pointed them their places, and appointed them their places when He foreknew them? There is sin itself. If He had not foreknown this. He would not have proclaimed a caution against it under the penalty of death. Now, if there were in God such attributes as must have rendered it both impossible and improper for any evil to have happened to man,* and yet evil did occur, let us consider man's con- dition also — whether //were not, in fact, rather the cause why that came to pass which could not have happened through God. I find, then, that man was by God constituted free, master of his own will and power; indicating the presence of God's image and likeness in him by nothing so well as by this constitution of his nature. For it was not by his face, and by the lineaments of his body, though they were so varied in his human nature, that he expressed his likeness to the form of God; but he showed his stamp' in that essence which he derived from God Himself (that is, <he spiritual,^ which answered to the form of God), and in the freedom and power of his will. This his state was confirmed even by the very law which God then imposed upon ' Articulo.
3 He refers to Hermogenes • see Adv. Hcrmog. chap, xxxii.
SQuanquam.
* As the Marcionites alleged.
TSisrnatus est.
8 Anim.x.
him. For a law would not be imposed upon; one who had it not in his power to render that obedience which is due to law; nor again, would the penalty of death be threat- ened against sin, if a contempt of the law were impossible to man in the liberty of his will. So in the Creator's subsequent laws also 30U will find, when He sets be- fore man good and evil, life and death, that the entire course of discipline is arranged in precepts by God's calling men from sin, and threatening and exhorting them; and this on no other ground than' that man is free, with a will either for obedience or resistance.
CHAP. VI. THIS LIBERTY VINDICATED IN RE- SPECT OF ITS ORIGINAL CREATION; SUITABLE ALSO FOR EXHIBITING THE GOODNESS AND THE PURPOSE OF GOD. REWARD AND PUN- ISHMENT IMPOSSIBLE IF MAN WERE GOOD OR EVIL THROUGH NECESSITY AND NOT CHOICE.
But although we shall be understood, from our argument, to be only so affirming man's unshackled power over his will, that what hap- pens to him should be laid to his own charge, and not to God's, yet that you may not object, even now, that he ought not to have been so constituted, since his liberty and power of will might turn out to be injurious, I will first of all maintain that he was rightly so constituted, that I may with the greater confidence com- mend both his actual constitution, and the ad- ditional fact of its being worthy of the Divine ^eing; the cause which led to man's being cieated with such a constitution being shown to be the better one. Moreover, man thus constituted will be protected by both the goodness of God and by His purpose^ •" both of which are always found in concert in our God. For His purpose is no purpose without goodness; nor is His goodness goodness with- out a purpose, except forsooth in the case of Marcion's god, who is purposelessly" good, as we have shown.'- Well, then, it was proper that God should be known; it was no doubt '^ a good and reasonable '■* thing. Proper also was it that there should be something worthy of knowing God. What could be found so worthy as the image and likeness of God?
This also was undoubtedly good and reason- able. Therefore it was proper that (he who is) the image and likeness of God should be formed with a free will and a mastery of him- 9 Nee alias nisi.
'<^ Ratio, or, " His reason." We have used both words, which are equally suitable to the Divine Being, as seemed most conven- ient.
" Irrationalitcr, or, "irrationally."
" See above, book L chap, xxiii. p. 288.
'3 Utique.
'4 Rationale,.or, " consistent with His purpose."
TERTULLIAN AGAINST MARCION.
