itself with the rivers of life, such things as are naturally adapted to live, but together with being supernally producing essence in all things. But being itself which is primarily being generates all things by its very exist- ' For ivTovot^ it is necessary to read tv ropvots, * For fliwTOij read aunj^.
ence, all lires, and intellects and souls, and is uniformljr present to all things, and is exempt from the whole of things according to one cause which gives subsistence to all things. Hence it is the most similar of all things to the ont^ and unites the comprehension of beings in itself to the first principle of the whole of things, through which all beings, and non* being, wholes and parts, forms and the privations of forms subsist, which privations do not necessarily participate of being, but it is entirely neces* sary that they should participate of the one.
These things as it appears to me persuaded the Elean guest in the So* phista, when discussing that which is perfectly being, to admit that not only being is there, but also life, intellect and soul. For if true and real being is venerable and honorable, intellect is there in the first place, says he. For it is not lawful for that which is of itself venerable and immate- rial to be without inteBect. But if intellect is in that which is perfectly being, intellect will entirely be moved. For it is not possible for intellect ever to subsist, either without motion or pennanency. But if intellect is moved and stands still, there are in being both life and motion. Hence, from what hais been said, three things become apparent, viz. being, hfe and intellect Moreover, soul also in the next place is discovered through these things. For it is necessary, says he, that life and intellect which before were by themselves, should also be in soul. For every soul is a plenitude of life and intellect, participating of both, which the Elean guest indicating adds, " Shall we say that both these are inherent in it, but yet it does not possess these in soul.^' For Xjo possess^ as some one says in a certain place,^ is secondary to existing. And soul indeed participates of each of these according to the peculiarity of itself; but it mindes the rational form of its own hyparxis, with the intellectual vivific power. But both intellect and life subsist prior to soul, the former as being moved and standing still at one and the same time, and the latter as being motion and permanency. These four monads also, soul, intellect, life and being arie not only mentioned by Plato here, but in many other places. And as in soul all things subsist according to participation, so in intellect the things which are prior to it subsist, and in life that which is prior to life. For we say that life exists, or has a being. Or how could it be said to be arranged in being unless it participated of being? We 164 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK HI.
likewise %ay that intellect is and lives. For it is moved, and is a portion of being. Hence it is the third of the more comprehensive monads. Prior however to beings which are participated, it is every where neces- sary that imparticipable causes should subsist, as was before demonstrated, conformably to the similitude of beings to the one. Being therefore which is primarily being, is imparticipable; but life first participates of being, yet IS imparticipable, being exempt from intellect. And intellect is filled indeed from being and life; but is imparticipable in souls, and in the natures posterior to itself. Intellect also presides over soul, imparting to it by illumination the participation of life and being; but being imparti* cipable subsists prior to bodies. The last order of beings therefore is that to which bodies are annexed; celestial bodies indeed primarily, but sub- lunary bodies with the addition of material [vestments.] This therefore is the progression of beings, through life, intellect and soul, ending in a corporeal nature.
If, however, it is necessary that the superessential unities of the Gods which derive their subsistence from the imparticipable cause ' of all things should be participated, some of them indeed, by the first orders in beings, others by the middle, and others by the last orders, as was before demon- strated, it is evident that some of them deify the imparticipable portion of being, but that others illuminate hfe, others intellect, others soul, and others bodies. And of the last unities indeed, not only bodies participate, but likewise soul, intellect, life and essence. For intellect in itself is a plenitude of life and being. But from the unities which are above this world intellect is suspended, and the psychical power, which preexists in intellect. From the unities above these, imparticipable - and intellectual intellect is suspended. From those that are beyond these, the first and im- participable life is suspended. And from the highest unities, the first being itself, and which is the most divine of beings, is suspended. Hence Par- menides beginning from the one being, produces from thence the whole orders of the Gods. These things therefore being previously determined by us, let us speak concerning the divine dialogues, beginning from on high, and producing from the one the whole orders of the Gods. Let us also, ' For amm it is neceisary to read amas* CHAP. III. OF PLATO. ig5 following Plato^ in the first place demonstrate the several orders from other dialogues, bj arguments which cannot be confuted. Afterwards, let us thus conjoin and assimilate the conclusions of Parmenides,to the divine progressions, adapting the first conclusions to the first, but the last to the last progressions.
