It is necessary therefore, from the before-mentioned axiqms, since there is one unity the principle of the whole of things, and from which every hyparxis derives its subsistence, that this unity should produce from itself, prior to all other things, a multitude characterized by unity, and a num- ber most allied to its cause. For if every other cause constitutes a pro- geny similar to itself prior to that which is dissimilar, much more must the one unfold into light after this manner things posterior to itself, since it is beyond similitude, and the one i^se/f must produce according to union things which primarily proced from it. For how can the one give subsist- ence to its progeny except unically? For nature generates things secon- dary to itself physically, soul psychically, and intellect intellectually. The one therefore is the cause of the whole of things according to union, and the progression from the one is uniform. But if that which prima- rily produces all things is the one^ and the progression from it is unical, it is certainly necessary that the multitude thence produced should be self- perfect unities, most allied to their producing cause. Farther still, if every monad constitutes a number adapted to itself, as was before demonstrated, by a much greater priority must the one generate a number of this kind. For in the progression of things, that which is produced is frequently dissimilar to its producing cause, through the dominion of dif- ference: for such are the last of things, and which are far distant from their proper principles. But the first number, and which is connascent with the one^ is uniform, ineffable, superessential, and perfectly similar to its cause. For in the first causes, neither does difference intervening separate from the generator the things begotten, and transfer them into another order, nor does the motion of the cause effecting a remission of power, produce into dissimilitude and indefiniteness the generation of the whole of things; but the cause of all things being unically raised above all motion and division, has established about itself a divine number, and has united it toits own simplicity. The one therefore prior to beings has ^ven subsistence to the unities of beings.
For again, according to another mode [of considering the subject] it is CHAP. I. OF PLATO. J53 necessary that primary beings should participate of the first cause through their proximate unities. For secondary things are severally conjoined to the natures prior to them through similars; bodies indeed to the soul which ranks as a whole, through the several souls [which they participate]; but souls to universal intellect through intellectual monads; and first beings, through unical hyparxes to the one. For being is in its own nature dis- similar to the one. For essence and that which is in want of union ex* ternally derived, are unadapled to be conjoined with that which is super- essential, and with the first union, and are far distant from it. But the unities of beings, since they derive their subsistence from the imparticipa- ble unity, and which is exempt from the whole of things, are able to con- join beings to the one^ and to convert them to themselves.
It appears therefore to me, that Parmenides demonstrating these things through the second hypothesis, connects the one with being, surveys all things about the one^ and evinces that this proceeding nature, and which extends its progressions as far as to the last of things is the one. For prior to true beings it was necessary to constitute the unities; since it neither was nor is lawful, says Timaeus, for that which is the best of things to effect any thing else than that which is most beautiful. But this is in a remarkable degree most similar to that which is best. To the one however, a unical multitude is most similar; since the demiurgus of the universe also being good, constituted all things similar to himself through goodness itself. Much more therefore, does the fountain of all good produce goodnesses naturally united to itself, and establish them in beings. Hence there is one God, and many Gods, one unityand many unities prior to beings, and one goodness, and many after the one good- ness, through which the demiurgic intellect is good; and every intellect is divine,, whether it be an intellectual or intelligible intellect. And that which is primarily superessential is the one; and there are many superessentials after the one. Whether therefore, is this multitude of unities im- participable in the same manner as the one itself ^ or is it participated by beings, and is each unity of beings the flower as it were of a certain being, and the summit and center of it, about which each being ' subsists?
' For t¥ it is necessary to read ov* Proc. VoL^I. U 154 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK 111.
