172 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK III.
we have said^ from the first God, and does not subsist from tlie principles alone posterior to the one^ but proceeds also from these, and is triad ic* And in the first place indeed, it participates from God of ineffable union^ and the whole of its subsistence. But from bound, it receives hyparxis,. and the uniform, and a stable peculiarity. And from infinity, it receives power, and the occult power which is in itself, of all things. For in short, since it is one and not one, the one is inherent in it according to bounds but the, non-one according to infinity. The mixture however of both these, and its wholeness, are derived from the first God. That which is mixed therefore, is a monad, because it participates of the ones and it is biformed, so far as it proceeds from the two principles; but it is a triad, so far as in every mixture, these three things are necessary according to Socrates, viz. beauty, truth, and symmetry. Concerning these things however, we shall speak again.
In what manner, however, essence is that which is first mixed^we shaU now explain. For this is of all things the most difficult to discover, viz* what that is which is primarily being, as the Elean guest also somewhere says; for it is n:fost dubious how being is not less than non-being. In what manner therefore essence subsists from bound and infinity must be shown. For if bound and infinity are superessential, essence may appear to have its subsistence from non-essences. How therefore can non-es>- sences produce essence? Or is not this the case in all other things which subsist through the mixture of each other? For that which is produced from things mingled together, is not the same with things that are not min- gled. For neitheris soul the same with the genera, firom which, beingmingled together, the father generates! it, nor is a happy life the same with the life which is according to intellect, or with the life which is according to plea- sure, nor is the one in bodies the same with its elements. Hence it is not wonderful, if that which is primarily being, though it is neither bound nor infinity, subsists from both these, and is mixed, superessential natures them- selves not being assumed in the mixture of it, but secondary progressions from them coalescing into the subsistence of essence. Thus therefore being consists of these, as participating of both, possessing indeed the CHAP. IX. OF PLATO. 173 uniform from bound» but the generative, and in short, occult multitude from infinity. For it is all things occultly, and on this account, is the cause of all beings; which also the Elean guest indicating to us, calls being the first power, as subsisting according to the participation of the first power, and participating of hyparxis from bound, and of power from infinity. Afterwards however, the Elean guest defines being to be power, as prolific and generative of all things, and as being all things uni- formly. For power is every where the cause of prolific progressions, and of all multitude; occult power indeed being the cause of occult multi* tude; but the power which exists in energy, and which unfolds itself into light, being the cause of all-perfect multitude. Through this cause there* fore, I think, that every being, and every essence has connascent powers. For it participates of infinity, and derives its hyparxis indeed from bound,, but its power from infinity. And being is nothing else than a monad of many powers, and a multiplied hyparxis, and on this account being i» one many. The many however subsist occultly and without separation in the first natures; but with separation in secondary natures. For by how much being is nearer to the one, by so much the more does it conceal multitude, and is defined according to union alone. It appears to me also that Plotinus and his followers,. frequently indicating these things,, produce being from form and intelligible matter, arranging form ' as ana-, logous to the onej and to hyparxis, but power as analogous to matter.. And if indeed they say this, they speak rightly. But if they ascribe a certain formless and indefinite nature to an intelligible essence, they ap- pear to me to wander from the conceptions of Plato on this subject. For the infinite is not the matter of bound, but the power of it, nor is bound the form of the infinite, but the hyparxis of it. But being consists of both these, as not only standing in the one^ but receiving a multitude of unities and powers which are mingled into one essence.
* For wkffio^ in the original it it necessary to read ulos^ 174 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK HI CHAPTER X.
