessary that intellectual natures which derive the enjoyment of their being from intelligibles, but of good and a unifonn hyparxis from the first cause, should connect su- permundane natures by intellectual light. And that the genera of the Gods prior to the world, through receiving a pure intellect from the in- tellectual Gods, but intelligible light from the intelligible Gods, and a unical light from the father of the whole of things, should send into this apparent world the illumination of the light which they possess. On this account, the sun being the summit of mundane natures, and proceeding from the etherial profundities, imparts to visible natures supernatural perfection, and causes these as much as possible to be similar to the su*^ percelestial worlds. These things therefore we shall afterwards more abundantly discuss.
Tlie present discourse, however, suspends all things after the above mentioned manner from the goody and the first unity.- For if indeed the sun connects every thing sensible, but the good produces and perfects every thing intelligible, and of these, the second monad [i. e. the -sun] is denominated the offspring of the good^ and on this account causes ihat which is sensible to be splendid, and adorns and fills it with good, because it imitates the primogeuial cause of itself, — if this be the cf^se, all things will thus participate of the good^ and will be extended to this one principle, intelligibles indeed, and the most divine of beings without a medium, but sensibles through their monad [the sun.]
Again therefore, and after another manner, Plato narrates to us in this extract from the Republic the analysis to the first principle. For he sus- pends all the multitudes in the world from the intelligible monads, as for instance, all beautiful things from the beautiful itself, all good things from the goody and all equal things from the equal itself. And again, he con- siders some things as intelligibles, but others as sensibles; but the sum-. mits of them are uniformly established in intelligibles. Again, from these intelligible forms he trunks fit to ascend still higher, and venerating in a greater <legree the goodness which is beyond intelligibles, he apprehends CHAP.Vn. OF PLATO. 125 that all intelligibles, and the monads which they contain, subsist and are perfected through it. For as we refer the sensible multitude to a monad uncoordinated with sensibles, and we think that through this monad the multitude of sensibles derives its subsistence, so it is necessary to refer the intelligible multitude to another cause which is not connumerated with in^ telligibles, and from which they are allotted their essence and their divine hyparxis* Let not, however, any one fancy that Plato admits there is the same order of the good in intelligible forms, as there is prior to intelligibles* But the good indeed, which is coordinated with the beautiful, must be considered as essential, and as one of the forms which are in intelUgibles. Fof the first good, which by conjoining the article with the noun we are accustomed to call rayeAop or the good^ is admitted to be something Btiperessential, and more excellent than all beings both in dignity and power; since Socrates also, when discussing the beautiful and the good, calls the one the beautiful itself and the other the good itself, and thus says he we must denominate all the things which we then very properly considered as many. Again, particularly considering each thing as being one, we denominate each thing that which it is, and thus Socrates leading us from sensible things that are beautiful and good, and in short from things that are participated, subsist in other things, and are multiplied, to the superessential unities of intelligibles and the first essences, from these again, he transfers us to the exempt cause of every thing beautiful and good. For in forms, the beautiful itself is the leader of many beautiful things, and the good itself of many goods, and each form alone gives subsistence to things similar to itself. But the first good is not only the cause of what is good, but similarly of things beautiful, as Plato else- where says; and " all things are for its sake, and it is the cause of every thing beautiful.''
For again, in addition to what has been said, the good which is in forms is intelligible and known, as Socrates himself teaches; but the good prior to forms is beyond beings, and is established above all know- ledge. And the former is the source of essential perfection; but the latter is the supplier of good to the Gods sq far as they are God§, and is Digitize^d by Google jgg ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK II.
g^emlive of goods which are prior to essences. We must not therefore apprehend that when Soorates cails the first principle tke goody from the name of idea, that he directlj calb it the intelligible goodness; but though the first principle is superior to all huiguageand appellation, we permit Socrates to call it the cause of every thing beautifiil and good, transfer* ring through the things which are proximately filled by it, appellations to it. For this I think Socrates indicating asserts in all that he says about the goody that it is beyond knowledge and things that are known, and likewise beyond essence and being, according to its analogy to the sun. And after a certain admirable manner he presents us with an epi- tome of the negations of the one in the Parmenides. For the assertion tiiat ihe good is neither truth, nor essence, nor intellect, nor science, at one and the same time separates it from the superessential unities, and every genus of the Gods, and from the intellectual and intelligible orders, and from every psychical subsistence. But these are the first things, and through the first hypothesis of the Parmenides, these are taken away from the principle of the whole of things.
