consequence being that he was finally defeated and overthrown. He did not realise that the tricks and artifices of war are beyond verbal computation. Duke Hsiang of Sung[153] and King Yen of Hsü[154] were brought to destruction by their misplaced humanity.
The treacherous and underhand nature of war necessitates the use of guile and stratagem suited to the occasion. There is a case on record of Confucius himself having violated an extorted oath,[155] and also of his having left the Sung State in disguise.[156] Can we then recklessly arraign Sun Tzŭ for disregarding truth and honesty?[157] Bibliography.
The following are the oldest Chinese treatises on war, after Sun Tzŭ.
The notes on each have been drawn principally from the 四庫全書簡明目錄 1. 吳子 Wu Tzŭ, in 1 _chüan_ or 6 篇 chapters. By 吳起 Wu Ch‘i (_d._ 2. 司馬法 Ssŭ-ma Fa, in 1 _chüan_ or 5 chapters. Wrongly attributed to 司馬穰苴 Ssŭ-ma Jang-chü of the 6th century B.C. Its date, however, must be early, as the customs of the three ancient dynasties are constantly to be met with in its pages.[158] See _Shih Chi_, ch. 64.
The _Ssŭ K‘u Ch‘üan Shu_ (ch. 99, f. 1) remarks that the oldest three treatises on war, _Sun Tzŭ_, _Wu Tzŭ_ and the _Ssŭ-ma Fa_, are, generally speaking, only concerned with things strictly military—the art of producing, collecting, training and drilling troops, and the correct theory with regard to measures of expediency, laying plans, transport of goods and the handling of soldiers[159]—in strong contrast to later works, in which the science of war is usually blended with metaphysics, divination and magical arts in general.
3. 六韜 Liu T‘ao, in 6 _chüan_ or 60 chapters. Attributed to 呂望 Lü Wang (or Lü 尙 Shang, also known as 太公 T‘ai Kung) of the 12th century B.C.[160] But its style does not belong to the era of the Three Dynasties.[161] 陸德明 Lu Tê-ming (550–625 A.D.) mentions the work, and enumerates the headings of the six sections, 文, 武, 虎, 豹, 龍 and 犬, so that the forgery cannot have been later than the Sui dynasty.
4. 尉繚子 Wei Liao Tzŭ, in 5 _chüan_. Attributed to Wei Liao (4th cent.
B.C.), who studied under the famous 鬼谷子 Kuei-ku Tzŭ. The 漢志, under 兵家, mentions a book of Wei Liao in 31 chapters, whereas the text we possess contains only 24. Its matter is sound enough in the main, though the strategical devices differ considerably from those of the Warring States period.[162] It has been furnished with a commentary by the well-known Sung philosopher 張載 Chang Tsai.
5. 三略 San Lüeh, in 3 _chüan_. Attributed to 黃石公 Huang-shih Kung, a legendary personage who is said to have bestowed it on Chang Liang (_d._ B.C. 187) in an interview on a bridge.[163] But here again, the style is not that of works dating from the Ch‘in or Han period. The Han Emperor Kuang Wu [A.D. 25–57] apparently quotes from it in one of his proclamations; but the passage in question may have been inserted later on, in order to prove the genuineness of the work. We shall not be far out if we refer it to the Northern Sung period [420–478 A.D.], or somewhat earlier.[164] 6. 李衞公問對 Li Wei Kung Wên Tui, in 3 sections. Written in the form of a dialogue between T‘ai Tsung and his great general 李靖 Li Ching, it is usually ascribed to the latter. Competent authorities consider it a forgery, though the author was evidently well versed in the art of war.[165] 7. 李靖兵法 Li Ching Ping Fa (not to be confounded with the foregoing) is a short treatise in 8 chapters, preserved in the _T‘ung Tien_, but not published separately. This fact explains its omission from the 8. 握奇經 Wu Ch‘i Ching,[166] in 1 _chüan_. Attributed to the legendary minister 風后 Fêng Hou, with exegetical notes by 公孫宏 Kung-sun Hung of the Han dynasty (_d._ B.C. 121), and said to have been eulogised by the celebrated general 馬隆 Ma Lung (_d._ A.D. 300). Yet the earliest mention of it is in the 宋志. Although a forgery, the work is well put together.[167] Considering the high popular estimation in which 諸葛亮 Chu-ko Liang has always been held, it is not surprising to find more than one work on war ascribed to his pen. Such are (1) the 十六策 Shih Liu Ts‘ê (1 _chüan_), preserved in the 永樂大典 _Yung Lo Ta Tien_; (2) 將苑 Chiang Yüan (1 _ch._); and (3) 心書 Hsin Shu (1 _ch._), which steals wholesale from Sun Tzŭ. None of these has the slightest claim to be considered genuine.
