distinguished from those ideas of perception from which the former kind are yet derived. The consequence is, that the brute neither speaks nor laughs, and lacks all those qualities which make human life great. The nature of _motives_, too, is different where abstract ideas are possible.
No doubt the actions of men follow of necessity from their causes, not less than is the case with the brutes, but the kind of sequence through thought which renders choice, _i.e._, the conscious conflict of motives, possible is different. Our abstract ideas, being incapable of being objects of perception, would be outside consciousness, and the operations of thought would be impossible, were it not that they are fixed for sense by arbitrary signs called words, which therefore always indicate _general_ conceptions. It is just because the brutes are incapable of general conceptions that they have no faculty of speech. But thought does not consist in the mere presence of abstract ideas in consciousness, but in the union and separation of two or more of them, subject to the manifold restrictions and modifications which logic deals with. Such a clearly expressed conceptual relation is a judgment. In relation to judgments the principle of sufficient reason is valid in a new form: that of the ground of knowing. In this form it asserts that if a judgment is to express knowledge it must have a ground; and it is just because it has a ground that it has ascribed to it the predicate true. The grounds on which a judgment may depend are divisible into four kinds. A judgment may have another judgment as its ground, in which case its truth is formal or _logical_. There is no truth except in the relation of a judgment to something outside it, and intrinsic truth, which is sometimes distinguished from extrinsic logical truth, is therefore an absurdity. A judgment may also have its ground in sense‐perception, and its truth is then material truth. Again, those forms of knowledge which lie in the understanding and in pure sensibility, as the conditions of the possibility of experience, may be the ground of a judgment which is then synthetical _a priori_. Finally, those formal conditions of all thinking which lie in the reason may be the ground of a judgment, which may in that case be called metalogically true. Of these metalogical judgments there are four, and they were long ago discovered and called laws of thought.
(1.) A subject is equal to the sum of its predicates. (2.) A subject cannot at once have a given predicate affirmed and denied of it. (3.) Of two contradictorily opposed predicates one must belong to every subject.
(4.) Truth is the relation of a judgment to something outside it as its sufficient reason. Reason, it may be remarked, has no material but only formal truth.
Chapter VI.
The third class of objects for the subject is constituted by the formal element in perception, the forms of outer and inner sense, space and time.
This class of ideas, in which time and space appear as pure intuitions, is distinguished from that other class in which they are objects of perception by the presence of matter which has been shown to be the perceptibility of time and space in one aspect, and causality which has become objective, in another. Space and time have this property, that all their parts stand to one another in a relation in which each is determined and conditioned by another. This relation is peculiar, and is intelligible to us neither through understanding nor through reason, but solely through pure intuition or perception _a priori_. And the law according to which the parts of space and time thus determine one another is called the law of sufficient reason of _being_. In space every position is determined with reference to every other position, so that the first stands to the second in the relation of a consequence to its ground. In time every moment is conditioned by that which precedes it. The ground of being, in the form of the law of sequence, is here very simple owing to the circumstance that time has only one dimension. On the nexus of the position of the parts of space depends the entire science of geometry.
Ground of _knowledge_ produces _conviction_ only, as distinguished from _insight_ into the ground of being. Thus it is that the attempt, which even Euclid at times makes, to produce _conviction_, as distinguished from insight into the ground of being, in geometry, is a mistake, and induces aversions to mathematics in many an admirable mind.
Chapter VII.
The remaining class of objects for the subject is a very peculiar and important one. It comprehends only one object, the immediate object of inner sense, the subject in volition which becomes an object of knowledge, but only in inner sense, and therefore always in time and never in space; and in time only under limitations. There can be no knowledge of knowledge, for that would imply that the subject had separated itself from knowledge, and yet knew knowledge, which is impossible. The subject is the condition of the existence of ideas, and can never itself become idea or object. It knows itself therefore never as _knowing_, but only as _willing_. Thus what we know in ourselves is never what knows, but what wills, the will. The identity of the subject of volition with the subject of knowledge, through which the word “I” includes both, is the insoluble problem. The identity of the knowing with the known is inexplicable, and yet is immediately present. The operation of a motive is not, like that of all other causes, known only from without, and therefore indirectly, but also from within. Motivation is, in fact, causality viewed from within.
