Perhaps the word “baulk” falls short of expressing the full force of 伐, which implies not an attitude of defence, whereby one might be content to foil the enemy’s stratagems one after another, but an active policy of counter-attack. Ho Shih puts this very clearly in his note: “When the enemy has made a plan of attack against us, we must anticipate him by delivering our own attack first.”
the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy’s forces; Isolating him from his allies. We must not forget that Sun Tzŭ, in speaking of hostilities, always has in mind the numerous states or principalities into which the China of his day was split up.
the next in order is to attack the enemy’s army in the field; When he is already in full strength.
and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities.
The use of the word 政 is somewhat unusual, which may account for the reading of the modern text: 其下攻城.
4. 攻城之法爲不得已修櫓轒轀具器械三月而後成距闉又三月而後已 The rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it can possibly be avoided.
Another sound piece of military theory. Had the Boers acted upon it in 1899, and refrained from dissipating their strength before Kimberley, Mafeking, or even Ladysmith, it is more than probable that they would have been masters of the situation before the British were ready seriously to oppose them.
The preparation of mantlets, movable shelters, and various implements of war, will take up three whole months; It is not quite clear what 櫓 were. Ts‘ao Kung simply defines them as 大楯 “large shields,” but we get a better idea of them from Li Ch‘üan, who says they were to protect the heads of those who were assaulting the city walls at close quarters. This seems to suggest a sort of Roman _testudo_, ready made. Tu Mu says they were “what are now termed 彭排” (wheeled vehicles used in repelling attacks, according to K‘ang Hsi), but this is denied by Ch‘ên Hao. See _supra_, II. 14. The name is also applied to turrets on city walls. Of 轒轀 (_fên yün_) we get a fairly clear description from several commentators. They were wooden missile-proof structures on four wheels, propelled from within, covered over with raw hides, and used in sieges to convey parties of men to and from the walls, for the purpose of filling up the encircling moat with earth. Tu Mu adds that they are now called 木驢 “wooden donkeys.” Capt.
Calthrop wrongly translates the term, “battering-rams.” I follow Ts‘ao Kung in taking 具 as a verb, co-ordinate and synonymous with 修. Those commentators who regard 修 as an adjective equivalent to 長 “long,” make 具 presumably into a noun.
and the piling up of mounds over against the walls will take three months more.
The 距闉 (or 堙, in the modern text) were great mounds or ramparts of earth heaped up to the level of the enemy’s walls in order to discover the weak points in the defence, and also to destroy the 樓櫓 fortified turrets mentioned in the preceding note. Tu Yu quotes the Tso Chuan: 楚司馬子反乘堙而窺宋城也.
5. 將不勝其忿而蟻附之殺士三分之一而城不拔者此攻之災 The general, unable to control his irritation, will launch his men to the assault like swarming ants, Capt. Calthrop unaccountably omits this vivid simile, which, as Ts‘ao Kung says, is taken from the spectacle of an army of ants climbing a wall. The meaning is that the general, losing patience at the long delay, may make a premature attempt to storm the place before his engines of war are ready.
with the result that one-third of his men are slain, while the town still remains untaken. Such are the disastrous effects of a siege.
We are reminded of the terrible losses of the Japanese before Port Arthur, in the most recent siege which history has to record. The _T‘ung Tien_ reads 不勝心之忿...則殺士卒...攻城之災. For 其忿 the _Yü Lan_ has 心怒. Capt. Calthrop does not translate 而城不拔者, and mistranslates 此攻之災.
6. 故善用兵者屈人之兵而非戰也拔人之城而非攻也毁人之國而非久也 Therefore the skilful leader subdues the enemy’s troops without any fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to them; he overthrows their kingdom without lengthy operations in the field.
Chia Lin notes that he only overthrows the 國, that is, the Government, but does no harm to individuals. The classical instance is Wu Wang, who after having put an end to the Yin dynasty was acclaimed “Father and mother of the people.”
7. 必以全爭於天下故兵不頓而利可全此謀攻之法也 With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of the Empire, and thus, without losing a man, his triumph will be complete.