CHAPTER IIL Ao^iK therefore, the mystic doctrine concerning tlie one must be re- sumed by us, in order that proceeding from the first principle, we may celelH*ate the second and third principles of the whole of things. Of all beings therefore, and of the Gods that produce beings, one exempt and imparticipable cause preexists, — a cause ine£&ble indeed by all language, and unknown by all knowledge and incomprehensible, unfolding all things into light from itself, subsisting ineffably prior to, and converting all things to itself, but existing as the best end of all things. This cause therefore, which is truly exempt from all causes, and which gives subsist- ence unically to all the unities of divine natures, and to all the genera of beings, and their progressions, Socrates in the Republic calls the good^ and through its analogy to the sun reveals its admirable and unknown transcendency with respect to all intelligibles. But again, Parmenides denominates it the one. And through negations demonstrates the exempt and ineffable hyparxis of this one which is the cause of the whole of things. But the discourse in the epistle to Dionysius proceeding through enigmas, celebrates it as that about which all things subsist, and as the cause of all beautiful things. In the Philebus however, Socrates celebrates it as that which gives subsistence to the whole of things, because it is the cause of all deity. For all the Gods derive their existence as Gods from the firet God. Whether therefore, it be lawful to denominate it the fountain jgg ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK III.
4^ deity» or the kingdam of beings, or the unity of all unities, or the good* ness which is generative of truth, or an hyparxis exempt from all these things, and beyond all causes, both the paternal and the generative, let it be honored by us in silence, and prior to silence by union, and of the mystic end may it impart by illumination a portion adapted to our souls. But let us survey with intellect the biformed principles proceeding from and posterior to it. For what else is it necessary to arrange after the union of the whole theory, than the duad of principles? What ' the two principles therefore are of the divine orders after the first principle, we shall in the next place survey* For conformably to the theology of our ancestors, Plato also establishes two jprinciples after the one. In the Phi- lebus therefore, Socrates says, that God gives subsistence to bound and infinity, and through these mingling all beings, has produced them, the nature of beings, according to Philolaus subsisting from the conne^^iou of things bounded, and things infinite. If, therefore, all beings subsist from these, it is evident that they themselves have a subsislenee prior to beings. And if secondary natures participate of these mingled togeth^^ these will subsist unmingled prior to the whole of things. For the pro- gression of the divine orders originates, not from things coordinated and which exist in others, but from things exempt, and which are established in themselves. As therefore the one is prior to things united, and as that which is passive to the one, has a second order after the imparticipable union, thus also the two principles of beings^ prior to the participation of and commixture with beings, are themselves by themselves the causes of the whole of things. For it is necessary that bound should be prior to things bounded, and infinity prior to infinites, according to the similitude to the one of things which proceed from it. For again, if we should pro* duce beings immediately after the one^ we shall no where find the pecu« liarity of the one subsisting purely. For neither is being the same with the one^ but it participates of the one^ nor in reality is that which is the first ^Ae one; for, as has been frequently said, it is better than the one.
Where therefore is that which is most properly and entirely one? Hence ^ * For fivo^ it is necetaary to read r%n$.
CHAP. Ill: OF PLATO. i^ there is a certain one prior to being, which gives subsistence to being, and is primarily the cause of it; since that which is prior to it is beyond union, and is a cause without habitude with respect to all things, and imparticipable, being exempt from all things. If however this one is the cause of being, and constitutes it, there will be a power in it generative of being. For every thing which produces, produces according to its own power, which is allotted a subsistence between that which produces and the things produced, and is of the one the progression and as it were extension, but of the other is the pre-arranged generative cause. For being which is produced from these^ and which is not the one itself^ but uniform, possesses its progression indeed from the one^ through the power wliich produces and unfolds it into light from the one; but its occult union from the hyparxis of the one. This one therefore which subsists prior to power, and first presubsists from the imparticipable and unknown cause of the whole of things, Socrates in the Philebus calls bounds but he denomiqates the power of it which is generative of being, infinity. But he thus speaks in that dialogue, " God we said has exhibited the bound, and also the infinite of beings.''