Moreover, neither when he celebrates ihe good the leader of the divine orders, as the most splendid of being, does he denominate it mo»t splendid as participating of light. For the first light proceeds from it to intellig^- bles and intellect, but he ^ves it this appdlation as the cause of the li^t which is every where diffhsed, and as the fountain of every intelligible, o^ intellectual, or mundane deity. For this light is nothing else than the participation of a divine hyparxis. For as all things become bonifonn through participating of th^ goody and are filled with the illumination pro- ceeding from thence, thus also the natures which are primarily beings are deiform; and as it is said, intelligible and intellectual essences become divine through the participation of deity. Looking therefore to all that has been said, we shall preserve the exempt transcendency of the good with reference to all beings and the divine orders. But again, in each order of beings, we must grant that there is a monad analogous to it, not only in sensibles, as Plato says the sun is, but likewise in supermundane natures, and in the genera of Gods arranged from the good prior to these. For it is evident that the natures which are nearer to the first cause and CHAR VU. OF PLATO. 1^7 whiek participate of it in a greater degmtr possess a graater aitxubla^ to it^ Aiid as tiKtt is tke cause of all beings, so these establiah monads wbkkare the teaders of more partial orders. And Pkto indeed arrangjes the muiiti* tudes under the mooadfi; but extends all tiie monads to the exempt prin- ciple of the wliK^ of things^ and establishes them uniformlj about it. It is necessary therefore that the theological science should be unfiled cen- formably to the divine orders, aod that our conceptions about it should be transcendent, and unmin^ed and unconneeted ^th other things. And we should survey indeed all secondary natures, subsisting according to and perfected about it; but we should establish it as transcending all the monads in beings, according to one excess of sinij^ieitjr, and as unically arranged prior to the whole orders \pf Gods.] For as the Grods themsdves enact the order which is in tbem, thus also it is necessary that the truth coneernsng them, the precedaneous causes of beings, and the second and third progeny of these should be definitely distingui^ied.
This, therefore, is^ the one truth concerning the first principle, and which possesses one reason reniarkably conformable to the Ptatonic hypothesis, via. diat this principle subsists prior to the whole orders in the Gods, that it gives subsistence to the boniform essence of the Gods, that it is the fountain of superessential goodness, and that all things posterior to it being es^nded towards it, are filled with good, after an ineffable manner are united to it, and subsist uniformly about it« For its unical nature is not unprolific, but it is by so much the more generative of other things, as it pre-establishes a union exempt from the things which have a subsistence* Nor does its fecundity tend to multitude and division; but it abides with undefiled purity concealed in inaccessible places. For in the natures also which are posterior to it, we every where see tiiat what is perfect desires to generate, and that what is full hastens to impart to other things its plenitude. In a much greater degree therefore it is necessary that the nature which contains in one all perfections, and which is not a certain good, but good itself, and super-full, (if it be lawful so to speak) should be generative of the whole of things, and give subsistence to them; producing all things by being exempt from all things, and by being imparti- cipable, similarly generating the first and the last of beings.
J2j5 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK II.
You must not, however, suppose that this generation and progression is epiitted in consequence of the good either being moved, or multiplied, or possessing a generative power, or energizing; since all these are secon- dary to the singleness of the first. For whether the good is moved, it will not be the good; since the good itself ^ and which is nothing else, if it were moved would depart from goodness. How, therefore, can that which is the source of goodness to beings, produce other things when deprived of good? Or whether the good is multiplied through imbecility, there will be a progression of the whole of things through a diminution, but not through an abundance of goodness. For that which in generating departs from its proper transcendency, hastens to adorn inferior natures, not through prolific perfection, but through a diminution and want of its owp power. But if the good produces all things by employing power, there will be a diminution of goodness about it. For it will be two things and not one, viz. it will be good and power. And if indeed it is in want of power, that which is primarily good will be indigent. But if to be the good itself is sufficient to the perfection of the things produced, and to the plenitude of all things, why do we assume power as an addition.^ For additions in the Gods are ablations of transcendent unions. Let the good therefore alone be prior to power, and prior to energy. For all eneVgy is the progeny of power. Neither, therefore, does the good energizing give subsistence to all things through energy, nor being in want of power does it fill all things with powers, nor being multiplied do all things participate of good, nor being moved do all beings' enjoy the first principle. For the good precedes all powers, and all energies, and every multitude and motion; since each of these is referred to the good as to its end. The good therefore is the most final of all ends, and the centre of all diesirable na^ tures. All desirable natures, indeed, impart an end to secondary beings^ but that which pre-subsists uncircumscribed by all things is the first gpod, * For ifoatru xoforra, I read irana xol err^ CHAP. VIH. OF PLATO. 129 CHAPTER VIII.
