of forms, and the intdligible of the jdemiurgic intellect, it wiU thus have mtelleotual number, as beiog arranged near the intellectual end. But if he should call intelli^ble animal number, in this case there will l^e separation and difference in the Gods, whom we have asserted to be established above the whole of things, according to supreme union. For* all section and division originate from the intellectual Gods; since here* difference proceeds, adorning things in conjunction with the one and^ being. How therefore, does the division of the unities into minute parts^> or the multiform nature of beings pertain to intelllgibles? And how can the multitude of all forms accord with the first animal itself? For the* tetrad was there, divided by the monad and triad, a division of this kind; being adapted, to the third order of intelligible forms. For as the OQe* Being is a monad, but eternity is a monad and duad, (for to be is con« joined with the ever) so animal itself is a monad and triads Since^ however, it comprehends in itself tk^d, cause of all number^ Timseus^ denominates it the tetrad which is comprehensive of the four firsts effective causes. For the tetrad itself preexists as the fountain of all the^ production of fbrms. But in intelligibles the monad, duad and triads subsist unically; but in intellectuals in a divided manner.
Difference therefore necessarily generates all these for us with sepa-- ration. For every where, the first of subordinate natures have the peculiar form of the natures that exist prior to them/ Hence, the first multitudes- proceed indeed from the one^ but they are unical, without separation,^ and without number, imitating the one principle of the whole of things.- Very properly therefore, does Parmenides constitute multitude in intelli- gibles, according to the end [of the intelligible order]; but number in^ intellectuals according to the beginning [of the intelligible and at the* same time intellectual order.] And these are conjoined with each other.. Parmenides also pre-establishes unical and intelligible multitude, as the cause of intellectual 4iumbers. And Timaeus shows that animal itself is- only-begotten, because it was monadically the cause of the whole of?
* Bittead of wamtxov yotf ra rgwrtrroi tm v^rreifuvm, njv ihav i^u /togfijv, it U necessary tO tead^ ^dirr^^t; y^ ret wfwrirwt rm vfM^fuvm, rm rfoS^irrai/ifivm, tv i8my a^'i l^ffn** 296 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK IVthings, and not dyadically, nor according to divine diflFerenCc. That number however, is the first thing in intellectuals, we have abundantly shown.
CHAPTER XXXIIL But Parmenides begins to speak about it as follows: *^ Proceed therefore, and still farther consider this. What? We have said dmt ihe one participates of essence, so far as it is being. We have said bo.
And on this account the one being appears to be many.'' But he completes his discourse about the first monad thus: ^^ Are not three (things odd, and two even? How should they not?*' And about the second monad, as follows: " Hence there will be the evenly-even, and the oddly-odd, and the oddly-even, and the evenly-odd.'' But he ^completes his discourse about the third and all the succeeding triad, as follows: ** The one being therefore, is not only many, but it is likewise necessary that the one which is distributed by being should be many.
Entirely so." The first triad, therefore, of the intelligible, and at the same time, intellectual Gods, is through these things unfolded to us by Plato, and which possesses indeed, according to the first monad 'the first powers of numbers^ I mean the odd and the even, and is completed through these principles which were in intelligibles occultly, viz. monad, duad, triad. But according to the second monad it possesses the second powers of numbers which subsist from these [i. e. from the first powers].
For the section of the forms of the even number, is allotted a second order. And the oddly-odd is subordinate to the first odd numbers.
But according to the third monad, it possesses the more partial causes of divine numbers. Hence also, a separation into minute parts, infinity.
CHAP. XXXTV. OF PLATO- 2^7 ^U-perfect division) and unical and essential number are here; receiving indeed) the unical and the essential from unity and being, but the sepa- ration of number from difference. For every where difference is in the three monads, but it particularly unfolds the multitudes of numbers, according to the third monad, generates more partial Gods, and divides being in conjunction with the Gods. For neither is deity in these imparticipable, because unity is not separate from being, nor is essence destitute of deity, because neither is being deprived of the one.
Since however, all things are in each of the monads, but unically and intelligibly in the first, generatively, and acc<H*ding to the peculiarity of difference in the second, and intellectually, and according to being in the third; — this being the case, Plato when unfolding to us the first monad^ very properly begins from the monad, and proceeds as far as to the triad; but when teaching about the second, be begins from evenly-even num- bers, and proceeds as far as to those that are evenly-odd, both which belong to the nature of the even number. And when he adds the third monadt he begins from being, and recurs through difference to the one. For having shown that being participates of number, he from hence leads us round to unical number, employing the mode of conversion iq the conception of this monad.
