considered that the fact of his being also a native of 汝南 Ju-nan should not be allowed to palliate a clear breach of discipline, and accordingly he ordered his summary execution, the tears rolling down his face, however, as he did so. This act of severity filled the army with wholesome awe, and from that time forth even articles dropped in the highway were not picked up. [_San Kuo 27. 知吾卒之可以擊而不知敵之不可擊勝之半也 If we know that our own men are in a condition to attack, but are unaware that the enemy is not open to attack, we have gone only halfway towards victory.
That is, as Ts‘ao Kung says, “the issue in this case is uncertain.”
28. 知敵之可擊而不知吾卒之不可以擊勝之半也 If we know that the enemy is open to attack, but are unaware that our own men are not in a condition to attack, we have gone only halfway towards victory.
Cf. III. § 13 (1).
29. 知敵之可擊知吾卒之可以擊而不知地形之不可以戰勝之半也 If we know that the enemy is open to attack, and also know that our men are in a condition to attack, but are unaware that the nature of the ground makes fighting impracticable, we have still gone only halfway towards victory.
I may take this opportunity of pointing out the rather nice distinction in meaning between 擊 and 攻. The latter is simply “to attack” without any further implication, whereas 擊 is a stronger word which in nine cases out of ten means “to attack with expectation of victory,” “to fall upon,” as we should say, or even “to crush.” On the other hand, 擊 is not quite synonymous with 伐, which is mostly used of operations on a larger scale, as of one State _making war_ on another, often with the added idea of invasion. 征, finally, has special reference to the subjugation of rebels. See Mencius, VII. 2. ii. 2.
30. 故知兵者動而不迷舉而不窮 Hence the experienced soldier, once in motion, is never bewildered; once he has broken camp, he is never at a loss.
The reason being, according to Tu Mu, that he has taken his measures so thoroughly as to ensure victory beforehand. “He does not move recklessly,” says Chang Yü, “so that when he does move, he makes no mistakes.” Another reading substitutes 困 for 迷 and 頓 for 窮. The latter variant only is adopted by the _T‘ung Tien_ and _Yü Lan_. Note that 窮 here means “at the end of his _mental_ resources.”
31. 故曰知彼知己勝乃不殆知地知天勝乃可全 Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, your victory will not stand in doubt; Capt. Calthrop makes the saying end here, which cannot be justified.
if you know Heaven and know Earth, 天 and 地 are transposed for the sake of the jingle between 天 and 全. The original text, however, has 知天知地, and the correction has been made from the _T‘ung Tien_.
you may make your victory complete.
As opposed to 勝之半, above. The original text has 勝乃不窮, the corruption being perhaps due to the occurrence of 不窮 in the preceding sentence. Here, however 不窮 would not be synonymous with 不困, but equivalent to 不可以窮 “inexhaustible,” “beyond computation.” Cf. V. § 11. The _T‘ung Tien_ has again supplied the true reading. Li Ch‘üan sums up as follows: 人事天時地利三者同知則 百戰百勝 “Given a knowledge of three things—the affairs of man, the seasons of heaven and the natural advantages of earth—, victory will invariably crown your battles.”
XI. 九地篇 THE NINE SITUATIONS.
Li Ch‘üan is not quite right in calling these 勝敵之地. As we shall see, some of them are highly disadvantageous from the military point of view. Wang Hsi more correctly says: 用兵之地利害有九也 “There are nine military situations, good and bad.” One would like to distinguish the 九地 from the six 地形 of chap. X by saying that the latter refer to the natural formation or geographical features of the country, while the 九地 have more to do with the condition of the army, being 地勢 “situations” as opposed to “grounds.” But it is soon found impossible to carry out the distinction. Both are cross-divisions, for among the 地形 we have “temporising ground” side by side with “narrow passes,” while in the present chapter there is even greater confusion.
1. 孫子曰用兵之法有散地有輕地有爭地有交地有衢地有重地有圮地有圍地有死地 Sun Tzŭ said: The art of war recognises nine varieties of ground: (1) Dispersive ground; (2) facile ground; (3) contentious ground; (4) open ground; (5) ground of intersecting highways; (6) serious ground; (7) difficult ground; (8) hemmed-in ground; (9) desperate ground.
2. 諸侯自戰其地者爲散地 When a chieftain is fighting in his own territory, it is dispersive ground.