Chapter VIII.
In this, the concluding chapter, Schopenhauer sums up his results.
Necessity has no meaning other than that of the irresistible sequence of the effect where the cause is given. All necessity is thus conditioned, and absolute or unconditioned necessity is a contradiction in terms. And there is a fourfold necessity corresponding to the four forms of the principle of sufficient reason:—(1.) The logical form, according to the principle of the ground of knowledge; on account of which, if the premisses are given, the conclusion follows. (2.) The physical form, according to the law of causality; on account of which, if the cause is given, the effect must follow. (3.) The mathematical form, according to the law of being; on account of which every relation expressed by a true geometrical proposition is what it is affirmed to be, and every correct calculation is irrefutable. (4.) The moral form, on account of which every human being and every brute must, when the motive appears, perform the only act which accords with the inborn and unalterable character. A consequence of this is, that every department of science has one or other of the forms of the principle of sufficient reason as its basis. In conclusion, Schopenhauer points out that just because the principle of sufficient reason belongs to the _a priori_ element in intelligence, it cannot be applied to the entirety of things, to the universe as inclusive of intelligence. Such a universe is mere phenomenon, and what is only true because it belongs to the form of intelligence can have no application to intelligence itself. Thus it is that it cannot be said that the universe and all things in it exist because of something else. In other words, the cosmological proof of the existence of God is inadmissible.
INDEX.(55) Aboriginals, interference with, iii. 411.
Absolute, conception of, has reality only in matter, ii. 94; how not to be conceived, ii. 94; Abstract, idea, knowledge, dependent on idea of perception, i. 45, 52, 53, ii. 258; insufficiency of, i. 72, ii. 248‐251; opposite of idea of perception, i. 7; philosophy must not start from, ii. 261 _seq._; relation to intuitive knowledge, ii. 54, 55, 91; use of, ii. 235, 238.
Absurd, sphere of, ii. 242; supremacy of, i. 418.
Academies, relation of, to great men, ii. 496.
Accident. See _Substance_.
Actors, why madness common among, iii. 168.
Æschylus, iii. 213, 378.
Æsthetic mode of contemplation, i. 253 _seq._, iii. 127 _seq._ Alemann, Matteo, iii. 363.
Alfieri, i. 247.
Allegory, nature of, use and abuse in art, i. 305‐313.
America, compared with Old World in physical regard, iii. 57, 58.
Ampere, iii. 44.
Anacreon, iii. 377.
Analytical method, ii. 309.
Anatomy, what it teaches, iii. 38; value of comparative anatomy, i. 187, iii. 84.
Ancients, the, their architecture, iii. 185, 188, 190; defects in religion, iii. 452; freedom of thought, ii. 394; inferiority of tragedy, iii. 213, 214; philosophy, ii. 400; Anger, evidence of primacy of will, ii. 442; psychological effect of, ii. 429.
Animals, lower, distinctive characteristics of animal life, i. 25, ii.
228, 232; essential identity with man, i. 192; do not laugh, ii. 280; nor weep, i. 486; naïveté of, i. 204; no passions proper, iii. 16; no knowledge of death, iii. 249; yet fear death, iii. 251; right of man over, i. 481 n.
Animal magnetism, iii. 76, 418, 419.
Anselm of Canterbury, ii. 125, 126.
Anticipation in art, i. 287, 288; in nature, iii. 103, 104.
Antinomies, criticism of Kantian, i, 39, ii. 107 _seq._; the two of natural science, i. 37 _seq._ Anwari Soheili, ii. 283.
Απαγωγη and επαγωγη, ii. 290.
Apollo Belvedere, i. 230.
Apperception, transcendental unity of, ii. 333.