Most of the large Chinese encyclopaedias contain extensive sections devoted to the literature of war. The following references may be found useful:— 太平御覽 T‘ai P‘ing Yü Lan (983), ch. 270–359.
文獻通考 Wên Hsien T‘ung K‘ao (13th cent.), ch. 221.
玉海 Yü Hai (13th cent.), ch. 140, 141.
三才圖會 San Ts‘ai T‘u Hui (16th cent.), 人事 ch. 7, 8.
廣博物志 Kuang Po Wu Chih (1607), ch. 31, 32.
潛確類書 Ch‘ien Ch‘io Lei Shu (1632), ch. 75.
淵鑑類函 Yüan Chien Lei Han (1710), ch. 206–229.
古今圖書集成 Ku Chin T‘u Shu Chi Ch‘êng (1726), section XXX, _esp._ ch. 81–90.
續文獻通考 Hsü Wên Hsien T‘ung K‘ao (1784), ch. 121–134.
皇朝經世文編 Huang Ch‘ao Ching Shih Wên Pien (1826), ch. 76, 77.
The bibliographical sections of certain historical works also deserve mention:— 前漢書 Ch‘ien Han Shu, ch. 30.
隋書 Sui Shu, ch. 32–35.
舊唐書 Chiu T‘ang Shu, ch. 46, 47.
新唐書 Hsin T‘ang Shu, ch. 57–60.
宋史 Sung Shih, ch. 202–209.
To these of course must be added the great Catalogue of the Imperial Library:— 四庫全書總目提要 Ssŭ K‘u Ch‘üan Shu Tsung Mu T‘i Yao (1790), ch. 99, 100.
I. 計篇 LAYING PLANS.
This is the only possible meaning of 計, which M. Amiot and Capt.
Calthrop wrongly translate “Fondements de l’art militaire” and “First principles” respectively. Ts‘ao Kung says it refers to the deliberations in the temple selected by the general for his temporary use, or as we should say, in his tent. See § 26.
1. 孫子曰兵者國之大事 Sun Tzŭ said: The art of war is of vital importance to the State.
2. 死生之地存亡之道不可不察也 It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin.
Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected.
3. 故經之以五校之以計而索其情 The art of war, then, is governed by five constant factors, to be taken into account in one’s deliberations, when seeking to determine the conditions obtaining in the field.
The old text of the _T‘ung Tien_ has 故經之以五校之計, etc. Later editors have inserted 事 after 五, and 以 before 計. The former correction is perhaps superfluous, but the latter seems necessary in order to make sense, and is supported by the accepted reading in § 12, where the same words recur. I am inclined to think, however, that the whole sentence from 校 to 情 is an interpolation and has no business here at all. If it be retained, Wang Hsi must be right in saying that 計 denotes the “seven considerations” in § 13. 情 are the circumstances or conditions likely to bring about victory or defeat. The antecedent of the first 之 is 兵者; of the second, 五. 校 contains the idea of “comparison with the enemy,” which cannot well be brought out here, but will appear in § 12.
Altogether, difficult though it is, the passage is not so hopelessly corrupt as to justify Capt. Calthrop in burking it entirely.
4. 一曰道二曰天三曰地四曰將五曰法 These are: (1) The Moral Law; (2) Heaven; (3) Earth; (4) The Commander; (5) Method and discipline.
It appears from what follows that Sun Tzŭ means by 道 a principle of harmony, not unlike the Tao of Lao Tzŭ in its moral aspect. One might be tempted to render it by “morale,” were it not considered as an attribute of the _ruler_ in § 13.
