If, however, you choose to transfer the ac- count ^ of evil from man to the devil as the instigator of sin, and in this way, too, throw the blame on the Creator, inasmuch as He created the devil, — for He maketh those spirtual beings, the angels — then it will follow that ** what was made, that is to say, the angel, will belong to Him who made it; while that which was not made by God, even the devil, or accuser,' cannot but have been made by itself; and this by false detraction '" from God: first, how that God had forbidden them to eat of every tree; then, with the pretence that they should not die if they ate; thirdly, as if God grudged them the property of divinity. Now, whence originated this malice of lying and deceit towards man, and slandering of God "> Most certainly not from God, who made the angel good after the fashion of His good works. Indeed, before he became the devil, he stands forth the wisest of creatures; and " wisdom is no " evil. If you turn to the prophecy of Ezekiel, you will at once perceive that this angel was both by creation good and by choice corrupt. For in the person of the prince of Tyre it is said in reference to the devil: " Moreover, the word of the Lord came unto me, saying. Son of man, take up a lamentation upon the king of Tyrus, and say unto him. Thus saith the Lord God: Thou sealest up the sum, full of wisdom, perfect in beauty" (this belongs to him as the highest of the angels, the archangel, the wisest of all); "amidst the delights of the paradise of thy God wast thou born " (for it was there, where God had made the angels in a shape which resembled the figure of animals). " Every precious stone was thy covering, the sardius, the topaz, and the diamond, the beryl, the onyx, and the jasper, the sapphire, the eme- rald, and the carbuncle; and with gold hast thou filled thy barns and thy treasuries. From the day when thou wast created, when I set thee, a cherub, upon the holy mountain of God, thou wast in the midst of stones of fire, thou wast irreproachable in thy days, from the day of thy creation, until thine iniquities were discovered. By the abundance of thy 7 Elogium.
8 Ergo.
9 Delator.
■f Deferendo, in reference to the word delator, our author's synonyme for £ia/3oAo9. >' Nisi.
TERTULLIAN AGAINST MARCION.
[book II.
merchandise thou hast filled thy storehouses, and thou hast sinned," etc' This descrip- tion, it is manifest, properly belongs to the transgression of the angel, and not to the prince's: for none among human beings was either born in the paradise of God, not even Adam himself, who was rather translated thither; nor placed with a cherub upon God's holy mountain, that is to say, in the heights of heaven, from which the Lord testifies that Satan fell; nor detained amongst the stones of fire, and the flashing rays of burning con- stellations, whence Satan was cast down like lightning.* No, it is none else than the very author of sin who was denoted in the person of a sinful man: he was once irreproachable, at the time of his creation, formed for good by God, as by the good Creator of irreproach- able creatures, and adorned with every angelic glory, and associated with God, good with the Good; but afterwards of his own accord removed to evil. From the day 7vhen thine iniquities,^ says he, tvere discovered, — attribut- ing to him those injuries wherewith he in- jured man when he was expelled from his al- legiance to God, — even from that time did he sin, when he propagated his sin, and thereby plied " the abundance of his merchandise," that is, of his wickedness, even the talc* of his transgressions, because he was himself as a spirit no less (than man) created, with the faculty of free-will. For God would in nothing fail to endow a being who was to be next to Himself with a liberty of this kind. Never- theless, by precondemning him, God testified that he had departed from the condition ^ of his created nature, through his own lusting after the wickedness which was spontaneously conceived within him; and at the same time, by conceding a permission for the operation of his designs, He acted consistently with the purpose of His own goodness, deferring the devil's destruction for the self-same reason as He postponed the restitution of man. For He afforded room for a conflict, wherein man might crush his enemy with the same freedom of his will as had made him succumb to him (proving that the fault was all his own, not God's), and so worthily recover his salvation by a victory; wherein also the devil might receive a more bitter punishment, through being vanquished by him whom he had pre- viously injured; and wherein God might be discovered to be so much the more good, as waiting* for man to return from his present ' Ezek. xxviii. 11-16 (Sept.).
