other hand, simply say 無故 “without reason,” “on a frivolous pretext,” as though 約 bore the rather unusual sense of “important.” Capt. Calthrop has “without consultation,” which is too loose.
27. 奔走而陳兵者期也 When there is much running about Every man hastening to his proper place under his own regimental banner.
and the soldiers fall into rank, I follow the _T‘u Shu_ in omitting 車 after 兵. Tu Mu quotes the _Chou Li_, ch. xxix. fol. 31: 車驟徒趨及表乃止.
it means that the critical moment has come.
What Chia Lin calls 晷刻之期, as opposed to 尋常之期.
28. 半進半退者誘也 When some are seen advancing and some retreating, it is a lure.
Capt. Calthrop is hardly right in translating: “An advance, followed by sudden retirement.” It is rather a case of feigned confusion. As Tu Mu says: 僞爲雜亂不整之狀.
29. 倚仗而立者飢也 When the soldiers stand leaning on their spears, they are faint from want of food.
仗 is here probably not a synonym for 倚, but = 兵 “a weapon.” The original text has 杖而立者, which has been corrected from the 30. 汲而先飮者渴也 If those who are sent to draw water begin by drinking themselves, the army is suffering from thirst.
As Tu Mu remarks: 覩一人三軍可知也 “One may know the condition of a whole army from the behaviour of a single man.” The 先 may mean either that they drink before drawing water for the army, or before they return to camp. Chang Yü takes the latter view. The _T‘ung Tien_ has the faulty reading 汲役先飮者, and the _Yü Lan_, worse still, 汲設飮者.
31. 見利而不進者勞也 If the enemy sees an advantage to be gained Not necessarily “booty,” as Capt. Calthrop translates it. The _T‘ung Tien_ and _Yü Lan_ read 向人見利, etc.
and makes no effort to secure it, the soldiers are exhausted.
32. 鳥集者虛也夜呼者恐也 If birds gather on any spot, it is unoccupied.
A useful fact to bear in mind when, for instance, as Ch‘ên Hao says, the enemy has secretly abandoned his camp.
Clamour by night betokens nervousness.
Owing to false alarms; or, as Tu Mu explains it: 恐懼不安故夜呼以 自壯也 “Fear makes men restless; so they fall to shouting at night in order to keep up their courage.” The _T‘ung Tien_ inserts 喧 before 呼.
33. 軍擾者將不重也旌旗動者亂也吏怒者倦也 If there is disturbance in the camp, the general’s authority is weak.
If the banners and flags are shifted about, sedition is afoot.
If the officers are angry, it means that the men are weary.
And therefore, as Capt. Calthrop says, slow to obey. Tu Yu understands the sentence differently: “If all the officers of an army are angry with their general, it means that they are broken with fatigue” [owing to the exertions which he has demanded from them].
34. 粟馬肉食軍無懸缻不返其舍者窮宼也 When an army feeds its horses with grain and kills its cattle for food, 粟馬肉食 is expanded by Mei Yao-ch‘ên (following Tu Mu) into 給糧以𥞊乎馬殺畜以饗乎士, which is the sense I have given above. In the ordinary course of things, the men would be fed on grain and the horses chiefly on grass.
and when the men do not hang their cooking-pots The _T‘ung Tien_ reads 缶, which is much the same as 缻, and the _Yü Lan_ 箠, which is manifestly wrong.
over the camp-fires, showing that they will not return to their tents, you may know that they are determined to fight to the death.
For 窮宼, see VII. § 36. I may quote here the illustrative passage from the _Hou Han Shu_, ch. 71, given in abbreviated form by the _P‘ei Wên Yün Fu_: “The rebel 王國 Wang Kuo of 梁 Liang was besieging the town of 陳倉 Ch‘ên-ts‘ang, and 皇甫嵩 Huang-fu Sung, who was in supreme command, and 董卓 Tung Cho were sent out against him. The latter pressed for hasty measures, but Sung turned a deaf ear to his counsel. At last the rebels were utterly worn out, and began to throw down their weapons of their own accord. Sung was now for advancing to the attack, but Cho said: ‘It is a principle of war not to pursue desperate men and not to press a retreating host.’ Sung answered: ‘That does not apply here. What I am about to attack is a jaded army, not a retreating host; with disciplined troops I am falling on a disorganised multitude, not a band of desperate men.’ Thereupon he advanced to the attack unsupported by his colleague, and routed the enemy, Wang Kuo being slain.” The inferior reading of the _T‘u Shu_ for § 34 is as follows: 殺馬肉食者 軍無糧也懸缻不返其舍者窮宼也. The first clause strikes me as rather shallow for Sun Tzŭ, and it is hard to make anything of 懸缻 in the second without the negative. Capt. Calthrop, nothing daunted, set down in his first edition: “When they _cast away_ their cooking-pots.” He now has: “When the cooking-pots are hung up on the wall.”
