SigPhi · Proclus

Elements of Theology

Page 35 of 47

lug that the most splendid of intelligibles subsists according to intelligible multitude, though multitude is there occult, and uniformly. For accord- ing to each order of divine natures, multitude is appropriately generate^ in the extremities^ CHAPTER XXIX.

Tbe intelligible number therefore of the intellectual genera, proceeds from these, and through these. And it possesses indeed properties in* ' It ia here necesaary to supjdy xai Ti)y ouvtuv rov tvof. * laatead of Ij fbtff^i^, I read ^ /atii^if.

CHAP. XXIX. OF PLATa j|85 Qomprehensible by human reasonings^ but which aredivided into two first effective powers, viz. the power generative of wholes, and the power which collects into union all progressions. For according to the monad indeed, it collects intellectual multitude, and conjoins it to intelligibles; but according to the duad it produces multitude, and separates it accord- ing to difference. And according to the odd number indeed, it collects the many orders into indivisible union; but according to the even num* ber, it prolifically produces into light all the genera of the Gods. For being established as the middle of the intelligible and intellectual Gods, and giving completion to the one bond of them, it is carried in its summit indeed, in intellectuals as in a vehicle, but being united to intelligibles, it evolves intdligible multitude, and calls forth its occult and unical nature into separation, and prolific generation. It also collects that which is in- tellectual into union and impartible communion. And not this only, but generating all tilings as far as to the last of things, according to the in- comprehensible cause of the duad and the nature of the even number, it again unites the proceeding natures and convolves them^ according to the monad, and the sameness of the odd number. Through unity indeed^ and the duad, it produces, ' collects and binds all things intelligibly, occultly, and in an unknown manner to the intelligible, and effects this even in the last matter and the vestigies of forms which it contains. But through the even and odd number it constitutes the two coordinations, viz. the vivific and the immutable, the prolific and the effective, all the impartible genera of fabricating and animal-producing powers, those powers that preside over a partible life, or partible production, the more intellectual and singular mundane natures, and which belong to the better coordina- tion, and those natures that are more irrational and multiplied, and which give completion to the subordinate series. And again, through this divided generation we may see that each of the proceeding natures, is united and at the same time multiplied, is indivisible and divided in its causes, and through diminution is separated from them. And we attri- bute indeed things that are more excellent and more simple to the nature ' It appears to me that the word wpoayti is wanting in the original, and I hare therefore suj^ lied it in the translation.

236 ^N THE THEOLOGY BOOK IV.

of the odd B«imber^ but things that are less excellent and more various^ to the nature of the even number. For every where indeed, the odd number is the leader of impartible, simple, and unical goods; but the even num- ber is the cause of divided, various, and generative progressions. And thus we may see all the orders of beings woven together according to di- vine number which is most ancient, intellectual, and exempt from all the dinumerated genera. For it is necessary that number should exist prior to the things that are numbered, and that prior to things which are separated there should be the cause of all separation, according to which the genera of the Gods are divided, and are distinguished in an orderly manner by appropriate numbers.

If therefore in intellectuals there are divisions, contacts, and separa* Uons of the proceeding natures, and likewise communications of coordi^ nate natures, it is necessary that number should be prior to intellectuals, which divides and collects all things intelligibly by the powers of itself. And if all things subsist occultly, intelligibly, in an unknown mamner and exemptly in this summit, ' there is a number of them, and a peculiarity unical and without separation. Number therefore subsists according to the middle bond of intelligibles and intellectuals, being indeed expanded above intellectuals through intelligible goods, but subordinate to intelligi- bles through intellectual separations. And it is assimilated indeed to intelligibles according to the power which is collective of many things into union, but to intellectuals according to the power which is generative of the many from the one. But from this highest place of survey of the intellectual Go<ls, it constitutes the first intellectual numbers themselves which have the nature of forms, are universal, and preside over the whole of generation and production. It likewise constitutes the second num«- bers, which are supermundane, and vivific, and measure the Gods that are in the world. But it constitutes as the third numbers, these celestial governors of the perpetual circulations, and who convolve all the orbs according to the intellectual causes of them. And it constitutes as the last numbers those powers that in the sublunary region connect and * It w rcquiiitc to suj^ljr in tbia place ly tjj otK^vrf^Ti Tptvrjj, CHAP. XXIX. OF PLAtO. gg^ bound the infinity and unstat^ nature of matter by forms, and numbers and reasons, tbroi^ which both the wholes and parts of all mortal na«> tures are variegated with proper numbers. But it every where connects^ the precedaneous and more perfect genera of the Gods by the odd num« bcr^ but the subordinate and secondary genera, by the even number, llius for instance, in the intellectual orders, it produces the female and the prolific according to the even number, but the male and the paternal according to the odd number. But in the supermundane orders, it cha«» racterizes similitude and the immutable according to the odd number^ but dissimilitude and a progression into secondary natures, according to the even number. For thus the Athenian guest also, orders that in sacred worship odd things should be distributed to the celestial, but even to the terrestriaf powers. And according to each of these genera that which is^ of a more ruling nature must be referred to the odd number, but that which is subordinate, to the even number.