_A priori_ knowledge, meaning and explanation of, ii. 33; directness, necessity, and universality of, i. 88; the basis of ontology, ii. 220.
Apuleius, ii. 352.
Architecture, its problem as a fine art, i. 276; beauty and grace in, i. 277, iii. 188, 189; combines beauty with usefulness, i. 280; its relation to light, i. 279, 280; to music, iii. 239 _seq._; to plastic arts and poetry, i. 280; its effects dynamical as well as mathematical, i. 279; comparison of antique and Gothic, iii. 189‐192.
Aristippus, ii. 319, 363.
Aristo of Chios, ii. 319.
Aristocracy of intellect, ii. 342.
Aristotle, his logic, i. 62; on scientific knowledge, i. 95; on essential conflict in nature, i. 192; his method, i. 239; on Platonic Ideas, i. 273, iii. 124; on derivation of ηθη, i. 378; his style, ii. 21; denies reciprocity, ii. 66; on the necessary and contingent, ii. 70; contented with abstract conceptions, ii. 71; on quality and quantity, ii. 76; his categories, ii. 85; on existence as subject, ii. 101; on infinity of world in space, ii. 110; atomism not necessary, ii. 111; infinity _potentia_ not _actu_, ii. 115; refutation of ontological proof, ii. 129; νους πρακτικος of, ii. 133; the seat of the virtues, ii. 137; treatment of art, ii. 153; an infinitely large body immovable, ii. 203; relation of number and time, ii. 205; Topi of, ii. 212; division of causes, ii. 217; on pure matter, ii. 219; on origin of things, ii. 220; real things and conceptions, ii. 244; meaning of his _nihil est in intellectu nisi quod ante fuerit in sensu_, ii. 258; eight spheres of, ii. 265; rhetorics of, ii. 285; his επαγωγη and απαγωγη, ii. 290; his syllogistic figures, ii. 297; analysis of syllogisms, ii. 303; on the prudent man, ii. 347; his ethics eudæmonistic, ii. 349; wonder the origin of philosophy, ii. 360; view of the Sophists, ii. 362; necessity of metaphysics, ii. 379; on invertebrate animals, ii. 481; on plants, iii. 34; difference between efficient and final cause, iii. 82; his freedom from physico‐theology, iii. 94; merits of his teaching as to organised and unorganised nature, iii. 95; nature a demon, iii. 106; music a cathartic of the feelings, iii. 174; poetry better than history, iii. 220.
Arithmetic, depends on _a priori_ intuition of time, i. 99, ii. 204.
Arrian, ii. 355 _seq._ object of, see _Idea_; subject of, see _Genius_; relation to and difference from philosophy, iii. 176, 177, 178; contrasted with history, i. 298, 315, iii. 224; inborn and acquired, i. 252; the two extremes in series of, i. 274 _seq._, 280; value and importance of, i. 345, 346, iii. 132; opposition between useful and fine, iii. 181.
Art, works of, tendency of, iii. 177; relation of conception to execution of, iii. 180; the abstract concept barren in, i. 303, 304, iii. 179, 180; why Idea more easily comprehended in than in nature, i. 252, iii. 132; co‐operation of the beholder required for enjoyment of, iii. 177; why they do not give all to the senses, iii. 178 _seq._; superiority of those dashed off in moment of conception, iii. 178, 180.
Asceticism, its source, i, 490 _seq._; its way of manifesting itself, i. 492, 493, 506, iii. 425; identity of its spirit in different countries and religions, i. 502, 503, iii. 433; difference of spirit of cynicism, ii. 352, 353.
Assertion, definition of, ii. 308.
Association of ideas, its root, ii. 324; kinds of, ii. 324; apparent exceptions to law of, ii. 327; the will secretly controls the law of, ii. 328.
Astronomy, what it teaches, iii. 37; source of its certainty and comprehensibility, i. 86; its method, i. 87; Ptolemaic, i. 64.
Athanasius, iii. 439.