So called because the soldiers, being near to their homes and anxious to see their wives and children, are likely to seize the opportunity afforded by a battle and scatter in every direction.
“In their advance,” observes Tu Mu, “they will lack the valour of desperation, and when they retreat, they will find harbours of refuge.” The 者, which appears in the _T‘u Shu_, seems to have been accidentally omitted in my edition of the standard text.
3. 入人之地而不深者爲輕地 When he has penetrated into hostile territory, but to no great distance, it is facile ground.
Li Ch‘üan and Ho Shih say 輕於退也 “because of the facility for retreating,” and the other commentators give similar explanations.
Tu Mu remarks: 師出越境必焚舟梁示民無返顧之心 “When your army has crossed the border, you should burn your boats and bridges, in order to make it clear to everybody that you have no hankering after home.” I do not think that “disturbing ground,” Capt.
Calthrop’s rendering of 輕地, has anything to justify it. If an idiomatic translation is out of the question, one should at least attempt to be literal.
4. 我得則利彼得亦利者爲爭地 Ground the possession of which imports great advantage to either side, is contentious ground.
I must apologise for using this word in a sense not known to the dictionary, i.e. “to be contended for”—Tu Mu’s 必爭之地. Ts‘ao Kung says: 可以少勝衆弱勝强 “ground on which the few and the weak can defeat the many and the strong,” such as 阨喉 “the neck of a pass,” instanced by Li Ch‘üan. Thus, Thermopylae was a 爭地, because the possession of it, even for a few days only, meant holding the entire invading army in check and thus gaining invaluable time.
Cf. Wu Tzŭ, ch. V. _ad init._: 以一擊十莫善於阨 “For those who have to fight in the ratio of one to ten, there is nothing better than a narrow pass.” When 呂光 Lü Kuang was returning from his triumphant expedition to Turkestan in 385 A.D., and had got as far as 宜禾 I-ho, laden with spoils, 梁熙 Liang Hsi, administrator of 涼州 Liang-chou, taking advantage of the death of Fu Chien, King of Ch‘in, plotted against him and was for barring his way into the province. 楊翰 Yang Han, governor of 高昌 Kao-ch‘ang, counselled him, saying: “Lü Kuang is fresh from his victories in the west, and his soldiers are vigorous and mettlesome. If we oppose him in the shifting sands of the desert, we shall be no match for him, and we must therefore try a different plan. Let us hasten to occupy the defile at the mouth of the 高梧 Kao-wu pass, thus cutting him off from supplies of water, and when his troops are prostrated with thirst, we can dictate our own terms without moving. Or if you think that the pass I mention is too far off, we could make a stand against him at the 伊吾 I-wu pass, which is nearer. The cunning and resource of 子房 Tzŭ-fang himself [i.e.
張良] would be expended in vain against the enormous strength of these two positions.” Liang Hsi, refusing to act on this advice, was overwhelmed and swept away by the invader. [See 晉書, ch. 122, fol. 3 _r_^o, and 歴代紀事年表, ch. 43, fol. 26.]
5. 我可以往彼可以來者爲交地 Ground on which each side has liberty of movement is open ground.
This is only a makeshift translation of 交, which according to Ts‘ao Kung stands for 交錯 “ground covered with a network of roads,” like a chess-board. Another interpretation, suggested by Ho Shih, is 交通 “ground on which intercommunication is easy.” In either case, it must evidently be 平原 “flat country,” and therefore 不可杜絶 “cannot be blocked.” Cf. 通形, X. § 2.
6. 諸侯之地三屬先至而得天下之衆者爲衢地 Ground which forms the key to three contiguous states, 我與敵相當而旁有他國也 “Our country adjoining the enemy’s and a third country conterminous with both.” [Ts‘ao Kung.] Mêng Shih instances the small principality of 鄭 Chêng, which was bounded on the north-east by 齊 Ch‘i, on the west by 晉 Chin, and on the south by 楚 Ch‘u.
so that he who occupies it first has most of the Empire at his command, 天下 of course stands for the loose confederacy of states into which China was divided under the Chou dynasty. The belligerent who holds this dominating position can constrain most of them to become his allies. See _infra_, § 48. 衆 appears at first sight to be “the masses” or “population” of the Empire, but it is more probably, as Tu Yu says, 諸侯之衆.
is ground of intersecting highways.