35. 諄諄翕翕徐言入入者失衆也 The sight of men whispering together 諄諄 is well explained by Tu Mu as 乏氣聲促 “speaking with bated breath.”
in small knots The _Shuo Wên_ rather strangely defines 翕 by the word 起, but the _Êrh Ya_ says 合 “to join” or “contract,” which is undoubtedly its primary meaning. Chang Yü is right, then, in explaining it here by the word 聚. The other commentators are very much at sea: Ts‘ao Kung says 失志貌, Tu Yu 不眞, Tu Mu 顚倒失次貌, Chia Lin 不安貌, Mei Yao-ch‘ên 曠職事, Wang Hsi 患其上.
or speaking in subdued tones 入入 is said to be the same as 如如.
points to disaffection amongst the rank and file.
失衆 is equivalent to 失其衆心, the subject of course being “the general,” understood. In the original text, which seems to be followed by several commentators, the whole passage stands thus: 諄諄翕翕徐與人言者失衆也. Here it would be the general who is talking to his men, not the men amongst themselves. For 翕, which is the chief stumbling-block in the way of this reading, the _T‘u Shu_ gives the very plausible emendation 𧬈 (also read _hsi_, and defined by K‘ang Hsi as 疾言 “to speak fast”). But this is unnecessary if we keep to the standard text.
36. 屢賞者窘也數罰者困也 Too frequent rewards signify that the enemy is at the end of his resources; Because, when an army is hard pressed, as Tu Mu says, there is always a fear of mutiny, and lavish rewards are given to keep the men in good temper.
too many punishments betray a condition of dire distress.
Because in such case discipline becomes relaxed, and unwonted severity is necessary to keep the men to their duty.
37. 先暴而後畏其衆者不精之至也 To begin by bluster, but afterwards to take fright at the enemy’s numbers, shows a supreme lack of intelligence.
I follow the interpretation of Ts‘ao Kung: 先輕敵後聞其衆則心惡之也, also adopted by Li Ch‘üan, Tu Mu and Chang Yü. Another possible meaning, set forth by Tu Yu, Chia Lin, Mei Yao-ch‘ên and Wang Hsi, is: “The general who is first tyrannical towards his men, and then in terror lest they should mutiny, etc.” This would connect the sentence with what went before about rewards and punishments. The 38. 來委謝者欲休息也 When envoys are sent with compliments in their mouths, it is a sign that the enemy wishes for a truce.
Tu Mu says: 所以委質來謝此乃勢已窮或有他故必欲休息也 “If the enemy open friendly relations by sending hostages, it is a sign that they are anxious for an armistice, either because their strength is exhausted or for some other reason.” But it hardly needs a Sun Tzŭ to draw such an obvious inference; and although Tu Mu is supported by Mei Yao-ch‘ên and Chang Yü, I cannot think that hostages are indicated by the word 委.
39. 兵怒而相迎久而不合又不相去必謹察之 If the enemy’s troops march up angrily and remain facing ours for a long time without either joining battle or taking themselves off again, the situation is one that demands great vigilance and circumspection.
Capt. Calthrop falls into a trap which often lurks in the word 相.
He translates: “When both sides, eager for a fight, face each other for a considerable time, neither advancing nor retiring,” etc. Had he reflected a little, he would have seen that this is meaningless as addressed to a commander who has control over the movements of his own troops. 相迎, then, does not mean that the two armies go to meet each other, but simply that the other side comes up to us. Likewise with 相去. If this were not perfectly clear of itself, Mei Yao-ch‘ên’s paraphrase would make it so: 怒而來逆我, etc. As Ts‘ao Kung points out, a manœuvre of this sort may be only a _ruse_ to gain time for an unexpected flank attack or the laying of an ambush.