Atheism, what strengthens the reproach of, ii. 379; not necessarily materialism, ii. 131, 132.
Atom, assumption of, not necessary, iii. 44 _seq._; has no reality, ii. 223; defence of, from porosity refuted, iii. 47.
Attraction and repulsion, forces of, constitute space‐occupation, ii. 224.
Augustine, recognises identity of all things with will, i. 165; cause of beauty of vegetable world, i. 260 n.; on original sin, i. 524; the will not free, i. 525; beginner of Scholasticism, ii. 12; on moral systems of ancients, ii. 349; spirit of his anti‐Pelagianism, ii. 368, iii. 421; on affections of will, ii. 412 n.; Autobiography. See _Biography_.
Avarice, the vice of old age, iii. 465 Avatar, iii. 426.
Axiom, definition, ii. 308.
Bacon, his conception of philosophy, i. 109; all movement preceded by perception, i. 137 n.; on atheism, ii. 131; his philosophical method, ii. 212; on the intellect, ii. 433; his moral character, ii. 447; influence of climate upon intellect, iii. 18; rejected teleology, iii. 91; on final causes, iii. 93; on Democritus, iii. 95; on rarity of genius, iii. 158.
Basilidians, iii. 305.
Bass. See _Music_.
Baumgarten, his æsthetics, ii. 153.
Beard, its efficient and final cause in man, iii. 88.
Beauty, the beautiful, two elements of, i. 270; source of pleasure in, i. 253 _seq._; everything beautiful, i. 271; why one thing more beautiful than another, i. 272; distinguished from grace, i. 289; distinguished from the sublime, i. 270; effect of natural beauty, i. 255, iii. 173, 174; beauty in art. See _Painting_, _Sculpture_, &c.
Beccaria, iii. 413.
Being, as the most general conception, ii. 236; in the professorial philosophy, ii. 288; relation of thought to. See _Thing in itself_; limitation of individual being the cause of philosophy, i. 135; contrast of seeing and being, iii. 392.
Bell, Sir Ch., i. 133, iii. 6.
Benedict, iii. 450.
Berkeley, on rareness of thought, i. 50; Bible, one metaphysical truth in Old Testament, iii. 423; ascetic spirit of New Testament, iii. 437, 458 _seq._; opposition of Old and New Testaments, i. 420, iii. 281, 441, 445; its historical material unsuited for paintings, i. 300.
Bichat, “_Sur la vie et la mort_,” ii. 470, 488; on circulation of blood, ii. 478; on organic and animal life, ii. 489; only animal life can be educated, ii. 491; Flourens’ attack on, ii. 494 _seq._; nervous and muscular systems in children, iii. 161; effect of emotions on organism, iii. 296.
Bio, on relation of science and philosophy, ii. 319.
Biography, superiority to history, i. 319 _seq._; difficulty of dissimulating in autobiographies, i. 320.
Biot, on colour rings, ii. 338.
Blood, the primitive fluid of organism, ii. 478‐481.
Body, the, an object among objects, i. 5, 14, 23, 25, 129, ii. 167; relation of physiological and metaphysical explanations of, i. 139 knowledge of, key to nature of things, i. 136, 141 _seq._; criticism of antithesis of body and soul as two substances, ii. 101‐104, 378, iii. 11.
Böhm, Jakob, everything half dead, i. 191; Bolingbroke, iii. 397.
Books, not so instructive as reality, ii. 244, 245; why they cannot take the place of experience, ii. 248, 249.
Boswell, his Life of Johnson, ii. 446.
Boureguon, Antoinette, iii. 435.
Brahmanism, recognises no beginning of world, ii. 94, 95, 108, 109; teaches metempsychosis, iii. 303.