5. 道者令民與上同意也 6. 故可與之死可與之生而民不畏危 _The Moral Law_ causes the people to be in complete accord with their ruler, so that they will follow him regardless of their lives, undismayed by any danger.
The original text omits 令民, inserts an 以 after each 可, and omits 民 after 而. Capt. Calthrop translates: “If the ruling authority be upright, the people are united”—a very pretty sentiment, but wholly out of place in what purports to be a translation of Sun Tzŭ.
7. 天者陰陽寒暑時制也 _Heaven_ signifies night and day, cold and heat, times and seasons.
The commentators, I think, make an unnecessary mystery of 陰陽.
Thus Mêng Shih defines the words as 剛柔盈縮 “the hard and the soft, waxing and waning,” which does not help us much. Wang Hsi, however, may be right in saying that what is meant is 總天道 “the general economy of Heaven,” including the five elements, the four seasons, wind and clouds, and other phenomena.
8. 地者遠近險易廣狹死生也 _Earth_ comprises distances, great and small; danger and security; open ground and narrow passes; the chances of life and death.
死生 (omitted by Capt. Calthrop) may have been included here because the safety of an army depends largely on its quickness to turn these geographical features to account.
9. 將者智信仁勇嚴也 _The Commander_ stands for the virtues of wisdom, sincerity, benevolence, courage and strictness.
The five cardinal virtues of the Chinese are (1) 仁 humanity or or good faith. Here 智 and 信 are put before 仁, and the two military virtues of “courage” and “strictness” substituted for 義 and 禮.
10. 法者曲制官道主用也 By _Method and discipline_ are to be understood the marshalling of the army in its proper subdivisions, the gradations of rank among the officers, the maintenance of roads by which supplies may reach the army, and the control of military expenditure.
The Chinese of this sentence is so concise as to be practically unintelligible without commentary. I have followed the interpretation of Ts‘ao Kung, who joins 曲制 and again 主用. Others take each of the six predicates separately. 曲 has the somewhat uncommon sense of “cohort” or division of an army. Capt. Calthrop translates: “Partition and ordering of troops,” which only covers 曲制.
11. 凡此五者將莫不聞知之者勝不知者不勝 These five heads should be familiar to every general: he who knows them will be victorious; he who knows them not will fail.
12. 故校之以計而索其情 Therefore, in your deliberations, when seeking to determine the military conditions, let them be made the basis of a comparison, in this wise:— The _Yü Lan_ has an interpolated 五 before 計. It is obvious, however, that the 五者 just enumerated cannot be described as 計.
Capt. Calthrop, forced to give some rendering of the words which he had omitted in § 3, shows himself decidedly hazy: “Further, with regard to these and the following seven matters, the condition of the enemy must be compared with our own.” He does not appear to see that the seven queries or considerations which follow arise directly out of the Five heads, instead of being supplementary to them.
13. 曰主孰有道將孰有能天地孰得法令孰行兵衆孰强士卒孰練賞罰孰明 (1) Which of the two sovereigns is imbued with the Moral law?
I.e., “is in harmony with his subjects.” Cf. § 5.
(2) Which of the two generals has most ability?
(3) With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven and Earth?
See §§ 7, 8.
(4) On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced?
Tu Mu alludes to the remarkable story of Ts‘ao Ts‘ao (A.D.
155–220), who was such a strict disciplinarian that once, in accordance with his own severe regulations against injury to standing crops, he condemned himself to death for having allowed his horse to shy into a field of corn! However, in lieu of losing his head, he was persuaded to satisfy his sense of justice by cutting off his hair. Ts‘ao Ts‘ao’s own comment on the present passage is characteristically curt: 設而不犯犯而必誅 “when you lay down a law, see that it is not disobeyed; if it is disobeyed, the offender must be put to death.”
(5) Which army is the stronger?
Morally as well as physically. As Mei Yao-ch‘ên puts it, 內和外附, which might be freely rendered “_esprit de corps_ and ‘big battalions.’”
(6) On which side are officers and men more highly trained?