Capt. Calthrop’s “path-ridden ground” might stand well enough for 交地 above, but it does not bring out the force of 衢地, which clearly denotes the central position where important highways meet.
7. 入人之地深背城邑多者爲重地 When an army has penetrated into the heart of a hostile country, leaving a number of fortified cities in its rear, After 多, the _T‘ung Tien_ intercalates the gloss 難以返.
it is serious ground.
Wang Hsi explains the name by saying that 兵至此者事勢重也 “when an army has reached such a point, its situation is serious.” Li Ch‘üan instances (1) the victorious march of 樂毅 Yo I into the capital of Ch‘i in 284 B.C., and (2) the attack on Ch‘u, six years later, by the Ch‘in general 白起 Po Ch‘i.
8. 山林險阻沮澤凡難行之道者爲圮地 Mountain forests, Or simply, “forests.” I follow the _T‘u Shu_ in omitting the 行 before 山林, given in the standard text, which is not only otiose but spoils the rhythm of the sentence.
rugged steeps, marshes and fens—all country that is hard to traverse: this is difficult ground.
圮 _p‘i_^3 (to be distinguished from 圯 i^4) is defined by K‘ang Hsi (after the _Shuo Wên_) as 毁 “to destroy.” Hence Chia Lin explains 圮地 as ground 經水所毁 “that has been ruined by water passing over it,” and Tu Yu simply as 沮洳之地 “swampy ground.” But Ch‘ên Hao says that the word is specially applied to deep hollows—what Chu-ko Liang, he tells us, used to designate by the expressive term 地獄 “earth-hells.” Compare the 天井 of IX. § 15.
9. 所由入者隘所從歸者迂彼寡可以擊吾之衆者爲圍地 Ground which is reached through narrow gorges, and from which we can only retire by tortuous paths, so that a small number of the enemy would suffice to crush a large body of our men: this is hemmed-in ground.
10. 疾戰則存不疾戰則亡者爲死地 Ground on which we can only be saved from destruction by fighting without delay, is desperate ground.
The situation, as pictured by Ts‘ao Kung, is very similar to the 圍地, except that here escape is no longer possible: 前有高山後有大水 進則不得退則有礙 “A lofty mountain in front, a large river behind, advance impossible, retreat blocked.” Ch‘ên Hao says: 人在死地如 坐漏船伏燒屋 “to be on ‘desperate ground’ is like sitting in a leaking boat or crouching in a burning house.” Tu Mu quotes from Li Ching a vivid description of the plight of an army thus entrapped: “Suppose an army invading hostile territory without the aid of local guides:—it falls into a fatal snare and is at the enemy’s mercy. A ravine on the left, a mountain on the right, a pathway so perilous that the horses have to be roped together and the chariots carried in slings, no passage open in front, retreat cut off behind, no choice but to proceed in single file (鴈行魚貫之嚴). Then, before there is time to range our soldiers in order of battle, the enemy in overwhelming strength suddenly appears on the scene. Advancing, we can nowhere take a breathing-space; retreating, we have no haven of refuge. We seek a pitched battle, but in vain; yet standing on the defensive, none of us has a moment’s respite. If we simply maintain our ground, whole days and months will crawl by; the moment we make a move, we have to sustain the enemy’s attacks on front and rear. The country is wild, destitute of water and plants; the army is lacking in the necessaries of life, the horses are jaded and the men worn-out, all the resources of strength and skill unavailing, the pass so narrow that a single man defending it can check the onset of ten thousand; all means of offence in the hands of the enemy, all points of vantage already forfeited by ourselves:—in this terrible plight, even though we had the most valiant soldiers and the keenest of weapons, how could they be employed with the slightest effect?” Students of Greek history may be reminded of the awful close to the Sicilian expedition, and the agony of the Athenians under Nicias and Demosthenes. [_See_ Thucydides, VII. 78 sqq.].
11. 是故散地則無以戰輕地則無止爭地則無攻 On dispersive ground, therefore, fight not. On facile ground, halt not. On contentious ground, attack not.