CHAPTER XXXIV.
If, however, it be requisite to survey the unknown pecuKarity of divine numbers, and how the first order of intelligibles and intelledtuals, and number which subsists according to this order, is the most ancient of all numbers, in the first place, we should consider the infinity mentioned by Parmenides, and see whether he does not say that intelligible multitude is infinite on account of this number, in consequence of its being unknown Froc. Vol. I- 2 P 29fi ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK IV.
and incomprehensible by pdrti^l conceptions. For the all-pef*fect^ and all-powerful peculiarity of divine numbers is exempt from the compre* tension of partible natures, [such as ours]. They are therefore unknown, and on this account ar^ said to be inexplicable, and not to be investigated. , For number also in the last of things, and multitude, together with the knotrn have likewise the unknown. And we are notable to comprehend the progression of every number in consequence of being vanquished by infinity. The incomprehensibility therefore, of thjs power^which is un- known according to a discursive energy, is comprehended according to eau9e, in intelligible numbers and inultitudes. For there would not be a thing of this kiiKi in the last of numbers, unless the unknown preexisted in intelligible numbers, and unless the former were ultimate imitations of the exempt incomprehensibility of the latter.
In the second place, after this, we may also add, that unical lumbers ar^ likewise of themselves unknown. For they are more ancient tbaA beings, more single than forms, and being generative of, exist prior to the forms which we call intelligible. But the most venerable of divine ope^ rations manifest this, since they emj>loy numbers, as possessing an inefJai^ ble efficacy, and through these effect the greatest, and most arcane of works. And prior to these nature ineffably, according to sympathy, im* parts different powers to different " things, to some solar, but to others lunar powers, and renders the productions of these concordant with numbers. For in these monadic numbers also, the forms of numbers, such as the triad^ the pentad, and the heptad, are one thing, but the unions of the forms another thing. For each of these forms is both one, and multitude. Hence form is unknown according to the highest union.
If therefore, monadic number participates of a certain unknown power, much naore must the first number possess this peculiarity unically exempt from the whole of things. And besides this, we may also assume the anagogic power of numbers, not only because they define the periods of the physical restitutions, circumscribing our indefinite lation by appropriate measures, perfecting us according to these measures, and conjoining us stead of aAX^^oi^^ I read MhXo^s.
CHAP. XXXIV. OP PLATO. 299 to our first mues, imt becmise Jikeviae/number in a renarkable manner possesses a certain power of attracting to tnUh^ as Socrates says ia the Republic, leading us to intelligibles from a sensible nature* ' As there- fore, the last number is allotted this peculiarity, what ought we to say about the first number.^^ Is it not this, that it unfolds intelligible light, especially persuades to an establishment in intelligibles, and through its own order announces to us the uniform power of principles? If there- fore, we rightly assert these things, we shall in a greater degree admire Timaeus, who having placed time over the perfections of souls, and the whole world, through which it would become more similar to animal itself says, that tiiae proceeds accocdictg to nuiobert mod by Bimber nea- mre$ the «iuiitwoe ^f total souls. Aad as in inteNeetufite, nMiber 10 ^staWsbed above the i^elestial circulation, coUectiag aod caoaiof it to be o»e, ithiis also ia wawbleB Timse^ i«y«t t^at time baH^ luimlwr MoeMMwref •die celestial period«» aed compreheads in iteelf tbe fieilb causf^ «f tfa<^ per?- fectkm lOf tbe perimk. If also, Socrates ia tbe IU^Mibl«c» in Ihe ifwecb of Uie M«iseB, apeajcs about die one and entipe period of the uiuvene» whkek he tays a perli^t jiu«ber ooeiprcAiendit <1oe9 it not tfarough tbeae ihiags appear cbait dtviee number is perfective of wbdefi* *xkd mstores ihua to their priatiBe state, and that it measures all periods? The power Jiiieivisa of collecting things imperfect to the perfect, accedes to all things fhom number, wihich elevates souls from ihings apparent to those that Bjoe un- appanent, illuminates the whole world with the pesfecticMD of motion^ and ^defines to aU thifigs measures, and the order ^f periods^ But if not only^ a perfect number contains the period of a divine generated * nature, bul; another eecoo^^nmiiber after this is the Ira'd of better and worse genecar tiooSt as the si^e Socrates says, dunbar will not only restore things to their pristine state, but wiU also be of a generative natur^. And it is evid^Mit thatibese things subsist in a divided manner, s^ccording to the second and thiiHl periods of numbers; but at once, and conkactedly in the first of ' ImtMl 9I mmmfm iiii^f mm rw frnfrm vwi t^fi tuv^ifnuif foo^i^, it it nectMsry to find ttsnym ^itMs *£T«y i^erpetuallf tircvlitiiiigbody kcsUed by PJi|td» « $Unae gNWiited mtuit.