[book II.
self; ' so that this very thing — namely, free- dom of will and self-command — might be reckoned as the image and likeness of God in him. For this purpose such an essence ^ was adapted 3 to man as suited this character," even the afflatus of the Deity, Himself free and uncontrolled. 5 But if you will take some other view of the case,^ how came it to pass ' that man, when in possession of the whole world, did not above all things reign in self- possession ^ — a master over others, a slave to himself? The goodness of God, then, you can learn from His gracious gift' to man, and His purpose from His disposal of all things.'" At present, let God's goodness alone occupy our attention, that which gave so large a gift to man, even the liberty of his will. God's pu7'pose claims some other opportunity of treatment, offering as it does instruction of like import. Now, God alone is good by na- ture. For He, who has that which is without beginning, has it not by creation," but by nature. Man, however, who exists entirely by creation, having a beginning, along with that beginning obtained the form in which he exists; and thus he is not by nature disposed to good, but by creation, not having it as his own attribute to be good, because, (as we have said,) it is not by nature, but by creation, that he is disposed to good, according to the appointment of his good Creator, even the Author of all good. In order, therefore, that man might have a goodness of his own," be- stowed '3 on him by God, and there might be henceforth in man a property, and in a certain sense a natural attribute of goodness, there was assigned to him in the constitution of his nature, as a formal witness '* of the goodness which God bestowed upon him, freedom and power of the will, such as should cause good to be performed spontaneously by man, as a property of his own, on the ground that no less than this '^ would be required in the matter of a goodness which was to be voluntarily ex- ercised by him, that is to say, by the liberty of his will, without either favour or servility to the constitution of his nature, so that man ' Suae potestatis.
2 Substantia.
3 Accommodata. *■ Status.
5 Suae potestatis. *Sed et alias. 7 Quale erat. SAnimi sui possessione. 9 Dignatione.
10 Ex dispositione. The same as the " universa disponendo ' above.
" Institutione.
'2 Bonum jam suum, not bonitateni. '3 Kmancipatum.
'4 Libripens. The language here is full of legal technicalities, denved from the Roman usage in conveyance of property. " Lib- ripens quasi arbiter mancipationis " (Rigalt.). ■5 (^iiuniam (with a subj.) et hoc.
should be good '* just up to this point,''' if he should display his goodness in accordance with his natural constitution indeed, but still as the result of his will, as a property of his nature; and, by a similar exercise of volition,'* should show himself to be too strong '' in de- fence against evil also (for even this God, of course, foresaw), being free, and master of himself; because, if he were wanting in this prerogative of self-mastery, so as to perform even good by necessity and not will, he would, in the helplessness of his servitude, become subject to the usurpation of evil, a slave as much to evil as to good. Entire freedom of will, therefore, was conferred upon him in both tendencies; so that, as master of him- self, he might constantly encounter good by spontaneous observance of it, and evil by its spontaneous avoidance; because, were man even otherwise circumstanced, it was yet his bounden duty, in the judgment of God, to do justice according to the motions ^° of his will, regarded, of course, as free. But the reward neither of good nor of evil could be paid to the man who should be found to have been either good or evil through necessity and not choice. In this really lay ^' the law which did not exclude, but rather prove, human liberty by a spontaneous rendering of obedience, or a spontaneous commission of iniquity; so pat- ent was the liberty of man's will for either issue. Since, therefore, both the goodness and purpose of God are ^'^ discovered in the gift to man of freedom in his will, it is not right, after ignoring the original definition of goodness and purpose which it was necessary to determine previous to any discussion of the subject, on subsequent facts to presume to say that God ought not in such a way to have formed man, because the issue was other than what was assumed to be^^ proper for God. We ought rather,^^'* after duly considering that it behoved God so to create man, to leave this consideration unimpaired, and to survey the other aspects of the case. It is, no doubt, an easy process for persons who take offence at the fall of man, before they have looked into the facts of his creation, to impute the blame of what happened to the Creator, without any examination of His purpose. To conclude: the goodness of God, then fully considered from the beginning of His works, will be enough to convince us that nothing evil could '6 Bonus consisteret. '7 Ita demum. '8 Proinde. '9 Fortior. 20 Meritis. 2' Constituta est.
2= Our author's word invenitur (in the singular) combines the /'onitas and ratio in one view. *3 The verb is suhj.^ " deceret. =^4 Sed, with oJ>ortet understood.
CHAP, vni.]
