ful Jhinga, shining upon them with divine light, and who encloses that which is deformed and without measure, and the most obscure of all things in the extremity of the universe?
132 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK il.
If you are willing also from the words of Plato that follow the prece- ding, we will show that to be the recipient neither of language nor of knowledge is adapted to the first principle. For the words: " This your inquiry concerning the cause of all beautiftil things is as of a nature en- dued with a certain quality/' are to be referred to this principle. For it is not possible to apprehend it intellectually, because it is unknown, nor to unfold it, because it is uncircumscribed; but whatever you may say of it, you will speak as of a certain thing; and you will speak indeed about it, but you will not speak it. For speaking of the things of which it is the cause, we are unable to say, or to apprehend through intelligence what it is. Here therefore, the addition of quality, and the busy energy of the soul, remove it from the goodness which is exempt from all things, by the redundancy of its conceptions about it. This likewise draws the soul down to kindred, connate, and multiform intelligibles, and prevents her from receiving that which is characterized by unity, and is occult in the participation oi the good. And it is not only proper that the human soul should be purified from things co-ordinate with itself in the union and communion with that which is first, and that for this purpose it should leave all the multitude of itself behind, and exciting its own hyparxis, approach with closed eyes, as it is said, to the king of all things, and par- ticipate of his light, as much as this is lawAil for it to accomplish; but intellect also, which is prior to us, and all divine natures, by their highest unions, superessential torches, and first hyparxes are united to that which is first, and always participate of its exuberant fulness; and this not so far as they are that which they are, but so far as they are exempt from things allied to themselves, and converge to the one principle of all. For the cause of all disseminated in all things impressions of his own all-per- fect transcendency, and through these establishes all things about himself, and being exempt from the whole of things, is ineffably present to all things. Every thing therefore, entering into the ineffable of its own nature, . finds there the symbol of the fdther of all. All things too naturally venerate him, and are united to him, through an appropriate mystic impres- sion, divesting themselves of their own nature, and hastening to become his impression alone, and to participate him alone, through the desire of CHAP. IX. QF PLATO. 133 his unknown nature, and of the fountain of good. Hence, when they have run upwards as far as to this cause, they become tranquil, and are liberated from the parturitions and the desire which all things naturally possess of goodness unknown, ineffable, imparticipable, and transcen- dently full. But that what is here said is concerning the first God, and that Plato in these conceptions leaves him uncoordinated with and exempt from the other causes, has been, I think, sufficiently evinced.
CHAPTER IX.
CHAPTER IX.
Let us in the next place consider each of the dogmas, and adapt them to our conceptions concerning cause, that from these we may comprehend by a reasoning process, the scope of the whole of Plato's theology. Let then one truth concerning the first principle be especially that which celebrates his ineffable, simple, and all-transcending nature; which esta- blishes all things about him, but does not assert that he generates or pro- duces any thing, or that he presubsists as the end of things posterior ta himself/ For such a form of words neither adds any thing to the unknown, who is exempt from all things, nor multiplies him who is established above all union, nor refers the habitude and communion of things secondary to him who is perfectly imparticipable. Nor in short, does it annoimce that it teaches any thing about him, or concerning his nature, but about the second and third natures which subsist after him.
Such then being this indication of the first God, and such the manner in which it venerates the ineffable, the second to this is that which con- verts all the desires of things to him, and celebrates him as the object of desire to and common end of all things, according to one cause which precedes all other causes. For the last of things subsists oqly for the sake of something else, but the first is that only for the sake of which all other things subsist: and all the intermediate natures participate of these two peculiarities. Hence fhey genuinely adhere to the natures which surpass them, as objects of desire, but impart the perfection of desires to subordinate beings.