Brain, metaphysically considered, ii. 468, 485, 486; physiologically considered, its origin and function, ii. 411, 462, 463, 470, iii. 9; its share in perception, ii. 185; its relation to the ganglia, ii. 483; the seat of motives, ii. 473; develops with organism, ii. 416, iii. 13, 14; as necessary for thought as stomach for digestion, ii. 237; the regulator of the will, ii. 470; the condition of self‐consciousness, iii. 12 _seq._; influence of its development upon intellect at different periods of necessity of sleep for, ii. 464; effect of over‐work on, ii. 255, 256; its variation in man the cause of individual character, i. 171; its activity in dreams, ii. 464; the brain of genius, iii. 159, 160; influence on agility of limbs, iii. 21; influence of noise on, ii. 196, 197.
Brandis, Ch. A., ii. 264.
Bridgewater Treatise Men, iii. 91.
Brougham, Lord, iii. 91.
Brown, Thomas, “On Cause and Effect,” ii. 207, iii. 92.
Bruno, Giordano, started from real in his philosophy, i. 33; his view of life, i. 366; lonely position in his age, ii. 13 n.; on finiteness of world, ii. 110; infinitely large body immovable, ii. 203; matter incorporeal, ii. 208, iii. 51, 54; no space beyond the world, ii. 265; his death, iii. 106; his motto, iii. 144.
Buddhism, its pre‐eminence over all religions, ii. 371; superiority to Brahmanism, i. 460, iii. 430; compared with Christianity, iii. 445 _seq._; its pessimism, i. 372, iii. 397; its mysticism, iii. 435; teaches that nature expects salvation from man, i. 492; its doctrine of metempsychosis, iii. 302; doctrine of Nirvana, iii. 308, 427.
Buffon, on intelligence of animals, i. 29; on style, ii. 247.
Bunyan, John, iii. 435.
Bundahish, iii. 391.
Burdach, sleep the original state, ii. 463; formation of muscles from blood, ii. 478; heart independent of nervous system and sensibility, ii. 479; reciprocal support of vegetable and insect world, iii. 90; on bees, iii. 100; on the burrying beetle, iii. 102; on maternal affection of animals, iii. 317.
Bürger, his place in German poetry, iii. 327; his parents, iii. 327; on love, iii. 336.
Burke, on the beautiful, ii. 153; on the apprehension of words, ii. 239.
Byron, an instance of connection of genius and madness, i. 247; brain weighed 6 lbs., iii. 160; Cabanis, on arterial and venous systems, ii. 257; his materialism, ii. 378; on passions of children, ii. 424; “_Des rapports du physique au moral_,” iii. 6.
Cæsar, Jul., on Druids, iii. 304.
Calderon, life a dream, i. 22; steadfast prince, i. 327; a crime to be born, i. 328, 458, iii. 420; his Semiramis, iii. 343; Camerarius, J., collection of emblems, i. 309.
Cannibalism, most palpable example of wrong, i. 431; hereditary, iii. 322.
Canisius, iii. 440.
Canova, iii. 195.
Caravaggio, iii. 197.
Caricature, character of species annulled by that of individual, i. 291.
Carové, iii. 440.
Carracci, Hannibal, his allegorical paintings, i. 306, 308.
Casper, on length of human life, iii. 301.
Castration, its significance, iii. 310; its use as a punishment, iii. 331.
Categories, criticism of the Kantian, ii. 48‐51.
Catholicism, compared with Protestantism in an ethical regard, iii. 448, 449.
Catullus, iii. 318.
Caucasian, an original race, iii. 58.
Cause, Causality, law of, ii. 214; corollary from it the permanence of substance, ii. 79; difference of cause and force, i. 144, 145; mysteriousness of connection between cause and effect, i. 174; temporal relation between cause and effect, ii. 209, 210; three kinds of causes, i. 149, 150; truth of doctrine of occasional causes, i. 178 _seq._; falseness of proposition “the effect cannot contain more than the cause,” ii. 213; to determine the cause of an effect, ii. 154.
Celibacy, from Christian and ethical point of view, iii. 425, 437, 438, 449, 450, 451.
Cellini, Benvenuto, his conversion, i. 510.
Celsus, on generation, iii. 310.