Owing to the double meanings of 兵, 頓 [= 鈍] and 利, the latter part of the sentence is susceptible of quite a different meaning: “And thus, the weapon not being blunted by use, its keenness remains perfect.” Chang Yü says that 利 is “the advantage of a prosperous kingdom and a strong army.”
This is the method of attacking by stratagem.
8. 故用兵之法十則圍之五則攻之倍則分之 It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten to the enemy’s one, to surround him; if five to one, to attack him; Straightaway, without waiting for any further advantage.
if twice as numerous, to divide our army into two.
Note that 之 does not refer to the enemy, as in the two preceding clauses. This sudden change of object is quite common in Chinese.
Tu Mu takes exception to the saying; and at first sight, indeed, it appears to violate a fundamental principle of war. Ts‘ao Kung, however, gives a clue to Sun Tzŭ’s meaning: 以二敵一則一術爲正一術爲奇 “Being two to the enemy’s one, we may use one part of our army in the regular way, and the other for some special diversion.” [For explanation of 正 and 奇, see V. 3, note.] Chang Yü thus further elucidates the point: “If our force is twice as numerous as that of the enemy, it should be split up into two divisions, one to meet the enemy in front, and one to fall upon his rear; if he replies to the frontal attack, he may be crushed from behind; if to the rearward attack, he may be crushed in front. This is what is meant by saying that “one part may be used in the regular way, and the other for some special diversion.” Tu Mu does not understand that dividing one’s army is simply an irregular, just as concentrating it is the regular, strategical method, and he is too hasty in calling this a mistake.”
9. 敵則能戰之少則能逃之不若則能避之 If equally matched, we can offer battle; Li Ch‘üan, followed by Ho Shih, gives the following paraphrase: 主客力敵惟善者戰 “If attackers and attacked are equally matched in strength, only the able general will fight.” He thus takes 能 as though it were 能者, which is awkward.
if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy; The _T‘u Shu_ has 守 instead of 逃, which is hardly distinguishable in sense from 避 in the next clause. The meaning, “we can _watch_ the enemy,” is certainly a great improvement on the above; but unfortunately there appears to be no very good authority for the variant. Chang Yü reminds us that the saying only applies if the other factors are equal; a small difference in numbers is often more than counterbalanced by superior energy and discipline.
if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him.
10. 故小敵之堅大敵之擒也 Hence, though an obstinate fight may be made by a small force, in the end it must be captured by the larger force.
In other words: “C’est magnifique; mais ce n’est pas la guerre.”
11. 夫將者國之輔也輔周則國必强輔隙則國必弱 Now the general is the bulwark of the State: if the bulwark is complete at all points, the State will be strong; if the bulwark is defective, the State will be weak.
隙 cannot be restricted to anything so particular as in Capt.
Calthrop’s translation, “divided in his allegiance.” It is simply keeping up the metaphor suggested by 周. As Li Ch‘üan tersely puts it: 隙缺也將才不備兵必弱 “_Ch‘i_, gap, indicates deficiency; if the general’s ability is not perfect (i.e. if he is not thoroughly versed in his profession), his army will lack strength.”
12. 故君之所以患於軍者三 There are three ways in which a ruler can bring misfortune upon his army:— 13. 不知軍之不可以進而謂之進不知軍之不可以退而謂之退是謂縻軍 (1) By commanding the army to advance or to retreat, being ignorant of the fact that it cannot obey. This is called hobbling the army.
_ad fin._ But in reality it is one of those graphic metaphors which from time to time illuminate Sun Tzŭ’s work, and is rightly explained by Li Ch‘üan as = 絆. He adds the comment: 如絆驥足無馳驟也. “It is like tying together the legs of a thoroughbred, so that it is unable to gallop.” One would naturally think of “the ruler” in this passage as being at home, and trying to direct the movements of his army from a distance. But the commentators understand just the reverse, and quote the saying of T‘ai Kung: 國不可以從外治軍不可以從中御 “A kingdom should not be governed from without, an army should not be directed from within.” Of course it is true that, during an engagement, or when in close touch with the enemy, the general should not be in the thick of his own troops, but a little distance apart. Otherwise, he will be liable to misjudge the position as a whole, and give wrong orders.