Tu Yu quotes 王子 as saying: “Without constant practice, the officers will be nervous and undecided when mustering for battle; without constant practice, the general will be wavering and irresolute when the crisis is at hand.”
(7) In which army is there the greater constancy both in reward and punishment?
明, literally “clear;” that is, on which side is there the most absolute certainty that merit will be properly rewarded and misdeeds summarily punished?
14. 吾以此知勝負矣 By means of these seven considerations I can forecast victory or defeat.
15. 將聽吾計用之必勝留之將不聽吾計用之必敗去之 The general that hearkens to my counsel and acts upon it, will conquer:—let such a one be retained in command! The general that hearkens not to my counsel nor acts upon it, will suffer defeat:—let such a one be dismissed!
The form of this paragraph reminds us that Sun Tzŭ’s treatise was composed expressly for the benefit of his patron 闔閭 Ho Lü, king of the Wu State. It is not necessary, however, to understand 我 before 留之 (as some commentators do), or to take 將 as “generals under my command.”
16. 計利以聽乃爲之勢以佐其外 While heeding the profit of my counsel, avail yourself also of any helpful circumstances over and beyond the ordinary rules.
Capt. Calthrop blunders amazingly over this sentence: “Wherefore, with regard to the foregoing, considering that with us lies the advantage, and the generals agreeing, we create a situation which promises victory.” Mere logic should have kept him from penning such frothy balderdash.
17. 勢者因利而制權也 According as circumstances are favourable, one should modify one’s plans.
Sun Tzŭ, as a practical soldier, will have none of the “bookish theoric.” He cautions us here not to pin our faith to abstract principles; “for,” as Chang Yü puts it, “while the main laws of strategy can be stated clearly enough for the benefit of all and sundry, you must be guided by the actions of the enemy in attempting to secure a favourable position in actual warfare.” On the eve of the battle of Waterloo, Lord Uxbridge, commanding the cavalry, went to the Duke of Wellington in order to learn what his plans and calculations were for the morrow, because, as he explained, he might suddenly find himself Commander-in-chief and would be unable to frame new plans in a critical moment. The Duke listened quietly and then said: “Who will attack the first to-morrow—I or Bonaparte?” “Bonaparte,” replied Lord Uxbridge. “Well,” continued the Duke, “Bonaparte has not given me any idea of his projects; and as my plans will depend upon his, how can you expect me to tell you what mine are?”[168] 18. 兵者詭道也 All warfare is based on deception.
The truth of this pithy and profound saying will be admitted by every soldier. Col. Henderson tells us that Wellington, great in so many military qualities, was especially distinguished by “the extraordinary skill with which he concealed his movements and deceived both friend and foe.”
19. 故能而示之不能用而示之不用近而示之遠遠而示之近 Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near.
20. 利而誘之亂而取之 Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him.
取, as often in Sun Tzŭ, is used in the sense of 擊. It is rather remarkable that all the commentators, with the exception of Chang Yü, refer 亂 to the enemy: “when he is in disorder, crush him.” It is more natural to suppose that Sun Tzŭ is still illustrating the uses of deception in war.
21. 實而備之强而避之 If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. If he is in superior strength, evade him.
The meaning of 實 is made clear from chap. VI, where it is opposed to 虛 “weak or vulnerable spots.” 强, according to Tu Yu and other commentators, has reference to the keenness of the men as well as to numerical superiority. Capt. Calthrop evolves an extraordinarily far-fetched translation: “If there are defects, give an appearance of perfection, and awe the enemy. Pretend to be strong, and so cause the enemy to avoid you”!
22. 怒而撓之卑而驕之 If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irritate him. Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant.
I follow Chang Yü in my interpretation of 怒. 卑 is expanded by Mei Yao-ch‘ên into 示以卑弱. Wang Tzŭ, quoted by Tu Yu, says that the good tactician plays with his adversary as a cat plays with a mouse, first feigning weakness and immobility, and then suddenly pouncing upon him.
23. 佚而勞之親而離之 If he is taking his ease, give him no rest.