Certainty, distinguished from scientific completeness of knowledge, i. 83; superiority of immediate to indirect, i. 89, 90.
Change, nature of, i. 11; always conditioned by a cause, i. 170, ii. 211 _seq._ Character, as a force of nature, i. 370; difference between that of man and brutes, i. 170, 386, 387; that of man individual, i. 290; empirical, ii. 407; inherited from father, iii. 320 _seq._; relation of intelligible to empirical, i. 203, 207, 373 _seq._; a false inference from unalterableness of, i. 389; the acquired, i. 391‐397; explanation of inharmonious nature of, iii. 330; Chatham, Lord, iii. 324.
Chateaubriand, iii. 435.
Chemistry, what it teaches, iii. 38; Chevreul, experiments on light, iii. 62.
Childhood, character of, iii. 161 _seq._ Chiliasts, ii. 243.
garden, iii. 157.
Chladni, i. 344.
Choice, man larger sphere of, than brutes, i. 388; not freedom of individual volition, _loc. cit._ Christianity, different constituent parts of, i. 500, 501, iii. 422; its connection with Brahmanism and Buddhism, iii. 391, 421, 459; pessimistic spirit of, ii. 372, iii. 397, 436; symbol of, iii. 462.
Circle, the symbol of nature, iii. 267.
Classics, advantage of studying, ii. 239.
Classical poetry, distinguished from romantic, iii. 209.
Clouds, illustration of opposition between Idea and phenomenon, i. 235.
Comedy, distinguished from tragedy, iii. 218.
Composer, musical, i. 336.
Concept, conception, see _Abstract_; their construction the function of reason, i. 7, 50, ii. 235 _seq._; content and extent of, ii. 236; spheres, i. 55, 64; representatives of, i. 51; relation to word, i. 51; ii. 234, 238; relation to Idea, i. 301, 302; simple, ii. 236; distinct, ii. 237; abstract and concrete, i. 53; pure, ii. 385; 345 _seq._ Concrete, union of form and matter, ii. 215.
Condillac, his materialism, ii. 175, 187. iii. 45.
Condorcet, ii. 187.
Connections among men, foundation of, ii. 450.
Conscience, presupposes intelligible character, i. 474; is only affected by deeds, i. 387; the good, i. 482.
Consciousness, only a property of animal beings, ii. 336, 337, 414; origin, aim, and seat of, ii. 475; what common to all, and what distinguishes one from another, ii. 414, iii. 17 _seq._; self‐consciousness and that of other things, ii. 259, 412, 468, iii.
126; as opposed to unconsciousness, ii. 328; fragmentary nature of, ii. 330 _seq._; what gives it unity and connection, iii. 333; extinguished in death, iii. 255 _seq._ Considering things, ways of, i. 239; 121 _seq._ Contingent, contingency, conception of, ii. 67; misuse of word by pre‐Kantian dogmatists, ii. 70.
Conversation, ii. 343.
Copula, ii. 287, 288.
Coriolanus, ii. 136.
Corneille, iii. 203.
Correct, distinguished from true, real, &c., ii. 208.
Cosmogony, of Laplace, iii. 71, 72.
Cosmological proof, Kant’s refutation of, ii. 130.
Cousin, M., iii. 45.
Cramp, ii. 484.
Crime, chief cause of, iii. 412.
See _Punishment_.
Criticism, the Kantian, ii. 6‐11.
Crystal, its one manifestation of life, i. 202; its individuality, i. 171; becomes rigid in the moment of movement, iii. 37.
Culture, cannot make up for want of understanding, ii. 253 _seq._, 343 Cynicism, spirit and fundamental thought of, ii. 350 _seq._, iii. 388.
_Da Capo_, i. 342.
Davis, iii. 207.
sudden death, why prayed against, iii, 428.
Decameron, iii. 365.
Deductive method, ii. 310.
Delamark, ii. 318, 378.
Delirium, distinguished from madness, i. 248.
Denial. See _Will_.
