182 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK III.
and at the same time proceeds; so the third, after progression converts the intelligible end to the beginning, and convolves the order to itself. For it is every virhere the province of intellect to convert and converge to the intelligible. All these likewise are uniform [i- e. have the form of one] and intelligible, viz. the abiding, the proceeding, and the returning. For each of these is not asserted after the same manner in intelligibles. And the] inteUigible genus of Gods * is unical, simple, and occult, conjoining* itself to the one itself which is prior to beings; and unfolds * into light nothing else than the transcendency of the one. For these three triads, mystically announce that unknown cause the first and perfectly imparti- cipable God. The first of them indeed, announcing his ineffable union; the second his transcendency, by which he surpasses all powers; and the third, his all-perfect generation of beings. For as they are able to comprehend the principle which surpasses both the union and the powers of all beings, so they exhibit to secondary natures, his ' admirable transcendency; receiving indeed separately the unical power and domi- nion of the first God; but unfolding into light intelligibly the cause which is prior to intelligibles. For these Gods though they are allotted a sim- plicity which is equally exempt from all the divine orders, yet they fall short of the union of the father. Of this triad therefore, which/ converts all intelligibles to the first principle, and convolves the multitude apparent in itself to the stable union of the whole of things, one thing is bound, and unity and hyparxis; another, is infinity and power; and another is that which is mixed, essence, life, and intelligible intellect. But the whole triad subsists according to being, and is the intellect of the first triad. For the first triad is an intelligible God primarily. But the triad posterior to it is an intelligible and intellectual God. And the third triad is an in- telleptual God. These three deities also, arid triadic monads, give com- pletion to the intelligible genera. For they are monads^according to their deities; since all other things are suspended from the Gods, and also » The words rm ftera in the original immediately before to vot^ov tnov ytyoj, are to be rejected as superfluous. ^ rxf «iyci is omitted in the original* ^ For wnmsi it is necessary to read ixur/j$.
CHAP. XiV. ' OF PLATO. igS powers and beings. But they are triads according to a separate division. For bound, infinity, and that which is mixed, have a threefold subsist- ence; but in one place indeed, all things are according to bound; in another, all things are according to infinity; and in another, all things are according to that which is mixed. And in one place, that which is mixed is essence; in another, it is intelligible life; and in another, intel- ligible intellect. In this last therefore, forms subsist primarily. For the separation of intelligible?, unfolds the order of forms; because form is being, but is not simply being. Hence that which is primarily being, is being itself, and is that which is being. But that which is the second being, is power, proceeding indeed from the first being, and existing as it were a duad generative of the multitude of beings, but not yet being multitude. And that whicKis the third being, is itself the multitude of beings; being there existing with separation. For being is the exempt cause of those things which forms constitute divisibly. And of the things of which being is productive collectively, of these, forms are the cause in a way attended with separation. Because forms indeed, are causes productive of separation in their effects, and also because forms are called the paradigms of beings. Being however, is the cause of all things posterior to itself, but is not the paradigm of them. For paradigms are the causes of things which are separated according to existence, and which have diffe- rent characters of essence. After the one^ therefore which is prior to beings, that which is one-many occultly, arid the united subsists. On this account, it is that which is divided into multitude, and which tends from the uniform to the splendid. But the last of intelligibles, is that from which a certain distribution into parts originates, and which is compre- hensive of intelligible multitude.
184 on THE THEOLOGY BOOK lU.
CHAPTER XV.
SociiAT£s IheFefore, in the Philebus, affords qs such like auxiliaries to the theory of the intelligible triads. It is requisite however, not onlj to abide in these conceptions, but also to demonstrate the theology of Plato about these triads from other dialogues, and from them to point out oue truth adapted to the things themselves. We shall assume therefore, what is written in the Timseus, and shall follow our leader [Syrianus] who has unfolded to us die arcane mysteries of these triads, and conjoin with the end of what has been said the beginning of the following discussion. In theTimsBus therefore, Plato investigating what the paradigm of the whole world is, discovers that it is comprehensive of all intelligible ani- mals, that it is all-perfect, that it is tiie most beautiful of intelligibleSt thaj it is only-begotten, and that it is the intelligible of the demiurgus. He likewise denominates it animal iteelf, as being the intelligible paradigm of every animal, and of that which is the object of sense. Hence it is ne- cessary that this animal itself, because it is all-perfect, and the most beau- tiful of intelligibles, should be established in the intelligible orders. For though there is intelligible animal in the demiurgus, yet it is rather intellectual than intelligible, and is not the most beautiful of all intelligibles, but is second to them in beauty and power. For primary beauty is in the intelligible Gods. In the demiurgus also, there are not only four forms of the things contained in the worid, but there is all the multitude of forms. For in him the paradigms of individual forms presubsist. But animal itself is totally constitutive of all animals by the intelligible tetrad. The demiurgus likewise is not like animal itself only-begotten among be- ings, but subsists in conjunction with the vivific cause, together with which he constitutes the second genera of being, mingling them in the crater or bowl, in order to the generation of souls. For of the things of which in- telligible animal is effective and at the same time generative, of these the demiurgus is allotted the cause in a divided manner, in conjunction with CHAP. X?. OF PLATO. ^ fgj^ Iheerater. Hei»ce» u I have saicU animal iitsilf id exei&ptftbin fbe dfe- miurgus, and is, as Timaeus every where denominates it, intdKgible.