3 Laesurae = " injuries." 'A£iic^/iaTa tv aoi, — Iniquitates in te." — HiERON.
life to a more glorious paradise, with a right to pluck of the tree of life.'
CHAP. XI. — IF, AFTER MAN's SIN, GOD EXER- CISED HIS ATTRIBUTE OF JUSTICE AND JUDG- MENT, THIS WAS COMPATIBLE WITH HIS GOODNESS, AND ENHANCES THE TRUE IDEA OF THE PERFECTION OF GOD's CHARACTER.
Up to the fall of man, therefore, from the beginning God was simply good; after that He became a judge both severe and, as the Marcionites will have it, cruel. Woman is at once condemned to bring forth in sorrow, and to serve her husband,* although before she had heard without pain the increase of her race proclaimed with the blessing. Increase a?id multiply, and although she had been des- tined to be a help and not a slave to her male partner. Immediately the earth is also cursed, 5 which before was blessed. Immedi- ately spring up briers and thorns, where once had grown grass, and herbs, and fruitful trees. Immediately arise sweat and labour for bread, where previously on every tree was yielded spontaneous food and untilled '° nourishment. Thenceforth it is " man to the ground," and not as before, ''''from the ground; to death thenceforth, but before, to life; thenceforth with coats of skins, but before, nakedness without a blush. Thus God's prior goodness was from " nature. His subsequent severity from " a cause. The one was innate, the other accidental; the one His own, the other adapted;'^ the one issuing from Him, the other admitted by Him. But then tiature could not have rightly permitted His good- ness to have gone on inoperative, nor the catise have allowed His severity to have es- caped in disguise or concealment. God pro- vided the one for Himself, the other for the occasion. '3 You should now set about show- ing also that the position of a judge is allied with evil, who have been dreaming of another god as a purely good one — solely because you cannot tmderstand the Deity to be a judge; al- though we have proved God to be also a judge. Or if not a judge, at any rate a perverse and useless originator of a discipline which is not to be vindicated — in other words, not to be judged. You do not, however, disprove God's being a judge, who have no proof to show that He is a judge. You will undoubtedly have to accuse justice herself, which provides the judge, or else to reckon her among the species "> Secura. " Secundum. 12 Accommodata.
CHAP. XIII.]
TERTULLIAN AGAINST MARCION.
of evil, that is, to add injustice to the titles of goodness. But then justice is an evil, if injustice is a good. And yet you are forced to declare injustice to be one of the worst of things, and by the same rule are constrained to class justice amongst the most excellent. Since there is nothing hostile ' to evil which is not good, and no enemy of good which is not evil. It follows, then, that as injustice is an evil, so in the same degree is justice a good. Nor should it be regarded as simply a species of goodness, but as the practical observance* of it, because goodness (unless justice be so controlled as to be just) will not be goodness, if it be unjust. For nothing is good which is unjust; while everything, on the other hand, which is just is good.
CHAP. XII. THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOODNESS AND JUSTICE SHOULD NOT BE SEPARATED. THEY ARE COMPATIBLE IN THE TRUE GOD. THE FUNCTION OF JUSTICE IN THE DIVINE BEING DESCRIBED.
Since, therefore, there is this union and agreement between goodness and justice, you cannot prescribe ^ their separation. With what face will you determine the separation of your two Gods, regarding in their separate condition one as distinctively the good God, and the other as distinctively the just God? Where the just is, there also exists the good. In short, from the very first the Creator was both good and also just. And both His at- tributes advanced together. His goodness created, His justice arranged, the world; and in this process it even then decreed that the world should be formed of good materials, because it took counsel with goodness. The work of justice is apparent, in the separation which was pronounced between light and darkness, between day and night, between heaven and earth, between the water above and the water beneath, between the gathering together of the sea and the mass of the dry land, between the greater lights and the lesser, between the luminaries of the day and those of the night, between male and female, between the tree of knowledge of death and of life, between the world and paradise, between the aqueous and the earth-born animals. As goodness con- ceived all things, so did justice discriminate them. With the determination of the latter, everything was arranged and set in order. Every site and quality" of the elements, their effect, motion, and state, the rise and setting of each, are the judicial determinations of aCavere. This is Oehler's reading, and best suits the sense of the passage and the style of our author. * Habitus.
the Creator. Do not suppose that His func tion as a judge must be defined as beginning when evil began, and so tarnish His justice with the cause of evil. By such considera- tions, then, do we show that this attribute ad- vanced in company with goodness, the author ^ of all things, — worthy of being herself, too, deemed innate and natural, and not as acci- dentally accruing* to God, inasmuch as she was found to be in Him, her Lord, the arbiter of His works.