14. 不知三軍之事而同三軍之政者則軍士惑矣 (2) By attempting to govern an army in the same way as he administers a kingdom, being ignorant of the conditions which obtain in an army.
This causes restlessness in the soldier’s minds.
Ts‘ao Kung’s note is: 軍容不入國國容不入軍禮不可以治兵也, which may be freely translated: “The military sphere and the civil sphere are wholly distinct; you can’t handle an army in kid gloves.” And Chang Yü says: “Humanity and justice (仁義) are the principles on which to govern a state, but not an army; opportunism and flexibility (權變), on the other hand, are military rather than civic virtues.” 同三軍之政, “to assimilate the governing of an army”—to that of a State, understood. The _T‘ung Tien_ has 欲 inserted before 同, here and in § 15.
15. 不知三軍之權而同三軍之任則軍士疑矣 (3) By employing the officers of his army without discrimination, That is, he is not careful to use the right man in the right place.
through ignorance of the military principle of adaptation to circumstances. This shakes the confidence of the soldiers.
I follow Mei Yao-ch‘ên here. The other commentators make 不知 etc.
refer, not to the ruler, as in §§ 13, 14, but to the officers he employs. Thus Tu Yu says: 將若不知權變不可付以勢位 “If a general is ignorant of the principle of adaptability, he must not be entrusted with a position of authority.” Tu Mu quotes 黃石公: “The skilful employer of men will employ the wise man, the brave man, the covetous man, and the stupid man. For the wise man delights in establishing his merit, the brave man likes to show his courage in action, the covetous man is quick at seizing advantages, and the stupid man has no fear of death.” The _T‘ung Tien_ reads 軍覆疑, which Tu Yu explains as 覆敗 “is utterly defeated.” Capt. Calthrop gives a very inaccurate rendering: “Ignorant of the situation of the army, to interfere in its dispositions.”
16. 三軍既惑且疑則諸侯之難至矣是謂亂軍引勝 But when the army is restless and distrustful, trouble is sure to come from the other feudal princes. This is simply bringing anarchy into the army, and flinging victory away.
Most of the commentators take 引 in the sense of 奪, which it seems to bear also in the _Li Chi_, 玉藻, I. 18. [卻 is there given as its equivalent, but Legge tries notwithstanding to retain the more usual sense, translating “draw...back,” which is hardly defensible.] Tu Mu and Wang Hsi, however, think 引勝 means “leading up to the _enemy’s_ victory.”
17. 故知勝有五知可以戰與不可以戰者勝識衆寡之用者勝上下同欲者勝以虞待不虞者勝 將能而君不御者勝此五者知勝之道也 Thus we may know that there are five essentials for victory: (1) He will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight.
Chang Yü says: “If he can fight, he advances and takes the offensive; if he cannot fight, he retreats and remains on the defensive. He will invariably conquer who knows whether it is right to take the offensive or the defensive.”
(2) He will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior forces.
This is not merely the general’s ability to estimate numbers correctly, as Li Ch‘üan and others make out. Chang Yü expounds the saying more satisfactorily: “By applying the art of war, it is possible with a lesser force to defeat a greater, and _vice versâ_. The secret lies in an eye for locality, and in not letting the right moment slip. Thus Wu Tzŭ says: ‘With a superior force, make for easy ground; with an inferior one, make for difficult ground.’”
(3) He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout all its ranks.
Ts‘ao Kung refers 上下 less well to sovereign and subjects.
(4) He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the enemy unprepared.
(5) He will win who has military capacity and is not interfered with by the sovereign.
Tu Yu quotes 王子 as saying: 指授在君決戰在將也 “It is the sovereign’s function to give broad instructions, but to decide on battle is the function of the general.” It is needless to dilate on the military disasters which have been caused by undue interference with operations in the field on the part of the home government. Napoleon undoubtedly owed much of his extraordinary success to the fact that he was not hampered by any central authority,—that he was, in fact, 將 and 君 in one.
Victory lies in the knowledge of these five points.
Literally, “These five things are knowledge of the principle of victory.”