40. 兵非益多也惟無武進足以倂力料敵取人而已 If our troops are no more in number than the enemy, that is amply sufficient; Wang Hsi’s paraphrase, partly borrowed from Ts‘ao Kung, is 權力均足矣. Another reading, adopted by Chia Lin and the _T‘u Shu_, is 兵非貴益多, which Capt. Calthrop renders, much too loosely: “Numbers are no certain mark of strength.”
it only means that no direct attack can be made.
Literally, “no martial advance.” That is to say, 正 “_chêng_” tactics and frontal attacks must be eschewed, and stratagem resorted to instead.
What we can do is simply to concentrate all our available strength, keep a close watch on the enemy, and obtain reinforcements.
This is an obscure sentence, and none of the commentators succeed in squeezing very good sense out of it. The difficulty lies chiefly in the words 取人, which have been taken in every possible way. I follow Li Ch‘üan, who appears to offer the simplest explanation: 惟得人者勝也 “Only the side that gets more men will win.” Ts‘ao Kung’s note, concise as usual to the verge of incomprehensibility, is 厮養足也. Fortunately we have Chang Yü to expound its meaning to us in language which is lucidity itself: 兵力既均又未見便雖未足剛進足以取人於厮養之中以并兵合力察敵而取勝不必假他 兵以助己 “When the numbers are even, and no favourable opening presents itself, although we may not be strong enough to deliver a sustained attack, we can find additional recruits amongst our sutlers and camp-followers, and then, concentrating our forces and keeping a close watch on the enemy, contrive to snatch the victory. But we must avoid borrowing foreign soldiers to help us.”
He then quotes from Wei Liao Tzŭ, ch. 3: 助卒名爲十萬其實不過數萬耳 “The nominal strength of mercenary troops may be 100,000, but their real value will be not more than half that figure.”
According to this interpretation, 取人 means “to get recruits,” not from outside, but from the tag-rag and bobtail which follows in the wake of a large army. This does not sound a very soldierly suggestion, and I feel convinced that it is not what Sun Tzŭ meant. Chia Lin, on the other hand, takes the words in a different sense altogether, namely “to conquer the enemy” [cf. I. § 20]. But in that case they could hardly be followed by 而已. Better than this would be the rendering “to make isolated captures,” as opposed to 武進 “a general attack.”
41. 夫惟無慮而易敵者必擒於人 He who exercises no forethought but makes light of his opponents is sure to be captured by them.
The force of 夫惟 is not easy to appreciate. Ch‘én Hao says 殊無遠慮 但輕敵者, thus referring 惟 to the second verb. He continues, quoting from the _Tso Chuan_: 蜂蠆有毒而况國乎則小敵亦不可輕 “If bees and scorpions carry poison, how much more will a hostile state! [僖公, XXII. 3.] Even a puny opponent, then, should not be treated with contempt.”
42. 卒未親附而罰之則不服不服則難用也卒已親附而罰不行則不可用也 If soldiers are punished before they have grown attached to you, they will not prove submissive; and, unless submissive, they will be practically useless. If, when the soldiers have become attached to you, punishments are not enforced, they will still be useless.
This is wrongly translated by Capt. Calthrop: “If the troops know the general, but are not affected by his punishments, they are useless.”
43. 故令之以文齊之以武是謂必取 Therefore soldiers must be treated in the first instance with humanity, but kept under control by means of iron discipline.
文 and 武, according to Ts‘ao Kung, are here equivalent to 仁 and 法 respectively. Compare our two uses of the word “civil.” 晏子 Yen Tzŭ [✝ B.C. 493] said of 司馬穰苴 Ssŭ-ma Jang-chü: 文能附衆武能威敵也 “His civil virtues endeared him to the people; his martial prowess kept his enemies in awe.” Cf. Wu Tzŭ, ch. 4 _init_.: 夫總文武者軍之 將也兼剛柔者兵之事也 “The ideal commander unites culture with a warlike temper; the profession of arms requires a combination of hardness and tenderness.” Again I must find fault with Capt.
Calthrop’s translation: “By humane treatment we obtain obedience; authority brings uniformity.”
This is a certain road to victory.
44. 令素行以教其民則民服令不素行以教其民則民不服 If in training soldiers commands are habitually enforced, the army will be well-disciplined; if not, its discipline will be bad.
The _T‘ung Tien_ and _Yü Lan_ read: 令素行以教其人者也令素行則人服令素 不行則人不服.