TERTULLIAN AGAINST MARCION.
possibly have come forth from God; and the liberty of man will, after a second thought," show us that it alone is chargeable with the fault which itself committed.
CHAP, VII. — IF GOD HAD ANYHOW CHECKED man's liberty, MARCION WOULD HAVE BEEN READY WITH ANOTHER AND OPPOSITE CAVIL. man's FALL FORESEEN BY GOD. PROVISION MADE FOR IT REMEDIALLY AND CONSISTENTLY WITH HIS TRUTH AND GOODNESS.
By such a conclusion all is reserved " unim- paired to God; both His natural goodness, and the purposes of His governance and fore- knowledge, and the abundance of His power. You ought, however, to deduct from God's attributes both His supreme earnestness of purpose 3 and most excellent truth in His whole creation, if you would cease to inquire whether anything could have happened against the will of God. For, while holding this earnestness and truth of the good God, which are indeed * capable of proof from the rational creation, you will not wonder at the fact that God did not interfere to prevent the occur- rence of what He wished not to happen, in order that He might keep from harm what He wished. For, since He had once for all allowed (and, as we have shown, worthily al- lowed) to man freedom of will and mastery of himself, surely He from His very authority in creation permitted f/iese gifts to be enjoyed: to be enjoyed, too, so far as lay in Himself, according to His own character as God, that is, for good (for who would permit anything hostile to himself?); and, so far as lay in man, according to the impulses of his liberty (for who does not, when giving anything to any one to enjoy, accompany the gift with a permission to enjoy it with all his heart and will?). The necessary consequence, ^ there- fore, was, that God must separate from the liberty which He had once for all bestowed upon man (in other words, keep within Him- self), both His foreknowledge and power, through which He might have prevented man's falling into danger when attempting wrongly to enjoy his liberty. Now, if He had interposed, He would have rescinded the lib- erty of man's will, which He had permitted with set purpose, and in goodness. But, sup- pose God had interposed; suppose Him to have abrogated man's liberty, by warning him from the tree, and keeping off the subtle ser- pent from his interview with the woman; • Recogitata. [Again, a noble Theodicy.]
2 Salva.
3 Gravitatem.
4 Sed, for scilicet, not unfrequent with our author.
5 That is, from the Marcionite position referred to in the sec- ond sentence of this chapter, in opposition to that of TertuUian which follows.
would not Marcion then exclaim. What a frivo- lous, unstable, and faithless Lord, cancelling the gifts He had bestowed! Why did He allow any liberty of will, if He afterwards withdrew it? Why withdraw it after allowing it? Let Him choose where to brand Himself with error, either in His original constitution of man, or in His subseqpssnt abrogAion thereof! If He had 'checked (man's free- dofii), would He not then seem to have been rather deceived, through want of foresight into the future? But in giving it full scope, who would not say that He did so in ignorance of the issue of things? God, however, did fore- know that man would make a bad use of his created constitution; and yet what can be so worthy of God as His earnestness of purpose, and the truth of His created works, be they what they may? Man must see, if he failed to make the most of* the good gift he had received, how that he was himself guilty in respect of the law which he did not choose to keep, and not that the Lawgiver was com- mitting a fraud against His own law, by not permitting its injunctions to be fulfilled. Whenever you are inclined to indulge in such censure ' (and it is the most becoming for you) against the Creator, recall gently to your mind in His behalf ^ His earnestness, and endurance, and truth, in having given complete- ness 9 to His creatures both as rational and good.
CHAP. VIII. MAN, ENDUED WITH LIBERTY, SUPERIOR TO THE ANGELS. OVERCOMES EVEN THE ANGEL WHICH LURED HIM TO HIS FALL, WHEN REPENTANT AND RESUMING OBEDIENCE TO GOD.