CHAP. XIII. — FURTHER DESCRIPTION OF THE DIVINE justice; since the fall of MAN IT HAS REGULATED THE DIVINE GOODNESS. god's claims on our LOVE AND OUR FEAR RECONCILED.
But yet, when evil afterwards broke out, and the goodness of God began now to have an adversary to contend against, God's justice also acquired another function, even that of directing His goodness according to men's application for it.^ And this is the result: the divine goodness, being interrupted in that free course whereby God was spontaneously good, is now dispensed according to the deserts of every man; it is offered to the worthy, denied to the unworthy, taken away from the unthankful, and also avenged on all its enemies. Thus the entire office of justice in this respect becomes an agency^ for good- ness: whatever it condemns by its judgment, whatever it chastises by its condemnation, whatever (to use your phrase) it ruthlessly pursues,' it, in fact, benefits with good in- stead of injuring. Indeed, the fear of judg- ment contributes to good, not to evil. For good, now contending with an enemy, was not strong enough to recommend itself" by itself alone. At all events, if it could do so much, it could not keep its ground; for it had lost its impregnability through the foe, unless some power of fear supervened, such as might compel the very unwilling to seek after good, and take care of it. But who, when so many incentives to evil were assailing him, would desire that good, which he could despise with impunity? Who, again, would take care of what he could lose without danger? You read how broad is the road to evil," how thronged in comparison with the opposite: would not all glide down that road were there nothing in it to fear? We dread the Creator's tremen- dous threats, and yet scarcely turn away from 5 Auctrice.
6 Obventiciam.
7 Secundum adversionera 8 Procuratio.
9 Saevit.
'oCommendari. "Matt. vii. 13.
TERTULLIAN AGAINST MARCION.
[book II.
evil. What, if He threatened not? Will you call this justice an evil, when it is all un- favourable to evil? Will 3^ou deny it to be a good, when it has its eye towards ' good? What sort of being ought you to wish God to be? Would it be right to prefer that He should be such, that sins might flourish under Him, and the devil make mock at Him? Would you suppose Him to be a good God, who should be able to make a man worse by security in sin? Who is the author of good, but He who also requires it? In like manner, who is a stranger to evil, except Him who is its enemy? Who its enemy, besides Him who is its conqutror? Who else its conqueror, than He who is its punisher? Thus God is wholly good, because in all things He is on the side of good. In fact. He is omnipotent, because able both to help and to hurt. Merely to profit is a comparatively small matter, be- cause it can do nothing else than a good turn. From such a conduct^ with what confidence can I hope for good, if this is its only ability? How can I follow after the reward of inno- cence, if I have no regard to the requital of wrong-doing? I must needs have my doubts whether he might not fail in recompensing one or other alternative, who was unequal in his resources to meet both. Thus far, then, justice is the very fulness of the Deity Himself, manifesting God as both a perfect father and a perfect master: a father in His mercy, a master in His discipline; a father in the mildness of His power, a master in its severity; a father who must be loved with dutiful affection, a master who must needs be feared; be loved, because He prefers mercy to sacrifice; 3 be feared because He dislikes sin; be loved, because He prefers the sinner's re- pentance to his death;* be feared, because He dislikes the sinners who do not repent. Accordingly, the divine law enjoins duties in respect of both these attributes: Thou shalt lore God, and, T/iou shalt fear God. It pro- posed one for the obedient man, the other for the transgressor. 5 CHAP. XIV. EVIL OF TWO KINDS, PENAL AND CRIMINAL. IT IS NOT OF THE LATTER SORT THAT GOD IS THE AUTHOR, BUT ONLY OF THE FORMER, WHICH ARE PENAL, AND INCLUDED IN HIS JUSTICE.