45. 令素信著者與衆相得也 If a general shows confidence in his men but always insists on his orders being obeyed, The original text has 令素行者. 令素 is certainly awkward without 行, but on the other hand it is clear that Tu Mu accepted the _T‘ung Tien_ text, which is identical with ours. He says: “A general ought in time of peace to show kindly confidence in his men and also make his authority respected, so that when they come to face the enemy, orders may be executed and discipline maintained, because they all trust and look up to him.” What Sun Tzŭ has said in § 44, however, would lead one rather to expect something like this: “If a general is always confident that his orders will be carried out,” etc. Hence I am tempted to think that he may have written 令素信行者. But this is perhaps too conjectural.
the gain will be mutual.
Chang Yü says: 上以信使民民以信服上是上下相得也 “The general has confidence in the men under his command, and the men are docile, having confidence in him. Thus the gain is mutual.” He quotes a pregnant sentence from Wei Liao Tzŭ, ch. 4: 令之之法小過無更小疑無中 “The art of giving orders is not to try to rectify minor blunders and not to be swayed by petty doubts.” Vacillation and fussiness are the surest means of sapping the confidence of an army. Capt.
Calthrop winds up the chapter with a final mistranslation of a more than usually heinous description: “Orders are always obeyed, if general and soldiers are in sympathy.” Besides inventing the latter half of the sentence, he has managed to invert protasis and apodosis.
X. 地形篇 TERRAIN.
Only about a third of the chapter, comprising §§ 1–13, deals with 地形, the subject being more fully treated in ch. XI. The “six calamities” are discussed in §§ 14–20, and the rest of the chapter is again a mere string of desultory remarks, though not less interesting, perhaps, on that account.
1. 孫子曰地形有通者有挂者有支者有隘者有險者有遠者 Sun Tzŭ said: We may distinguish six kinds of terrain, to wit: (1) Accessible ground; Mei Yao-ch‘ên says: 道路交達 “plentifully provided with roads and means of communication.”
(2) entangling ground; The same commentator says: 網羅之地往必掛綴 “Net-like country, venturing into which you become entangled.”
(3) temporising ground; Tu Yu explains 支 as 久. This meaning is still retained in modern phrases such as 支托, 支演 “stave off,” “delay.” I do not know why Capt. Calthrop calls 支地 “suspended ground,” unless he is confusing it with 挂地.
(4) narrow passes; (5) precipitous heights; The root idea in 隘 is narrowness; in 險, steepness.
(6) positions at a great distance from the enemy.
It is hardly necessary to point out the faultiness of this classification. A strange lack of logical perception is shown in the Chinaman’s unquestioning acceptance of glaring cross-divisions such as the above.
2. 我可以往彼可以來曰通 Ground which can be freely traversed by both sides is called _accessible_.
Generally speaking, 平陸 “level country” is meant. Cf. IX. § 9: 處易.
3. 通形者先居高陽利糧道以戰則利 With regard to ground of this nature, The _T‘ung Tien_ reads 居通地.
be before the enemy in occupying the raised and sunny spots, See IX. § 2. The _T‘ung Tien_ reads 先據其地.
and carefully guard your line of supplies.
A curious use of 利 as a verb, if our text is right. The general meaning is doubtless, as Tu Yu says, 無使敵絶己糧道 “not to allow the enemy to cut your communications.” Tu Mu, who was not a soldier and can hardly have had any practical experience of fighting, goes more into detail and speaks of protecting the line of communications by a wall (壘), or enclosing it by embankments on each side (作甬道)! In view of Napoleon’s dictum, “the secret of war lies in the communications,”[175] we could wish that Sun Tzŭ had done more than skirt the edge of this important subject here and in I. § 10, VII. § 11. Col. Henderson says: “The line of supply may be said to be as vital to the existence of an army as the heart to the life of a human being. Just as the duellist who finds his adversary’s point menacing him with certain death, and his own guard astray, is compelled to conform to his adversary’s movements, and to content himself with warding off his thrusts, so the commander whose communications are suddenly threatened finds himself in a false position, and he will be fortunate if he has not to change all his plans, to split up his force into more or less isolated detachments, and to fight with inferior numbers on ground which he has not had time to prepare, and where defeat will not be an ordinary failure, but will entail the ruin or the surrender of his whole army.”[176] Then you will be able to fight with advantage.
Omitted by Capt. Calthrop.
4. 可以往難以返曰挂 Ground which can be abandoned but is hard to re-occupy is called _entangling_.
Capt. Calthrop is wrong in translating 返 “retreat from it.”