But if these unities also are imparticipable, in what do they differ from the one? For each of them is one, and primarily subsists from the one. Or in what being more redundant than the first cause were they consti- tuted by it? For it is every where necessary that what is second being subordinate to that which is prior to itself, should fall short of the union of its producing ' cause, and by the addition of a certain thing should have a diminution of the monadic simplicity of the first. What addition therefore, can we adduce, or what redundancy besides the oncj if each of these also is by itself one? For if each of them is one and many, we shall appear to transfer to them the peculiarity of being. But if each is one only, in the same manner as the one itself, why does this rank as the cause which is exempt from all things, but each of these is allotted a secondary dignity? Neither therefore shall we preserve the transcendency of the first with reference to the things posterior to it, nor can we admit that the unities proceeding from it are unconfused either with respect to themselves, or to the one principle of them.
But neither shall we be persuaded by Parmenides who produces the one together with being, and demonstrates that there are as many parts of the one as there are of being; that each being * also participates of the one^ but that the one is every where consubsistent with being; and in short, who asserts that the one of the second hypothesis participates of being, and is participated by being, the participation in each not being the same. For the one indeed participates of being, as not being primarily one, nor exempt from being, but as illuminating truly-existing essence. But being participates of the one^ as that which is connected by it, and filled with divine union, and converted to the one itself v^hich is imparticipable. For the participated monads conjoin beings to the one which is exempt from the whole of things, in the same manner as participated intellects conjoin souls to the intellect which ranks as a whole, and as participated souls conjoin bodies to the soul which ranks as a whole. For it is not possible that the dissimilar genera of secondary natures should be united without ' For %aqwro^ it appears requisite to read ira^«eyeyro(. * Here alsa for ty it is necessary to read ov.
CHAP- IL OF PLATO. X55 media to the cause which b exempt from multitude; but it is necessary that the contact should be effected through similars. For a similar mul* titude, so far indeed as it is multitude^ communicates with the dissimilar; ,but so far as it is similar to the monad prior to itself, it is conjoined with it. Being established therefore, in the middle of both, it is united to the whole, and to the one which is prior to multitude. But it contains in itself remote progressions, and which are of themselves dissimilar to the one. Through itself also, it converts all things to that one, and thus all things are extended to the first cause of the whole of things, dissimilars indeed through similars,' but similars through themselves. For similitude itself by itsdf conducts and binds the many to the one^ and converts secondary natures to the monads prior to them. For the very being of similars so far as they are similars is derived irom the one. Hence, it con« joins multitude to that from which it is allotted its progression. And on this account similitude is that which it is, causing many things to be allied, to possess sympathy with themselves^ and friendship with each other and the one.
CHAPTER II.
CHAPTER II.
If however it be requisite, not only by employing the intellectual pro- jections of Parmenides to unfold the multitude of Gods participated by beings, but also concisely to demonstrate the theory of Socrates about these particulars, we must recollect what is written in the Republic, where he says that the light proceeding from the good is unific of intellect and of beings. For through these things the good is demonstrated to be ex- empt from being and essence, in the same manner as the sun is exempt from visible natures. But this light being in intelligibles illuminates them, in the same manner as the solar-form light which is in visible na« ' For avofioKov it is necessary to read o/xoieoy.
156 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK 111.
tares. For visible natures no otherwise become apparent, and known to the sight, than through the light which is ingenerated in them. All intelligibles therefore become boniform through the participation of light, and through this light, every true "being is most similar to the good. If, therefore, it makes no difference to speak of this light, or of the one (for this light conjoins intelligibles, and causes them to be one, as deriving its subsistence from the one) if this be the case, the deity proceeding from the first is participate, and all the multitude of unities is participable. And that indeed which is truly superessential is the one. But each of the other Gods, according to his proper hyparxis, by which he is a superessential God, is simitar to the first; but they are participated by essence and being. According to this reasoning therefore, the Gods appear to us to be unities, and participable unities, binding indeed all beings to themselves, but conjoining through themselves to the one which similarly transcends all things, the natures posterior to themselves.
