Moreover, without an error of the intellectual faculty, it is impossible for good to be mistaken for evil. And only in respeCt of private advantages is it possible for the loss of one being to be the gain of another. But to the general good nothing is lost by the good of any private member; but every private good goes to fill in the public good.* But God is the universal good, by partaking in whose likeness all other things are called good. No other being's evil then can possibly be good for God. Nor again, seeing that God's knowledge makes no mistakes, can He apprehend as evil that which is simply good, and no evil to Him. Envy therefore is impossible to God, specifically as Envy, not only because it is a species of sadness, but also be- cause it is sadness at the good of another, and thus takes the good of another as evil to itself. f It is part of the same procedure to be sad at good and to desire evil. Such sadness arises from good being accounted evil: such desire, from evil being accounted good. Now Anger is desire of the evil of another for ven- geance' sake. Anger then is far from God by reason of its species, not only because it is a species of sadness, but also because it is a desire of vengeance, conceived for sadness at an injury done one.
CHAPTER XC-That there is in God Delight and Joy THERE are some passions which, though they do not befit God as passions, nevertheless, so far as their specific nature is considered, do not involve anything inconsistent with divine perfection. Of the number of these is Delight and Joy. Joy is of present good. Neither by reason of its objeCt, which is good, nor by reason of the relation in which the object, good actually possessed, stands to the subjeCt, does joy specifically contain anything inconsistent with divine perfection. Hence it is manifest that Joy or Delight has being properly in God. For as good and evil apprehended is the objeCt of the sensitive appetite, so also is it of the intellectual appetite, or will. It is the ordinary function of both appetites to pursue good and to shun evil, either real or apparent, except that the objeCt of the intellectual appetite is wider than that of the sensitive, inasmuch as the intellectual appetite regards good and evil simply, while the sensitive appetite regards good and evil felt by sense; as also the objeCt of intellect is wider than the objeCt of sense. But the activities of appetite are specified by their objeCts. There exist therefore in the intellectual appetite, or will, activities specifically similar to the activities of the sensitive appetite, and differing only in this, that in the sensitive appetite they are passions on account of the implication of a bodily organ, but in the intellectual appetite they are simple activities. J For as by the passion of fear, coming over the sensitive appetite, one shuns evil looming in the future, so the intellectual appetite works to the same effect without passion.§ Since then Joy and Delight are not repugnant to God specifically, but only inasmuch as they are passions, it follows that they are not wanting even in the divine will.
2. Joy and Delight are a sort of rest of the will in its objeCt. But God • As the flood-tide is ' filled in ' ( repraesentatur) tus felt this dread, nor is it yet extinct. Aeschylus by every advancing wave. The axiom should go down philosophises upon it (dgam. 750-762). Cf. Daniel in the pocket-book of the economist. iv, 29-34; St Luke xii, 16-21.
t The Greek dread is well known of the envy, or % See Dr Maher's Psychology, pp. 241, 470, 471, evil eye, of Heaven lighting upon any exuberance of fourth edition, 1900, Longmans, human prosperity. See the story of Polycrates and his § The man takes precautions, but is not afraid, ring in Herodotus, III, 41. Julius Caesar and Augus- 66 singularly rests in Himself as in the first object of His own will, inasmuch as He has all sufficiency in Himself.
3. Delight is the perfection of aftivity, perfecting activity as bloom does youth.* But the activity of the divine understanding is most perfect If there- fore our a6t of understanding, coming to its perfection, yields delight, most delightful must be the aft whereby God understands.
4. Everything naturally feels joy over what is like itself, except acciden- tally, inasmuch as the likeness hinders one's own gain, and 'two of a trade* quarrel. But every good thing is some likeness of the divine goodness, and nothing is lost to God by the good of His creature. Therefore God rejoices in good everywhere.
Joy and Delight differ in our consideration: for Delight arises out of good really conjoined with the subject; while Joy does not require this real conjunc- tion, but the mere resting of the will on an agreeable obje& is sufficient for it.f Hence, strictly speaking, Delight is at good conjoined with the subject: Joy over good external to the subject. Thus, in stridt parlance, God takes delight in Himself: but has joy both over Himself and over other things.
CHAPTER XCl-Tbat there is Love in Qod\ IT is of the essential idea of love, that whoever loves wishes the good of the obje6t loved. But God wishes His own good and the good of other beings (Chap. LXXV); and in this respedt He loves Himself and other beings.
2. It is a requisite of true love to love the good of another inasmuch as it is his good. But God loves the good of every being as it is the good of that being, though He does also subordinate one being to the profit of another.
