. ' Instead of oiihoTyrrMf it is necessary to ^ead liMTttra^.
* l^anjs is omitted in the originaL * Instead of Tfo tow tftparo^x^nd wgo tii$ aictifm^, it is necessary to read frpo^ rovTrefaroif and Igl ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK «i; lect) according to tbe deckioD of Plato, will be a)l-|>erfe€t» vbidi compre* bends all intelligibles, and defines the boundary of the intelligible order. The only-begotten, therefore, the eternal, the all-perfectt bound, infinity; und that which is mixed, manifest the nature of intelligible animaL On this acconnt, Timseas also, in these three conclusions, r^ainds us of the paradigm, vie. in the conclusion which shews that the universe is only- be^tten, and again, in the generation of time, and in the all-peffeet ccmr^ preheusion of all animals.
If likewise Timsras says, that animal itself is tbe most beaijttiful of all intelligibles, and that this has tbe third order in intelligibies, it will aot %e wonderful. For it has be^i before aaserted by us, that every where the cause of the best mixture is the triad symmetry, truth, and beauity* But beauty principally shines forth in the third progression of being, im4 exhibits its luminous nature together with intelligible farms, just as truth shines forth in theseoond, and symmetry in the first progression of bew^ If^ however, truth is indeed the first, beauty the second, aud symme<ary ^ third, it is by no means wonderfiil, that according to order, truth and beaiity should be prior to symmetry; but that symmetry being more ap^ parent in the first triad than the other two, should shine forth as th^ third in the secondary progressions. ¥<x these three subsist occultly in the first triad. And truth indeed, so fiir as it is intelligible knowledge^ is in the second triad; but beauty so far as it is the form of fomis is in the third triad. For that this triad subsists there first, is evident from this, that tmth is primarily in that which is especially being, prior to know- ledge. But beauty, which pervades as far as to the last of b^ngs, is necessarily in the first being, from which the last of beings are derived. And the first symmetry is in that which is primarily mixed. For every mixture requires symmetry, in order that what is produced from it may be one certain thing. Though these three things, theref(^e, presubsist there, for we assume, as acknowledged universally, that symmetry is there, and the most beautiful of intelligible animals, as Timaeus says, yet at present we shall dismiss the further consideration of them, as we have elsewhere precedaneously discussed them, and have especially endea- voured to enforce what we conceive to be the opinion of Plato concerntJlIAP. XIX. OF PLATO. j03 mg dieir order. For we have spoken of these things m a ti^eat^ i^otiM^ ingof one book, in whieh we demonstrate Ibat truth is co-ordkrafee to 1^ philosopher^ beauty to the lover, and symmetry to the flauskian; «*d that 8u<^ as is the order of these iives, such also is the l^Iatiofi 0f lMi4i, beauty, and t^ymmetry to each other* Animal itself, therefore, may with the greatest jusitice^ be <»Skd ftMt beautiful, so far as it is eminently contained in iiitelligible beauty. 9c^ beauty is went to be tarried in forms, and is as it were the fo^tnof A)ln9My Pinfolding that whic^ is occelt in tke g^dy causitig its lovelioest to dllmt ibitb, and attracting to its owa ^lendor &e desire w4ikih is cMiceated about it. And to the good indeed, aU things fyoskess -a ^ditenft a»d ar<&Mfe tendency; bat we are excited to tibe beadtiHil wiCh ai^tonisAimeBt 4Ml iDotion. For the illwninatioii from it, and its ^6acy, ac^^ly petnM#e through ev^ry fiouj, jmd as being IJie tnost siotilbr df all thibgft to lAe jj^^MT, it GMv^erts levery iod that rari'^s it. l\ito M»id blso, beboltl^ tiHit wUeh is arcane ehining forth as it were to IJbe tifew^ ne^ces hi/ tibd ni* iiiires that which it sees, and iis astonished aboatit. And aft ib the flUHt holy of the mysteries, prior to the mystie spectacle^, those th«t aii6 itii- f»ated| are fteited with astonishment, so in intdligiUes prior to the pattiigi- pation of the good^ beauty shining forth, astonishes those that behold JMt, convertftthe^oul to itself, and b^tig e^tabliehed in the testibulefs [o^fAr gMMTj shows what that is which is in the ady ta, and what the tmnfldMl^ dency is of occult good. Thn>Bgh these things therefbre, let it be i^i^pi^ r«yi| whence beauty originates, and liow it first ^ines forth; and 4to that animal it^f is the most Ibeitatiftd of all intdligiMes« mm^^ €HA1T£R XIX.