The third speculation of the principle of things is far inferior to the preceding, considering him as giving isubsistence to all beautiful things* Tor to celebrate him as Ihe supplier of good, and as end preceding the two orders of things, is not very remote from the narration which ^ays^ that all causes are posterior to him, and derive their subsistence from hira, as well those which are paternal, and the sources of good, as those that are the suppliers of prolific powers. But to ascribe to him a producing and generative cause, is still more remote from the all-perfect union of the first. For as it cannot be known or discussed by language, by secondary natures, it must not be said that it is the cause, or that it is generative of beings, but we should celebrate in silence this ineffable nature, and this perfectly causeless cause which is prior to all causes. If, however, as we 'endeavour to ascribe to him the good and the one^ we in like manner at- tribute to him catLse^ and that which is Jinal or patemaly we must pardon tlie parturition of the soul about this ineffable principle, aspirin;? to per- ceive him with the eye of intellect^ and to speak about him; but, at the same time, the exempt transcendency of the one which is immense, must be considered as surpassing an indication of this kind. From these things therefore, we may receive the sacred conceptions of Plato, and an order ' adapted to things themselves. And we may say that the fiirst part of this sentence sufficiently indicates the simplicity,* transcendency, and in short the uncoordination with all things of the king of all. For the assertion that all things subsist about him, unfolds the hyparxis of things second, but leaves that which is beyond all things without any connexion with things posterior to it. But the second part celebrates the cause of all the Gods^ as prearranged in the order of end. For that which is the highest of all causes, is immediately conjoined with that which is prior to cause; but of this kind is the final cause, and that for the sake of which » For irpc^tVf it is necessaty to read raf iv. * For Tij^ a^AoT>jT»j I read njv awAMTjra. ^ For Tov 6eov, it is necessary to read tcov imv.
CHAP. rx. OF PLATO. i^S all things subsist.^ This part therefore is posterior to the other, and is woven together with the order of things, and the progression of the Pla- tonic doctrine.
Again, the third part asserts him to be productive of all beautiful things, and thus adds to him a spedes of cause " inferior ta the final. Whence also Plotinus, t thin^, does not hesitate toeall the first God the fountain of the beautiful. It is necessary therefore to attribute that which is best to the best of all things, that he may be the cause of all, and in reality prior to cause. But this is the good. This too, which is an admirable circumstance, may be Been in the words of Plato, that the first of these three divine dogmas, neither presumes to say any thing about the goody and this ineffable nature, nor does it permit us to refer any species of cause to it. But the second dogma leaves indeed the good ineffable, as it is fit it should, but from the habitude of things^ posterior to it, enables us to collect the final cause: for it does not refuse to call it that for the sake of which all things subsist. But when it asserts that all things are for the sake of the goody it excites in us the conception of the communion and co-ordination oft that which is the object of desire with the desiring na- tures. And the third dogma evinces that the good is the cause of all beautiful things. But this is to say something concerning it, and to add to the simplicity of the first cause, and not to abide in the conceptions of the end, but to conjoin with it the producing principle of things second* And it appears to me thit Plato here indicates the natures which are proximately unfolded into light after the first. For it is not possible to say any thing concerning, it except at one time being impelled to this froin^ all things, and at another from the best of things: for it is the cause of hyparxis to all things, and unfolds its own separate union through the peculiarities of these. We ascribe to it therefore the one and the goody from the donation which pervades to all things from it. For of those things of which all participate, we say there is no other cause than that which is established prior to all these. But the about which (ro Tipi ©,) th^ ' FiOr.0tirioy it is necessary to read Mvm.
136 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK 11.
on account of which (ro Si, o '), and the from which (to a^*ou,) particularly subsist in the intelligible Gods: and from these they are ascribed to.the first God. For whence can we suppose the unical Gods derive their pe- culiarities^ except from that which is prior to them? To this summit of intelligibles therefore the term about is adapted, because all the divine orders occultly proceed about this summit which is arranged prior to them. But the term on account of which pertains to^the middle order of intelU- gibles: for all things subsist for the sake of eternity and an hyparxis per- fectly entire. And the term from which is adapted to the extremity of intelligibles: for this first produces all things, and adorns them uniformly. These things, therefore, we shall indeed make more known in the doctrine which will shortly follow concerning the intelligible Gods.
CHAPTER X.
CHAPTER X.
In the next place, let us finish the discussion concerning the first God, with the theory of Parmenides, and unfold the mystic conceptions of the first hypothesis as far as pertains to the present purpose. For we shaU refer the reader for the most perfect interpretation of them to our com- mentaries on that dialogue. In the first place therefore, it is requisite to determine this concerning the first hypothesis, that it comprehends as many conclusions negatively, as the hypothesis which follows it does af- firmatively. For this latter demonstrates all the orders proceeding from the one; but the former evinces that the one is exempt from all the divine genera. From both these hypotheses however, it is obvious to every one how it is necessary that the cause of the whole of things should transcend his productions. For because the one is the cause of all the Gods, he ' For $1* ou it is necessary to read St* o; since the former denotes the imirumentaly but the latter the ^ikrf cause.