500 ^N THE THEOLOGY BOQK IV.
numbers. The first number therefore, is generative,, mensuratlve, and^ perfective of generated natures.
CHAPTER. XXXV.
The first order therefore of intelligibles and intelliectuals i& thus sur^^ Teyed by Parmenides. But after this the order which possesses the- middle place of intelligibles and intellectuals^ and which & little before we- called connective, presents itself to the view. It is however denominated in a three^fbld respect^ viz. one, many, whole, parts, finite, infinite. For since the separation of unities and beings from number, extends to it, the ^ne and being, which we have said difier^nce divides, become wholes^ But the things proceeding from these, are the parts^ of these; And wholeness indeed connectedly contains parts, but these are contained by their wholeness, in one way indeed, by the one^ but in another by being. Vor there indeed, I mean in the summit of the intellectual Gods, unity was the cause of multitude, at the san>e time being exempt from multi^ tude, and generative of the many. But here unity is coarranged with multitude. Hence also it is a whole which has reference to n^ny unities as to parts. Since however, the connective order is triple, one division of it being intelligibJe^ another intelligibte and intellectual, and another intellectual, the first monad indeed subsists according to <Ae one and the many; but the second^ according to whole and parts; and the third, ac- cording to the finite and the infinite. For where the first triad ends^ there the second has its beginning. Hence, in the triad prior to- thi&, Parmenides infers that the one is many. And in this triad, he concludes the same thing together with what remains. There however, the one was generative of infinites; but here the one is comprehensive of many^ the whole of parts, and the finite of infinites. Hence, there indeed^ unity is CHAP. XXXV. OP PLATO. 30I exempt from the many; but here it is coarranged with muTtitude. Hence also, the first coarrangement generates whole together with parts; but thft subsistence of whole and parts produces the finite and at the same time infinite. For these are successive to each other, viz. the one, the whple, the finite, and the things which are as it were in an opposite arrangement to these, the many, parts, infinites. And the one itself is indeed the prin^ eiple of the rest. But whole has now a habitude with respect to parts, and a representation of the duad, and proceeds into a coarrangement with reference to the parts^ The finite however, is now multitude, participating of bound and the one, and is as i^ were a triad. For it is neither bound alone, as the monad, nor infinite alone, as the duad, but it participates of bounds which is primarily a triad; Every thing finite therefore, is a whole, but not every whole is finite. For the infinite is a whole, wheUier it is multitude, or magnitude. And every whole indeed, is one, but not every one is a whole. For that which is without habitude to multitude is not a whole. The one therefore, is beyond whcde; but whole is beyond the finite; ' After the same manner alto, infinite partis are said to be the parts' of that which is finite. For the infinite of itself has no subsistence; by ;which also it is evident that the infinite is not in quantity in energy,' but^ in eapmcity. All parts however are not infinite. For according to bound they are characterized by one of the part». And again, parts indeed are many, but the many are not entirely parts. The many therefore, are prior to parts: and parts are prior to infinites. Hence, as the many are to the one^ so are parts to whole, aadso are infinites to the finite. And these three connectedly-containing monads, give completion to the middle order of intelligibles and intellectuals. For unity indeed, is the suppher of stable and intelligible connection to all the secondary orders. But wholeness connects the progressions of divine natures, and produces one habitude of the orderly distribution of wholes^ And the finite monad imparts by illumination to the conversions of second natures, connection .with the natures prior to them. And one of these indeed is analogous 502 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK IV.
to the ooe beingt <^ which accouBi ako it is iDteUigiye. But aocrtber is ^^nalq^us to the third order, io which thene was the vn^^ aad the duad which g€»erates iufinite multitude. Such is iJie connective triad, whach Panueaides cKhihits to us through these thiugs. The m^t therefore, is ooe aod many, whole and parts, fiaite and vo&mt^ multitude. Let no one however, be disturbed that Plato calls the wt or beiog iofioite mul- titude. For he calls the one and bang wheu they have proceeded and are divided, infifiite iu multitude. F<)r aU radititude iodeed, is lefetred to the intelligible mfiaity. But divided multitude, and which has pro- ceeded perfectly, is most signally infinite.