5. 挂形者敵無備出而勝之敵若有備出而不勝難以返不利 From a position of this sort, if the enemy is unprepared, you may sally forth and defeat him. But if the enemy is prepared for your coming, and you fail to defeat him, then, return being impossible, disaster will ensue.
不利 (an example of litotes) is paraphrased by Mei Yao-ch‘ên as 必受制 “you will receive a check.”
6. 我出而不利彼出而不利曰支 When the position is such that neither side will gain by making the first move, it is called _temporising_ ground.
俱不便久相持也 “Each side finds it inconvenient to move, and the situation remains at a deadlock” (Tu Yu).
7. 支形者敵雖利我我無出也引而去令敵半出而擊之利 In a position of this sort, even though the enemy should offer us an attractive bait, Tu Yu says 佯背我去 “turning their backs on us and pretending to flee.” But this is only one of the lures which might induce us to quit our position. Here again 利 is used as a verb, but this time in a different sense: “to hold out an advantage to.”
it will be advisable not to stir forth, but rather to retreat, thus enticing the enemy in his turn; then, when part of his army has come out, we may deliver our attack with advantage.
Mei Yao-ch‘ên paraphrases the passage in a curious jingle, the scheme of rhymes being _abcbdd_: 各居所險，先出必敗，利而誘我，我不可愛，僞去引敵，半出而擊.
8. 隘形者我先居之必盈之以待敵 With regard to _narrow passes_, if you can occupy them first, Capt. Calthrop says: “Defiles, make haste to occupy.” But this is a conditional clause, answering to 若敵先居之 in the next paragraph.
let them be strongly garrisoned and await the advent of the enemy.
Because then, as Tu Yu observes, 皆制在我然後出奇以制敵 “the initiative will lie with us, and by making sudden and unexpected attacks we shall have the enemy at our mercy.” The commentators make a great pother about the precise meaning of 盈, which to the foreign reader seems to present no difficulty whatever.
9. 若敵先居之盈而勿從不盈而從之 Should the enemy forestall you in occupying a pass, do not go after him if the pass is fully garrisoned, but only if it is weakly garrisoned.
10. 險形者我先居之必居高陽以待敵 With regard to _precipitous heights_, if you are beforehand with your adversary, you should occupy the raised and sunny spots, and there wait for him to come up.
Ts‘ao Kung says: 地形險隘尤不可致於人 “The particular advantage of securing heights and defiles is that your actions cannot then be dictated by the enemy.” [For the enunciation of the grand principle alluded to, see VI. § 2]. Chang Yü tells the following anecdote of 裴行儉 P‘ei Hsing-chien (A.D. 619–682), who was sent on a punitive expedition against the Turkic tribes. “At nightfall he pitched his camp as usual, and it had already been completely fortified by wall and ditch, when suddenly he gave orders that the army should shift its quarters to a hill near by. This was highly displeasing to his officers, who protested loudly against the extra fatigue which it would entail on the men. P‘ei Hsing-chien, however, paid no heed to their remonstrances and had the camp moved as quickly as possible. The same night, a terrific storm came on, which flooded their former place of encampment to the depth of over twelve feet. The recalcitrant officers were amazed at the sight, and owned that they had been in the wrong. ‘How did you know what was going to happen?’ they asked. P‘ei Hsing-chien replied: ‘From this time forward be content to obey orders without asking unnecessary questions.’ [See _Chiu T‘ang Shu_, ch. 84, fol.
it may be seen,” Chang Yü continues, “that high and sunny places are advantageous not only for fighting, but also because they are immune from disastrous floods.”
11. 若敵先居之引而去之勿從也 If the enemy has occupied them before you, do not follow him, but retreat and try to entice him away.
The turning-point of 李世民 Li Shih-min’s campaign in 621 A.D.
against the two rebels, 竇建德 Tou Chien-tê, King of 夏 Hsia, and 王世充 Wang Shih-ch‘ung, Prince of 鄭 Chêng, was his seizure of the heights of 武牢 Wu-lao, in spite of which Tou Chien-tê persisted in his attempt to relieve his ally in Lo-yang, was defeated and taken prisoner. [See _Chiu T‘ang Shu_, ch. 2, fol. 5 _v_^o and also ch.
54.]