The nature of number, therefore, pervades from on high, as far as to the fast of things, adorning all things, and connecting them by appropriate forms. For how could a perfect number comprehend the period of ^he wliole world, as tlie Muses in Plato assert that it does? Or how could numbers, some of which are productive of fertility, and others of sterility, comprehend the descents of souls? Or how could some of them define the ascents of souls in less, but others in greater periods, as Socrates says^ in the Pliadrus, where he delivers to us restitutions consisting of three thousand and ten thousand years? Or how could time itself which is nnically comprehensive of the psychical measures, proceed according to number, as Timaus says it does, unless divine number exists prior to all these, which imparts to all things a principal cause of order according to numbers? Since all things therefore subsist through numbers and forms, numbers are allotted a progression, from the intellectual summit. But forms have their generation from intelligible' forms. For forms subsist primarily in the third triad of intelligibles. But numbers are primarily in the first triad of intellectuals; since also in the effects of these, every^ number indeed is form^, but not every form is number.

*?br voiftov, it is necessary to read yo^rra-v.

288 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOBC IV.

If» however, it be. requisite clearly to unfold the truth, numbers are also prior to forms. For there are indeed superessential numbers, but there are not superessential forms. -And according to this reasoning every form is number, as also the Pythagoreans said. For Timaeus being a Pytha- gorean, not only asserts that there are intelligible forms, but also intelli- gible numbers; for he says that the intelligible forms are four. There however, number is intelligibly, and monadically according to cause. For intelligible animal is a monad, occultly containing the whole of number. But in the summit of intellectuals, number subsists separately, evolving the number which preexists in the monad according to cause and uni- formly. For there is a difference, I think, between saying multitude in its cause, and multitude from its cause, and between saying united, and saying separated multitude. And the one indeed is prior to number, but the other is number. So that according to Timaeus there are intelli- gible numbers together with forms, and prior to forms. And according to Parmenides, number is after multitude* For Timaeus calls uniform and occult multitude the number of forms. But since number is prima- ril^ in the Gods, but forms participate of the divine unities, he denominates the first ideas four. For monad and triad, were primarily indeed in the Gods themselves, but secondarily in intellectuals; and superessentially indeed in the former, but formally in the latter. In intelligibles therefore, multitude was unically; but in intellectuals it subsists separately. But where there is separation there also there is number, as we have frequently observed. Hence likewise all the genera of the Gods are from hence generated. And they are divided, the paternal indeed and generative among intelligibles and intellectuals; but the demiurgic and vivific, among intellectuals. And the genera indeed, that bind through simili- tude, are divided among supermundane natures; but those that are both exempt and distributed, are divided among the liberated Gods. And the celestial ' and sublunary genera, are divided among the mundane Gods. And in short, all the coordinations of beings receive their dis- tinction and separation from this order. From these things therefore, it is evident what the peculiarities are which intelligible and at the same « ' For uTotipavM, it seema to be nqctwxj tlut we should read oofavuL.

CHAP. XXX. OF PLATO. 339 time intellectual number possesses^ and of what it is the cause to the Gods.

CHAPTER XXX.

Iir the next place, we must likewise assert that the first number ' is of a feminine nature. For in this, difference first shines forth, separating the one from being, and dividing the one into many unities, and being into many beings. What therefore is the difference which is the cause of these tilings to the Gods? For if we should call it a genus of being, in the first place indeed, how is it prior to being? For separating being and the one^ it is arranged between both of them. But existing as a middle, it calls forth indeed the one into generations, but it fills being with generative cause. If therefore, it is prior to being, how will it be one certain genus of being? And [in the second place, after this, the different which is a genus of being, is every where essential, and is by no means inherent in superes- sential natures. But difference itself is primarily present with the uni- ties themselves, and separates and produces many unities from one. How therefore, can superessential difference ever come to be the same with the difterence which gives completion to essences?