But rather let all your energies be bent on occupying the advantageous position first. So Ts‘ao Kung. Li Ch‘üan and others, however, suppose the meaning to be that the enemy has already forestalled us, so that it would be sheer madness to attack. In the 孫子敘錄, when the King of Wu inquires what should be done in this case, Sun Tzŭ replies: “The rule with regard to contentious ground is that those in possession have the advantage over the other side. If a position of this kind is secured first by the enemy, beware of attacking him. Lure him away by pretending to flee—show your banners and sound your drums—make a dash for other places that he cannot afford to lose—trail brushwood and raise a dust—confound his ears and eyes—detach a body of your best troops, and place it secretly in ambuscade. Then your opponent will sally forth to the rescue.”
12. 交地則無絶衢地則合交 On open ground, do not try to block the enemy’s way.
Because the attempt would be futile, and would expose the blocking force itself to serious risks. There are two interpretations of 無絶. I follow that of Chang Yü (不可以兵阻絶其路). The other is indicated in Ts‘ao Kung’s brief note: 相及屬也 “Draw closer together”—_i.e._, see that a portion of your own army is not cut off. Wang Hsi points out that 交地 is only another name for the 通地 “accessible ground” of X. § 2, and says that the advice here given is simply a variation of 利糧道 “keep a sharp eye on the line of supplies,” be careful that your communications are not cut. The _T‘ung Tien_ reads 無相絶.
On ground of intersecting highways, join hands with your allies.
Or perhaps, “form alliances with neighbouring states.” Thus Ts‘ao Kung has: 結諸侯也. Capt. Calthrop’s “cultivate intercourse” is much too timid and vague. The original text reads 交合.
13. 重地則掠圮地則行 On serious ground, gather in plunder.
On this, Li Ch‘üan has the following delicious note: 深入敵境不可 非義失人心如漢高祖入秦無犯婦女無取寳貨得人心也此筌以掠字爲無掠字 “When an army penetrates far into the enemy’s country, care must be taken not to alienate the people by unjust treatment. Follow the example of the Han Emperor Kao Tsu, whose march into Ch‘in territory was marked by no violation of women or looting of valuables. [_Nota bene_: this was in 207 B.C., and may well cause us to blush for the Christian armies that entered Peking in 1900 A.D.] Thus he won the hearts of all. In the present passage, then, I think that the true reading must be, not 掠 ‘plunder’, but 無掠 ‘do not plunder’.” Alas, I fear that in this instance the worthy commentator’s feelings outran his judgment. Tu Mu, at least, has no such illusions. He says: “When encamped on ‘serious ground,’ there being no inducement as yet to advance further, and no possibility of retreat, one ought to take measures for a protracted resistance by bringing in provisions from all sides, and keep a close watch on the enemy.” Cf. also II. § 9: 因糧於敵.
In difficult ground, keep steadily on the march.
Or, in the words of VIII. §2, 無舍 “do not encamp.”
14. 圍地則謀死地則戰 On hemmed-in ground, resort to stratagem.
Ts‘ao Kung says: 發奇謀 “Try the effect of some unusual artifice;” and Tu Yu amplifies this by saying: 居此則當權謀詐譎可以免難 “In such a position, some scheme must be devised which will suit the circumstances, and if we can succeed in deluding the enemy, the peril may be escaped.” This is exactly what happened on the famous occasion when Hannibal was hemmed in among the mountains on the road to Casilinum, and to all appearances entrapped by the Dictator Fabius. The stratagem which Hannibal devised to baffle his foes was remarkably like that which T‘ien Tan had also employed with success exactly 62 years before. [See IX. § 24, note.] When night came on, bundles of twigs were fastened to the horns of some 2000 oxen and set on fire, the terrified animals being then quickly driven along the mountain side towards the passes which were beset by the enemy. The strange spectacle of these rapidly moving lights so alarmed and discomfited the Romans that they withdrew from their position, and Hannibal’s army passed safely through the defile. [See Polybius, III. 93, 94; Livy, XXII.
16, 17.]
On desperate ground, fight.
For, as Chia Lin remarks: 力戰或生守隅則死 “if you fight with all your might, there is a chance of life; whereas death is certain if you cling to your corner.”
15. 所謂古之善用兵者能使敵人前後不相及衆寡不相恃貴賤不相救上下不相扶 Those who were called skilful leaders of old 所謂 is omitted in the _T‘u Shu_ text.
knew how to drive a wedge between the enemy’s front and rear; More literally, “cause the front and rear to lose touch with each other.”
to prevent co-operation between his large and small divisions; to hinder the good troops from rescuing the bad, I doubt if 貴賤 can mean “officers and men,” as Capt. Calthrop translates. This is wanted for 上下.
the officers from rallying their men.