Nevertheless, because forms are first separated in it, and because it is all-perfect, it subsists in the third order of intelligibles. For neither that which is primarily, nor that wbieh-iO; secondarily 'being,' is all-perfect. For the former is beyond all separation; but the latter generates indeed^ and is parturient with intelligibles, but is not yet the multitude of beings. If therefore neither of these is multitude, how can either of them be all- perfect multitude? If however all-perfect multitude shines forth in the third triad of inleUigibles, as was a littld befivie deoMimtiiatod) but animal itaelf 15 the £iFSt pamdigm (for it is ccroprelMMive 4f{ aM inteUigiblls aaU mals, h an only-begotten parradigift, audi ts^ not coajmnei with any otfaef principle) it is necessary Uiat aoimal ]>ts6lf siMuld be eMablifllied b^^^qt^ log to this order. For ^ithar there will not be an intelUj^ble paradigniy ] fand m this case, how will seiisiblss i>e images of iwteMigibleB? er hew will the mtdligible Gods be the fatlierB of the whole of things?) or if ^ere is, it is the third in intelligibleB. For the natures which are priot to the triad in intelligibles^ are not aH'-perfect; since tfiey^ are ifixempt iVom the division into multitude. But the natures posterior to it are not only^egotten. For they proceed together with others; the mate indeed^ with the female, afid tiiose that are of a demiurgic together with those that are of a generative characteristic Nor are they the most foeant^l of inteNigibles; for beauty is in the intelligible. But animal itself is all- perfect, and at the same time only b^otten. The first paradigm of beings theoefore, is arranged in the third triad of intelligibles. MoreoTer, animal itself is eternftl, as Timaeus himself says. For says he, ^'the nature of animal is etemak'^ And again, in another place he asserts, ^ that the paradigm is through all eternity hdng/' If therefore it is eternal, it par- ticipates of eternity. And if that which participates is every where secondary to that which is participated, animal itself is secondary to eter- nity. And if it is through all eternity being, it is filled with the whold power of eternity. If this however be the case, it subsists proximately ' lit. Intelligible life, or life itself, or the fint life.
Proe. Vol. I. 2 A 186 ON THIS THEOLOGY BOOfi UL after eternity. For that which enjoys the whole of causes, is arranged proximately aft^ them« CHAPTER XVI.
Mqbboybr$ if eternity has the same ratio to intelligible animal, vfhkh time has to thait which is sensible, but the universe proxin^tely partici* pates of time (for time was generated together with the universe) it is c^tainty aecesaary that animal itself should primarily participate of eternity. Eternity th^efore is beyond the first paradigmi^ Jpor eternity ind^ m^tsures the existence of animal itself: but animal itself is oiea-^ isured and fiU^ with perpetuity from it. To whidi may be added, that we ass4E)rt eternity to be the cause of immortality to all thing?. Hence eternity is that which is primarily immortal. For as that which is pri* narily being is the cause of existence to all things, but that which is effective of form is itself prior to other forms, sq that which is the cause of perpetuity and immortality, i^ itself primarily immortal. The daemo* piacal Anstotle also rightly calls eternity immortal and divine, and that from whence the existence and life of all things are suspend0d. If how- ever it is that which is primarily immortal, and not according to partici* pation, but is as it were immortality and perpetuity, it will be life, pos* tessing from itself the ever, and exuberantly scattering the power oi per* petuity, and extending it to other things, so far a^ each is naturally adapt* ed to receive it. For the immortal is in life, and subasts together with Jife. Hence Socrates in the Phsedo,' after many and beautiful demon- strations of the psychical immortality, says, " God therefore, my dear Ce^es, and the form itself of life, are much more immortal.* Hence, in- telligible life, and the God who is connective of this life, primarily pos- sess the immortal, and are the fountain of the whole of perpetuity. But ' For ^mifof it U necessary to read ^cuictvu CHAP.Xyi.:0F.Pf.AfrO. jjy this is eternity. Eternity therefore has its subsistence in life^ and will be established in the middle of the intelligible order.