Since, however, Tlmseus txiy^ XhaX.^jpqiBa»xj gxA digms have their subsistence in intdligible animal, and that aU these are . Proc Vol. t 1 B 194 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK Ul.
four, unfolding themselves first into light, according to the all-peFfcct te- tradf — 'this being the case, in the first place it deserve^ to be considered,, that as species or forms present themselves to the viejr in the intelligible,, .it is necessary by a much greater priority, that the genera of beings should pre-subsist in intelligibles. For it is not possible to admit that forms are intelligible, but that genera are intellectual only. But as forms exist •intelligibly indeed, according to their first subsistence, but the pleroma, or plenitude of them sliines forth in the intellectual ' gods, and divides that which is total into more partial decrements, produces the uniform, into multitude, and expands that which is exempt into co-ordinate causes, thus ^Iso the genera of being are occultly and indivisibly in intelligibles, .but are accompanied with separation in intellectuals. Andon this ac- count the first triad indeed has essence for that which is mixed;. but the second has life, where there was motion and permanency^ life both abiding /an4 proceeding; and in the third there are sameness and difierence. For the all-perfect multitude indeed, is through intelligible difference, but the united and that which is comprehensive in common of parte . according to genera, and according to one, is through intelligible same*^ . ness. And all these subsist intelligibly,. essenti?iny, and unifi)rmly in these triads.
In the first place therefore, this deserves to be inferred by those who love to survey the nature of things, and it is also fit that they should attri- bute co-ordinate genera to intelligible forms. For it neither was nor will ' be;lawful for genera to shine forth secondarily * after forms* Hence much more must it be admitted that genera subsist in the intelligible afler the above-mentioned manner, by those who admit tliat there are intelligible forms. In the next place, in addition to these things we must sur- vey how this tetrad of forms subsists^ and how it shines forth in intelli- gible intellect analogous to the principles. For it is divided into a mo- nad and triad. For so far as the idea of the celestial gods is arranged prior to the others, it is defined according to a divine cause. It appears ' For vo))roif it U necessary to read vofpoi^. ^ For^SfUTfpot it is necessary to read lwr»f<»i^ CHAP. XiX. OF PLATO. 195 however tome that intelligible intellect returning to the. principles of the -i?hole of things, according to the conversion of itself, it becomes the ple- nitude of forms, aiid is all things intellectually and at the same time in- telligibly, comprehending in itself the causes of beings, and being fiill of the ineffable and exempt cause of all things, constitutes the monad of the gods; whence also, Plato I think calls it the idea of the gods. But re- ceiving the intellectual causes of the three principles posterior to /Ae one, it exhibits three ideas after this, one of them indeed, being the cause of air- wandering and volant animals, this cause proceeding analogous to bound. Hence also it constitutes gods that are uniform, elevating, undefiled, united to the celestial gods, and which receive measures second in dignity to theirs, and have the same relation to those gods that govern generation co-ordinately, as the celestial gods have to these, according to exempt transcendency. But it exhibits the cause of the aquatic gods, co-ordi« nate with generative and infinite power, and which produces gods that are the suppliers of motion and prolific abundance, and that are the in- spective guardians of life;.since also this water itself which is the object of sense is under the dominion of effusion, infinite lation and ihdefinite- ness. Hence likewise it is attributed to vivific powers. And intelligible intellect exhibits the prccedaneous cause of terrestrial and pedestrious gods, in a manner adapted to the nature of that which is mixed. It also generates gods who contain the end of the whole of things, who are stable, ^vho subdue the formless nature of matter by the last forms, and fix the seat of mundane natures in the one centre of the universe. For deriving their subsistence from the first Vesta as it were, or seat of beings, they sta- bly define thjs mundane seat. Thus therefore forms first unfold them- selves into light in intelligible intellect, possessing their progression and order according to the first principles. It is necessary however, in addi- tion to these things, to infer this in the third place, following Timseus, that according to this triad, the multitude of intelligible parts shines forth, and the whole is divided into an all-perfect order of parts. For that, says he, of which other intelligible animals both according to one, and according to genera are parts, is the first and most beautiful paradigm of the universe. But if other intelligible animals are parts of this, it is 1^ ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK III.
e^deptdiat it iiiai wbple, comprehendmg in itself the multitude of ia- te)ljgiJble parts, and that it is connective of all intelligible parts. It must be inferred therefore that this triad is the first cause of production and fabrication. For if it contains the primary paradigms of things, it is evi^ d^nt that the orderly distribution of secondary natures, originates from it* And if it is an animal constitutive of all animals, every psychical extent, and all the extent of bodies, have their progression from thence; and it will also comprehend the intelligible causes of all Uie vivific and deraiur|fic orders.
GHAPTJER XX.
GHAPTJER XX.