This is probably the meaning, though Mei Yao-ch‘ên has the note: 以我之佚待彼之勞 “while we are taking our ease, wait for the enemy to tire himself out.” The _Yü Lan_ has 引而勞之 “Lure him on and tire him out.” This would seem also to have been Ts‘ao Kung’s text, judging by his comment 以利勞之.
If his forces are united, separate them.
Less plausible is the interpretation favoured by most of the commentators: “If sovereign and subject are in accord, put division between them.”
24. 攻其無備出其不意 Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected.
25. 此兵家之勝不可先傳也 These military devices, leading to victory, must not be divulged beforehand.
This seems to be the way in which Ts‘ao Kung understood the passage, and is perhaps the best sense to be got out of the text as it stands. Most of the commentators give the following explanation: “It is impossible to lay down rules for warfare before you come into touch with the enemy.” This would be very plausible if it did not ignore 此, which unmistakably refers to the maxims which Sun Tzŭ has been laying down. It is possible, of course, that 此 may be a later interpolation, in which case the sentence would practically mean: “Success in warfare cannot be taught.” As an alternative, however, I would venture to suggest that a second 不 may have fallen out after 可, so that we get: “These maxims for succeeding in war are the first that ought to be imparted.”
26. 夫未戰而廟算勝者得算多也未戰而廟算不勝者得算少也多算勝少算不勝而況於無算 乎吾以此觀之勝負見矣 Now the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple ere the battle is fought.
Chang Yü tells us that in ancient times it was customary for a temple to be set apart for the use of a general who was about to take the field, in order that he might there elaborate his plan of campaign. Capt. Calthrop misunderstands it as “the shrine of the ancestors,” and gives a loose and inaccurate rendering of the whole passage.
The general who loses a battle makes but few calculations beforehand.
Thus do many calculations lead to victory, and few calculations to defeat: how much more no calculation at all! It is by attention to this point that I can foresee who is likely to win or lose.
II. 作戰篇 WAGING WAR.
Ts‘ao Kung has the note: 欲戰必先算其費務 “He who wishes to fight must first count the cost,” which prepares us for the discovery that the subject of the chapter is not what we might expect from the title, but is primarily a consideration of ways and means.
1. 孫子曰凡用兵之法馳車千駟革車千乘帶甲十萬千里饋糧則內外之費賓客之用膠漆之材 車甲之奉日費千金然後十萬之師舉矣 Sun Tzŭ said: In the operations of war, where there are in the field a thousand swift chariots, as many heavy chariots, and a hundred thousand mail-clad soldiers, The 馳車 were lightly built and, according to Chang Yü, used for the attack; the 革車 were heavier, and designed for purposes of defence. Li Ch‘üan, it is true, says that the latter were light, but this seems hardly probable. Capt. Calthrop translates “chariots” and “supply wagons” respectively, but is not supported by any commentator. It is interesting to note the analogies between early Chinese warfare and that of the Homeric Greeks. In each case, the war-chariot was the important factor, forming as it did the nucleus round which was grouped a certain number of foot-soldiers. With regard to the numbers given here, we are informed that each swift chariot was accompanied by 75 footmen, and each heavy chariot by 25 footmen, so that the whole army would be divided up into a thousand battalions, each consisting of two chariots and a hundred men.
with provisions enough to carry them a thousand _li_, 2.78 modern _li_ go to a mile. The length may have varied slightly since Sun Tzŭ’s time.
the expenditure at home and at the front, including entertainment of guests, small items such as glue and paint, and sums spent on chariots and armour, will reach the total of a thousand ounces of silver per day.
則, which follows 糧 in the _textus receptus_, is important as indicating the apodosis. In the text adopted by Capt. Calthrop it is omitted, so that he is led to give this meaningless translation of the opening sentence: “Now the requirements of War are such that we need 1,000 chariots,” etc. The second 費, which is redundant, is omitted in the _Yü Lan_. 千金, like 千里 above, is meant to suggest a large but indefinite number. As the Chinese have never possessed gold coins, it is incorrect to translate it “1000 pieces of gold.”
Such is the cost of raising an army of 100,000 men.
Capt. Calthrop adds: “You have the instruments of victory,” which he seems to get from the first five characters of the next sentence.
