Again therefore, after these triple orders we must direct our attention to the intellectual Gods subsisting from these^ and receiving a tripartite di- vision, and must demonstrate that the one transcends these also. For such is the one^ says Parmenides, since it is neither in itself, nor in another. For if it were in another, it would be on all sides comprehended by that in which it is, and would every where touch that which comprehends it. But in this case, it would have a figure, would consist of parts, and on this account would be many and not one. And if it were ip itself it would entirely comprehend itself in itself. But comprehending and at the same time being comprehended, it will be two, and will be no longer primarily one. 'The discourse therefore proceeds to the same conclusion, and evinces that the one will not be one, by the summit of the intellectual order, if any one endeavours to mingle it with other things. Hence the one being perfectly exempt from this summit also„ gives subsistence to it, this summit at one and the same time participating of the third of the Gods placed above it, but being produced from the second of these Gods, and being perfected from the first, and entirely established in it.
Moreover, the one likewise generates the second intellectual order, being unmingled with it. For the one neither stands still, nor is moved. It participates therefore of neither of these; but being similarly exempt from both^ it at the same time transcends the middle orders of the intel- lectual progression of the Gods. For if it were moved, it would be moved in a twofold respect, viz. either according to a change in quality, or local motion. But it is not possible that the one can be changed in quality; for being thus changed it will be not one, and will fall off from a unical hyparxis. Nor can it be locally moved. For it is impossible that it should be moved in a circle, because it would have parts, viz* middle and extremes. And if it changed one place for another it would be par- tible. For it would be necessary that it should neither be wholly in that place to which it is moved, nor in that whence it begins to be moved. For if it were wholly in either of them, it would be immoveable, in con* sequence of partly not yet being moved, and partly having now ceased CHAP. XIL OF PLATO. 143 its motion. But if the one stands still, it is certainly necessary that it should abide in the same thing. But it has been demonstrated that the- one is no where. Hence it is neither in itself, nor in another thing. In no respect therefore is the one moved, or does it stand still, which things [viz. motion \and permanency] particularly belong to the middle order of intellectuals, as will be evident from the second hypothesis. For the first God produces this order also, being exempt from it.
In the third place, we may survey through what next follows, the last order of intellectuals, proceeding from the one^ and subordinate to it. For in this order sameness and difference subsist unitedly. But at the same time the one subsists prior to both these. For different is said to be dif* ferent both from itself and from other things. And in a similar manner same is the same with itself, and with other things. But the one is not indeed different from itself, because that which is different from the one will be not one. And it is not the same with other things, lest becoming the same with them, it should latently pass into their nature. Moreover, neither is the one different from other things. For it would be at the same time one, and would have as an addition the power of difference. For so far as it is different it will not be one; since difference is not the one. Hence being one and different, it will be many and not the one. Nor is the one the same with itself. For if the one and the same differ only in name, the many will not be in consequence of participating of sameness with each other. For it is impossible that the many should become one by participating of the many. But if the one and sameness are essentially different, that which is primarily one does not participate of sameness, lest by receiving sameness in addition to the one^ it should become a pas- sive one, and not that which is primarily one. If however the extremity of intellectuals is characterized by this tetrad, it is evident that the one exist- ing beyond this also supernally unfolds it into light, and places over die wholes of the universe a tetradic monad, the source of ornament to all secondary natures. For from henee other things primarily receive a com- munication with the one which are also indeed produced and connectedly contained by the one.
But after the intellectual Gods, the inefiable transcendency of the one 144 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK II.
arranges the extoit of the supermundane divinities, the one in the mean time, being occultly exempt from its supermundane progeny. And this extent indeed proximately subsists from the intellectual Gods, but uni- formly receives its hyparxis from the first God. This, therefore, Parmen- ides produces through similitude and dissimilitude, from the deity which encloses the boundary of the intellectual monads. For the similar is that which is passive to sameness, in [the same manner as dissimilitude is that which is passive to diflference. Parmenides therefore demonstrates that the one transcends according to one simplicity such a peculiarity of the Gods also as this. For that which is established above the power of same and different, in a much greater degree transcends the genera which are allotted a subsistence according to similitude and dissimilitude.