The reading 扶, derived from the _Yü Lan_, must be considered very doubtful. The original text has 救, and the _T‘u Shu_ 收.
16. 卒離而不集兵合而不齊 When the enemy’s men were scattered, they prevented them from concentrating; Capt. Calthrop translates 卒離 “they scattered the enemy,” which cannot be right.
even when their forces were united, they managed to keep them in disorder.
Mei Yao-ch‘ên’s note makes the sense plain: 或已離而不能合或雖合而 不能齊. All these clauses, of course, down to 不齊, are dependent on 使 in § 15.
17. 合於利而動不合於利而止 When it was to their advantage, they made a forward move; when otherwise, they stopped still.
Mei Yao-ch‘ên connects this with the foregoing: 然能使敵若此當須有利則 動無利則止 “Having succeeded in thus dislocating the enemy, they would push forward in order to secure any advantage to be gained; if there was no advantage to be gained, they would remain where they were.”
18. 敢問敵衆整而將來待之若何曰先奪其所愛則聽矣 If asked how to cope with a great host of the enemy in orderly array and on the point of marching to the attack, 敢問 is like 或問, introducing a supposed question.
I should say: “Begin by seizing something which your opponent holds dear; then he will be amenable to your will.”
Opinions differ as to what Sun Tzŭ had in mind. Ts‘ao Kung thinks it is 其所恃之利 “some strategical advantage on which the enemy is depending.” Tu Mu says: 據我便地畧我田野利其糧道斯三者敵人之所愛惜倚 恃者也 “The three things which an enemy is anxious to do, and on the accomplishment of which his success depends, are: (1) to capture our favourable positions; (2) to ravage our cultivated land; (3) to guard his own communications.” Our object then must be to thwart his plans in these three directions and thus render him helpless. [Cf. III. § 3.] But this exegesis unduly strains the meaning of 奪 and 愛, and I agree with Ch‘ên Hao, who says that 所愛 does not refer only to strategical advantages, but is any person or thing that may happen to be of importance to the enemy.
By boldly seizing the initiative in this way, you at once throw the other side on the defensive.
19. 兵之情主速乘人之不及由不虞之道攻其所不戒也 Rapidity is the essence of war: 兵之情 means “the conditions of war,” not, as Capt. Calthrop says, “the spirit of the troops.” According to Tu Mu, 此統言兵之情狀 “this is a summary of leading principles in warfare,” and he adds: 此乃兵之深情將之至事也 “These are the profoundest truths of military science, and the chief business of the general.” The following anecdotes, told by Ho Shih, show the importance attached to speed by two of China’s greatest generals. In 227 A.D., 孟達 Mêng Ta, governor of 新城 Hsin-ch‘êng under the Wei Emperor Wên Ti, was meditating defection to the House of Shu, and had entered into correspondence with Chu-ko Liang, Prime Minister of that State.
The Wei general Ssŭ-ma I was then military governor of 宛 Wan, and getting wind of Mêng Ta’s treachery, he at once set off with an army to anticipate his revolt, having previously cajoled him by a specious message of friendly import. Ssŭ-ma’s officers came to him and said: “If Mêng Ta has leagued himself with Wu and Shu, the matter should be thoroughly investigated before we make a move.”