2. 其用戰也勝久則鈍兵挫銳攻城則力屈 When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, the men’s weapons will grow dull and their ardour will be damped.
The _Yü Lan_ omits 勝; but though 勝久 is certainly a bold phrase, it is more likely to be right than not. Both in this place and in injure”) instead of 鈍.
If you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your strength.
As synonyms to 屈 are given 盡, 殫, 窮 and 困.
3. 久暴師則國用不足 Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the State will not be equal to the strain.
久暴師 means literally, “If there is long exposure of the army.”
Of 暴 in this sense K‘ang Hsi cites an instance from the biography of 竇融 Tou Jung in the _Hou Han Shu_, where the commentary defines it by 露. Cf. also the following from the 戰國策: 將軍久暴露於外 “General, you have long been exposed to all weathers.”
4. 夫鈍兵挫銳屈力殫貨則諸侯乘其幣而起雖有智者不能善其後矣 Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardour damped, your strength exhausted and your treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to take advantage of your extremity. Then no man, however wise, will be able to avert the consequences that must ensue.
Following Tu Yu, I understand 善 in the sense of “to make good,” i.e. to mend. But Tu Mu and Ho Shih explain it as “to make good plans”—for the future.
5. 故兵聞拙速未睹巧之久也 Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has never been seen associated with long delays.
This concise and difficult sentence is not well explained by any of the commentators. Ts‘ao Kung, Li Ch‘üan, Mêng Shih, Tu Yu, Tu Mu and Mei Yao-ch‘ên have notes to the effect that a general, though naturally stupid, may nevertheless conquer through sheer force of rapidity. Ho Shih says: “Haste may be stupid, but at any rate it saves expenditure of energy and treasure; protracted operations may be very clever, but they bring calamity in their train.” Wang Hsi evades the difficulty by remarking: “Lengthy operations mean an army growing old, wealth being expended, an empty exchequer and distress among the people; true cleverness insures against the occurrence of such calamities.” Chang Yü says: “So long as victory can be attained, stupid haste is preferable to clever dilatoriness.” Now Sun Tzŭ says nothing whatever, except possibly by implication, about ill-considered haste being better than ingenious but lengthy operations. What he does say is something much more guarded, namely that, while speed may sometimes be injudicious, tardiness can never be anything but foolish—if only because it means impoverishment to the nation.
Capt. Calthrop indulges his imagination with the following: “Therefore it is acknowledged that war cannot be too short in duration. But though conducted with the utmost art, if long continuing, misfortunes do always appear.” It is hardly worth while to note the total disappearance of 拙速 in this precious concoction. In considering the point raised here by Sun Tzŭ, the classic example of Fabius Cunctator will inevitably occur to the mind. That general deliberately measured the endurance of Rome against that of Hannibal’s isolated army, because it seemed to him that the latter was more likely to suffer from a long campaign in a strange country. But it is quite a moot question whether his tactics would have proved successful in the long run. Their reversal, it is true, led to Cannae; but this only establishes a negative presumption in their favour.
6. 夫兵久而國利者未之有也 There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare.
The _Yü Lan_ has 圖 instead of 國—evidently the mistake of a scribe.
7. 故不盡知用兵之害者則不能盡知用兵之利也 It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils of war that can thoroughly understand the profitable way of carrying it on.
That is, with rapidity. Only one who knows the disastrous effects of a long war can realise the supreme importance of rapidity in bringing it to a close. Only two commentators seem to favour this interpretation, but it fits well into the logic of the context, whereas the rendering, “He who does not know the evils of war cannot appreciate its benefits,” is distinctly pointless.
8. 善用兵者役不再籍糧不三載 The skilful soldier does not raise a second levy, neither are his supply-waggons loaded more than twice.
Once war is declared, he will not waste precious time in waiting for reinforcements, nor will he turn his army back for fresh supplies, but crosses the enemy’s frontier without delay. This may seem an audacious policy to recommend, but with all great strategists, from Julius Caesar to Napoleon Buonaparte, the value of time—that is, being a little ahead of your opponent—has counted for more than either numerical superiority or the nicest calculations with regard to commissariat. 籍 is used in the sense of 賦. The _T‘ung Tien_ and _Yü Lan_ have the inferior reading 藉.