After these things, however, let us direct our attention to the concep- tions about the firsf principle in the epistle [of Plato] to Dionysius, and survey the manner in which he considers its ineffable and immense tran- scendency. But perhaps some one may be indignant with us for rashly drawing to our own hypotheses the assertions of Plato, and may say that the three kings of which he speaks are all of them intellectual Gods; but that Plato does not think fit to co-arrange or connumerate the good with secondary natures. For such a connumeration ought not to be considered as adapted to the exempt transcendency oi the good with respect toother things, nor in short, must it be said that the good contributes as the first with reference to another second or third cause to the completion of a triad in conjunction with other natures; but that it in a greater degree precedes every triad and every number, than the intelligible precede the intellectual Gods. How, therefore, can we connumerate with other kin^ the good which is at once exempt from all the divine numbers, and co- arrange one as the first [king,] another as the second, and another as the third? Some one may also adduce many other things, indicating the transcendency of the first principle with respect to every thing divine. Such a one, however, in thus interpreting the words of Plato will remark- ably accord with us who assert the good to be imparticipable, to transcend all the intelligible and intellectual genera, and to be established above all the divine tnonads.. - ^ That Plato, indeed, admits the first God to be the king of all things,* and says that all things are for his sake, and that he is the cause of all beautiful things, does not I think require much proof to those who consi- der his words by themselves apart from their own conjectures, by intro- ducing which they violently endeavour to accord with Plato. But that we do not assert these things connumerating [the first GoH with secondary Froc. Vol. I. R ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK IK natures,] Plato bimself manifests, neither calling the first king the first,, bat alone the king of all things, nor asserting that sortie things are about liim, as he says that second things are about that which is second, and third things about that which is third, but' he say5, in short, that all things are about him. And to the other kings, indeed, he introduces, number and a divided kingdom; but to the king of all things he neither attributes a part of number, nor a distribution of dominion opposite ta^ that of the others- Such a mode of words, therefore, neither connumerates the king of all things with the other kings, nor co-arranges him as the- leader of a triad with the second ^nd third power. For of a triadic divi- sion the first monad, indeed, is the leader of first orders, and which are co-ordinate with itself; but the second of second; and the third of third' orders. If, however, some one should apprehend that the first monad ia the leader of all things^ so as to comprehend at once both second and third allotments; yet the cause which subsists according to compreheai- siou is different from that which similarly per\'ades to all things. And to the king of all things, indeed, all things are subject according to one reason and one order; but to the first of the triad, things first are subjected according to the same order; and it is necessary that things second and third should be subservient according to their communion with the remain- ing kings. Does not, therefore, what is here said by Plato remarkably celebrate the exempt nature of the first cause, and his un-coordinatioa with the other kingdoms of the Gods? Since he says that this cause si-^ milady reigns over all things^ that all things subsist about him, and that for bis sake essence and energy are inherent in all things.
If also Socrates in the Republic clearly * teaches that the sun reigns over the world analogous to the goody let no one dare to accuse this ana- logy as connumerating the good with the king of mundane natures. Fof tinleas^ together with the simiUtude of secondary causes to the first principles, we think fit to preserve that exempt dominion [of the first . ' For KM here, it U necessary to read aXXai * For tro^w^, it is necessavy to read <ra^»^. ' In the original ft^n is wanting after lu XmAV. VIII. 6V PLATO. 131 c^use] it will be impossible for us to evince that the super-roundane kings have their allotment analogous to the first cause, who subsists prior to the whole of things according to one transcendency. But what occasion is there to be prolix? For Plato indeed calls the first God king; but he does not think fit to give the others the same appellation, not only in the beginning of wliat he says about the first, but shortly after, he adds: " About the king himself and the natures of which I have spoken there is nothing of this kind/' The first God, therefore, alone is called king. But he is called not only the king of things first, in the same manner as the second of things second, and the third of things third, but as the cause at once of all being and all beauty. Hence the first God precedes the other causes in an exempt and uniform manner, and according to a transcendency of the whole of things, and is neither celebrated by Plato as co-ordinated with them, nor as the leader of a triad.
l^hat these things, however, are asserted by Plato about the first God we shall learn by recurring a little to the preceding words, which are a5 follow: " You say, that I have not sufficiently demonstrated to you the particulars respecting the first nature. I must speak to you, therefore, in enigmas, that in case the letter should be intercepted, either by land or sea, he who reads it may not understand this part of its contents. AH things are situated about the king of all; and all things are for his sake; and he is the cause of every thing beautiful.'' In these words, therefore, Plato proposing to purify our conceptions about the first principle through enigmas, celebrates the king of all things, and refers to^him the cause of the whole of things beautiful and good. Who, therefore, is the king of all things, except the unical God who is exempt from all things, who pro- duces all things from himself, and is the leader of all orders according to pne cause? Who is he that converts all ends to himself, and estabhshes them about himself? For if you call him, for whose sake all things sub- sist, the end of all ends, and the primogenial cause, you will not deviate from the truth concerning him. Who is he that is the cause of all beauti-