Ssŭ-ma I replied: “Mêng Ta is an unprincipled man, and we ought to go and punish him at once, while he is still wavering and before he has thrown off the mask.” Then, by a series of forced marches, he brought his army under the walls of Hsin-ch‘êng within the space of eight days. Now Mêng Ta had previously said in a letter to Chu-ko Liang: “Wan is 1200 _li_ from here. When the news of my revolt reaches Ssŭ-ma I, he will at once inform his Imperial Master, but it will be a whole month before any steps can be taken, and by that time my city will be well fortified. Besides, Ssŭ-ma I is sure not to come himself, and the generals that will be sent against us are not worth troubling about.” The next letter, however, was filled with consternation: “Though only eight days have passed since I threw off my allegiance, an army is already at the city-gates. What miraculous rapidity is this!” A fortnight later, Hsin-ch‘êng had fallen and Mêng Ta had lost his head. [See _Chin Shu_, ch. 1, f. 3.] In 621 A.D., Li Ching was sent from 夔州 K‘uei-chou in Ssŭ-ch‘uan to reduce the successful rebel 蕭銑 Hsiao Hsien, who had set up as Emperor at the modern 荆州 Ching-chou Fu in Hupeh. It was autumn, and the Yangtsze being then in flood, Hsiao Hsien never dreamt that his adversary would venture to come down through the gorges, and consequently made no preparations. But Li Ching embarked his army without loss of time, and was just about to start when the other generals implored him to postpone his departure until the river was in a less dangerous state for navigation. Li Ching replied: “To the soldier, overwhelming speed is of paramount importance, and he must never miss opportunities. Now is the time to strike, before Hsiao Hsien even knows that we have got an army together. If we seize the present moment when the river is in flood, we shall appear before his capital with startling suddenness, like the thunder which is heard before you have time to stop your ears against it. [_See_ VII, § 19, note.] This is the great principle in war. Even if he gets to know of our approach, he will have to levy his soldiers in such a hurry that they will not be fit to oppose us. Thus the full fruits of victory will be ours.” All came about as he predicted, and Hsiao Hsien was obliged to surrender, nobly stipulating that his people should be spared and he alone suffer the penalty of take advantage of the enemy’s unreadiness, make your way by unexpected routes, and attack unguarded spots.
20. 凡爲客之道深入則專主人不克 The following are the principles to be observed by an invading force: The further you penetrate into a country, the greater will be the solidarity of your troops, and thus the defenders will not prevail against you.
21. 掠於饒野三軍足食 Make forays in fertile country in order to supply your army with food.
Cf. _supra_, § 13. Li Ch‘üan does not venture on a note here.
22. 謹養而勿勞併氣積力運兵計謀爲不可測 Carefully study the well-being of your men, 謹養, according to Wang Hsi, means: 撫循飮食周謹之 “Pet them, humour them, give them plenty of food and drink, and look after them generally.”
and do not overtax them. Concentrate your energy and hoard your strength.
Tu Mu explains these words in a rhyming couplet: 氣全力盛一發取勝; and Ch‘ên Hao recalls the line of action adopted in 224 B.C. by the famous general 王翦 Wang Chien, whose military genius largely contributed to the success of the First Emperor. He had invaded the Ch‘u State, where a universal levy was made to oppose him.
But, being doubtful of the temper of his troops, he declined all invitations to fight and remained strictly on the defensive. In vain did the Ch‘u general try to force a battle: day after day Wang Chien kept inside his walls and would not come out, but devoted his whole time and energy to winning the affection and confidence of his men. He took care that they should be well fed, sharing his own meals with them, provided facilities for bathing, and employed every method of judicious indulgence to weld them into a loyal and homogeneous body. After some time had elapsed, he told off certain persons to find out how the men were amusing themselves. The answer was, that they were contending with one another in putting the weight and long-jumping (投石超距). When Wang Chien heard that they were engaged in these athletic pursuits, he knew that their spirits had been strung up to the required pitch and that they were now ready for fighting. By this time the Ch‘u army, after repeating their challenge again and again, had marched away eastwards in disgust. The Ch‘in general immediately broke up his camp and followed them, and in the battle that ensued they were routed with great slaughter. Shortly afterwards, the whole of Ch‘u was conquered by Ch‘in, and the king It should be noted that, 楚 being a taboo character under the Ch‘in dynasty, the name figures as 荆 throughout.]
Keep your army continually on the move, In order that the enemy may never know exactly where you are. It has struck me, however, that the true reading might be, not 運兵, but 連兵 “link your army together” [cf. _supra_ § 46, 吾將使之屬], which would be more in keeping with 併氣積力. Capt. Calthrop cuts the Gordian knot by omitting the words altogether.
and devise unfathomable plans.
Ch‘ang Yü’s paraphrase is: 常爲不可測度之計.
23. 投之無所往死且不北死焉不得士人盡力 Throw your soldiers into positions whence there is no escape, and they will prefer death to flight.
Cf. Nicias’ speech to the Athenians: Τό τε ξύμπαν γνῶτε, ὦ ἄνδρες στρατιῶται, ἀναγκαῖόν τε ὂν ὑμῖν ἀνδράσιν ἀγαθοῖς γίγνεσθαι ὡς μὴ ὄντος χωρίου ἐγγὺς ὅποι ἂν μαλακισθέντες σωθείητε, etc. [Thuc.