3. The essential idea of love seems to be this, that the affe&ion of one tends to another as to a being who is in some way one with himself. The greater the bond of union, the more intense is the love. And again the more intimately bound up with the lover the bond of union is, the stronger the love. But that bond whereby all things are united with God, namely, His goodness, of which all things are imitations, is to God the greatest and most ir\timate of bonds, seeing that He is Himself His own goodness. There is therefore in God a love, not only true, but most perfect and strong.
But some might be of opinion that God does not love one obje<5t more than another; for a higher and a lower degree of intensity of affection is charac- teristic of a changeable nature, and cannot be attributed to God, from whom all change is utterly removed. Besides, wherever else there is mention of any divine adtivity, there is no question of more and less: thus one thing is not known by God more than another. In answer to this difficulty we must observe that whereas other activities of the soul are concerned with one object only, love alone seems to tend to two. For love wishes something to somebody: hence the things that we desire, we are properly said to 4 desire,' not to Move,' but in them we rather love ourselves for whom we desire them. Every divine a6t then is of one and the same intensity; but love may be said to admit of 4 greater * Aristotle, Eth, Nic. x. 1174 b, 22 sq., a great tcr: but all the conclusion argued and drawn in the saying and a potent solvent of all forms of hedonism. text is " that God loves," " that there is love in God."
Unction between them is foreshadowed by that which i, 5); and, owing to the divine simplicity (Chap. Plato puts in the mouth of Prodicus between rfi*<rd<u XVIII), it may be argued that whatever attribute is (pleasure) and €\nf>pcuv€<rOai (gladness), Trotag. 337 C. in God, is God.
X Quod Dens est jfmor \ is the heading of the chap- 67 and less ' in two ways, either in point of the good that we will to another, in which way weare said to love him more towhomwewish greater good; oragain in point of the intensity of the aft, in which way we are said to love him more to whom we wish, not indeed a greater good, but an equal good more fervently and effectually. In the former way then there is nothing to obje6t to in the saying that God loves one more than another, inasmuch as He wishes him a greater good: but, understood of the second way, the saying is not tenable.
Hence it appears that of our afFeftions there is none that can properly be in God except joy and love, though even these are in Him not by way of passion, as they are in us. That there is in God joy or delight is con- firmed by the authority of Holy Scripture. J was delighted day by day playing before him, says the Divine Wisdom, which is God (Prov. viii, 30). The Philosopher also says that God ever rejoices with one simple delight.* The Scripture also speaks of love in God: With everlasting lo"Pe I have loved thee (Jer. xxxi, 3); For the Father himself love th you (John xvi, 27).
But even other affections [affe£liones), which are specifically inconsistent with divine perfection, are predicated in Holy Writ of God, not properly but metaphorically, on account of likeness of effeCts. Thus sometimes the will in following out the order of wisdom tends to the same effeCt to which one might be inclined by a passion, which would argue a certain imperfection: for the judge punishes from a sense of justice, as an angry man under the promptings of anger. So sometimes God is said to be 4 angry,' inasmuch as in the order of His wisdom He means to punish some one: When his anger shall blaze out suddenly (Ps. ii, 13). He is said to be Compassionate,' inas- much as in His benevolence He takes away the miseries of men, as we do the same from a sentiment of pity: The Lord is merciful and compassionate \ patient and abounding in mercy (Ps. cii, 8). Sometimes also He is said to be 'repentant,' inasmuch as in the eternal and immutable order of His provi- dence, He builds up what He had previously destroyed, or destroys what He had previously made, as we do when moved by repentance: // repenteth me that I hate made man (Gen. vi, 6, 7). God is also said to be 'sad,' inasmuch as things happen contrary to what He loves and approves, as sadness is in us at what happens against our will: And the Lord saw, and it seemed eVil in his eyes, because judgement is not: God saw that there is no man, and he was dis- pleased, because there was none to meet him (Isa. lix, 15, 16).
CHAPTER XCll-In what sense Virtues can be posited in God AS the divine goodness comprehends within itself in a certain way all goodnesses, and virtue is a sort of goodness, the divine goodness must contain all virtues after a manner proper to itself. But no vir- tue is predicated as an attribute of God after the manner of a habit, as virtues are in us. For it does not befit God to be good by anything super- added to Him, but only by His essence, since He is absolutely simple. Nor again does He adt by anything superadded to His essence, as His essence is His being (Chap. XLV). Virtue therefore in God is not any habit, but His own essence.
2. A habit is an imperfeft aftuality, half-way between potentiality and * " God's delight is ever one and simple," says one involving unchangeableness." In the latter there Aristotle, Eth. Nic. vii, 1 1 54 b. He adds: " For there is nothing of potentiality, is not only an actuality involving change, but also 68 a£tuality: hence the subjefts of habits are compared to persons asleep. But in God aftuality is most perfect. Virtue therefore in Him is not like a habit or a science, but is as a present a6t of consciousness, which is the extremest perfection of aCtuality.