What therefore remains after this? Is it not evident that it is the muU titude of the mundane Gods? But this also is twofold^ the one being celestial, but the other sublunary. Of these, therefore, the genus whidi revolves in the heavens, proceeds together with the equal, the greater and the less. But in the sublunary genus the equal is allotted a difference in multitude from the celestial equality, but the unequal is again divided by the power of the more and the less. According to another genus there^ fore of the divine orders, there will be a monad and a duad, but above indeed, they are allied to the one and to sameness, and beneath to multi* tude, and the inteUectual cause of difference. Hence the one transcends «11 these. For the equal indeed every where consists of the same parts. By what contrivance therefore is it possible that the i^ature which at one and the same time is exempt from sameness, and the difference which is associated with it, should participate of equality and inequality?
Besides all these divide orders therefore we must intellectually survey the genera of deified souls, and which are distributed about the Gods, For in each of the divine progressions and in the progressions also of souIb, the first genus presents itself to the view connascent with the Gods; since both in the heavens, and in the sublunary region divine sou]s receive the division of the Gods into the world, as the Athenian Guest in a certain place demonstrates. The psychical extent therefore, is characterized by time, and by a life according to time, But the peculiarity of divine squIs CHAP. XII. OF PLATO. 145 is shown by Parmenides to consist in their being younger and at the same time older both than themselves and other things. For revolving always according to the same time, and conjoining the beginning with the end, as at one and the same time proceeding to the end of the whole period they become younger, but as at the same time circulating to the beginning of it, they become older. All their ages however, perpetually preserve the same measures of time. Again, there is sameness in them and difference, the former indeed preserving equality, but the latter inequality, according to time. The one therefore subsists prior to divine souls, and generates these also together with the Gods. We now therefore come to the end of the whole distribution of more excellent natures; and the cause of all intelligibles at once unfolds into light the genera that follow the Gods, and that are triply divided by the three parts of time. But this c^use is demonstrated by the intellectual projections of Parmenides to be also exempt from these. For that which is beyond all time and the life which is according to time, can by no contrivance become subservient to the more partial periods of time.
That which is the first of all things therefore, unfolds into light all the Gods, divine souls, and the more excellent genera, and is neither compli- cated with its progeny, nor multiplied about them; but being perfectly exempt from them in an admirable simplicity, and transcendency of union, it imparts to all things indifferently progression and at the same time order in the progression. Parmenides therefore beginning from the intelligible place ^of survey of the first intellectual Gods, proceeds thus far, according to the measures of generation, giving subsistence to the genera of the Gods, and to the natures that are united to and follow the Gods/ and perpetually evinces that the one is ineffably exempt from all things. But again, from hence he returns to the beginning, and imitating the conversion of the whole of things, separates the one from the highest, viz. from the intelligible Gods. For thus especially we may survey the transcendency of the one^ and the immense difierence of its union from all other things, if we not only demonstrate that it is established above ' For rm 0fc»y it is necessary to read roi; (fo<;.
Proc. Vol. i. T 146 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK II.
tlie second or third progressions in the divine orders, but also that it sub- sists prior to the intelligible unities themselves, and this in a manner eon« fbrmable to the simplicity of their occult nature, and not through a variety of If ords, but through intellectual projection alone. For intelligibles are naturally adapted to be.known by intellect. This therefore, Parmenides also evinces in reality, relinquishing logical methods, but energizing ac- cording to intellect, and asserting that the one is above ess^ice, and being characterized by the one. For this assertion was not collected from the jH'eceding conclusions. For the discourse about the first Gods them- selves would be without demonstration, if it derived its credibility from things subordinate. At the same time therefore, Parmenides contends that all knowledge, and all the instrun^ents of knowledge, fall short of the transcendency of the one, and beautifully end in the inefiaUb of that Grod who is beyond all things. For after scientific energies, and intellec- tual projections, a union with the unknown follows, to which also Par- menides referring the whde of his discussion, concludes the first hypo- thesis, suspending indeed all the divine genera from the one, but evincing tiiat the one is unically exempt from all things, subsisting without the participation of intelligibles and sensibles, and in an ineffable manner giving subsistence to the j>articipated monads. Hence also, the one is said to-be beyond that one which is conjoined with essence, and at tlie same time to be bey<md every participated multitude of unities.
BOOK III- CHAPTER i.