The commentators explain 不三載 by saying that the waggons are loaded once before passing the frontier, and that the army is met by a further consignment of supplies on the homeward march. The _Yü Lan_, however, reads 再 here as well.
9. 取用於國因糧於敵故軍食可足也 Bring war material with you from home, but forage on the enemy. Thus the army will have food enough for its needs.
用, “things to be used,” in the widest sense. It includes all the impedimenta of an army, apart from provisions.
10. 國之貧於師者遠輸遠輸則百姓貧 Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army to be maintained by contributions from a distance. Contributing to maintain an army at a distance causes the people to be impoverished.
The beginning of this sentence does not balance properly with the next, though obviously intended to do so. The arrangement, moreover, is so awkward that I cannot help suspecting some corruption in the text. It never seems to occur to Chinese commentators that an emendation may be necessary for the sense, and we get no help from them here. Sun Tzŭ says that the cause of the people’s impoverishment is 遠輸; it is clear, therefore, that the words have reference to some system by which the husbandmen sent their contributions of corn to the army direct. But why should it fall on them to maintain an army in this way, except because the State or Government is too poor to do so? Assuming then that 貧 ought to stand first in the sentence in order to balance 近 (the fact that the two words rhyme is significant), and thus getting rid of 國之, we are still left with 於師, which latter word seems to me an obvious mistake for 國. “Poverty in the army” is an unlikely expression, especially as the general has just been warned not to encumber his army with a large quantity of supplies.
If we suppose that 師 somehow got written here instead of 國 (a very simple supposition, as we have 近於師 in the next sentence), and that later on somebody, scenting a mistake, prefixed the gloss 國之 to 貧, without however erasing 於師, the whole muddle may be explained. My emended text then would be 貧於國者, etc.
11. 近於師者貴賣貴賣則百姓財竭 On the other hand, the proximity of an army causes prices to go up; and high prices cause the people’s substance to be drained away.
近, that is, as Wang Hsi says, before the army has left its own territory. Ts‘ao Kung understands it of an army that has already crossed the frontier. Capt. Calthrop drops the 於, reading 近師者, but even so it is impossible to justify his translation “Repeated wars cause high prices.”
12. 財竭則急於丘役 When their substance is drained away, the peasantry will be afflicted by heavy exactions.
Cf. Mencius VII. 2. xiv. 2, where 丘民 has the same meaning as 丘役. 丘 was an ancient measure of land. The full table, as given 丘 = 1 甸. According to the _Chou Li_, there were nine husbandmen to a 井, which would assign to each man the goodly allowance of 100 畝 (of which 6.6 now go to an acre). What the values of these measures were in Sun Tzŭ’s time is not known with any certainty.
The lineal 尺, however, is supposed to have been about 20 cm. 急 may include levies of men, as well as other exactions.
13. 力屈財殫中原內虛於家百姓之費十去其七 14. 公家之費破車罷馬甲胄矢弩戟楯蔽櫓丘牛大車十去其六 With this loss of substance and exhaustion of strength, the homes of the people will be stripped bare, and three-tenths of their incomes will be dissipated; The _Yü Lan_ omits 財殫. I would propose the emended reading 力屈則中, etc. In view of the fact that we have 財竭 in the two preceding paragraphs, it seems probable that 財 is a scribe’s mistake for 則, 殫 having been added afterwards to make sense.
中原內虛於家, literally: “Within the middle plains there is emptiness in the homes.” For 中原 cf. _Shih Ching_ II. 3. vi. 3 and II. 5. ii. 3. With regard to 十去其七, Tu Mu says: 家業十耗其七也, and Wang Hsi: 民費大半矣; that is, the people are mulcted not of 3⁄10, but of 7⁄10, of their income. But this is hardly to be extracted from our text. Ho Shih has a characteristic tag: 國以民爲本民以食爲天居人上者宜乎重惜 “The _people_ being regarded as the essential part of the State, and _food_ as the people’s heaven, is it not right that those in authority should value and be careful of both?”
while Government expenses for broken chariots, worn-out horses, breast-plates and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields, protective mantlets, draught-oxen and heavy waggons, will amount to four-tenths of its total revenue.