In the third place, that different which is a genus of being,] presents itself to the view in intellectuals, according to the demiurgic order. But * difference itself is the intelligible summit of intellectuals. Andthefor^ mer indeed, subsists together with sameness; but the latter has by itself a subsistence in the intelligibles of intellectuals. To which also may be added, that in what follows, Plato as he proceeds makes mention of dif- ference, and generates it in conjunction with sameness. How therefore, does he effect the same conclusion twice? For he does not employ such * In the origlhal a^it/xo^ ii omitted* 290 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK IV.

a repetitioit as this in any one of the other conckisiCMMit For wbole^^ which he seems to assume twice, is not the same whole, vi^. the intd* lectual is not the same with the intelligible; but these, as we have said,> diflfer from each other. For how could he unfold to us the difierent progressions of divine natures,, if he collected the same conclusions ^ According to all these conceptions, therefore, we must separate the* diffi^renee which is generative of numbers from the genus of beings^ ' But if difference itself is not the nature of the different, but a power generative of beings, it will be collective of being and the one. For every where power is allotted an hyparxis of this kind. Fur through power the one participates of being, and being of the one. Power therefore was the cause, not of division, but of communion, of contact without separation, and of the habitude ef the one to being, and of being, to the ofie. Hence it is necessary that it should neither be arranged according to intelligible power, nor according to the intellectual differ- ence of beings; but that being the middle of both, it should subsist analogous to intelligible power, but should generate in the extremities of intellectuals the portion of the different. What else therefore is it than* the feminine nature of the Gods? Hence also it imitates intelligible- power, and is prolific of many unities, and of many beings. And how could it otherwise separate number from itself, and the forms and powers- of number, unless it was the cause of the divine progressions in a feminine manner. Multitude therefore is paternally in intelligibles, but maternally in intellectuals. Hence, in the former indeed, it subsists monadically, but in the latter according to number. Very properly therefore, in the second genera of the Gods also, union is derived from' the male, but separation from the female divinities. And bound indeed proceeds from the males, but infinity from the females. For the male is analogous to bound, but the female to infinity. The female, however,, differs from infinite power, so far as power indeed, is united to the father, and is in him; but the female is divided from the paternal cause. For power is not only in the female divinities, but is also prior to them, since the intelligible powers are in the male divinities, according to Timaeus, who says that the power of the demiu^us is the cause of the generation CHAP. XXXL OF PLATO. gpi of perpetual natures. Far [the demiurgus ^lyrs to the juobr Gods] ** imitating my power, produce and generate animals/' Power therefore, is prior to the male and the female, and i* in both, and postmor to both. For it perirades through all beings, and every being participates of pow^, as the Elean guest says. For power is every where. But the female participates in a greater degree of its peculiarity, and th&male of union according to bound. That the first number therefore, which presents itself to die view from intelligibles, is of a feminine nature, is through these things evjident m^ m CHAPTER XXXL m^ m CHAPTER XXXL It remains then^ that we should speak concerning the triadic division of it, following Parmenides. These three things therefore, have app^red to us from the b^inning, according to the separation of the one from being, viz. the one^ difierence, and being; di£ference not being the same either with the one or being. For though the one and being were ih intelligibles, yet difference first subsists here. Since however power abo\^ [i. e. in intelligibles] was collective, but here is the separator of the GftvemeSf there are not only three monadsi, but also three duads, vig. the ooe in conjunotion with difference, difference in conjunction with beiu^, and the one in conjunction with being. For difference also is the cause of A reparation of this kind, not preserving the union of the one being with ^nuine purity. There are therefore three monads, and three diMuis. But these likewise may become three triads, when we begin, at of^ time from the one^ at another time from being, and at another from diffidrence. Hence this tma4 subsists monadicaHy^ and triadically. But this is the same thing as to assert that diflerence and the first feminine nature generates in itself^ monadt, duads, and triads. For the divided 29J ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK IF.

assumption, generates for us different monads; but the conjoined assumption, duads, and triads, some^ indeed being vanquished by the one^ others by difference, and others by being. And thus far the first deity presents itself to the view, being proHficof the first numbers; according, to the one indeed, of unical numbers, but according to difference of generative, and according to being, of essential numbers.