Since therefore each of the Gods is indeed a unity, but is participated by some being, whether shall we say that the same being participates of each of the unities or that the participants of some of the unities are more, but of others less numerous } And if this be the case either the par- ticipants of the superior unities must be more, but of the inferior must be fewer in number, or vice versa. For it is necessary that there should be an order of the unities, in the same manner as we see that of numbers some are nearer to their principle, but othejs more remote from it. And that some are more simple, but others more composite, and exceed indeed in quantity, but suffer a diminution in power. But it is well that we have mentioned numbers. For if it is necessary to survey the order of the first monads with respect to each other, and their progression about beings, from these as images, in these also the monads which are nearer to the one will be participated by things which are more simple in essence^ but thos(i which are more remote from it, will be participated by more composite essences. For thus the participation will be according to the analogous; first monads being always participated by the first beings, but second monads by secondary beings. For again, if the first is exempt ' oyrco; is omitted in the original.
CHAP. n. OP PLATO. 15 7 from all things, and is imparticipable, but that which is connascent with the most simple nature and the one is more similar to the imparticipable than that which is connascent with a more various and multiform nature, and which has more powers suspended from it, — if this be the case, it is perfectly obvious, that the unities which are nearer to the one are neces* sarily participated by the first and most simple essences; but that those which are more remote are participated by more composite essences, which are less in power, but are greater in number and multitude. For in short, additions in these unities are ablations of powers; and that which is nearer to the one^ which surpasses the whole of things by an admirable simplicity, is more uniform, and is consubsistent with more total orders. And it happens according to the ratio of power, that the simplicity of the first unities is transcendent. For those things which are the causes of a greater number of effects, imitate as much as possible the cause of all things, but those which are the causes of fewer effects, have an essence more various than the natures that are prior to them/ For this variety distributes into minute parts and diminishes the power which abides in one. Moreover, in participated souls also, such as are first and most divine subsist in simple and perpetual bodies. Others again are connected with bodies that are simple, but in conjunction with these with material bodies also. And others are connected at one and the same time with simple, material and composite bodies. For the celestial souls indeed rule over simple bodies, and such as have an immaterial and im* mutable subsistence. But the souls that govern the wholes of the elements, are at the same time invested with etherial garments, and at the same time through these are carried in the wholes of the elements, which as wholes indeed are perpetual and simple, but as material receive genera* tion and corruption, and composition from dissimilar natures. And the souls that rank in the third order, are those which proximately inspire with life their luciform * vehicles, but also attract from the simple ele* Instead of t« ftt y yap irA«ioya)y an^tt^ xat roov iravrcof aiTiwv Kara i^v ^vvafMV tow wpo Mnw¥ iro«xiA«Tf ^«y xara -njy owtriay fOTiv, it is necessary to read ra f«v yap TXfioy«y mrtx, xai rm xavrooif atriov xara Iwafutf fUf/Louvratf ra tn rwt lAao-a-oycov rtw Tgo awtoaf voixiXartpa xara njv ovatav t^riv. * For avTOf iSwiy it is requisite to read «uyofiWiy.
158 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK HI.
ment material vestsmeuts, pour into these a secondary life, and through these communicate with composite and multiform bodies, and sustain through this participation another third hfe.
If, however, you are willing to survey the intellectual orders, some of these are arranged in the souls which rank as wholes, and in the most divine of mundane souls, which also they govern in a becoming manner. But others being arranged in the souls of the more excellent genera, are proximately participated by the rulers that are in them; and are parti- cipated secondarily by more partial essences* But again they arrange third intellectual orders in partial souls. And according as the power which they are allotted is diminished, in such proportion is partij:;ipation in them more various, and far more composite than the participation of the natures that are prior to them. If, therefore, this is the mode of par- ticipation in all beings, it is certainly necessary that of the Gods also those that are nearer to the one^ should be carried in the more simple parts of being, but that those which have proceeded to a greater distance should be carried in the more composite parts of being. For the parti- cipations of second genera are divided after this manner according to a similitude to them.