That therefore which is primarily being is through these things deno- minated by Plato that which is mixed. And through the similitude of it, generation also is mingled from bound and infinity. And the in- finite indeed in this is imperfect power; but the bound in it is form and the morphe of this power, dn this account we establish this power to be matter, not possessing existence in energy, and requiring to be bounded by something eke. We no longer however say that it is lawful to call the power of being matter, since it is generative of energies^ produces all beings from itself, and is prolific of the perfect powers in beings. For the power of matter being imperfect dissimilarly imitates the power of being j and becoming multitude in capacity, it expresses the parturition of mul- titude lin the power of being/ Moreover, the form of matter imitates ultimately bound, since it gives limits to matter, and terminates its infi- nifty. But it is multiplied and divided about it. It is also mingled with the privation of matter, and represents the supreme union of the hyparxis of toeing, by its essence always advancing to existence, and always tending to decay. For those things which subsist in the first natures according to transcendency, are in such as are last according to deficiency. For that also which is primarily being is mixed, is exempt from the bound of in- finite life, aad is the cause of it. But that which consists of the last * of forms and the first matter, is in its own nature void of life; since it pos- sesses life in capacity. For there indeed generative causes subsist prior to their progeny, and things perfect prior to such as are imperfect. But here things in capacity are prior to such as are in energy, and concauses " The punctuation in the latter part of this sentence in the original is erroneous: for instead of xcu rriv vf ffxfinirot; 'KXtfiou^ coSiva iuvufMi ytvofi^ivri, ro tAi}4o^ aTFetxaa-aro, it should be xat djv cv cxfiyp * For 'jrgwrotj here, it is necessary to read tirxotrot). For in this place, Frodus is speaking of body.
CHAP. X. OF PLATO. 175 are subject to the things which are produced from them. This however, I think, happens naturally, because the gifts of tfaefirst principles pervade as far as to the last of things, and not only generate more perfect natures, but also such as have a more imperfect subsistence. And on tiiis account that which is mixed is the cause of generation, and of the nature which is mingled here. The bound and infinity however, which are prior to being, are not only the causes of this nature, but also of the elenients of it, of which that which is mixed is not the cause, so far as it is mixed. For bound and infinity are twofold. And one kind of these is exempt from the things mingled, but another kind is assumed to the completion of the mixture. For I think it is every where necessary that prior to things that are mingled, there should be such as are unmingled, prior to things imperfect, such as are perfect, prior to parts, wholes, and prior to things that are in others, such as are in themselves; and this Socrates persuades us to admit not in one thing only, but also in beauty and sym- metry, and in all forms. If therefore the second and third genera of being and forms subsist prior to their participants, how can we assert that bound and infinity which pervade through all beings have their first sub- sistence as things mingled? It must be admitted therefore, that they are unmingled and separate from being, and that being is derived from them^ and at the same time consists of them. It is derived from them indeed, because they have a prior subsistence; but it consists of them, because they subsist in being according to a second progression.
The genera of being also are twofold; some of them indeed being fa- bricative of beings, but others existing as the elements of the nature of each being. For some of them indeed presubsist themselves by themselves,, jas possessing a productive power; but others being generated from these.-, constitute each particular being. Let no one therefore any longer won- der, how Socrates indeed in the Philebus establishes that which is min- gled, prior to bound and infinity, but we on the contrary evince that bound and infinity are exempt from that which is mixed. For each is twofold, and the one indeed is prior to beings but the other is in being; and the one is generative, but the other is the element of the mixture. Of this kind also, are the bound and infinity of the mixed life, each being the 176 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK HI.
element of the whole of felicity. Hence also each is indigent of each. And neither is intellect by itself desirable, nor perfect pleasure. It is necessary however, that the good should consist of all these, viz. of the desirable, the sufficient, and the perfect. Bound itself therefore and in- finity, which are separate, subsist according to cause prior to that which is mixed. But the bound and infinity which are mixed are more imperfect than the mixture. Hence, from what has been said, it is evident what the (things are of which the mixture consists.
CHAPTER XI.