The first therefore and unical God, is without any addition denominated by him God; because each of the second Gods is participated by being, and has being suspended from its nature* But the first indeed, as being exempt ' from the whole of beings, is God, defined according to the in- eifable itself, the unical alone, and superessentiaL But the bound and the infinite of beings, unfold into light that unknown and imparticipable cause; bound indeed, being the cause of stable, uniform, and connective deity; but the infinite being the cause of power proceeding to all things and capable of being multiplied, and in short, being the leader of every generative distribution. For all union and wholeness, and communion of beings, and all the divine measures, are suspended * from the first bound. But all division, prolific production, and progression into multitude, de- rive their subsistence from this most principal infinity. Hence, when we ' For ffft]pi)T«« k is necessary to read i^i^pn^rai.
* Here also it is necessary for i^pvf^eu to read ^pniTei$.
168 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK III.
say that each of the divine orders abides ' and at the same time proceeds, we must confess that it stably abides indeed, according to bound, but proceeds according to infinity, and that at one and the same time it has unity and multitude, and we must suspend the former from the principle of bound, but the latter from that of infinity. And in short, of all the opposition in the divine genera, we must refer that which is the more excellent to bound, but that which is subordinate to infinity. For from these two principles all things have their progression into being, even as far as to the last of things. For eternity itself participates at once of bound and infinity; so far indeed, as it is the intelligible measure, it par« ticipates of bound; but so far as it is the cause of a never-failing power of existing, it participates of infinity. And intellect, so far indeed as it is uniform, and whole, and so far as it is connective of paradigmatical measures, so far it is the progeny of bound. But again, so far as it pro- duces all things eternally, and subsists conformably to the whole of eter- nity, supplying all things with existence at once, and always possessing its own power undiminished, so far it is the progeny of infinity. And soul 4Ddeed, in consequence of measuring its own life, by restitutions and pe- riods, and introducing a boundary to its own motions, is referred to the cause of bound; but in consequence of having no cessation of motions, but making the end of one period the beginning of the whole of a second vital circulation, it is referred to the order of infinity. The whole of this heaven also, according to the wholeness of itself, its connexion, the order of its periods, and the measures of its restitutions, is bounded. But ac- cording to its prolific powers, its various evolutions, and the never-failing revolutions of its orbs, it participates of infinity. Moreover, the whole of generation, in consequence of all its forms being bounded, and always permanent after the same manner, and in consequence of its own circle which imitates the celestial circulation, is similar to bound. But again, in consequence of the variety of the particulars of which it consists, their unceasing mutation, and the intervention of the more and the less in the participations of forms, it is the image of infinity. And in addition to these things, every natural production, according to its form indeed, is ' jAmiv is omitted in the ofiginal* CHAP, IX. OF PLATO. 169 similar to bouDd, but according to its matter, resembles infinity. For these are suspended in the last place * from the two principles posterior to the onCy and as far as to these the progression of their productive power extends. Each of these also is one, but form is the measure and boun- dary of matter, and is in a greater degree one. Matter however is all things in capacity, so far as it derives its subsistence from the first power. There, however, power is generative of all things. But the power of matter is imperfect, and is indigent of the hypostasis which is generative * of all things according to energy. Very properly therefore is it said by So- crates that all beings are from bound and infinity, and that these two io- telhgible principles primarily derive their subsistence from God. For that which congregates both of them, and perfects them, and unfolds it- self into light through all beings is the one prior to the duad. And union indeed is derived to all things through that which is first; but the division of the two orders of things is generated from these primary causes, and through these is extended to the unknown and inefiable principle. Let it therefore be manifest through these things, what the two principles of beings are, which become proximately apparent from the oncj according to the theology of Plato.
CHAPTER IX.