18. 故曰知彼知己百戰不殆不知彼而知己一勝一負不知彼不知己每戰必殆 Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat.
Li Ch‘üan cites the case of 苻堅 Fu Chien, prince of 秦 Ch‘in, who in 383 A.D. marched with a vast army against the 晉 Chin Emperor.
When warned not to despise an enemy who could command the services of such men as 謝安 Hsieh An and 桓沖 Huan Ch‘ung, he boastfully replied: “I have the population of eight provinces at my back, infantry and horsemen to the number of one million; why, they could dam up the Yangtsze River itself by merely throwing their whips into the stream. What danger have I to fear?” Nevertheless, his forces were soon after disastrously routed at the 淝 Fei River, and he was obliged to beat a hasty retreat.
If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.
The modern text, represented by the 北堂書鈔 and _T‘u Shu_, has 必敗, which I should be inclined to adopt in preference to 殆 here, though the _T‘ung Tien_ and _Yü Lan_ both have the latter. Chang Yü offers the best commentary on 知彼知己. He says that these words “have reference to attack and defence: knowing the enemy enables you to take the offensive, knowing yourself enables you to stand on the defensive.” He adds: 攻是守之機守是攻之策 “Attack is the secret of defence; defence is the planning of an attack.” It would be hard to find a better epitome of the root-principle of war.
IV. 形篇 TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS.
形 is a very comprehensive and somewhat vague term. Literally, “form,” “body,” it comes to mean “appearance,” “attitude” or “disposition;” and here it is best taken as something between, or perhaps combining, “tactics” and “disposition of troops.” Ts‘ao Kung explains it as 軍之形也，我動彼應兩敵相察情也 “marching and counter-marching on the part of the two armies with a view to discovering each other’s condition.” Tu Mu says: “It is through the 形 dispositions of an army that its condition may be discovered. Conceal your dispositions (無形), and your condition will remain secret, which leads to victory; show your dispositions, and your condition will become patent, which leads to defeat.” Wang Hsi remarks that the good general can 變化其形因敵以制勝 “secure success by modifying his tactics to meet those of the enemy.” In the modern text, the title of the chapter appears as 軍形, which Capt. Calthrop incorrectly translates “the order of battle.”
1. 孫子曰昔之善戰者先爲不可勝以待敵之可勝 Sun Tzŭ said: The good fighters of old first put themselves beyond the possibility of defeat, and then waited for an opportunity of defeating the enemy.
2. 不可勝在己可勝在敵 To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself.
That is, of course, by a mistake on his part. Capt. Calthrop has: “The causes of defeat come from within; victory is born in the enemy’s camp,” which, though certainly an improvement on his previous attempt, is still incorrect.
3. 故善戰者能爲不可勝不能使敵必可勝 Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against defeat, “By concealing the disposition of his troops, covering up his tracks, and taking unremitting precautions” (Chang Yü).
but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy.
The original text reads 使敵之可勝, which the modern text has further modified into 使敵之必可勝. Capt. Calthrop makes out the impossible meaning, “and further render the enemy incapable of victory.”
4. 故曰勝可知而不可爲 Hence the saying: One may _know_ how to conquer without being able to _do_ it.
Capt. Calthrop translates: “The conditions necessary for victory may be present, but they cannot always be obtained,” which is more or less unintelligible.
5. 不可勝者守也可勝者攻也 Security against defeat implies defensive tactics; ability to defeat the enemy means taking the offensive.
For 不可勝 I retain the sense which it undoubtedly bears in §§ 1–3, in spite of the fact that the commentators are all against me. The meaning they give, “He who cannot conquer takes the defensive,” is plausible enough, but it is highly improbable that 勝 should suddenly become active in this way. An incorrect variant in the _Yü Lan_ is 不可勝則守可勝則攻.
6. 守則不足攻則有餘 Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient strength; attacking, a superabundance of strength.
7. 善守者藏於九地之下善攻者動於九天之上故能自保而全勝也 The general who is skilled in defence hides in the most secret recesses of the earth; Literally, “hides under the ninth earth,” which is a metaphor indicating the utmost secrecy and concealment, so that the enemy may not know his whereabouts. The 九地 of this passage have of course no connection with the 九地 “Nine situations” of chap. XI.
he who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of heaven.