Again therefore, we may summarily say, that after the one principle of the whole of things, the Gods present themselves to our view as self- perfect monads, participated by beings.' How many orders 'therefore there are of beings we shall afterwards unfold, and show what beings are allotted a more simple, and what a more various hyparxis. Of all. beings then, the last is that which is corporeal. For this derives its being, and all its perfection from another more ancient cause, and is neither allotted sim* plicity nor composition, nor perp)etuity, nor incorruptibility from its own power. For no body is either self-subsistent, or self-begotten; but every thing which is so contracting in one, cause, and that which proceeds from cause, is incorporeal and impartible. And in short, that which is the cause of hyparxis to itself, imparts also to itself an infinite power of ex- ' In the origmal here, about a Une and a half i$ $o defectivei that not being able to supply the deficiency, I have not attempted to translate it.
CHAP. II. OF PLATO- i^ istence. For never deserting itself, it will never cease to be, or depart from its own subsistence. For every thing that is corrupted, is corrupted through being separated from the power that supplied it with being. But that which imparts being to itself, as it is not separated from itself, is allotted through itself a perpetual essence. No body however, since it is not the cause of perpetuity to itself, will be perpetual. For every thing which is perpetual possesses an infinite power. But body being finite is not the cause of infinite power. For infinite power is incorporeal, because all power is incorporeal. But this is evident, because greater powers are every where. But no body is capable of being wholly every where. If there- fore, no- body imparts to itself power, whether the power be infinite or finite, but that which is self-subsistent imparts to itself the power of being, and of existing perpetually, no body will be self-subsistent. Whence therefore is being imparted to bodies, and what is it which is adapted proximately to supply them with being? Must we not say that the cause of being to bodies primarily is that which by being present renders the nature of body more perfect than its kindred bodies [when they are deprived of it?] This indeed is obvious to every one. For it is the province of that which imparts perfection to connect also the essence of secondary^ natures, since perfection itself is the perfection of essence. What there^ fore is that of which bodies participating, are said to be better than the bodies which do not participate of it? Is it not evident that it is soul? For we say that animated bodies are more perfect than such as are inanimate. Soul therefore is primarily beyond bodies; and it must be admitted that all heaven and every thing corporeal is the vehicle of soul. Hence, these two orders of beings present theinselves to our view; the one indeed being corporeal, but the other which is above this*, psychical.
With respect to soul itself however, whether is it the same with or dif- ferent from intellect? For as the body which participates of soul is per- fect, thus also the soul is perfect which participates of intellect. And of the soul indeed, which is able to live according to reason, all things do not participate: but of intellect and intellectual illumination rational souls participate, and also such things as partake of any kind of know- ledge. And soul indeed energizes according to time; but intellect corn- 160 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK HI.
prehe&ds in eternity both its essence, and at the same time its stable energy. And not every soul indeed is adiapted to preserve immutably and without diminution the perfection of itself; but every intellect is always perfect, and possesses a never-failing power of its own blessedness. The intellec- tual genus therefore is essentially beyond the psychical; since the former, neither in whole nor in partial intellects^ admits the entrance of the na- ture of evil; but the latter being undefiled in whole souls, departs in partial souls from its own proper blessedness. What therefore is the first of beings? Shall we say intellect, or prior to this the extent of life? For soul indeed is self-vital, supplying itself with life; and intellect is the best and most perfect, and as we have said, an eternal life. But the life of intellect is indeed in a certain respect intellectual, and is mingled from the intellectual and vital peculiarity. It is necessary however, that there should be life itself. Whether therefore is life or intellect the more ex- cellent thing? But if gnostic beings only participate of intellect, but such beings as are destitute of knowledge participate of life, (for we say that plants live) it is certainly necessary that life should be arranged above intellect, being the cause of a greater number of effects, and im- parting by illumination more gifts from itself than intellect. What then? fc life the first of beings? And is to live the same thing as to be? But this is impossible. For if life is that which is primarily being, and to be vital is the same thing as to have being, and there is the same definition of both life and being, every thing which participates of life would also participate of being, and every thing which participates of existence would likewise participate of life. For if each is the same thing all things woyld similarly participate of being and life. All vital natures indeed have essence and being; but there are many beings that are des- titute of life. Being therefore subsists prior to the first life. For that which is more universal, and the cause of a greater number of effects, is nearer to the ofie^ as has been before demonstrated. Soul therefore is that which is piimarily established above bodies; but intellect is beyond soul;* life is more ancient than intellect; and being which is primarily being is established above all these. Every thing also which participates * Instead of l^anis here it is necessary to read inf^fig.