Descartes, vortex of, i. 159; identifies will with judgment, 377, 385; his thought not free, ii. 13; on repetition, ii. 21, 25; ontological proof, ii. 126; made philosophy start from self‐consciousness, ii. 164, 165, 201, 400, iii. 59; the quantity of a motion, ii. 226; opinion of mathematics, ii. 323; slept a great deal, ii. 465; criticism of his doctrines, ii. 494‐496; relation to Spinoza, iii. 475.
Desire, the universal nature of things, i. 165, iii. 34; in a psychological regard, ii. 429.
Determinism, iii. 67‐69.
Δευτερος πλους, the second way of the denial of the will, i. 506, iii.
454, 465.
Dialectic, definition of, ii. 285.
Diderot, ii. 341, iii. 233, 272.
Diodorus the Megaric, ii. 72.
Diogenes the Cynic, i. 151, ii. 351, 352, iii. 388.
Dionysius the Areopagite, ii. 264.
Discovery, the work of understanding, i. 26, 27.
Disease, its nature, ii. 487.
Disgusting, the, i. 269.
Divisibility, infinite, of time, i. 13, ii. 221; of matter, iii. 46.
Dog, intelligence of, ii. 230‐232; wags its tail, ii. 280.
Dogmas, their relation to virtue and morality, i. 475 _seq._ Dogmatism, philosophical, opposed to criticism, ii. 10, 11; its fundamental error, iii. 27.
Domenichino, iii. 193.
Donatello, iii. 193.
Don Quixote, i. 311.
Drama, the, i. 321‐330, iii. 211‐219.
Drapery in sculpture, i. 296.
Dreams, distinguished from real life, i. 20 _seq._ Duns Scotus, i. 111, ii. 237.
Dutch paintings, i. 269.
Ebionites, iii. 458.
Edda, the, iii. 304.
the logical ego, ii. 333.
Egoism, origin, nature, and scope of, i. 427, iii. 416, 417; theoretical egoism, i. 135.
Egyptians, gospel of, iii. 436, 444.
Election, doctrine of, i. 378, ii. 149.
Elephant, intelligence of, i. 29, ii. 232, 233.
Eloquence, ii. 305, 306.
Emotion, its origin and effect, ii. 346, iii. 407, 408.
Encratites, iii. 438.
English, the, their faults, ii. 131, iii. 92.
ἑν και παν, iii. 65, 471.
Envy, iii, 389.
επαγωγη and απαγωγη, ii. 290.
Epiphanias, iii. 446.
Erigena, Scotus, ii. 319, iii. 432, 470, 471.
Error, definition of, i. 30, 103‐105; difference between man and brutes with regard to, ii. 243, _seq._; pernicious nature of, i. 45, ii. 241 _seq._; tragic and comic side of, ii. 243; how perpetuated, ii. 243, 341.
Esquirol, iii. 117, 328.
Essenes, iii. 437, 451.
_Essentia_ and _existentia_, their relation, ii. 129, 130; their union in pure matter, ii. 218.
criticism of Kantian, ii. 133 _seq._; of ancients, ii. 348, iii. 213, 214, 452.
Ethiopian, an original race, iii. 58.
Etiology, subject and scope of, i. 124 _seq._; its relation to the philosophy of nature, i. 182 _seq._ Euchel, Isaak, his “Prayers of the Jews,” ii. 98.
Euclid, criticism of his method, i. 90‐100, ii. 33, 164, 321‐323.
Eudæmonism, ii. 348 _seq._ ευκολος and δυσκολος, i. 407.
Evidence, distinction between empirical and _a priori_, i. 85; the predicate “evident” defined, ii. 308.
Evil, meaning of word, i. 426; the _punctum pruriens_ of metaphysics, ii. 375.
See _Pessimism_.
Existence, vanity of, iii. 382 _seq._; the end of, ii. 695.
Experiment, ii. 268.
Extension. See _Matter_.
Fear, effect of, ii. 429 _seq._; origin of belief in God, ii. 130.