Another metaphor, implying that he falls on his adversary like a thunderbolt, against which there is no time to prepare. This is the opinion of most of the commentators, though Ts‘ao Kung, followed by Tu Yu, explains 地 as the hills, rivers, and other natural features which will afford shelter or protection to the attacked, and 天 as the phases of weather which may be turned to account by the attacking party. Capt. Calthrop’s “The skilful in attack push to the topmost heaven” conveys no meaning at all.
Thus on the one hand we have ability to protect ourselves; on the other, a victory that is complete.
Capt. Calthrop draws on a fertile imagination for the following: “If these precepts be observed, victory is certain.”
8. 見勝不過衆人之所知非善之善者也 To see victory only when it is within the ken of the common herd is not the acme of excellence.
As Ts‘ao Kung remarks, 當見未萌 “the thing is to see the plant before it has germinated,” to foresee the event before the action has begun. Li Ch‘üan alludes to the story of Han Hsin who, when about to attack the vastly superior army of 趙 Chao, which was strongly entrenched in the city of 成安 Ch‘êng-an, said to his officers: “Gentlemen, we are going to annihilate the enemy, and shall meet again at dinner.” The officers hardly took his words seriously, and gave a very dubious assent. But Han Hsin had already worked out in his mind the details of a clever stratagem, whereby, as he foresaw, he was able to capture the city and inflict a crushing defeat on his adversary. For the full story, see 前漢書, chap. 34, 韓信傳. Capt. Calthrop again blunders badly with: “A victory, even if popularly proclaimed as such by the common folk, may not be a true success.”
9. 戰勝而天下曰善非善之善者也 Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight and conquer and the whole Empire says, “Well done!”
True excellence being, as Tu Mu says: 陰謀潛運攻心伐謀勝敵之日曾不血刃 “To plan secretly, to move surreptitiously, to foil the enemy’s intentions and baulk his schemes, so that at last the day may be won without shedding a drop of blood.” Sun Tzŭ reserves his approbation for things that “the world’s coarse thumb And finger fail to plumb.”
10. 故舉秋毫不爲多力見日月不爲明目聞雷霆不爲聰耳 To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength; 秋毫 is explained as the fur of a hare, which is finest in autumn, when it begins to grow afresh. The phrase is a very common one in Chinese writers. Cf. Mencius, I. 1. vii. 10, and Chuang Tzŭ, 知北遊, _et al._ to see sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight; to hear the noise of thunder is no sign of a quick ear.
Ho Shih gives as real instances of strength, sharp sight and quick hearing: 烏𫉬 Wu Huo, who could lift a tripod weighing 250 stone; 離朱 Li Chu, who at a distance of a hundred paces could see objects no bigger than a mustard seed; and 師曠 Shih K‘uang, a blind musician who could hear the footsteps of a mosquito.
11. 古之所謂善戰者勝勝易勝者也 What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who not only wins, but excels in winning with ease.
The original text, followed by the _T‘u Shu_, has 勝於易勝者也. But this is an alteration evidently intended to smooth the awkwardness of 勝勝易勝者也, which means literally: “one who, conquering, excels in easy conquering.” Mei Yao-ch‘ên says: “He who only sees the obvious, wins his battles with difficulty; he who looks below the surface of things, wins with ease.”
12. 故善戰者之勝也無智名無勇功 Hence his victories bring him neither reputation for wisdom nor credit for courage.
Tu Mu explains this very well: “Inasmuch as his victories are gained over circumstances that have not come to light, the world at large knows nothing of them, and he wins no reputation for wisdom; inasmuch as the hostile state submits before there has been any bloodshed, he receives no credit for courage.”
13. 故其戰勝不忒不忒者其所措必勝勝已敗者也 He wins his battles by making no mistakes.