Since however, from this deity which is intelHgible, that which i» posterior to it proceeds, it is evidently necessary that the moaad, duad, aad triad, shoula several Ij^ have prolific pow^r. These powers therefore^ Parmenides calls once,, twice, thrice. For each of these is a power which is the cause of the above-mentioned essences that produce either separately, or connectedly. For ttiere with respect to the generations of them, some of them are entirely peculiar, but others are common to^ secondary natures. The progeny therefore of these are, the oddly*odd, the evenly-even and the evenJy-odd/ And of these, the oddly-odd> indeed, as we have before observed, is collective into union of Tiie divine progressions. But the evenly-even is generative of wholes, and proceeds as far as to the last of things. The evenly-odd however, is mixed, having its subsistence from both the even and the odd. Hence we must establish the first as analogous to bound, but the second as analogous to power, and the third as analogous to being. And you may see, how indeed in the first order all things had a primary subsistence, viz. monad, duad, triad; but how in this order, all things are secondarily and subordi^ nately. And the mixture which is the triad, subsisted there indeed in one way, but here the evenly-odd subsists in another way. For there the extremes were odd, because they were intelligible; but here the even is more abundant, and the intelligible summit only is odd. For the middle of the triad is analogous to power. And there indeed, is the monad, which has all the forms of odd numbers according to cause, and the duad is there, which is occultly all the forms of even numbers, and also the triad, which is number primarily. But here both the odd and the even number now subsist in a twofold respect, in one place in * T« tf^fOfffjiro'oy is omitted in the original..

CHAP. XXXI. OF PLATO. > 295 an unmiogled, and in another in a mingled manner. All things there- fore, are here prolifically, but there, paternally and intelligibly. But that monad does not proceed from intelligibles, but subsists- in them in unproceeding union. Hence, after these, and from these, we may survey the whole of number subsisting according to a third progression. •*Fbr these things,"" says Parmenides, " preexisting, no number will be absent.** Every number therefore, is generated through these in the third monad, and both the one and being become many, difference separating each of them. And every part indeed of being participates of the one; but every unity is carried as in a vehicle in a certain portion of being* Each of these however, is mtiltiplied, intellectually separated, divided into minute parts, and proceeds to infinity. For as in intelhgibles, we attribute infinite multitude ta the third triad, so here,^ in this triad we assign infinite number to the third part of the triad. For in short every where, the infinite is the extremity, as^ proceeding in an all-perfect manner, and comprehending indeed all secondary natures,, but being itself participated by none of them. In xthe first monad therefore, thera were powers, but intelligibly. In the second,, there were progressions and generations^ but both intelligibly and intellectually. And in the third, there was all-powerful number, unfolding the whole of itself into light; and which also Parmenides denominates infinite. It is likewise especially manifest that it is not proper to transfer this infinity to quantity. For how can there be an infinite number, since infinity i»* hostile to the nature of number? And how are the parts of the one equal to the minute parts of being? For in infinites there is not the equal. But this indeed has been thought worthy of attention by those who were^ prior to us,.

294 ON THE THEOLOGV BOOK IV.

CHAPTER XXXIL Thb division therefore into three^ having been demonstrated by us, we .€ha11 briefly observe, that the one appears to be many according to this •Order^ ihe one itseif proceeding into a multitude of unities^ and being in A similar manner becoming generated in conjunclion with the one. For those three monads are the intelligible compn^ensions of all orders^ and they at once preside over all the progressions froni intelligibles^ produce idi 6f them in an ex<empt manlier^ and collect them to liie intelligible JCAases. Since howevter, Plotinus admits that number is prior to animal itself^ and says that the first being produces froin itself number^ and that this is estaUished as a medium between the one bdng^ and animal itad^ but is the basis and place of beings, it k worth while to speak likewise concisely about this. For if he says that animal itself has intdligibie and occult number, as comprehended in the mx)nad, he speaks rightly, find accords with Plato. But if he says that animal itself comprehends number, now separated, or which has a multiform subsistence, and is the fA-Qgeny of diflferettce, intelligible multitude is not a thing of this kind. For there indeed^ the on^ is being, and being is the one. Hence animal itself is according to all things perfect. But in number, the one is separated from being, and being from the one^ and each of the parts is no longer an rntelKgible whole, as an animal itself. For that is a whole of wholes:; and every where the one was with being in the parts of it, and animal itself was only-begotten. But number proceeded after the two- fold coordinations^ I mean the monad and duad, the odd and the even number. How therefore, can we place in animal itself the first number? If however, some one should say that number exists there, it is according to cause and intelligibly. But it is intellectually separated by difference. And farthej: still, in addition to these things, if anii;nal itself is surveyed by some one in the demiurgic order, and he denominates it the plenitude CHAP. XXXII. OF PLATO. 295