The _Yü Lan_ has several various readings here, the more important of which are 疲 for the less common 罷 (read _p‘i_^2), 干 for 蔽, and 兵牛 for 丘牛, which latter, if right, must mean “oxen from the country districts” (cf. _supra_, § 12). For the meaning of 櫓, see note on III, § 4. Capt. Calthrop omits to translate 丘牛大車.
15. 故智將務食於敵食敵一鍾當吾二十鍾𦮼秆一石當吾二十石 Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging on the enemy. One cartload of the enemy’s provisions is equivalent to twenty of one’s own, and likewise a single picul of his provender is equivalent to twenty from one’s own store.
Because twenty cartloads will be consumed in the process of transporting one cartload to the front. According to Ts‘ao Kung, a 鍾. The 石 picul consisted of 70 斤 catties (Tu Mu and others say 120). 𦮼秆, literally, “beanstalks and straw.”
16. 故殺敵者怒也取敵之利者貨也 Now in order to kill the enemy, our men must be roused to anger; that there may be advantage from defeating the enemy, they must have their rewards.
These are two difficult sentences, which I have translated in accordance with Mei Yao-ch‘ên’s paraphrase. We may incontinently reject Capt. Calthrop’s extraordinary translation of the first: “Wantonly to kill and destroy the enemy must be forbidden.” Ts‘ao Kung quotes a jingle current in his day: 軍無財士不來軍無賞士不往. Tu Mu says: “Rewards are necessary in order to make the soldiers see the advantage of beating the enemy; thus, when you capture spoils from the enemy, they must be used as rewards, so that all your men may have a keen desire to fight, each on his own account.” Chang Yü takes 利 as the direct object of 取, which is not so good.
17. 故車戰得車十乘已上賞其先得者而更其旌旗車雜而乘之卒善而養之 Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots have been taken, those should be rewarded who took the first.
Capt. Calthrop’s rendering is: “They who are the first to lay their hands on more than ten of the enemy’s chariots, should be encouraged.” We should have expected the gallant captain to see that such Samson-like prowess deserved something more substantial than mere encouragement. The _T‘u Shu_ omits 故, and has 以上 in place of the more archaic 已上.
Our own flags should be substituted for those of the enemy, and the chariots mingled and used in conjunction with ours. The captured soldiers should be kindly treated and kept.
18. 是謂勝敵而益强 This is called, using the conquered foe to augment one’s own strength.
19. 故兵貴勝不貴久 In war, then, let your great object be victory, not lengthy campaigns.
As Ho Shih remarks: 兵不可玩武不可黷 “Soldiers are not to be used as playthings. War is not a thing to be trifled with.” Sun Tzŭ here reiterates the main lesson which this chapter is intended to enforce.
20. 故知兵之將民之司命國家安危之主也 Thus it may be known that the leader of armies is the arbiter of the people’s fate, the man on whom it depends whether the nation shall be in peace or in peril.
In the original text, there is a 生 before the 民.
III. 謀攻篇 ATTACK BY STRATAGEM.
1. 孫子曰凡用兵之法全國爲上破國次之全軍爲上破軍次之全旅爲上破旅次之全卒爲上破卒次 之全伍爲上破伍次之 Sun Tzŭ said: In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy’s country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good. So, too, it is better to capture an army entire than to destroy it, to capture a regiment, a detachment or a company entire than to destroy them.
of 12500 men; according to Ts‘ao Kung, a 旅 contained 500 men, a 卒 any number between 100 and 500, and a 伍 any number between 5 and 100. For the last two, however, Chang Yü gives the exact figures of 100 and 5 respectively.
2. 是故百戰百勝非善之善者也不戰而屈人之兵善之善者也 Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting.
Here again, no modern strategist but will approve the words of the old Chinese general. Moltke’s greatest triumph, the capitulation of the huge French army at Sedan, was won practically without bloodshed.
3. 故上兵伐謀其次伐交其次伐兵下政攻城 Thus the highest form of generalship is to baulk the enemy’s plans; I.e., as Li Ch‘üan says (伐其始謀也), in their very inception.