Ch‘ên Hao says: “He plans no superfluous marches, he devises no futile attacks.” The connection of ideas is thus explained by Chang Yü: “One who seeks to conquer by sheer strength, clever though he may be at winning pitched battles, is also liable on occasion to be vanquished; whereas he who can look into the future and discern conditions that are not yet manifest, will never make a blunder and therefore invariably win.” Li Ch‘üan thinks that the character 忒 should be 貳 “to have doubts.” But it is better not to tamper with the text, especially when no improvement in sense is the result.
Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory, for it means conquering an enemy that is already defeated.
The _T‘u Shu_ omits 必. 措 is here = 置. Chia Lin says it is put for 錯 in the sense of 雜; but this is far-fetched. Capt. Calthrop altogether ignores the important word 忒.
14. 故善戰者立於不敗之地而不失敵之敗也 Hence the skilful fighter puts himself into a position which makes defeat impossible, and does not miss the moment for defeating the enemy.
A 不可爲之計 “counsel of perfection,” as Tu Mu truly observes. 地 need not be confined strictly to the actual ground occupied by the troops. It includes all the arrangements and preparations which a wise general will make to increase the safety of his army.
15. 是故勝兵先勝而後求戰敗兵先戰而後求勝 Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle after the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks for victory.
Ho Shih thus expounds the paradox: “In warfare, first lay plans which will ensure victory, and then lead your army to battle; if you will not begin with stratagem but rely on brute strength alone, victory will no longer be assured.”
16. 善用兵者修道而保法故能爲勝敗之政 The consummate leader cultivates the moral law, and strictly adheres to method and discipline; For 道 and 法, see _supra_, I. 4 sqq. I think that Chang Yü is wrong in altering their signification here, and taking them as 爲戰之道 and 制敵之法 respectively.
thus it is in his power to control success.
17. 兵法一曰度二曰量三曰數四曰稱五曰勝 In respect of military method, we have, firstly, Measurement; secondly, Estimation of quantity; thirdly, Calculation; fourthly, Balancing of chances; fifthly, Victory.
18. 地生度度生量量生數數生稱稱生勝 Measurement owes its existence to Earth; Estimation of quantity to Measurement; Calculation to Estimation of quantity; Balancing of chances to Calculation; and Victory to Balancing of chances.
It is not easy to distinguish the four terms 度量數稱 very clearly.
The first seems to be surveying and measurement of the ground, which enable us to 量 form an estimate of the enemy’s strength, and to 數 make calculations based on the data thus obtained; we are thus led to 稱 a general weighing-up, or comparison of the enemy’s chances with our own; if the latter turn the scale, then 勝 victory ensues. The chief difficulty lies in 數, which some commentators take as a calculation of _numbers_, thereby making it nearly synonymous with 量. Perhaps 量 is rather a consideration of the enemy’s general position or condition (情 or 形勢), while 數 is the estimate of his numerical strength. On the other hand, Tu Mu defines 數 as 機數, and adds: 强弱已定然後能用機變數也 “the question of relative strength having been settled, we can bring the varied resources of cunning into play.” Ho Shih seconds this interpretation, which is weakened, however, by the fact that 稱 is given as logically consequent on 數; this certainly points to the latter being a calculation of numbers. Of Capt. Calthrop’s version the less said the better.
19. 故勝兵若以鎰稱銖敗兵若以銖稱鎰 A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as a pound’s weight placed in the scale against a single grain.
Literally, “a victorious army is like an 鎰 _i_ (20 oz.) weighed against an _i_.” The point is simply the enormous advantage which a disciplined force, flushed with victory, has over one demoralised by defeat. Legge, in his note on Mencius, I. 2. ix. 2, makes the 鎰 to be 24 Chinese ounces, and corrects Chu Hsi’s statement that it equalled 20 oz. only. But Li Ch‘üan of the T‘ang dynasty here gives the same figure as Chu Hsi.
20. 勝者之戰民也若決積水於千仞之谿者形也 The onrush of a conquering force is like the bursting of pent-up waters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep. So much for tactical dispositions.
The construction here is slightly awkward and elliptical, but the general sense is plain. The _T‘u Shu_ omits 民也. A 仞 = 8 尺 or Chinese feet.