On all occasions does God meet you: it is He who smites, but also heals; who kills, but also makes alive; who humbles, and yet exalts; who " creates' evil," but also *' makes ■ Prospicit.
2 Dc ejusmodi.
4 Ezek. xxxiii. ii.
* Condens.
peace; " '' — so that from these very (contrasts of His providence) I may get an answer to the heretics. Behold, they say, how He acknowl- edges Himself to be the creator of evil in the passage, "It is I who create evil." They take a word whose one form reduces to con- fusion and ambiguity two kinds of evils (be- cause both sins and punishments are called evils), and will have Him in every passage to be understood as the creator of all evil things, in order that He may be designated the author of evil. We, on the contrary, distinguish be- tween the two meanings of the word in ques- tion, and, by separating evils of sin from penal evils, mala culpce from mala poencB, confine to each of the two classes its own author, — the devil as the author of the sinful evils {culpce), and God as the creator of penal evils {pana); so that the one class shall be accounted as morally bad, and the other be classed as the opera- tions of justice passing penal sentences against the evils of sin. Of the latter class of evils which are compatible with justice, God is therefore avowedly the creator. They are, no doubt, evil to those by whom they are endured, but still on their own account good, as being just and defensive of good and hostile to sin. In this respect they are, moreover, worthy of God. Else prove them to be unjust, in order to show them deserving of a place in the sin- ful class, that is to say, evils of injustice; be- cause if they turn out to belong to justice, they will be no longer evil things, but good — evil only to thj bad, by whom even directly good things are condemned as evil. In this case, you must decide that man, although the wilful contemner of the divine law, unjustly bore the doom which he would like to have escaped; that the wickedness of those days was unjustly smitten by the deluge, afterwords by the fire (of Sodom); that Egypt, although most depraved and superstititious, and, worse still, the harasser of its guest-population,^ was unjustly stricken with the chastisement of its ten plagues. God hardens the heart of Pharaoh. He deserved, however, to be in- fluenced' to his destruction, who had already denied God, already in his pride so often re- jected His ambassadors, accumulated heavy burdens on His people, and (to sum up all)^ as an Egyptian, had long been guilty before God of Gentile idolatry, worshipping the ibis and the crocodile in preference to the living God. Even His own people did Ciod visit in their ingratitude.'" Against young lads, too.
7 See Isa. xlv. 7.
* Hospitis populi confliclatricem.
oSubministrari. In Apol. ii., the verb ministrare is used to indicate Satan's power in influencing men. [The translator here corrects his own word seduced and I have substituted his better word influcnc-d. The Lord gave him over to Satan's influence.]
•o Niini. xi. and xxi.
ClIAI'. XVI.]
TERTULLIAN AGAINST MARCION.
did He send forth bears, for their irreverence to the prophet.'
CHAP. XV. — THE SEVERITY OF GOD COMPATIBLE WITH REASON AND JUSTICE. WHEN INFLIC'I- ED, NOT MEANT TO BE ARBITRARY, BUT REMEDIAL.
Consider well,' then, before all things the justice of the Judge; and if its purpose ^ be clear, then the severity thereof, and the opera- tions of the severity in its course, will appear compatible with reason and justice. Now, rhat we may not linger too long on the point, (I would cnallenge you to) assert the other reasons also, that you may condemn the Judge's sentences; extenuate the delinquen- cies of the sinner, that you may blame his ju- dicial conviction. Never mind censuring the Judge; rather prove Him to be an unjust one. Well, then, even though* He required the sins of the fathers at the hands of the children, the hardness of the people made such reme- dial measures necessary s for them, in order that, having their posterity in view, they might obey the divine law. For who is there that feels not a greater care for his children than for himself? Again, if the blessing of the fathers was destined likewise for their off- spring, previous to*" any merit on the part of these, why might not the guilt of the fathers also redound to their children? As was the grace, so was the offence; so that the grace and the offence equally ran down through the whole race, with the reservation, indeed, of that subsequent ordinance by which it became possible to refrain from saying, that " the fathers had eaten a sour grape, and the chil- dren's teeth were set on edge:"' in other words, that the father should not bear the in- iquity of the son, nor the son the iniquity of the father, but that every man should be chargeable with his own sin; so that the harsh- ness of the law having been reduced^ after the hardness of the people, justice was no longer to judge the race, but individuals. If, however, you accept the gospel of truth, you will discover on whom recoils the sentence of the Judge, when requiting on sons the sins of their fathers, even on those who had been (hardened enough) to imprecate spontane- ously on themselves this condemnation: " His blood be on us, and on our children." ' This, therefore, the providence of God has ordered throughout its course," even as it had heard it.