Since human virtues are for the guidance of human life, and human life is twofold, contemplative and aCtive, the virtues of the aCtive life, inasmuch as they perfeCt this present life, cannot be attributed to God: for the aCtive life of man consists in the use of material goods, which are not assignable to God. Again, these virtues perfeCt human conduCt in political society: hence they do not seem much to concern those who keep aloof from political society: much less can they befit God, whose conversation and life is far removed from the manner and custom of human life.* Some again of the virtues of the aCtive life direCt us how to govern the passions: but in God there are no passions.t CHAPTER XClll-T&atsn God there are the Virtues which regulate AElion THERE are virtues directing the aCtive life of man, which are not concerned with passions, but with aCtions, as truth, justice, liberality, magnificence, prudence, art. Since virtue is specified by its objedt, and the aCtions which are the objeCts of these virtues are not inconsistent with the divine perfection, neither is there in such virtues, specifically con- sidered, anything to exclude them from the perfection of God.
3. Of things that come to have being from God, the proper plan of them all is in the divine understanding (Chap. LXVI). But the plan of a thing to be made in the mind of the maker is Art: hence the Philosopher says that Art is " the right notion of things to be made." There is therefore properly Art in God, and therefore it is said: Wisdom, artificer of all, taught me (Wisd. vii, 21).
4. Again, the divine will, in things outside God, is determined by His knowledge (Chap. LXXXII). But knowledge directing the will to aCt is Prudence: because, according to the Philosopher, Prudence is "the right notion of things to be done." There is therefore Prudence in God; and hence it is said: With him is prudence (Job xii, 13).
5. From the faCt of God wishing anything, He wishes the requisites of that thing. But the points requisite to the perfection of each several thing are due to that thing: there is therefore in God Justice, the function of which is to distribute to each his own. Hence it is said: T6e Lord is just, and hatb loved justice (Ps. x, 8).
6. As shown above (Chapp. LXXIV, LXXV), the last end, for the sake of which God wills all things, in no way depends on the means to that end, neither in point of being nor in point of well-being. Hence God does not wish to communicate His goodness for any gain that may accrue to Him- self thereby, but simply because the mere communication befits Him as the fountain of goodness. But to give, not from any advantage expeCted from the gift, but out of sheer goodness and the fitness of giving, is an aCt of Liberality. God therefore is in the highest degree liberal; J and, as Avicenna • But is not God the head of all political society? \ Deus igitur est ma.x'ime hberalis. 'Liberal,* as an Yes, that is allowed for in the next chapter. adjective, may connote either liberalism or (as here) t On these passion-controlling virtues (tempe- liberality, ranee and fortitude) see Ethics and Natural Lav*, PP- 74-76» n. 3: pp. 85, 86, nn. 2, 3.
69 says, He alone can properly be called liberal: for every other agent but Him is in the way of gaining something by his aftion and intends so to gain. This His liberality the Scripture declares, saying: <tAs thou openest thy hand, all things shall be filled with goodness (Ps. ciii, 28); and, Who gheth to all abundantly, and reproacheth not (James i, 5).
7. All things that receive being from God, necessarily bear His likeness, in so far as they are, and are good, and have their proper archetypes in the divine understanding (Chap. LIV). But this belongs to the virtue of Truth, that every one should manifest himself in his deeds and words for such as he really is. There is therefore in God the virtue of Truth.* Hence, Qod is true (Rom. iii, 4); and, All thy Vays are truth (Ps. cxviii, 151).
In point of exchange, the proper aft of commutative justice, justice does not befit God, since He receives no advantage from any one; hence, Who hath first gfoen to him, and recompense shall be made him? (Rom. xi, 35;) and, Who hath given to me beforehand, that I may repay him? (Job xli, 2.) Still, in a metaphorical sense, we are said to give things to God, inasmuch as He takes kindly what we have to offer Him. Commutative justice therefore does not befit God, but only distributive justice.f To judge of things to be done, or to give a thing, or make a distribution, is not proper to man alone, but belongs to any and every intelledtual being. Inasmuch therefore as the aforesaid actions are considered in their generality, they have their apt place even in divinity: for as man is the distributer of human goods, as of money or honour, so is God of all the goods of the uni- verse. The aforesaid virtues therefore are of wider extension in God than in man: for as the justice of man is to a city or family, so is the justice of God to the entire universe: hence the divine virtues are said to be archetypes of ours. But other virtues, which do not properly become God, have no arche- type in the divine nature, but only, as is the case with corporeal things generally, in the divine wisdom, which contains the proper notions of all things.j CHAPTER XGIV-Thatthe Contemplative (Intellectual) Virtues are in Qod IF Wisdom consists in the knowledge of the highest causes; and God chiefly knows Himself, and knows nothing except by knowing Himself, as the first cause of all (Chap. XLVI), it is evident that Wisdom ought to be attributed to God in the first place. Hence it is said: He is wise of heart (Job ix, 4); and, All wisdom is of the Lord Qod, and hath been with him alway (Ecclus i, 1). The Philosopher also says at the beginning of his ^Meta- physics that Wisdom is a divine possession, not a human.