CHAP. 11. OF PLATO. l6l of soul, by a much greater priority participates of intellect; but not every thing which enjoys intellectual efficiency, is also adapted to participate of soul. For of soul rational animals only participate; since we say that the rational soul is truly soul. For Plato in the Republic says, that the work of soul is to reason and survey beings. And every soul [i. e. every rational soul] is immortal, as it is written in the Phsedrus; the irrational soul being mortal, according to the demiurgus in the Timaeus. And in short, it is in many places evident that Plato considers the rational soul to be truly soul, but others to be the images of souls, so far as these also are intellectual and vital, and together with whole souls produce the lives that are distributed about bodies. Of intellect however, we not only admit that rational animals participate, but also such other animals as possess agnostic power; I mean such as possess the phantasy, memory and sense; since Socrates also in the Philebus refers all such animals to the intellectual series. For taking away intellect from the life which is according to pleasure, he hkewise takes away not only the rational life, but every, gnostic power of the irrational life. For all knowledge is the progeny of intellect, in the same manner as allreasonis an image of souL Moreover, all things which participate of intellect, by a much greater priority participate of life, some things indeed more obscurely, but others more manifestly. But all living beings do not participate of intellectual power, since plants indeed are animals, as Timaeus.says, but they neither f^rticipate of sense, or phantasy; unless some one should say that they have a co-sensation of what is pleasing and painful. And in short, the orectic powers every where are lives, and the images of the whole of life, and the last productions of life; but they are of themselves destitute of intellect and without any participation of the gnostic power. Hence also, they are of themselves indefinite, and deprived of all knowledge.
Again therefore, all animals indeed receive a portion of being, and different animab a different portion, according to their respective natures; but all beings are not similarly able to participate of life; since we say that quaUties and all passions, and the last of bodies, receive the ultimate effective energy of being, but we do not also say that they participate of life. Being therefore is more ancient than life; life than intellect; anc' Proc. Vol* I. X l^ ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK III.
iDtellect thaa soul. For it is necessary that the causes of a greater number of effects being more ancient and according to order more principal, should preside over causes which are able to produce and adorn fewer effects. Very properly therefore, does Plato in the Timaeus give subsist- ence to soul from intellect, as being secondary to it according to its own nature. But in the Laws he says that intellect is moved similarly to a sphere fashioned by a wheel.' For that which is moved, is moved by piarticipating of life, and is nothing else than real.life about motion. And in the Sophista he exempts being from all the total genera of things, and firpm njiotion. For being, says he, according to its own nature, neither stands still, nor is moved. But that which neither stands still nor is moved» is beyond eternal life.
These four causes therefore being prior to a corporeal subsistence, via. essence, life, intellect and soul, soul indeed participates of all the causes prior toitsdf, being allotted reason from its own peculiarity, but intellect^ life and being, from more ancient causes. Hence it gives subsistence to things posterior to itself in a fourfold manner. For according to its being indeed, it produces all things as far as to bodies; according to its life, all things which are said to live, even as far as to plants; according to it9 intellect, all things which possess a gnostic power, even as far as to the most irrational natures; and according to its reason, the first of the natures that are able to participate of it.^ But intellect being established beyond soul, and existing as the plenitude of life and being, adorns all things in a threefold manner, imparting indeed by illumination the power of the intellectual peculiarity to all gnostic beings, but supplying the participation of Ufe to a still greater number, and of being to all those ta whom primary being imparts itself. But life being arranged above intet lect, presubsists as the cause of the same things in a twofold respect, vivi* fying secondary natures indeed, together with intellect, and filling from