CHAP. XVI. — TO THE SEVERITY OF GOD THERE BELONG ACCESSORY QUALITIES, COMI'ATIBLK WITH JUSTICE. IF HUMAN PASSIONS ARE PREDICATED OF GOD, THEY MUST NOT BE MEASURED ON THE SCALE OF HUMAN IMPER FECTION.
Even His severity then is good, because just: when the judge is good, that is just. Other qualities likewise are good, by means of which the good work of a good severity runs out its course, whether wrath, or jealousy," or sternness." For all these are as indispensable '^ to severity as severity is to justice. The shamelessness of an age, which ought to have been reverent, had to be avenged. Accord- ingly, qualities which pertain to the judge, when they are actually free from blame, as the judge himself is, will never be able to be charged upon him as a fault. '•' What would be said, if, when you thought the doctor nec- essary, you were to find fault with his instru- ments, because they cut, or cauterize, or am- putate, or tighten; whereas there could be no doctor of any value without his professional tools? Censure, if you please, the practi- tioner who cuts badly, amputates clumsily, is rash in his cautery; and even blame his imple- ments as rough tools of his art. Your conduct is equally unreasonable, '^ when you allow indeed that God is a judge, but at the same time destroy those operations and dispositions by which He discharges His judicial func- tions. We are taught '* God by the prophets, and by Christ, not by the philosophers nor by Epicurus. We who believe that God really lived on earth, and took upon Him the low estate of human form,"'' for the purpose of man's salvation, are very far from thinking as those do who refuse to believe that God cares for"^ anything. Whence has found its way to the heretics an argument of this kind: If God is angry, and jealous, and roused, and grieved, He must therefore be corrupted, and must therefore die. Fortunately, however, it is a part of the creed of Christians even to believe that God did die,"' and yet that He is alive for evermore. Superlative is their folly, who prejudge divine things from human; so 2 Dispice.
3 Ratio.
4 Nam et si.
SEdomita, cf. chap. xix. sub init. and zxix. 9 Matt, xxvii. 25.
«o Omnis providentia. ".limulatio. «2 Saevitia. «3 Debita. M Exprobrari. '5 Proinde est enim. '6 Eriidimur. ■7 Habitus. «8 Curare.
•9 [See Vol. II. p. 71 (this series), for an early eTarrpli- nf this ConitHunicatio idio»iatii»i.'\ lO TERTULLIAN AGAINST MARCION.
[book il that, because in man's corrupt condition there are found passions of this description, there- fore there must be deemed to exist in God also sensations ' of the same kind. Discrimi- nate between the natures, and assign to them their respective senses, which are as diverse as their natures require, although they seem to have a community of designations. We read, indeed, of God's right hand, and eyes, and feet: these must not, however, be com- pared with those of human beings, because they are associated in one and the same name. Now, as great as shall be the difference be- tween the divine and the human body, al- though their members pass under identical names, so great will also be the diversity be- tween the divine and the human soul, not- withstanding that their sensations are desig- nated by the same names. These sensations in the human being are rendered just as cor- rupt by the corruptibility of man's substance, as in God they are rendered incorruptible by the incorruption of the divine essence. Do you really believe the Creator to be God? By all means, is your reply. How then do you suppose that in God there is anything human, and not that all is divine? Him whom you do not deny to be God, you confess to be not human; because, when you confess Him