V. 埶篇 ENERGY.
埶 here is said to be an older form of 勢; Sun Tzŭ, however, would seem to have used the former in the sense of “power,” and the latter only in the sense of “circumstances.” The fuller title 兵勢 is found in the _T‘u Shu_ and the modern text. Wang Hsi expands it into 積勢之變 “the application, in various ways, of accumulated power;” and Chang Yü says: 兵勢以成然後任勢以取勝 “When the soldiers’ energy has reached its height, it may be used to secure victory.”
1. 孫子曰凡治衆如治寡分數是也 Sun Tzŭ said: The control of a large force is the same in principle as the control of a few men: it is merely a question of dividing up their numbers.
That is, cutting up the army into regiments, companies, etc., with subordinate officers in command of each. Tu Mu reminds us of Han Hsin’s famous reply to the first Han Emperor, who once said to him: “How large an army do you think I could lead?” “Not more than 100,000 men, your Majesty.” “And you?” asked the Emperor. “Oh!” he answered, “the more the better” (多多益辦耳). Chang Yü gives the following curious table of the subdivisions of an army:—5 men make A 軍 or army corps thus works out at 3200 men. But cf. III. § 1, note. For 曲, see I. § 10. It is possible that 官 in that paragraph may also be used in the above technical sense.
2. 鬥衆如鬥寡形名是也 Fighting with a large army under your command is nowise different from fighting with a small one: it is merely a question of instituting signs and signals.
One must be careful to avoid translating 鬥衆 “fighting _against_ a large number,” no reference to the enemy being intended. 形 is explained by Ts‘ao Kung as denoting flags and banners, by means of which every soldier may recognise his own particular regiment or company, and thus confusion may be prevented. 名 he explains as drums and gongs, which from the earliest times were used to sound the advance and the retreat respectively. Tu Mu defines 形 as 陳形 “marshalling the troops in order,” and takes 名 as the flags and banners. Wang Hsi also dissents from Ts‘ao Kung, referring 形 to the ordering of the troops by means of banners, drums and gongs, and 名 to the various names by which the regiments might be distinguished. There is much to be said for this view.
3. 三軍之衆可使必受敵而無敗者奇正是也 To ensure that your whole host may withstand the brunt of the enemy’s attack and remain unshaken—this is effected by manœuvres direct and indirect.
For 必, there is another reading 畢, “all together,” adopted by Wang Hsi and Chang Yü. We now come to one of the most interesting parts of Sun Tzŭ’s treatise, the discussion of the 正 and the 奇.
As it is by no means easy to grasp the full significance of these two terms, or to render them at all consistently by good English equivalents, it may be as well to tabulate some of the commentators’ remarks on the subject before proceeding further. Li Ch‘üan: 當敵爲正傍出爲奇 “Facing the enemy is _chêng_, making lateral diversions is _ch‘i_.” Chia Lin: 當敵以正陳取勝以奇兵 “In presence of the enemy, your troops should be arrayed in normal fashion, but in order to secure victory abnormal manœuvres must be employed.” Mei Yao-ch‘ên: 動爲奇靜爲正靜以待之動以勝之 “_Ch‘i_ is active, _chêng_ is passive; passivity means waiting for an opportunity, activity brings the victory itself.” Ho Shih: 我之正使敵視之爲奇我之奇使敵視之爲正正亦爲奇奇亦爲正 “We must cause the enemy to regard our straightforward attack as one that is secretly designed, and _vice versâ_; thus _chêng_ may also be _ch‘i_, and _ch‘i_ may also be _chêng_.” He instances the famous exploit of Han Hsin, who when marching ostensibly against 臨晉 Lin-chin (now 朝邑 Chao-i in Shensi), suddenly threw a large force across the Yellow River in wooden tubs, utterly disconcerting his opponent.
[_Ch‘ien Han Shu_, ch. 34.] Here, we are told, the march on Lin-chin was 正, and the surprise manœuvre was 奇. Chang Yü gives the following summary of opinions on the words: “Military writers do not all agree with regard to the meaning of _ch‘i_ and _chêng_.