S^trqH. coficeptions. therefore, as these, may be assumed from what h wriliea in the l^imseus' concerning the three intelligible triads, conformably to what is sai^ of them in the Philebus, surveying in each bound, infinity, aiid that ^hich is mixed. If you are willing also, we Avill show from what is scattered in tlie Sophista, that Plato had the same conception as we liave concerning the first principles. The Elean guest theitefore, in that dialogue, doubting against the assertion of Parmenides that the uni- verse is one, unfolding intelligible multitude, and shouing how it is sus* pend^d from thetme^ at first indeed, he argues from the one being £or being characterized by the one] and reminds us that this is passive to /A€ one, and participates of the one, but is not the one itself^ nor that which is prima- rily one. But afterwards, he produces the conception of the distinction between the imparticipable one and being, from whole. For if the one beiqg is a whole, as Parmenides testifies, but that which is a whole has parts, aind that which has parts, is not the one itself, the one being will not be ^ same as the one. In the third place therefore, he argues from the CHAIMtX. OFFLATa ^97 all«-peifect Fcmt that which is perfectly divided, and is oonnectiveof many parts, can never have the same subsistence as that which is entirely one. And having proceeded thus far he shows that what is void of mul- titude, is in its own nature exiempt from the one being, proceeding ib the demonstration of this through three arguments; And at one time indeed, he begins from the one being, at another time from whole, and at another from alL It is better however to hear the words themsdvear of Plato. That the one therefore, is not the same with the one being, he pmves through the following words^ " But what with respect to those who as&ert that the universe is one ^ IVDust we not enquire to the utmost 6f our power what they aay^ being' is? Certainly^ To this question therefore they may answer: Do you say tbare is* one^ thing albne? We do say so. Or will they not speak, in this ma3lne^^ Thi^* will. What then, do you* call being any thing? Yesi Da yomcall it tkeam; empioyingtwo namc^r respecting thesame thing? Ox how doyouisay? What will be their an- SMrer.alier this O gtiest^' Through this therefore, Plato' separatingfAe- Mr and being from each otfasr, and. showing that the conception of Hte me is different from that of beings and that these are not the same with each other» evinces th^ the most proper and primary one is-exetupt fttymthe. one being* For the one being does not abide purely in an hyparxisvoid' of multitude and possessing the form of one- But/*c om it^eifis escentpt' from ev&ry addition. For by whatevjer you may add to it, you will di- minish its supreme and inef&ble union. Hence it is necessary to arrange the one prior to the one bdr^g^ and to suspend the one being from that which is one alone. For if the (me and the one being were the same, and it made no difi^aioe to say one and being (since if tliey differed, the one would again be cl^angedfromUie one being,) if therefore tlie one diflferr in no respect from the owe being, alt things will be one, and there wiil not be multitude in beings, nor wiil it be possible to denominate things, lest there should be two diings, the thing and the name. For being ex- empt from all multitude, and all division, there wiB neither be a name of* any thing, nof any* discoosrse^ about it, but the name wtH appear to be the same with the thing. And neither will a name be the name of a things o:n the theology book rn.
but a name will be the name of a name, if athing is the same with a name, and a name is the same with a thing,* and a thing will be the thing of a tiling. For all things will exist about a thing the same as about a name, through the union of the thing and the name. If therefore, these things are absurd, and the one is, and also being, and being participates of the one^ the one and the one being are not the same.
But that whole also is not the same with the one^ Plato afterwards de- monstrates [in the same dialogue,] beginning as follows: " What then } Will they say that whole is different from the one being, or that it is the same with it.'^ Undoubtedly they will and do say so. If therefore whole is, as Parmeriides says, ** that which is every where similar to the bulk of a perfect sphere, entirely possessing equal powers from the middle; for nothing is greater or more stable than this:*' — if this be the case, it is ne- cessary that being should have a middle and extremities. And having these, there is every necessity that it should have parts. Or how shall we say ^ Just so. Nothing however hinders but that when it is divided, it may have the passion of the one in all its parts, and that thus the all and whole may be one. Undoubtedly. But is it not impossible ^that that which suffers these things should be the one? Why? Because according to right reason, that which is truly one should be said to be entirely with- out parts. It must indeed necessarily be so. But such a thing as we have just now mentioned, in consequence of consisting of many parts would not accord with the one!' Through these things therefore, the Elean guest arguing from wholeness after the one being, ^and also from the division of the parts of wholeness, demonstrates that the all is not one. For if whole is in beings, as Parmenides in his verses testifies it is, all things will not be the one. For the one is impartible; but whole possesses parts. Whole therefore is not the one itself. For that transcends all things and whole- ness; but whole is passive to the one. Hence also it is denominated whole; for it is not the one itself. Hence all things are not one void of separation and multiplication.
Moreover, the all is comprehensive of many parts. For whole indeed, ^ Inttead of ro trpayiLa rep ovofbori; it is necenary tx> read ro owfia rap irpay/xan.