In the next place, we must speak of the triad, which is consubsistent with this mixture. For n every mixture, if it is rightly made, as Socrates says, requires these three things, beauty, truth, and symmetry. For nei- ther will any thing base, if it is introduced into the mixture, impart recti- tude, since it will be the cause of error, and qf inordinate prerogative, nor if truth is at any time separated, will it suffer the mixture to consist of things that are pure, and which are in reality subdued, but it will fill the whole with an image and with non-being. Nor without symmetry will there be a communion of the elements, and an elegant association. Sym- metry, therefore, is necessary to the union of the things that are mingled, and to an appropriate communion. But truth is necessary to purity. And beauty to ord^r; which also renders the whole lovely. For when each thing in the mixture has a place adapted to itself, it renders both the dements, and the arrangement resulting from them, beautiful. Here therefore, in the first mixture, these three things are apparent, symmetry, truth, and beauty. And symmetry indeed is the cause to the mixture, that being is one; truth is the cause of the reality of its existence; and beauty is the cause of its being intelligible. Hence it is intelligible and truly being. That also nhich is primarily being is more uniform, and in- CHAP. Xlt OF PLATO. 177 telleet is conjoined to It, according to its &miliaritj with the beautifiiL But each participates of exifttence, because it is being deriyed from beings That which is mixed however, is supreme among beings, because it is united to the good. And it appears to me, that the divine lamblichus perceiving these three causes of being, defines the intelligible in these three, viz. in symmetry, truth, and beauty, and unfolds the intelligible Gods through these in the Platonic theology. In what manner indeed, the intelligible breadth consists of these, will be most evident as we pro* ceed. Now however, from what has been said, it is perfectly manifest why Socrates says that this triad is found to be in the vestibules of the good. For that which is primarily being participates of this triad through its union with the good. For because indeed the good is the measure of all beings, the. first being becomes itself commensurate. Because the former is prior to being, the latter subsists truly and really. And because the former is good and desirable, the latter presents itself to the view as the beautiful itself. Here therefore, the first beauty also subsists; and on this account the one is not only the cause of good, but likewise of beauty, zs Plato says in his Epistles. Beauty however subsists here occultly, since this order comprehends all things uniformly, in consequence of sub« sisting primarily from the principles [bound and infinity]. But where and how beauty is unfolded into light, we shall shortlj explain.
CHAPTER Xn.
Such therefore, is the first triad of intelligibles, according to Socrates in the Philebus, viz. bound, infinite, and that which is mixed from these. And of these, bound indeed is a God proceeding to the intdligible sum- mit, from the imparticipable and first God, measuring and defining all things, and giving subsistence to every paternal, connective,^ and undefiled 178 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK III.
genus of Gods. But Jnfinite is the never-failing power of Uiis God, un«^ folding into light all the generative orders, and all infinity, both that which is prior to essence, and that which is essential, and also that which pro- ceeds as far as to the last matter. And that which is mixed, is the first and highest order of the Gods, comprehending all things occultly, deriving its completion indeed through the intelHgible connective triad, but uni- cally comprehending the cause of every being, and establishing its summit in the first intelligibles, exempt from the whole of things.
CHAPTER XIII.
CHAPTER XIII.
After this first triad subsisting from, and conjoined with the oncy we shall celebrate the second, proceeding from thisj and deriving its comple- tion through things analogous ' to the triad prior to it. For in this also it is necessary that being should participate, and that the one should be participated, and likewise that this one'which is secondarily one, should be generative 6i that which is secondarily being. For every where parti- cipated deity constitutes about itself that which participates it. Thus whole souls render bodies consubsistent with their causes: and partial souls generate, in conjunction with the Gods, irrational souls. Much more therefore, do the Gods produce in conjunction with the one alt things. Hence, as the first of the unities generates the summit of being, so like- wise the middle unity coijstitutes the middle being. But every thing which generates, and every thing which makes or produces, possesses a power prolific of the things produced, according to which it produces, corroborates and connects its progeny. Again therefore, there will be a second triad unfolded into light analogously to thq first. And one thing ihdeed, is the summit of it, which we call one, deity, and hyparxis. But For «Aoy«y it is necessary to read «v«Aoy»y.
CHAP. Xni. OF PLATO. 179 another thing is the middle of it^ which we call power. And another thing is the extremity of it, which we say is that which is secondarily being. This however is intelligible life. For all things are in the intelli* gible, as was before demonstrated, viz. to be, to live, and to energize intel* lectually. And the summit indeed, of the intelligible order, is all things according to cause, and as we have frequently said, occultly. But the middle of it, causes multitude to shine forth, and proceeds from the union of being into manifest light. And the extremity of it, is now all intelli* gible multitude, and the order of intelligible forms. For forms have their subsistence at the extremity of the intelligible orders For it is necessary that forms should subsist first and become apparent in intellect. If there- fore being abides exemptly in the first mixture, but now proceeds, and is generated dyadically from the monad, there will be motion about it; and if there is motion, it is also necessary that there should be intelligible life. For every where motion is a certain life, since some one calls even the motion of material bodies life. That which is first therefore, in this second triad, may be called bound; that which is second in it, infinity; and that which is the third, life. For the second triad also is a God, possessing pro- lific power, and unfolding into light from, and about itself, that which is secondarily being. Here however also, the triad is analogous to the first triad.