12. 遠形者勢均難以挑戰戰而不利 If you are situated at a great distance from the enemy, and the strength of the two armies is equal, The _T‘ung Tien_ reads 夫通形均勢.
it is not easy to provoke a battle, Ts‘ao Kung says that 挑戰 means 延敵 “challenging the enemy.” But the enemy being far away, that plainly involves, as Tu Yu says, 迎敵 “going to meet him.” The point of course is, that we must not think of undertaking a long and wearisome march, at the end of which 是我困敵銳 “we should, be exhausted and our adversary fresh and keen.”
and fighting will be to your disadvantage.
13. 凡此六者地之道也將之至任不可不察也 These six are the principles connected with Earth.
Or perhaps, “the principles relating to ground.” See, however, I.
§ 8.
The general who has attained a responsible post must be careful to study them.
Capt. Calthrop omits 至任. Out of the foregoing six 地形, it will be noticed that nos. 3 and 6 have really no reference to the configuration of the country, and that only 4 and 5 can be said to convey any definite geographical idea.
14. 故兵有走者有弛者有陷者有崩者有亂者有北者凡此六者非天之災將之過也 Now an army is exposed to six several calamities, not arising from natural causes, The _T‘u Shu_ reads 天地之災.
but from faults for which the general is responsible. These are: (1) Flight; (2) insubordination; (3) collapse; (4) ruin; (5) disorganisation; (6) rout.
I take exception to Capt. Calthrop’s rendering of 陷 and 崩 as “distress” and “disorganisation,” respectively.
15. 夫勢均以一擊十曰走 Other conditions being equal, if one force is hurled against another ten times its size, the result will be the _flight_ of the former.
Cf. III. § 10. The general’s fault here is that of 不料力 “not calculating the enemy’s strength.” It is obvious that 勢 cannot have the same force as in § 12, where it was equivalent to 兵力. I should not be inclined, however, to limit it, with Chang Yü, to 將之智勇兵之利銳 “the wisdom and valour of the general and the sharpness of the weapons.” As Li Ch‘üan very justly remarks, 若得形便之地用奇伏之計則可矣 “Given a decided advantage in position, or the help of some stratagem such as a flank attack or an ambuscade, it would be quite possible [to fight in the ratio of one to ten].”
16. 卒强吏弱曰弛吏强卒弱曰陷 When the common soldiers are too strong and their officers too weak, the result is _insubordination_.
弛 “laxity”—the metaphor being taken from an unstrung bow. Capt.
Calthrop’s “relaxation” is not good, on account of its ambiguity.
Tu Mu cites the unhappy case of 田布 T‘ien Pu [_Hsin T‘ang Shu_, ch. 148], who was sent to 魏 Wei in 821 A.D. with orders to lead an army against 王廷湊 Wang T‘ing-ts‘ou. But the whole time he was in command, his soldiers treated him with the utmost contempt, and openly flouted his authority by riding about the camp on donkeys, several thousands at a time. T‘ien Pu was powerless to put a stop to this conduct, and when, after some months had passed, he made an attempt to engage the enemy, his troops turned tail and dispersed in every direction. After that, the unfortunate man committed suicide by cutting his throat.
When the officers are too strong and the common soldiers too weak, the result is _collapse_.
Ts‘ao Kung says: 吏强欲進卒弱輒陷 “The officers are energetic and want to press on, the common soldiers are feeble and suddenly collapse.” Note that 弱 is to be taken literally of physical weakness, whereas in the former clause it is figurative. Li Ch‘üan makes 陷 equivalent to 敗, and Tu Mu explains it as 陷沒於死地 17. 大吏怒而不服遇敵懟而自戰將不知其能曰崩 When the higher officers 大吏, according to Ts‘ao Kung, are the 小將 “generals of inferior rank.” But Li Ch‘üan, Ch‘ên Hao and Wang Hsi take the term as simply convertible with 將 or 大將.
are angry and insubordinate, and on meeting the enemy give battle on their own account from a feeling of resentment, before the commander-in-chief can tell whether or no he is in a position to fight, the result is _ruin_.