CHAP. X. OF PLATO. f^q^ transcends all things. And because he is exempt from theth through transcendency, on this account he gives to all things their hypostases. For through being expanded above^all things he causes all things to subsist. Since in the second and third orders also of beings, causes which are en- tirely exempt from their effects, more perfectly generate and connect their progeny than those causes do which are coordinate with their effects. And the one by ineffably producing all the divine orders, appears to be unicalljr established above all. For in the productions posterior to it, cause is every where different from the things caused. And on this account nature indeed being incorporeal, is a cause which transcends bodies; but soul being perfectly perpetual, is the cause of things generated; and intellect being immoveable is the cause of every thing that is moved. If, therc-r fore, according to each progression of beings effects are denied of their causes, it is certainly necessary to take away all things similarly from the cause of a\h In the second place, I think it is necessary that the order of the nega- tions should be defined by those who receive theology according to the intention of Parraenides; and that it should be admitted that they pro- ceed indeed from the monads which subsist primarily in the divine genera, and that Parmenides takes away from the one all second and third natures, according to an order adapted to each. For that which transcends more principal causes must in a much greater degree subsist prior to those that are subordinate. Parmenides, however, does not begin his negations from the Gods that are united to the first: for this genus is with difficulty dis^ tinguished from the one: because being arranged naturally [immediateJy] after it, it is most unical and occult, and transcendently similar to its pro- ducing cause. Parmenides therefore beginning where prior to all other things division and multitude are apparent, and proceeding regularly through all the second orders as far as to the last of things, again returns to the beginning, and shows how the one differs from the Gods that are most similar to it, and which primarily participatQ^ of it, according to one ineffable cause.
In the third place, in addition to what has been said, I determine con- cerning the mode of negations, that they are not privative of their sub- Proc. Vol. I. S 158 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK IT.
jects, but generative of things which are as it were their opposites. For because the first principle is not many, the many proceed from it, and be- cause it is not a whole, wholeness proceeds from it, and in a similar man- ner in other things. And in thus determining, I speak conformably to Plato, who thinks it proper to abide in negations, and to add nothing to the one. For whatever you add, you diminish Me onf, and afterwards evince that it is not the one^ but that which is passive to [or participates] the one. For it is thus not one only, but in addition to this possesses some- thing else also by participation. This mode therefore of negations is exempt, unical, primary, and is a departure from the whole of things, in an unknown and ineffable transcendency of simplicity. It is likewise neces- sary, having attributed such a mode as this to the first God, again to exempt him from the negations also. For neither does any discourse, nor any name belong to the one^ says Parmenides. But if no discourse belongs to it, it is evident that neither does negation pertain to it. For all things are secondary to the one^ things knowable and knowledge, and the in- struments of knowledge, and after a manner that which is impossible presents itself at the end of the hypothesis. For if nothing whatever can be said of the one^ neither is this discussion itself adapted to the one. Nor is it at all wonderful that the discourse of those who wish to know the ineffable by words should terminate in that which is impossible; since all knowledge when conjoined with an object of knowledge which does not at all pertain to it loses its power. For sense, if we should say that it per- tained to that which is the object of science would subvert itself; and tibis would be the case with science and every kind of knowledge if we should say that they belonged to that which is intelligible; so that lan- guage when conversant with that which is ineffable, being subverted about itself, has no cessation, and opposes itself.
CHAP. XI. OF PLATO.
CHAPTER XI.