But again, it is necessary to comprehend by reasoning the peculiarity of this triad. For the first triad being all things, but intelligibly and uni- cally, and as I may say, speaking Platonically, according to the form of bound, the second triad is indeed all things, but vitally, and as I may say, following the philosopher, according to the form of infinity, just as the third triad proceeds according to the peculiarity of that which is mixed. For as in the progression according to breadth, that which is mixed presents itself to the view as the third, so likewise in the progres- sion according to depth of intelligibles, the third has the order of that which is mixed with reference to the superior triads. The middle triad therefore, is indeed all things, but is characterized by intelligible infinity. For the three principles after the first, orderly distribute for us the intelli^ gible genus of the Gods. For bound indeed, unfolds into light the first triad; but infinity the second; and that which is mixed, the third. It is 180 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK 111.
infinite power therefore^ according to which the second triad is character rized. For being the middle, it subsists according to the middle of the first triad, being all things from all. For in each triads there is bound,, infinity, and that which is mixed. But the peculiarity of the monads being respectively different, evolves the intelligible order of the Gods. The middle triad however, thus subsisting, but I say thus, because it con- sistsof all the things of which the triad prior to it consists, yet it contains and connects the middle of intelligibles according to infinite power, and is filled indeed from a more elevated union, but fills the union posterior to * itself with the powers of being. And it is measured indeed, from thence unifonnly, but measures the third triad by the power of itself. And it abides indeed, in the first triad stably, but it estabhshes in itself the triad which is next in order. And in short, it binds to itself the intelligible centre, and establishes one intelligible coherence; causing indeed that which is occult and possesses the form of the one in the first triad, to shine fi^rth; but collecting the intelligible multitude of the third triad, and comprdiending it on all sides« The being however, which gives complex lion to this triad is mixed, in the same manner as the being of the triad prior to it,^ and receives^the peculiarity of life. Foi the infinity in this generates life.
It is likewise necessary that this triad should participate of the three things, symmetry, truth, and beauty* That which is primarily being however, principally subsists according to symmetry, which unites it, and conjoins it to the good. But the second triad, principally subsists accord-^ ing to truth. For because it participates of that which is primarily beings it is being, and truly being. And the third triad principally subsists according to the beautifuk For there intelligible multitude, order and beauty, first shine forth to the view. Hence this being is the most beaur tiful of all intelligibles. This however will be discussed hereafter. As there is a triad th^efore, in each of the mixtures, the first indeed, sym- metry especially comprehends and connects; the second truth, and the third beauty. And this induced the divine lamblichus to say, that Plato in these tliree defines the whole of the intelligible j^order}. For all are in each, but one of these predominates more in one of the intelligible CHAP. XIV. OFPj4ATa igj monads than in another. Moreover, the third triad presents itself to the Tiew after this. For it is necessary that the extremity of being should also be deified, and should participate of an intelligible unity. For beings are not more in number than the unities, as Parmenides saysynor are the unities more numerous thau beings; but each progression of being par* ticipates of the one; since this universe also, according to each part of itself, is governed by soul and intellect. By a much greater priority therefore, must the intelligible in its first, middle, and last hypostases^ participate of the intelligible Gods.
CHAPTER XIV.
CHAPTER XIV.
As the first unity therefore, after tibe exemrpt cause of alt things, unfoldsr into light intelligible being, and the second unity, intelligible life, thus also the third constitutes about itself, intelligible intellect, and fills it with divine union^ constituting poweras the medium between itself and being, through which it gives completion to this being,^ and converts it to itself. In thi& therefore, every intelligible multitude shines foFth to the view. For the whole of this being is intelligible intellect,, life, and essence. And it i» neither all things according to cause, in the same manner as that which is- primarily being, nor does it cause aH things to shine forth,, as the second being doesy but it is as it were all things according to energy, and openly.. Hence also, it is the boundary of all intelUgibles. For since the progres- sion of beings is accomplished according to similitude, the first being is most similar to the one; the second, is parturient with multitude, and is the origin of. separation; but the third, is now all-perfect, and unfolds into light in itself, intelligible multitude and form.
Farther still, as the first triad abides occultly in bound, apd fi;(es in itself every thing that is stable in intelligibles; but the second abides^