Feeling, as sense of touch, ii. 195; as opposite of knowing, i. 66‐68.
Fénélon, i. 499.
Fernow, i. 293.
Fit Arari, ii. 444.
Flagellants, ii. 243.
Folly, a species of the ludicrous, i. 77 _seq._, ii. 277; a characteristic of genius, iii. 153.
Force, distinguished from cause, i. 144, 145, 174‐178, ii. 217; inseparable from matter, iii. 54 _seq._ Forms of thought, 86 _seq._; their relation to parts of speech, ii. 85, 86.
Frauenstädt, ii. 225.
Frederick the Great, ii. 133.
Freedom, as a metaphysical quality, i. 369 _seq._; intellectual, iii. 407; criticism of Kant’s doctrine, ii. 117 _seq._ French, national character of, i. 510; philosophy of, ii. 18, iii. 44, 45; poetry, iii. 209; music, iii. 244.
Friendship, i. 485.
Fright, effect of, ii. 429.
Froriep, ii. 209.
Future. See _Present_.
Galenus, ii. 297.
Gallows, iii. 456, 457.
Ganglia, their function in organism, ii. 484 _seq._ Gardening, landscape, i. 282; difference between English and old French, iii. 175.
Garrick, ii. 279, iii. 21.
_Gemüth_, distinguished from mind, ii. 458, 459.
Generation, and death essential moments in life of species, i. 365, iii.
270‐273; instinctive nature of act, iii. 309; act viewed subjectively and objectively, iii. 292, 293; inner significance of act, i. 423 _seq._, iii. 379; reason of shame connected with, i. 423, 378; existence a paraphrase of, iii. 377.
Genital organs, the opposite pole of the brain, i. 425, iii. 87, 310; independence of knowledge, i. 150, 426; difference of plants, animals, and man in respect of, i. 204, iii. 35; shame connected with, iii. 379; symbolical language of, iii. 380.
Genus, distinguished from species, iii. 123 _seq._; construction of logical genus, ii. 103, 104.
Geometry, content of, i. 9; Genre painting, i. 298.
Gichtel, iii. 434, 435.
Gilbert, ii. 196.
Giordano, Luca, iii. 198.
Given, the, ii. 23, 84.
γνωθι σαυτον, ii. 423.
God, origin of the word, iii. 446; egotistical origin of belief in, ii. 130; criticism of proofs for existence of, ii. 128‐133.
Goethe, his theory of colours, i. 26, 160, 245, ii. 433; on effect of human beauty, i. 285; on Laocoon, i. 293; on painting of music, i. 295; on fable of Proserpine and pomegranate, i. 311, 424; on indestructibility of human spirit, i. 362 n.; power of sight of suffering, i. 512; on persistency of error, ii. 4, 8; unknown to Kant, ii. 152; sensitive to noise, ii. 198; metamorphosis of plants, ii. 225, iii. 85; on skeletons of rodents, ii. 318; on Kant, ii. 340; never over‐worked, ii, 427; example of folly of childhood, ii. 456; on sleep, ii. 466; his love of natural sciences, iii. 39; his height, iii. 160; his childishness, iii. 163; his mother, iii. 327; Good, the conception, i. 464 _seq._; nature of the good man, 465, 480, iii. 306, 307.
Gorgias, ii. 281, 286.
Gothic architecture compared with antique, iii. 189‐192.
Gozzi, Carlo, i. 237, ii. 276, iii. 169.
Grace, distinguished from beauty, i. 289; Gracian, Balthasar, i. 311, ii. 250, iii. 401.
Grammar, relation to Logic, ii. 85‐87, 89.
Greatness in spiritual sense, iii. 150.
Guicciardini, ii. 447.
Guido Reni, iii. 191.
Haller, ii. 479, 488, iii. 328.
Hamilton, Sir W., ii. 323.
Happiness, is negative, i. 411‐413; from standpoint of higher knowledge, i. 456; impossible in an existence like ours, iii. 382, 383;