Ts‘ao Kung makes 大將, understood, the subject of 怒, which seems rather far-fetched. Wang Hsi’s note is: 謂將怒不以理且不知裨佐之才激致 其兇懟如山之崩壞也 “This means, the general is angry without just cause, and at the same time does not appreciate the ability of his subordinate officers; thus he arouses fierce resentment and brings an avalanche of ruin upon his head.” He takes 能, therefore, in the sense of 才; but I think that Ch‘ên Hao is right in his paraphrase 不顧能否 “they don’t care if it be possible or no.” My interpretation of the whole passage is that of Mei Yao-ch‘ên and Chang Yü. Tu Mu gives a long extract from the _Tso Chuan_, 宣公, XII. 3, showing how the great battle of 邲 Pi [597 B.C.] was lost for the 晉 Chin State through the contumacy of 先縠 Hsien Hu and the resentful spite of 魏錡 Wei I and 趙旃 Chao Chan. Chang Yü also alludes to the mutinous conduct of 欒黶 Luan Yen [_ibid._ 襄公, XIV. 3].
18. 將弱不嚴教道不明吏卒無常陳兵縱橫曰亂 When the general is weak and without authority; when his orders are not clear and distinct; Wei Liao Tzŭ (ch. 4) says: 上無疑令，則衆不二聽，動無疑事，則衆不二志 “If the commander gives his orders with decision, the soldiers will not wait to hear them twice; if his moves are made without vacillation, the soldiers will not be in two minds about doing their duty.”
General Baden-Powell says, italicising the words: “The secret of getting successful work out of your trained men lies in one nutshell—in the clearness of the instructions they receive.”[177] Assuming that clear instructions beget confidence, this is very much what Wei Liao Tzŭ (_loc. cit._) goes on to say: 未有不信其心而能得其 力者也. Cf. also Wu Tzŭ ch. 3: 用兵之害猶豫最大三軍之災生於狐疑 “the most fatal defect in a military leader is diffidence; the worst calamities that befall an army arise from hesitation.”
when there are no fixed duties assigned to officers and men, 吏卒皆不拘常度 “Neither officers nor men have any regular routine” [Tu Mu].
and the ranks are formed in a slovenly haphazard manner, the result is utter _disorganisation_.
19. 將不能料敵以少合衆以弱擊强兵無選鋒曰北 When a general, unable to estimate the enemy’s strength, allows an inferior force to engage a larger one, or hurls a weak detachment against a powerful one, and neglects to place picked soldiers in the front rank, the result must be a _rout_.
Chang Yü paraphrases the latter part of the sentence 不選驍勇之士使爲 先鋒兵必敗北也, and continues: 凡戰必用精銳爲前鋒者一則壯吾志一則挫敵威也 “Whenever there is fighting to be done, the keenest spirits should be appointed to serve in the front ranks, both in order to strengthen the resolution of our own men and to demoralise the enemy.” Cf. the _primi ordines_ of Caesar (“De Bello Gallico,” in § 15, except that 北 is a more forcible word.
20. 凡此六者敗之道也將之至任不可不察也 These are six ways of courting defeat, Ch‘ên Hao makes them out to be: (1) 不量寡衆 “neglect to estimate to use picked men.”
which must be carefully noted by the general who has attained a responsible post.
See _supra_, § 13.
21. 夫地形者兵之助也料敵制勝計險阨遠近上將之道也 The natural formation of the country is the soldier’s best ally; Chia Lin’s text has the reading 易 for 助. Ch‘ên Hao says: 天時不如 地利 “The advantages of weather and season are not equal to those connected with ground.”
but a power of estimating the adversary, The insertion of a “but” is necessary to show the connection of thought here. A general should always utilise, but never rely wholly on natural advantages of terrain.
of controlling the forces of victory, 制勝 is one of those condensed expressions which mean so much in Chinese, and so little in an English translation. What it seems to imply is complete mastery of the situation from the beginning.
and of shrewdly calculating difficulties, dangers and distances, The _T‘ung Tien_ and _Yü Lan_ read 計極險易利害遠近. I am decidedly puzzled by Capt. Calthrop’s translation: “an eye for steepness, _command_ and distances.” Where did he find the word which I have put in italics?
constitutes the test of a great general.
A somewhat free translation of 道. As Chang Yü remarks, these are 兵之本 “the essentials of soldiering,” ground being only a helpful accessory.
22. 知此而用戰者必勝不知此而用戰者必敗 He who knows these things, and in fighting puts his knowledge into practice, will win his battles. He who knows them not, nor practises them, will surely be defeated.
23. 故戰道必勝主曰無戰必戰可也戰道不勝主曰必戰無戰可也 If fighting is sure to result in victory, then you must fight, even though the ruler forbid it; if fighting will not result in victory, then you must not fight even at the ruler’s bidding.