Farther still, it is necessary to assert that intelligible eternity is one of these three things, viz. that it subsists either according to being, or ac- cording to life, or according to intelligible intellect. But being, as the Elean guest says, according to its own nature, neither stands srill, nor is moved.. For if being is being to all tliihgs, and essence is a thing- of this kind, much more must this be tiid case; with intelligible essence, and that which is pirimarily being. For they: are nothing dse than essancft only* But being unfolds rootioa uid permanency, aiid the oth^ geaem of ^beings, in the second and third, progressions: of itself;. The first being therefore^ as we hane saidy is at One and the same'tiirie exempt from notion and permanency.. But eteraity according to Timaeus alndesm one. HeQce also tioie imitatea in; its motion the intelligible pennwiency of eternity^ i £iet!i^ty therefore does not subsist according, to that which is primafily bdng, nor. yet according to intelligible intelleet/ For ndther is soul time, which is ntoved through the whole of tim6. And.ia shorty in divine beings, that which is participated is every wfa^re eata^ bHshed above that which participates. But the eternal participates of eternity, just as that whiqh is temporal participates of tirn^e.: Eternity ther0fore is priot: to intelligible intellect, and posterior to being; so that it is established in the middle of the intelligible breadth. And as aoi^- mal itself is eternal, so likewise et€»*nity is that which is always bem'g. For aa animal itself participates of eternity, so eternity participates cif being, and is the cause of existence, of perpetual life, and intellectioif^ and measures the essences, powers and energies of all thiri^« *,t * It bbtre necessary to suppljoXX'ovSf^^tfiTftTovvouV'tiiiryoiirey, IM ON tfit£ THfiOLOOY BOOK HI.
CHAPTER XVII.
SiNCirB, hawe^er^ eternity mibstfete according to the middle centre of m«> triKgibieB, and animtd itself according to the extremity of them^ and the most spleDdid of that whidi is inteUigiblo, what is that which is the first of tttelli^ibles^ abd how h it de^dnoinated by Tinyaeus? He says there^ toe bf c<ieniity, that wl»le it abides in one, time proceeds accoixiing to mnnber; and that by motioh it adumbrates the permanency of eternity, but by mamiyeis its staible unK>n<. What therefore is that onct in whidi Tiwetts Bays«l«rfiity abid^ f For it k necefiswy cidier to say ^at it is tiM one of «fbet«rity, ^ the oit\e wt»ch transcends all intelligibies, or the vnfe of tlie £m triad. But if Mdeed, we say that it is the amparticipable Ob^ liow » it possible that any tinii^g can abkle in that which is exempt Ami tdl thinigs; Had which neither admits 1^ habititdt nor commnnidik isf tteO0lida)7 naitnres with itself? For every thing which abiiles in any thing) il in a. oertirin respect on all sides comprehended by that in which we 'say it abides. It is howe^r perfectly impossible tliat the first one f&kould either comprehend any beings or be coarranged with beii^. But tf «ny ooe ^o«ld ^i^pposetbat it is the one of eternity, in which Tinifi&os 1Miy«>et€rnity abides, in this case, eternity will be in itself. It is necessary 4fO\vever, that it should abide in itsdf, by having its subsistence in abiding in tliat which is prior to itself. For to abide in that wliich is prior to, is better than the establishment of things in themselves, in the same manner as it is more perfect tlian the collocation of better in less excellent natures. If therefore eternity abides in itself, to what shall we primarily assign permanency in that which is prior to itself? For it is necessary that this being more divine, should have its generation prior to that which is infe- rior to it. If therefore eternity can neither abide in itself, nor in the one which is prior to beings, it is evident that abiding in one according to Tiniseus, it is estahliahed in the one of the first triads or rather in the whole C3IAF. XTUI. OP PLATO. t$$ of tbat triad. For, as we have before obserired, tihe first triad it the eaiue of stabilitj to all beings, in the same manner as tiiie middle triad it ^ cause of their progresnon, and the third triad of their conver»on to Ikeiv principle.
CHAPTER XVIII.