For it was not merely that he might live the natural life that God had produced man, but'° that he should live virtuously, that is, in relation to God and to His law. Accord- ingly, God gave him to //rr when he was formed into a living soul; but He charged him to live virtuously when he was required to obey a law. So also God shows that man was not consti- tuted for death, by now wishing that he should be restored to life, preferring the sinner's re- pentance to his death." As, therefore, God designed for man a condition of life, so man brought on himself a state of death; and this, too, neither through infirmity nor through ig- norance, so that no blame can be imputed to the Creator. No doubt it was an angel who was the seducer; but then the victim of that seduction was free, and master of himself; 6 Si non bene dispunxisset.
7 Peroraturus.
8 Tibi insusurra pro Creatore.
9 Functo.
'o Ut non, "as if he were not," etc. " Ezek. xviii. 2j.
TERTULLIAN AGAINST MARCION.
[book II.
and as being the image and likeness of God, was stronger than any angel; and as being, too, the afflatus of the Divine Being, was nobler than that material spirit of which angels were made. Who viaketh, says he, His angels spirits^ and His ministers a flame of fire ^ He would not have made all things subject to man, if he had been too weak for the dominion, and inferior to the angels, to whom He as- signed no such subjects; nor would He have put the burden of law upon him, if he had been incapable of sustaining so great a weight; nor, again, would He have threatened with /the penalty of death a creature whom He knew to be guiltless on the score of his help- lessness: in short, if He had made him infirm, it would not have been by liberty and inde- pendence of will, but rather by the withhold- ing from him these endowments. And thus it comes to pass, that even now also, the same human being, the same substance of his soul, the same condition as Adam's, is made con- queror over the same devil by the self-same liberty and power of his will, when it moves in obedience to the laws of God.^ CHAP. IX. ANOTHER CAVIL ANSWERED, i.E., THE FALL IMPUTABLE TO GOD, BECAUSE MAN's SOUL IS A PORTION OF THE SPIRITUAL ES- SENCE OF THE CREATOR. THE DIVINE AFFLA- TUS NOT IN FAULT IN THE SIN OF MAN, BUT THE HUMAN WILL WHICH WAS ADDITIONAL TO IT.
But, you say, in what way soever the sub- stance of the Creator is found to be susceptible of fault, when the afflatus of God, that is to say, the soul,^ offends in man, it cannot but be that that fault of the portion is referrible to the original whole. Now, to meet this ob- jection, we must explain the nature* of the soul. We must at the outset hold fast the meaning of the Greek scripture, which has afflatus, not spirit. ^ Some interpreters of the Greek, without reflecting on the difference of the words, and careless about their exact meaning, put spirit for afflatus; they thus af- ford to heretics an opportunity of tarnishing* the Spirit of God, that is to say, God Himself, with default. And now comes the question. Afflatus, observe then, is less than spirit, al- though it comes from spirit; it is the spirit's 2 [On capp. viii. and ix. See Kaye's references in notes p. 178 et seqq^ 3 Anima, for animus. This meaning seems required through- out this passage, where afterwards occurs the phrase uiniiortalis anima.
•♦ Qualitas.
SIIi'oiii', not TTi'tOjia; so the Vulgate has, s/iiraru/ioii, not spirituvi. [Kaye (p. 247) again refers to Profr. Andrews Norton of Harvard for valuable remarks concerning the use of the word sfirifiis by the ancients. Evidences, Vol. III. p. 160, note 7.]
'' Infuscandi.