Such therefore is the theology with Plato concerning the first God, as it appears to me, and so great is the transcendency which it is allotted v with respect to all other discussions of divine concerns; at one and the same time venerably preserving the ineffable union of this God exempt from the whole of things, uncircumscribed by all gnostic comprehensions, and apart fix)m all beings; and unfolding the anagogic paths to him, per- fecting that parturient desire which souls always possess of the fattier, and progenitor of all things, and enkindling that torch in them, by which they are especially conjoined with the unknown transcendency of the one. But after this imparti^ipable, inefiable, and truly superessential cause, which is separated from all essence, power and energy, the discussion of the Gods immediately follows. For to what other thing prior to the unities is it lawful to be conjoined with the one, or what else can be more united to the unical God than the multitude of Grods? Concerning these there- fore, we shall in the next place unfold the inartificial theory of Plato, in- voking the Gods themselves to enkindle in us the light of truth. I wish however prior to entering on the particulars of this theory, to convince the reader, and to make it evident to him through demonstration, that there are necessarily as many orders of the Gods, as the Parmenides of Plato unfolds to us in the second hypothesis.
148 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK III.
This therefore is I think prior to all other things apparent to those whose conceptions are not perverted, that every where, but especially in the divine orders, second progressions, are completed through the similitude of these to their proper principles. For nature and intellect, and every generative cause, are naturally adapted to produce and conjoin to them- selves things similar, prior to such as as are dissimilar to themselves. For if it is necessary that the progression of beings should be continued, and that no vacuum should intervene either in incorpor<^al natures, or in bodies, it is necessary that every thing which -proceeds naturally should proceed through similitude. For it is by no means lawful that the thing caused should be the same with its cause; since a remission and deficiency of the union of the producing cause generates secondary natures. For again, if that which is second were the same as that which is first, each would be similarly the same, and one would not be cause, but the other the thing caused. If however, the one by its very being, or essentially, has an exuberance of productive power, but the other falls short of the power that produced it, these are naturally separated from each other, and the generative cause precedes in excellence the thing generated, and there is not a sameness of things which so greatly differ. But if that which is second is not the same with that which is first, if indeed it is different only, they will not be conjoined to each other, nor will the one participate of the other. For contact and participation, are indeed a communion of things conjoined, and a sympathy of participants with the natures they participate. But if it is at the same time the same with and different from that which is first, if indeed the sameness is indigent, and vanquished by the power which is contrary to it, the one will no longer be the leader of the progression of beings, nor will every generative cause subsist prior to things of a secondary nature, in the order of the good. For the one is not the cause of division, but of friendship. And the good converts generated natures to their causes. But the conversion and friendship of things secondary to such as are primary is through similitude, but not through a dissimilar nature. If therefore the one is the cause of the whole of things, and if the good is in an exempt manner desirable to all things, it will every where give subsistence to the progeny of precedaneous causes, CHAP. 1. OF PLATO. 149 through similitude^ in order that progression may be according to the (me^ and that the conversion of things which have proceeded may be to iht good. For without similitude there will neither be the conversidn of things to their proper principles, nor the generation of effects. Let this there, fore be considered as a thing admitted in this place- But the second thing besides this, and which is demonstrated through this, is, that it is necessary every monad should produce a number co-or- dinate to itself, nature indeed a natural, but soul a psychical, and intellect an intellectual number. For if every thing generative generates similars prior to dissimilars, as has been before demonstrated, every cause will certainly deliver its own form and peculiarity to its own progeny, and before it gives subsistence to far distant progressions, and things which are separated from its nature, it will produce things essentially near to it, and conjoined with it through similitude. Every mo^ad therefore, gives subsistence to a multitude indeed, as generating that which is second to itself, and which divides the powers that presubsist occultly in itself. For 'those things which are uniformly and contractedly in the monad, present themselves to the view separately in the progeny of the monad. And this indeed the wholeness of nature manifests, since it contains in one the reasons, [i. e, productive principles] of all things both in the heavens and in the sublunary region; but distributes the powers of itself^to the natures which are divided from it about bodies. For the nature of earth, of fire, and of the moon, possesses from the wholeness of nature its pecu- liarity and form, and energizes together with this wholeness, and con- tains its own allottment. This also the monad of the mathematical sci- ences and of numbers manifests. For this being all things primarily, and spermatically producing in itself the forms of numbers, distributes dif- ferent powers to different externally proceeding numbers. For it is not possible that what is generated, should at once receive all the abundance of its generator. And it is necessary that the prolific power of every thing that pre-exists in the cause ' itsdf should become apparent. The monad therefore gives subsistence to a multitude about itself, and to ' For cuTHw it is necetssury to read eunet.