VII. 77. vii.]
If they will face death, there is nothing they may not achieve.
死 by itself constitutes the protasis, and 焉 is the interrogative = 安. Capt. Calthrop makes the protasis end with 得: “If there be no alternative but death.” But I do not see how this is to be got out of the Chinese. Chang Yü gives a clear paraphrase: 士卒死戰安不得志, and quotes his favourite Wei Liao Tzŭ (ch. 3): 一夫仗劔擊於市萬人無不避之者 臣謂非一人之獨勇萬人皆不肖也何則必死與必生固不侔也 “If one man were to run amok with a sword in the market-place, and everybody else tried to get out of his way, I should not allow that this man alone had courage and that all the rest were contemptible cowards. The truth is, that a desperado and a man who sets some value on his life do not meet on even terms.”
Officers and men alike will put forth their uttermost strength.
士人 appears to stand for the more usual 士卒. Chang Yü says: 同在 難地安得不共竭其力 “If they are in an awkward place together, they will surely exert their united strength to get out of it.”
24. 兵士甚陷則不懼無所往則固深入則拘不得已則鬥 Soldiers when in desperate straits lose the sense of fear. If there is no place of refuge, they will stand firm. If they are in the heart of a hostile country, they will show a stubborn front.
Capt. Calthrop weakly says: “there is unity,” as though the text were 則專, as in § 20. But 拘 introduces quite a new idea—that of _tenacity_—which Ts‘ao Kung tries to explain by the word 縛 “to bind fast.”
If there is no help for it, they will fight hard.
25. 是故其兵不修而戒不求而得不約而親不令而信 Thus, without waiting to be marshalled, the soldiers will be constantly on the _qui vive_; Tu Mu says: 不待修整而自戒懼. Capt. Calthrop wrongly translates 不修 “without warnings.”
without waiting to be asked, they will do your will; Literally, “without asking, you will get.” Chang Yü’s paraphrase is: 不求索而得情意.
without restrictions, they will be faithful; Chang Yü says: 不約束而親上.
without giving orders, they can be trusted.
This last clause is very similar in sense to the one preceding, except that 親 indicates the soldiers’ attachment to their leader, and 信 the leader’s attitude towards them. I rather doubt if 信 can mean “they will have confidence in their leader,” as the commentary seems to indicate. That way, the sense is not nearly so good. On the other hand, it is just possible that here, as in will carry out [their leader’s plans].” The whole of this paragraph, of course, has reference to “desperate ground.”
26. 禁祥去疑至死無所災 Prohibit the taking of omens, and do away with superstitious doubts.
祥 is amplified by Ts‘ao Kung into 妖祥之言, and 疑 into 疑惑之計.
Cf. the _Ssŭ-ma Fa_, ch. 3: 滅厲祥.
Then, until death itself comes, no calamity need be feared.
The superstitious, “bound in to saucy doubts and fears,” degenerate into cowards and “die many times before their deaths.”
Tu Mu quotes Huang-shih Kung: 禁巫祝不得爲吏士卜問軍之吉凶恐亂軍士之心 “‘Spells and incantations should be strictly forbidden, and no officer allowed to inquire by divination into the fortunes of an army, for fear the soldier’s minds should be seriously perturbed.’
The meaning is,” he continues, “that if all doubts and scruples are discarded, your men will never falter in their resolution until they die.” The reading of the standard text is 無所之 “there will be no refuge,” which does not fit in well here. I therefore prefer to adopt the variant 災, which evidently stood in Li Ch‘üan’s text.
27. 吾士無餘財非惡貨也無餘命非惡壽也 If our soldiers are not overburdened with money, it is not because they have a distaste for riches; if their lives are not unduly long, it is not because they are disinclined to longevity.
Chang Yü has the best note on this passage: 貨與壽人之所愛也所以燒擲 財寳割棄性命者非憎惡之也不得已也 “Wealth and long life are things for which all men have a natural inclination. Hence, if they burn or fling away valuables, and sacrifice their own lives, it is not that they dislike them, but simply that they have no choice.” Sun Tzŭ is slyly insinuating that, as soldiers are but human, it is for the general to see that temptations to shirk fighting and grow rich are not thrown in their way. Capt. Calthrop, mistaking 惡 for the adjective, has: “not because money is a bad thing...not because long life is evil.”