Let us now therefore, if ever, abandon multiform knowledge, exter- minate from ourselves all the variety of life, and in perfect quiet approach near to the cause of all things. For this purpose, let not only opinion and phantasy be at rest, nor the passions alone which impede our anago* gic impulse to the first, be at peace; but let the air be still, and the uni- verse itself be still. And let all things extend us with a tranquil power to communion with the ineffable. Let us also, standing there, having trans- cended the intelligible (if we contain any thing of this kind,) and with nearly closed eyes adoring as it were the rising sun, since it is not lawful for any being whatever intently to behold him — ^let us survey the sun whence the light of the intelligible Gods proceeds, emerging, as the poets say, from the bosom of the ocean; and again from this divine tranquillity descending into intellect, and from intellect, employing the reasonings of the soul, let us relate to ourselves what the natures are from which, in this progression, we shall consider the first God as exempt. And let us as it were celebrate him, not as establishing the earth and the heavens, nor as giving subsistence to souls, and the generations of all animals; for he produced these indeed, but among the last of things; but, prior to these, let us celebrate him as unfolding into light the whole intelligible and intel* lectual genus of Gods, together with all the supermundane and mundane divinities — ^as the God of all Gods, the unity of all unities, and beyond the first adyta,' — as more ineffable than all silence, and more unknown than all essence, — as holy among the holies, and concealed in the intelligi- ble Gods, And again after these things descending into a reasoning pro- cess from ^n intellectual hymn, and employing the irreprehensible science ' For e^otrm, it b necessary to read oSurcDy. For die occult and invisible order of Night and Phanes is called by Orpheus the oA/hm. So that by the Jlrst adgta, Produs means the highest order of intelligtbles.
140 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK IL of dialectic, let us, following the contemplation of first causes, survey the manner in which the first God is exempt from the whole of things. And let^our descent be as far as to this. But opinion and phantasy and sense, prevent us indeed firom partaking of the presence of the Gods, and draw us down from Olympian goods to earth-bom motions, Titannically divide the intellect that is in us, and divulse us from an establishment in wholes to the images of beings.
CHAPTER XII.
What therefore will be the first conception of the science proceeding from intellect, and unfolding itself into light? What other can we assert it to be than that which is the most simple and the most known of all the conceptions contained in this science? What therefore is this? " The one^ says Parmenides,ifitis the one will not be many/^ For it is necessary that the many should participate of the one; but the one does not participate of the oney but is the one itself. Neither is that which is primarily one par- ticipable. For it would not be purely one if mingled with the many, nor that which is one, if it received the addition of that which is subordinate. The one therefore is exempt from the many. The many however subsist pri- marily in the summit of the first intellectual Gods, and in the intelligible place of survey y as we are taught in the second hypothesis. The one^ there- fore, entirely transcends an order of this kind, and is the cause of it. For the not many 9 is not privation, as we have said, but the cause of the many. This, therefore, Parmenides does not think it requisite to demonstrate, but as a thing most manifest to every one, he first evinces this, through the opposition as it were of the many to the one. But employing this he takes away that which follows; and he takes away that which is posterior to this by employing the conclusions prior to it, and this he always does, after the CHAP. XII. OF PLATO. I41 same manner. And at one time indeed, he assumes the elements of the demonstrations from proximate conclusions, but at another time from those that are more remote. For after this intelligible order of Gods, as we have said, he gives subsistence to that order which connectedly con* tains and bounds the extent of them, from their exempt cause. But this order is called by him in the second hypothesis parts and a whole. These therefore he denies of the one employing the many for the purpose of distinguishing the subjects and the one. For, as he says, that which is a whole and has parts is many; but the one is beyond the many. If, therefore, the one transcends the intelligible simpHcity, but whole and that which has parts proceed from it in order to become the bond of the whole of this distribution, is it not necessary that the one should neither be a whole, nor be indigent of parts? And I think it is through this trans* cendency that the one presubsists as the cause of this order of Gods, and that it produces this order, but in an exempt manner.
In the third place after these, we may survey the order which is allotted the boundary of the intellectual and at the same time intelligible Gods, proceeding from the one^ and may behold the one perfectly expanded above it. For this order indeed subsists from the second genera, and from the intellectual wholeness of the genera. But the one^ as has been demon- strated, is exempt according to cause from this wholeness. The one there- fore has neither beginning, or middle, or end, nor has it extremes, nor does it participate of any figure. For through these Gods, the before men- tioned order of Gods becomes apparent. Whether therefore, there be a perfective summit, or what is celebrated as the middle centre in these Gods, or a termination converting the end of these divinities to their be* ginning, the one is similarly beyond every triple distribution. For the one would have parts, and would be many, if it participated of things of this kind. But it has been demonstrated that the one unically subsists prior to the mariy, and to wholeness together with its parts, as the cause of them. And you see how Parmenides indeed exhibits to us one ^nega- tion of the highest order, but two negations of the middle, and three of the last order. Besides this also, he shows that the one has no extremity* 143 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK H But the infinite is a thing of this kind. And separately from this he like- wise shows that the one is unreceptive of all figures.