尉繚子 Wei Liao Tzŭ [4th cent. B.C.] says: 正兵貴先奇兵貴後 ‘Direct warfare favours frontal attacks, indirect warfare attacks from the rear.’ Ts‘ao Kung says: ‘Going straight out to join battle is a direct operation; appearing on the enemy’s rear is an indirect war, to march straight ahead is _chêng_; turning movements, on the other hand, are _ch‘i_.’ These writers simply regard _chêng_ as _chêng_, and _ch‘i_ as _ch‘i_; they do not note that the two are mutually interchangeable and run into each other like the two sides of a circle [see _infra_, § 11]. A comment of the T‘ang Emperor T‘ai Tsung goes to the root of the matter: ‘A _ch‘i_ manœuvre may be _chêng_, if we make the enemy look upon it as _chêng_; then our real attack will be _ch‘i_, and _vice versâ_.
The whole secret lies in confusing the enemy, so that he cannot fathom our real intent.’” To put it perhaps a little more clearly: any attack or other operation is 正, on which the enemy has had his attention fixed; whereas that is 奇, which takes him by surprise or comes from an unexpected quarter. If the enemy perceives a movement which is meant to be 奇, it immediately becomes 正.
4. 兵之所加如以碬投卵者虛實是也 That the impact of your army may be like a grindstone dashed against an egg—this is effected by the science of weak points and strong.
虛實, literally “the hollow and the solid,” is the title of chap.
VI. 碫 _tuan_ is the _T‘u Shu_ reading, 碬 _hsia_ that of the standard text. It appears from K‘ang Hsi that there has been much confusion between the two characters, and indeed, it is probable that one of them has really crept into the language as a mistake for the other.
5. 凡戰者以正合以奇勝 In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory.
Chang Yü says: 徐發奇兵或擣其旁或擊其後 “Steadily develop indirect tactics, either by pounding the enemy’s flanks or falling on his rear.” A brilliant example of “indirect tactics” which decided the fortunes of a campaign was Lord Roberts’ night march round the Peiwar Kotal in the second Afghan war.[169] 6. 故善出奇者無窮如天地不竭如江河終而復始日月是也死而復生四時是也 Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhaustible as Heaven and Earth, unending as the flow of rivers and streams; 奇 is the universally accepted emendation for 兵, the reading of the 北堂書鈔.
like the sun and moon, they end but to begin anew; like the four seasons, they pass away but to return once more.
Tu Yu and Chang Yü understand this of the permutations of 奇 and 正. But at present Sun Tzŭ is not speaking of 正 at all, unless, indeed, we suppose with 鄭友賢 Chêng Yu-hsien that a clause relating to it has fallen out of the text. Of course, as has already been pointed out, the two are so inextricably interwoven in all military operations, that they cannot really be considered apart. Here we simply have an expression, in figurative language, of the almost infinite resource of a great leader.
7. 聲不過五五聲之變不可勝聽也 There are not more than five musical notes, 宮商角微羽.
yet the combinations of these five give rise to more melodies than can ever be heard.
8. 色不過五五色之變不可勝觀也 There are not more than five primary colours, 靑黃赤白黑 blue, yellow, red, white and black.
yet in combination they produce more hues than can ever be seen.
9. 味不過五五味之變不可勝嘗也 There are not more than five cardinal tastes, 酸辛醎甘苦 sour, acrid, salt, sweet, bitter.
yet combinations of them yield more flavours than can ever be tasted.
10. 戰埶不過奇正奇正之變不可勝窮也 In battle, there are not more than two methods of attack—the direct and the indirect; yet these two in combination give rise to an endless series of manœuvres.
11. 奇正相生如循環之無端孰能窮之 The direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn. It is like moving in a circle—you never come to an end. Who can exhaust the possibilities of their combination?
The _T‘u Shu_ adds 哉. The final 之 may refer either to the circle or, more probably, to the 奇正之變 understood. Capt. Calthrop is wrong with: “They are a mystery that none can penetrate.”
12. 激水之疾至於漂石者埶也 The onset of troops is like the rush of a torrent which will even roll stones along in its course.
13. 鷙鳥之疾至於毁折者節也 The quality of decision is like the well-timed swoop of a falcon which