28. 令發之日士卒坐者涕霑襟偃臥者涕交頤投之無所往者諸劌之勇也 On the day they are ordered out to battle, your soldiers may weep, The word in the Chinese is 涕 “snivel.” This is taken to indicate more genuine grief than tears alone.
those sitting up bedewing their garments, and those lying down letting the tears run down their cheeks.
Not because they are afraid, but because, as Ts‘ao Kung says, 皆持必死之計 “all have embraced the firm resolution to do or die.” We may remember that the heroes of the Iliad were equally childlike in showing their emotion. Chang Yü alludes to the mournful parting at the 易 I River between 荆軻 Ching K‘o and his friends, when the former was sent to attempt the life of the King of Ch‘in (afterwards First Emperor) in 227 B.C. The tears of all flowed down like rain as he bade them farewell and uttered the following lines: 風蕭蕭兮，易水寒，壯士一去兮，不復還 “The shrill blast is blowing, Chilly the burn; Your champion is going—Not to return.”[179] But let them once be brought to bay, and they will display the courage of a Chu or a Kuei.
諸 was the personal name of 專諸 Chuan Chu, a native of the Wu State and contemporary with Sun Tzŭ himself, who was employed by 公子光 Kung-tzŭ Kuang, better known as Ho Lü Wang, to assassinate his sovereign 王僚 Wang Liao with a dagger which he secreted in the belly of a fish served up at a banquet. He succeeded in his attempt, but was immediately hacked to pieces by the king’s bodyguard. This was in 515 B.C. The other hero referred to, 曹劌 Ts‘ao Kuei (or Ts‘ao 沫 Mo), performed the exploit which has made his name famous 166 years earlier, in 681 B.C. Lu had been thrice defeated by Ch‘i, and was just about to conclude a treaty surrendering a large slice of territory, when Ts‘ao Kuei suddenly seized 桓公 Huan Kung, the Duke of Ch‘i, as he stood on the altar steps and held a dagger against his chest. None of the Duke’s retainers dared to move a muscle, and Ts‘ao Kuei proceeded to demand full restitution, declaring that Lu was being unjustly treated because she was a smaller and weaker state. Huan Kung, in peril of his life, was obliged to consent, whereupon Ts‘ao Kuei flung away his dagger and quietly resumed his place amid the terrified assemblage without having so much as changed colour. As was to be expected, the Duke wanted afterwards to repudiate the bargain, but his wise old counsellor 管仲 Kuan Chung pointed out to him the impolicy of breaking his word, and the upshot was that this bold stroke regained for Lu the whole of what she had lost in three pitched battles. [For another anecdote of Ts‘ao Kuei see VII. § 27, note; and for the biographies of these three bravos, Ts‘ao, Chuan and Ching, see _Shih Chi_, ch. 86.]
29. 故善用兵譬如率然率然者常山之虵也擊其首則尾至擊其尾則首至擊其中則首尾俱至 The skilful tactician may be likened to the _shuai-jan_. Now the _shuai-jan_ is a snake that is found in the Ch‘ang mountains.
率然 means “suddenly” or “rapidly,” and the snake in question was doubtless so called owing to the rapidity of its movements.
Through this passage, the term has now come to be used in the sense of “military manœuvres.” The 常山 have apparently not been identified.
Strike at its head, and you will be attacked by its tail; strike at its tail, and you will be attacked by its head; strike at its middle, Another reading in the _Yü Lan_ for 中 is 腹 “belly.”
and you will be attacked by head and tail both.
30. 敢問兵可使如率然乎曰可夫吳人與越人相惡也當其同舟而濟遇風其相救也如左右手 Asked if an army can be made to imitate the _shuai-jan_, That is, as Mei Yao-ch‘ên says, 可使兵首尾率然相應如一體乎 “Is it possible to make the front and rear of an army each swiftly responsive to attack on the other, just as though they were parts of a single living body?”
I should answer, Yes. For the men of Wu and the men of Yüeh are enemies; Cf. VI. § 21.
yet if they are crossing a river in the same boat and are caught by a storm, they will come to each other’s assistance just as the left hand helps the right.
The meaning is: If two enemies will help each other in a time of common peril, how much more should two parts of the same army, bound together as they are by every tie of interest and fellow-feeling. Yet it is notorious that many a campaign has been ruined through lack of co-operation, especially in the case of allied armies.
31. 是故方馬埋輪未足恃也