CHAP. XX. OF PLATO. J99 consists at first of two parts; but the all possesses a multitude of parts, and participating of wholeness at the same time is all, as being perfectly distributed into parts. This therefore is not Me OTie itself ^ but is passive to the one. For the one itself is impartible. Biit it is impartible in such a manner as to be ex>empt from all parts. Hence the all is not the sanofe with tHe one. We therefore, have divided whole and the all, but Plato conjoins them, when he says:" Nothing however hinders but that when it is divided, it may have the passion of the one in all its parts, and that thus the all and whole may* be one/' Atthe'same time however, they are divided after the above mentioned manner. From these three' arguments therefore, the Elean guest separates the one from the participants of the one, and doubts against those who assert all things to begone, viz, the one being, whole and the all; of which the all indeed participates of whole, and is a self-perfect multitude,^ consisting of many parts; but whole par- ticipates of being* For being is not whole, as Parmenides testifies. These therefore, having such an order as this, is it not necessary that the argu- ments of Plato should be made conformably to the three intelligible' triads?. For it was tequisite, since Parmenides defined the one being in intelligibles, that Plato should from thence derive his demonstriations of the distinction between the one prior to intelligibles, and the one which is in intelligibles.. For the doubts against Parmenides, evince in many places that the one which is participated derives its subsistence from the imparticipable union. The one * therefore is not in these triads, but the one beingand whole. But with respect to the all, it is evident that it is in the extremity of the intelligible order. For that which is in every respect perfect, and all intelligible multitude, have their subsistence in that extremity. But whole is in the middle centre, and in the bond of the intelligible breadth. For whole is adapted to have a subsistence prior to the all; since the all is a whcJe, but whole is not necessarily aH. For the all is divided multitude; but that which contains multitude in itself, and which is not yet separated is whole. And this especially pertains to eternity. For eternity is the measure of all intelligible multitude, just asi ' For voBfctf here itis necessary to read voijt^.. * It ii requisite here to supply to sv..
£00 ON THE 13IEOLOGY BOOK III.
mboie k ^ cdn^ience and union cif tiw dlL But the one being is in the firet triad. For the catch especially the peculiarity of this triad, as Timaeus also has demoiDitrated. jAiid beiog which is occultly and intelli- gibly being, and which is the canse c£ eesenoe to all <s4iier things, prima^ xily shines £oTth tihere. Again tberafere,foikwiag the Elean guest, three triads present tfaemsdveB to our Tiew; tiie £mt indeed according to the one beii\g; ihe tseoraid ftooordin^ to whole; and the third according to the all. To which also the demnrgus <if the universe looking, adorns the sensible vmivenie, defining tiie visible natnra wkh reference to that jH^teH'^lde all; bat taowwith ref^^nmoe to the intetligiFble whc^enees. On which account also tirae is coaiin«ed. And as the iDtcDigible whole com- l^^haads two parts, butcontainstfae parte in<iiiet)Oftndary,aAer the same waABert time also is famuided by tke omt, but by its twofold parts is in* Snite, These thiti^ therefore, wie shall shorUy after moreditly discnss when we «peak concerning tiie Parmeoides. For tihe conceptions of the JEUean ^uest are ihie fntdda of the mystenes of the Parmenides. Before however we turs to the Parmeciides, let m discuss, if it is agreeable to you, the three triads irom the begwaiag, collecting <be ccmceptaon of I^ato Xrom lus assettkois that an scattered in many places.
CHAPTER XXL Thxbb are three triads thenelore, as we have frequently observed, and they are divided after this roaAner into bound, infinity, and that winch is mixed. Hence there are triple intelligible bounds, triple infinities, and triple mixtures. But of every intelligible triad, the bound in each is de- nominated father; the infiaite, poirer; and that which is mixed, intellect. And let not any one apprehend -that these names are foreign from the philosophy of Plat9. For it will appear that he uses these appeUations CBA^ XXI. OP PLATO. 20I itv tke before inentioned truuk more than any one. For lie denominates the first God father and lord in his EpisUesu It is evident however, that as the first God snrpatsses even the paternal order, the first paternal is m the inteltigibte Gods. For these arc they that are most eminently allied to^Ae ane, and that intelligibly unfold his inefi^ble and unknown union. }f therefore the first God is denominated one and father from the natures tliat pfosimatdy proceed from hinftji--- if this betbe case, as the intelligible Gods are primarily unities, so likewise they are primarily ^sttiiers. For Plato gives names ta the ineffable in a twofold respect, either from the summits of beings, or front all beings^. For tbiough these the transcen* dency e( the one is knowm Moreorer, the Elean guest calls being that which is powerful afid pawer. The first power therefore exists prior to being, and' is united to the father; but it particularly accords with beings which also it fHIs. Hence being as participating of po\fer is denominated powerfut; but as united to it, and producing aH* beings accord^m^ to^il^ it is called power- If however both liato himself, and hts most genuine disciples, frequently call all [true] beings intellect (on which account, in