Since therefore, all the primary causes of intellectuals are in this triad, and all things are disseoiiiis^bed in its bosoms, the first Synodheus indeed, conapr^ends these causes as multitude, being himsdf aA mtelligihle unity, and the floww as it were of the triad. But the secend comprehends indeed tecondaarily these causes, but co-airanged and co-multiplMd with tiieni. And t^ tihird, together with all^perfect ^vision, coaaects the multitude comprehended in himself. Each of them also is connective, but one as bounding another as gii^ng completion to a whole* and ano- ther as uniting. Plato ther^re made^ and makes as he pr<x;eeds his demonstrations of the one. For the whc^ theory is concerning the one. But it is evident that being is co-divided with the one. For universally, it has been before observed, that every deity proceeding dience is parti- cipable, and that every portion of being participates of deity. It is ne* cessary however, not to stop in the one alone, but to consider the same peculiarity ' as imparted to beii^ in a secondary degree, since Plato ako produces the one itself by itself according to the diflferences of the divine orders; which occasions me to wonder at those who think that all the conclusions of the second hypothesis are concerning intellect, and do not perceive that Plato omitting being surveys the one itse^ by itself, as pro- ceeding and generated, and receiving different peculiarities. For how in discoursing concerning intellect could he omit being, according to which intellect has ite subsistence, power, and energy. For the one is beyond the nature of intellect; but bekig gives hyparxis M intellect^ aa^ mteltect is nothing ebe than being. This opinion however of these men may be confuted by many other arguments. But if the three connective Go4b are divided after the above-mentioned manner, and the intelligible c«at- nective deity is one many, but the intelligible and at the same time intel- lectual deity is whole and parts, and the intellectual is finite and infinite, each of them is very properly called much. For each of the Synoches according to his own peculiarity is a multitude. For the first about the many, receives many Synoches of a more partial nature. The second receives these according to parts. And the third, according to infinites* If therefore, there are certain partial Gods who are allotted this peculia- rity, they are comprehended in this first triad.
CHAPTER XXXVL CHAPTER XXXVL Moreover, it is easy for every one to see how these things accord with what is written in the Phaedrus. for the connective one accords with the back of the heaven that comprehends these. For the one and the back are the same, comprehending according to one simplicity the whole circulation. But whole is the same with the profundity of the beaven, and with as it were the bulk of it. For the celestial profundity is a whole extended from the back as far as to the arch. And end is the same with the arch. This therefore, is evident beyond every thing, 3tnd each of the other conclusions, is to be referred to the same concep- tions. Hence from what has been said, it may be collected, that these three things pertain in a remarkable degree to the Synoches, viz. the oney whole, and the end [or the finite]. For what is so able to connect multi- tude as the one which is co-arranged with it? What is so connectedly- comprehensive of parts as whole? And how is it possible that the end 304 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK IT.
[or bound,] should not be the cause of binding together things which are borne along to inOnity. It terminates therefore, their progression, and brings back their dispersed section to the one essence of connection* And ihus much concerning die connective triad.