Again thsrsfore^ three oiders of intelhgiblds present themselves to our Tiews aceordii^ to the doctriQe of TimaBUSt viai. animal ksetf^ etermtj, 9nd Itb^ one* And throu^ thb one, and the firm establishment in k^ eternity has fi^ed tiie intelligible kiagdom. Bat through eterstit j^ animal itself d^oes the bQundary of the intelligible Gods» according to a pet» petual and invariable sameness. And animal itself indeed^ having pro^ ceeded tetradically, is suspended from the duad in eternity. For etetnitj is the ever in covffumtion with being* But the duad in eternity participates of the intelligible monad, which Timsaus on this account denominat&i one> as being the monad aiid principle of all the intelligible breadth. Since otherwise indeed, he very properly calls the first triad one, in cooaequence of its being e^ecially characterized according to bound, demimioatang it from bound. But he calls the middle triad dyadically, eternity, con^ necting the names; because this triad is defined according to intelligible power. And he denominates the third triad animal itself, transferring' the appellation to the whole of it, from the extremity of the triad. The first triad therefore is the union of all the intelligibles, being in a certain respect coordinated with them. For the union is difiistrent from this whicli is ex- empt from intelligibles and imparticipable. It is also the supplier cf stable power. For all things are established on account of it. But eteiv nity is primary being, and is that which is primarily established. Hence, with respect to the permanency of the whole of things, we say that the ^ igd ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK UU tnttrnd is that an account fff^ioh this permanenej is effected; but that tjb!s wcood triad is thbt by which it is produced. For tlie firm estabUsb^ aieot of beings is indeed according to this second triad, butts onacc99m$ of the first. But the second triad is the proximate measure of all b^ingsi, and is coordinated with the things that are measured. There are also at one and the same time in it, bound and infinity; bound indeed, so far as it measures intelligibles; but infinity, so far as it is the cause of perpe- tuity, and the ever. For according to the oracle, eternity is the cause of never-failing life, of unwearied power, and unsluggish energy. Neverthe- less, eternity is more characterised by infinity [than by bound.] For it com- prehends in itself infinite time. And time indeed has bound and infinity in a divided manner. For according to its continuity, it is infinite; but ifeccordmg'to the now it is bounded. For the now is a bound. ' But eter« miy ertabHsbes bound and infinity in the same. For it is a unity and power. And according to the one indeed, it is bound; but according to power infinite; which time ' also demonstrates as from images; because ilie.raiddle triad [of intelligibles] has bound, infiinity, and that which h mixed. For whence is the bound of tin>e derived except from eterdal bound.^ For the temporal bound also is impartible, in the same manner as die bound of eternity is one. For the impartible is the image of the one^ Whence hkewise is the infinity of the continuity of time derived except from the power of the infinite? For the latter is a stable infinity, but the former an infinity which is moved. And as the latter stands still accord- ing to the oncj so the fbrmer is moved according to number. Since whence is the alliance of time with lives, except from the first principle [of life, eternity?] But time proceeds through all temporal life.
Again, therefore, from these things it is evident, that eternity subsists according to the middle of the intelligible Gods. For here there is infi^ iiite life, and the cause of all life, intellectual, psychical, and that which subsists partibly in bodies* But eternity is the father and supplier of in«* iinite life; since eternity is also the cause of all immortality and perpe- tuity; And Plotinus, exhibiting, in a most divinely inspired manner, the ' f xf^v9$ 18 omitted in the original.
CHAP. X\rill. Of PLATO. jpj peculiarity " of eternity, accordiDg to the theology of Plato, d^nes it tQ be infinite life, at once unfolding into light the whole of itself, and its own being. For establishing its life in the intelligible centre, and through the one indeed measuring its being, and fixing it in that which is prior to itddf, but through power causing it to be infinite, it unfolds indeed. the uniform transcendency of the first triad, but defines the termination of the Gods> and extends jfrom the middle on all sides, and to all the intelligible breadth. Moreover the third triad is filled indeed with intelligible life,^ and on this account is an intelligible animal, and the first animal.. For it pri- marily participates <^ the whole nature of thb life; but unfolds iato light in itself the first of forms, to which also the demiurgic intellect extending itself, constitutes the whole world, and is itself the intelligible univers^f and the apparent world the sensible universe. Hence also,. Plato denoHii^ bates animal itself all*perfect Or rather, if you are willing we will- speak thtts: that in this third triads there are bound, infinity, and that which is mixed, which we hare called intelligible intellect* Hence the whole triad is denominated only-begotten from the father which is in it:. For thi^ cause of bound imparte that which is uncoordinated with other things; and an exempt transcendency. For that ^hich comprehends, ftagrsTi* m^us, all such animals as are intelligible, will not be the second with any other; since again, it would be requisite that there shbuld be fmo* ther animal about it. Hence that which comprehends in one all intelli- gible animals is a whole. But every where whole is refen*ed * to bouild^ and parts to infinity. So that if on this account animal itsdf i» only-be^ gott«i» it will possess this peculiarity according to bound. But again, it is denominated eternal according to the power of it. For this poweo especially pertains to that which is eternaL For eternity is infinite power alnding in one, and proceeding stably. Animal itself, however, is all-perfect according to intellectv For that which unfolds in itself all the intelligible se{)aration of being, is intelligible intellect. And that inteU