Cf. VIII. § 3 _fin._ Huang-shih Kung of the Ch‘in dynasty, who is said to have been the patron of 張良 Chang Liang and to have written the 三略, has these words attributed to him: 出軍行師將在自專 進退內御則功難成故聖主明王跪而推轂 “The responsibility of setting an army in motion must devolve on the general alone; if advance and retreat are controlled from the Palace, brilliant results will hardly be achieved. Hence the god-like ruler and the enlightened monarch are content to play a humble part in furthering their country’s cause [_lit._, kneel down to push the chariot wheel].”
This means that 閫外之事將軍裁之 “in matters lying outside the zenana, the decision of the military commander must be absolute.”
Chang Yü also quotes the saying: 軍中不聞天子之詔 “Decrees of the Son of Heaven do not penetrate the walls of a camp.” Napoleon, who has been accused of allowing his generals too little independence of action, speaks in the same sense: “Un général en chef n’est pas à couvert de ses fautes à la guerre par un ordre de son souverain ou du ministre, quand celui qui le donne est éloigné du champ d’opération, et qu’il connaît mal, ou ne connaît pas du tout le dernier état des choses.”[178] 24. 故進不求名退不避罪唯民是保而利合於主國之寳也 The general who advances without coveting fame and retreats without fearing disgrace, It was Wellington, I think, who said that the hardest thing of all for a soldier is to retreat.
whose only thought is to protect his country and do good service for his sovereign, 合, which is omitted by the _T‘u Shu_, is said by Ch‘ên Hao to be equivalent to 歸. If it had to be separately translated, it would be something like our word “accrue.”
is the jewel of the kingdom.
A noble presentment, in few words, of the Chinese “happy warrior.”
Such a man, says Ho Shih, 罪及其身不悔也 “even if he had to suffer punishment, would not regret his conduct.”
25. 視卒如嬰兒故可與之赴深谿視卒如愛子故可與之俱死 Regard your soldiers as your children, and they will follow you into the deepest valleys; look on them as your own beloved sons, and they will stand by you even unto death.
Cf. I. § 6. In this connection, Tu Mu draws for us an engaging picture of the famous general Wu Ch‘i, from whose treatise on war I have frequently had occasion to quote: “He wore the same clothes and ate the same food as the meanest of his soldiers, refused to have either a horse to ride or a mat to sleep on, carried his own surplus rations wrapped in a parcel, and shared every hardship with his men. One of his soldiers was suffering from an abscess, and Wu Ch‘i himself sucked out the virus. The soldier’s mother, hearing this, began wailing and lamenting. Somebody asked her, saying: ‘Why do you cry? Your son is only a common soldier, and yet the commander-in-chief himself has sucked the poison from his sore.’ The woman replied: ‘Many years ago, Lord Wu performed a similar service for my husband, who never left him afterwards, and finally met his death at the hands of the enemy. And now that he has done the same for my son, he too will fall fighting I know not where’.” Li Ch‘üan mentions 楚子 the Viscount of Ch‘u, who invaded the small state of 蕭 Hsiao during the winter. 申公 The Duke of Shên said to him: “Many of the soldiers are suffering severely from the cold.” So he made a round of the whole army, comforting and encouraging the men; and straightway they felt as if they were clothed in garments lined with floss silk. [_Tso Chuan_, 宣公, XII. 5]. Chang Yü alludes to the same passage, saying: 温言一撫士同 挾纊.
26. 厚而不能使愛而不能令亂而不能治譬如驕子不可用也 If, however, you are indulgent, but unable to make your authority felt; kind-hearted, but unable to enforce your commands; and incapable, moreover, of quelling disorder: Capt. Calthrop has got these three clauses quite wrong. The last he translates: “overindulgence may produce disorder.”
then your soldiers must be likened to spoilt children; they are useless for any practical purpose.
Cf. IX. § 42. We read in the 陰符經, pt. 2: 害生于思 “Injury comes out of kindness.” Li Ching once said that if you could make your soldiers afraid of you, they would not be afraid of the enemy. Tu Mu recalls an instance of stern military discipline which occurred in 219 A.D., when 呂蒙 Lü Mêng was occupying the town of 江陵 Chiang-ling. He had given stringent orders to his army not to molest the inhabitants nor take anything from them by force.
Nevertheless, a certain officer serving under his banner, who happened to be a fellow-townsman, ventured to appropriate a bamboo hat (笠) belonging to one of the people, in order to wear it over his regulation helmet as a protection against the rain. Lü Mêng