CHAPTER XXXVIL Btrr the third, as they say, to the saviour, and let us also following Plato in what remains celebrate the perfective order of the Gods. Because, therefore, the end of the connective order was the finite, [or the bounded] the perfective order has extremes. For the end [or bound] is the extremity* There however indeed the one was said to be the finite, but here it is said to have an extremity, as receiving according to participation that which has the power of terminating many things. And there indeed, the one was end or bound, which also connectedly contains the infinite; but here having an extremity, it will also have a middle and beginning, and will be perfect. For that which receives its com- pletion from all these, is perfect. Here, therefore, the perfection which consists of parts is apparent. For the consummation of the parts, prtKluces the perfect. Moreover, because such a one as this has a middle and extremes, it will have the figure of a circumference, or it will be rectilinear^ or it will be mixed [from the right and circular line]. For all these require a middle and extremes; some indeed with sim- plicity, but others with connexion. Three peculiarities, therefore, again present themselves to our view; the first, indeed, being that which we fliaid was to have extremes; the second, being according to the perfect; and the third, according to figure. And there are also three perfective CHAP. XXXVIII. OF PLATO. SO5 leaders of wholes; one indeed beiDg intelligible; another, intelligible and intellectual; and the third, intellectuaL The intelligible leader, therefore, is said to have extremes, as being directly arranged under the end of the connective Gods, and in the boundaries of himself intelligibly comprehending all the intellectual orders. But the intelligible and intellectual leader, is defined according to the perfect, comprehending in himself the beginnings, middles, and ends of beings, and giving completion to the middle bond of the whole perfective triad. And the intellectual leader proceeds according to .triadic figure, being the cause of bound and divine perfection; and imparting termination to things indefinite, but intellectual perfection to things imperfect And this triad indeed is produced according to the connective triad* For the ^id in them is the cause of the possession of' the extremity. But it is also produced from itself. For that which has extremes, having become a whole, constitutes the perfect through end £ot bound]. But the perfect comprehending b^nnings, middles and ends, unfolds figure. And thus the perfective triad proceeds superaally^ as far as to the last of things, pervading to all things, and perfecting ix>t|i whole and partial causes.
CHAFfER XXXVIIL And do you not see how each of the triads conjoins the summit of itself with the €nds placed above it? For the one many was the end of the collective and unknown triad; and the same is the beginning c^ the connective triad. The end of the connective triad was the finite; and this again is the beginning of the perfective triads For to have extremes manifests that which consists of ends or bounds. And thus the whde Froc. Vol. I. 2 Q 306 t>N THE THEOLOGY BOOK IV., mkldle order is connected with and united to itself, and is truly the bond of total orders, itself establishing an admirable communion with itself,, but conjoining intellectuals to intelligibles, and convolving them to one impartible union; above indeed, having the intelligible and unknown triad, but in the middle producing the triad which is connective of progressions, and at the end, the convertive empire, through which it proximately converts the intellectual to the intelligible Gods.
For on what account does intellect look to itself^ and is^in itself? Is it not because it is on all sides finite or bounded, converges to itself, and convolves its appropriate energies about itself? But why is it perfect, and full of intellectual goods P Is it not because it first participates of the perfection [of the above mentioned] leaders, and subsists according, to tfa«m, possessing a self-perfect essence and intellectual perception P Ader what manner likewise, is it said to be a sphere, both by Plato,, and other theologistsp Is it not because it is Uie fi»t participant of figure, and is intellectually figured according to it? All conversion, therefore, all perfection, and every intellectual figure^ accede to the intellectual Gods,. firom the perfective triad. For the intelligible leader of perfection, gives perfection to the ends and summits atid hyparxet of. wholes. But the intelligible and intellectual leader terminates their progressions which extead from on high as far as to the last of things. ^ And the intellectual leader comprehends in his own perfection, the conversions of all the Gods, and bounds and perfects through figures. their progressions to infinity.
CHAPTER XXXIX.
CHAPTER XXXIX.
Looking therefore to this division, we may be able to survey causally many things which are to be found among other theologists. For why CHAP. XXXIX. OF PLATO. ' 307 is ooe of tbft dmtm of the unknowa tiiad carried in the first of the world»» but aoatheF m the middle breadth^ acid another ia the extremity? It is hoBtuse the first of these was uniform^ but the second proceeded aeeordiAg to difierence^ and the third, according to the infinite number of faeiap* But why of the three connective Gods, is the first empyrean, the leeood etiierial, and the third material? It is because the first indeed mibskU aofif^rding to the one^ and conqectedly contains the one world. S«t tke ffeeond subsist^ according to whole, and divides the etherial world* 4Ad the third according to the finite, and rules over material iofinitjf« But w^y again, are the Tdetarchs co-divided with the Sytiophfis? Beeause the first having extremes governs like a charioteer tJM wing of fire, ^ut the middle coiqpn^Qding b^innioga, ends and fluddles, perfects isther» which is also itself triple. And the third, which ^^npreheods according to one unioa, the orbicular, thp rectilinear, and the imxed' figiu», perfects unfigu^ed and formlei^ matter; ginng fi^rm indeed (fu^HUflotf^) to the inerratic Bpherct aad the first matter, by the orbicular; but te the piaaetary sphere, and the second matter, by the mixed figure.