gentle breeze,' but it is not the spirit. Now a breeze is rarer than the wind; and although it proceeds from wind, yet a breeze is not the wind. One may call a breeze the image of the spirit. In the same manner, man is the image of God, that is, of spirit; for God is spirit. Afflatus is therefore the image of the spirit. Now the image is not in any case equal to the very thing. ^ It is one thing to be like the reality, and another thing to be the reality itself. So, although the afflatus is the image of the spirit, it is yet not possible to compare the image of God in such a way, that, because the reality — that is, the spirit, or in other words, the Divine Being — is fault- less, therefore the afflatus also, that is to say, the image, ought not by any possibility to have done wrong. In this respect will the image be less than the reality, and the afflatus inferior to the spirit, in that, while it possesses beyond doubt the true lineaments of divinity, such as an immortal soul, freedom and its own mastery over itself, foreknowledge in a great degree, ^ reasonableness, capacity of un- derstanding and knowledge, it is even in these respects an image still, and never amounts to the actual power of Deity, nor to absolute exemption from fault, — a property which is only conceded to God, that is, to the reality, and which is simply incompatible with an image. An image, although it may express all the lineaments of the reality, is yet wanting in its intrinsic power; it is destitute of motion. In like manner, the soul, the image of the spirit, is unable to express the simple power thereof, that is to say, its happy exemption from sinning. '° Were it otherwise," it would not be soul, but spirit; not man, who received a soul, but God. Besides, to take another view of the matter," not everything which per- tains to God will be regarded as God, so that you would not maintain that His afflatus was God, that is, exempt from fault, because it is the breath of God. And in an act of your own, such as blowing into a flute, you would not thereby make the flute human, although it was your own human breath which you breathed into it, precisely as God breathed of His own Spirit. In fact,'^ the Scripture, by expressly saying''* that God breathed intf) man's nostrils the breath of life, and that man became thereby a living soul, not a life-giving spirit, has distinguished that soul from the condition of the Creator. The ^\ork must 7 Aurulam.
sVeritati.
9 Plerumque.
i°Non dehnquendi felicitatem. " Ceterum. "Et alias autem. »3 Denique.
CHAP. X.]
TERTULLIAN AGAINST MARCION.
necessarily be distinct from the workman, and it is inferior to him. The pitcher will not be the potter, although made by the potter; nor in like manner, will the afflatus, because made by the spirit, be on that account the spirit. The soul has often been called by the same name as the breath. You should also take care that no descent be made from the breath to a still lower quality. So you have granted (you say) the infirmity of the soul, which you denied before! Undoubtedly, when you de- mand for it an equality with God, that is, a freedom from fault, I contend that it is infirm. But when the comparison is challenged with an angel, I am compelled to maintain that the head over all things is the stronger of the two, to whom the angels are ministers,' who is destined to be the judge of angels,^ if he shall stand fast in the law of God — an obedience which he refused at first. Now this disobedi- ence 3 it was possible for the afflatus of God to commit: it was possible, but it was not proper. The possibility lay in its slenderness of nature, as being the breath and not the spirit; the impropriety, however, arose from its power of will, as being free, and not a slave. It was furthermore assisted by the warning against committing sin under the threat of incurring death, which was meant to be a sup- port for its slender nature, and a direction for its liberty of choice. So that the soul can no longer appear to have sinned, because it has an affinity with God, that is to say, through the afflatus, but rather through that which was an addition to its nature, that is, through its free-will, which was indeed given to it by God in accordance with His purpose and reason, but recklessly employed" by man according as he chose. This, then, being the case, the entire course = of God's action is purged from all imputation to evil. For the liberty of the will will not retort its own wrong on Him by whom it was bestowed, but on him by wiiom it was improperly used. What is the evil, then, which you want to impute to the Creator? If it is man's sin, it will not be God's fault, because it is man's doing; nor is that Being to be regarded as the author of the sin, who turns out to be its forbidder, nay, its con- demner. If death is the evil, death will not give the reproach of being its own author to Him who threatened it, but to him who de- spised it. For by his contempt he introduced it, which assuredly* would not have appeared had man not despised it.
3 Hoc ipsum, referring to the noluit of the preceding clause.
4 Agitatum.
5 Dispositio. * Utique.
20 WHO INSTIGATl'lD MAN TO SIN HIMSKLF Till: CREATURE OF GOD. NAY, THE PRIMEVAL CHERUB ONLY WAS GOD's WORK. THE DEVIL- ISH NATURE SUPERADDED BY WILFULNESS.
IN man's recovery the devil is vanquish- ed IN A conflict on HIS OWN GROUND.