In the next place let us show what the third ' thing is which presents itself to the view from these principles. It is every where therefore called that which is mixed, as deriving its subsistence from bound and infinity. But if bound is the bound of beings, and the infinite is the infinite of beings, and beings are the things which have a subsistence from both * Tor i(rx^T(0¥ it it necessary to read tax^»f* * The word yemfrtxiis is omitted in the original. ' TgiTov is omitted in the originaL Proc. Vol. I. Y 170 «N THE THEOLOGY BOOK IIL these, as Socrates himself clearly teaches us, it is evident that the first of things mingled^ is the first of beings. This, however, is nothing eke than that which is highest in beings, which is being itsdf, and nothing else than being. My meaning is, that this is endent through those things by ivhich we demonstrate that what is primarily being, is comprehensive of all things intelligibly, and of life and intellect. For we say that life is triadic vitally, and intellect intellectually; and also that these three things being life and intellect are every wh^e. But all things presubsist primarily and essentially in being* For there essence, life and intellect subsist, and tbe ffocnmit of beings* Life however is the middle centre of being, which \b denominated and is intelligible life. But iulellectis the boundary of benng, and is intdligible intellect. For in the intelligible there is intellect^ and in intellect the intelligible. There however intellect subsists intdli* gibiy, but in intellect, tiie intelligible subsists intellectually.
And essence indeed is that which is stable in being, and which is woven together wiih the first princtples, and does not depart from the one. But life is that which proceeds from the principles, and is connascent with in- finite power. And intellect is that which converts itself to the principles^ conjoins the end with the beginning, and produces one intelligible circle. The first of beings therefore is that which is mingled from the first prin^ ciples, and is triple, one thing which it contains subsisting in it essentially,, another vitally, and another intellectwaHy, but all things presubsisting in it essentially. I mean however by the first of beings essence! For essence itself is the summit of all beings, and is as it were the monad of the whole of things. In all things therefore, essence is the first. And in each thing that which is essential is the most ancient, as deriving its subsistence from the Vesta of beings. For the intelligible is especially this. Since intellect indeed is that which is gnostic, hfe is intelligence,, and being is intelligible. If however every being is mingled, but essence is being itself, prior to all other things essence is that which sub* sists as mingled firom the two principles proceeding from the one. Hence Socrates indicating how the mode of generation in the two principles differs from that of the mixture says, " that God has exhibited bound and CHAP. IX. OF PLATO; J7i infinity/' For they are unities deriving their subsistence from the one^ and as it were luminous patefactions from the imparticipable and first union. But with respect to producing a mixture, and mingling, through the first principles, by how much to make is subordinate to the unfolding into lights and generation to patefaction^ by so much is that which is mixed allotted a progression from the one^ inferior to that of the two principles.
That which is mixed therefore, is intelligible essence, and subsists pri- marily from [the first] God, from whom infinity also and bound are de- rived. But it subsists secondarily from the principles posterior to the unical God, I mean from bound and infinity. For the fourth cause which is effective of the mixture is again God himself; since if any other cause should be admitted besides this, there will no longer be a fourth cause, but a fifth will be introduced. For the first cause was God, who unfolds into light the two principles. But after him are the two principles bound and infinity. And the mixture is the fourth thing. If therefore the cause of the mixture is different from the first divine cause, this cause will be the fifth and not the fourth thing, as Socrates says it is. Far- ther still, in addition to these things, if we say that God is especially the supplier of union to beings, and the mixture itself of the principles is a union into the hypostasis of being, God is also certainly the cause of thiy primarily. Moreover, Socrates in the Republic clearly evinces that the good is the cause of being and essence to intelligibles, in the same manner as the sun is to visible natures. Is it not therefore necessary, if that which is mix* ed is primarily being, to refer it to the first God, and to say that it receives its progression from him? If also the demiurgus in the Timseus, consti- tutes the essence of the soul itself by itself from an impartible and a par- tible essence, which is the same thing as to constitute it from bound and infinity; for the soul according to bound is similar to the impartible, but according to infinity, to the partible essence;— if therefore the demiurgus mingles the essence of the soul from these, and again separately^ from same and different, and if from these being now preexistent, he constitutes the whole soul, must we not much more say that the first God is the cause of the first essence? That which is mixed therefore, proceeds^ as