150 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK HI, number which distributes the peculiarities that abide coUectivdj in itself. Since however, as was before observed, the similar is always more allied to cause than the dissimilar, there will be one multitude of similars to th^ mcmad, proceeding from the monad; and another of dissimilars. But again, the multitude which is similar to the monad is that in a divided manner which the monad is indivisibly. For if the monad possesses a peculiar power and hyparxis, there will be the same form of hyparxis in Uie multitude together with a remission with reference to the whole.
After this however, it is necessary to consider in the third place, that of progressions, such as are nearer to their cause are indicative of a greater multitude of things, and are at the same time in a certain respect equal to their containing causes; but that such as are more remote possess a less extended power of signification; and on account of the diminution of their power, change and diminish at the same time the amplitude of production. For if, of progressions, that which subsists the first in order is more similar to its principle, and that which gives subsistence to liie greatest number is both with respect to essence and power more similar to the generating principle of all things, it is necessary that of secondary natures, such as are nearer to the monad, and which receive dominion after it, should give a greater extent to their productions; but that such things as are more separated from their primary monad should neither pervade in a similar manner through all things, nor extend their efficacious energies to far distant progressions^ And again, as similar to this, it is necessary that the nature which gives subsistence to the greatest number of effects, should be arranged next to the monad its principle; and that the nature generative of a more numerous progeny, because it is more similar to the supplying cause of all things than that which is generative of a few, must be arranged nearer to the monad, according to hyparxis. For if it is more remote, it will be more dissimilar to the first principle; but if it is more dissimilar, it will neither possess a power comprehending the p>ower of similar natures, nor an energy abundantly prolific. For an abundant cause is allied to the cause of all. And universally, tha& which is gene- rative of a more abundant, is more naturally allied to its principle than that which is productive of a less numerous progeny. For the production CHAP. I. OF PLATO. 151 of fewer dffects is a defect of power; but a defect of power is a diminu*- tion of essence; and a dhninntion of essence becomes redundant on ac- count of dissimilitude to its cause, and a departure from the first prin- ciple.
Again therefore, in addition to what has been said, we shall assert this which possesses the most indubitable truth, that prior to the causes which are participate, it is every where necessary that imparticipable causes should have a prior subsistence in the whole of things. For if it is neces- sary that a cause should have the same relation to its progeny as the one to all the nature of beings, and that it should naturally possess this order towards things secondary; but the one is imparticipable, being sim.ilariy exempt from all beings, bs unically producing all things; — if this be the case, it is requisite that every other cause which imitates the transcen* dency of the one with respect to all things, should be exempt from the natures which are in secondary ranks, and which are participated by them. And again, as equivalent to this, it is requisite that every imparticipable and primary cause should estabhsh monads of secondary natures similar to itself, prior to such as are dissimilar. I say, for instance, it is requisite that one soul should distribute many souls to different natures; and one intellect participated intellects to many souls. For thus the first exempt genus will every where have an order analogous to the one. And secondary natures which participate kindred causes will be analogous to these causes, and through the similitude of these will be conjoioed with their imparticipable principle. H^ice prior to the forms which are in other things, those are established which subsist in themselves; exempt causes prior to such as are co-ordinate; and imparticipable monads prior to such as are participable. And consequently (as that which is demonstrated at the same time with this) the exempt causes are generative of the co-or- dinate, and imparticipable natures extend participable monads to their progeny. And natures which subsist from themselves produce the powers which are resident in other things. These things therefore being discussed, let us consider fiow each of the divine genera subsists through analogy,' and survey following Plato himself, what are the first and most total ' For MfoXvp-iwi it U necessary to read wsO^^us.
152 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK III.
orders of the Gods. For having discovered and demonstrated this, we shall perhaps be able to perceive the truth concerning these several orders.