2. If Knowledge (Science) is an acquaintance with a thing through its proper cause, and God knows the order of all causes and effects, and thereby the several proper causes of individual things (Chapp. LXV, LXVII), it is manifest that Knowledge (Science) is properly in God; hence God is the Lord of sciences (1 Kings ii, 3).
3. If the immaterial cognition of things, attained without discussion, is * See my Ethics and Natural Law, pp. 228, 229. ture ' is technically defined * the principle of attion.'
t Ethics and Statural Law, pp. 104-106. A corol- Such a virtue as temperance has no place in the lary follows, that the creature has no rights against principle of divine action. Bodily appetites not being the Creator. proper to His being, God never ads the temperate I 'The divine nature ' is here spoken of as ' na- man. He does act the just judge.
70 Understanding (Intuition),* God has such a cognition of all things (Chap. L); and therefore there is in Him Understanding. Hence, He bath counsel and understanding (Job xii, 13).
CHAPTER XCV-Tbat God cannot will Evil EVERY aft of God is an aft of virtue, since His virtue is His essence (Chap. XCII). 2. The will cannot will evil except by some error coming to be in the reason, at least in the matter of the particular choice there and then made. For as the objeft of the will is good, apprehended as such, the will cannot tend to evil unless evil be somehow proposed to it as good; and that cannot be without error. f But in the divine cognition there can be no error (Chap. LXI).
3. God is the sovereign good, admitting no intermixture of evil (Chap. LXI).
4. Evil cannot befall the will except by its being turned away from its end. But the divine will cannot be turned away from its end, being unable to will except by willing itself (Chap. LXXV). It cannot therefore will evil; and thus free will in it is naturally established in good. This is the meaning of the texts: God is faithful and without iniquity (Deut. xxxii, 4); Thine eyes are clean, O Lord, and tbou canst not loo{ upon iniquity (Hab. i, 13).
CHAPTER XCVl-That Qod hates nothing AS love is to good, so is hatred to evil; we wish good to them whom we love, and evil to them whom wc hate. If then the will of God cannot be inclined to evil, as has been shown (Chap. XCV), it is im- possible for Him to hate anything.
2. The will of God tends to things other than Himself inasmuch as, by willing and loving His own being and goodness, He wishes it to be diffused as far as is possible by communication of His likeness. This then is what God wills in beings other than Himself, that there be in them the likeness of His goodness. Therefore God wills the good of everything, and hates nothing.
4. What is found naturally in all aftive causes, must be found especially in the Prime Agent. But all agents in their own way love the effefts which they themselves produce, as parents their children, poets their own poems, craftsmen their works. Much more therefore is God removed from hating anything, seeing that He is cause of all. J Hence it is said: Tbou lovest all things that are, and batest nothing of the things that Thou bast made (Wisd. xi, 25).
Some things however God is said to hate figuratively (similitudinarie), and that in two ways. The first way is this, that God, in loving things and will- ing their good to be, wills their evil not to be: hence He is said to have hatred of evils, for the things we wish not to be we are said to hate. So it is said: Think no evil in your hearts etery one of you against bis friend, and lo**e no lying oath: for all these are things that I hate, saith the Lord (Zach. viii, 17). But none of these things are effefts of creation: they are not as subsistent # InUlUctus. This word in St Thomas means t This is explained in Book III, Chap. VI.
sometimes the faculty of understanding'; sometimes, \ God loves all the works of His hands anteceas here, the aft, or habit of understanding, of which dently. His first disposition to every creature is one so much is made in modern philosophy under the of good will. This much these arguments may be name of intuition.' St Thomas too makes much of said to evince. But how the will of God may stand it. Thus his intelUBus principiorum is 'intuition of first to certain creatures consequently upon certain events, principles.' The corresponding Aristotelian and Pla- is not here considered, tonic word is kovs, as distinguished from 8tavoia. Kant's ' Reason ' is his equivalent for vovs and inulkctus.
71 things, to which hatred or love properly attaches. The other way is by God's wishing some greater good, which cannot be without the privation of a lesser good; and thus He is said to hate, whereas it is more properly love. Thus inasmuch as He wills the good of justice, or of the order of the universe, which cannot be without the punishment or perishing of some, He is said to hate those beings whose punishment or perishing He wills, according to the text, Esau I have hated (Malach. i, 3); and, Thou hatest all who work iniquity, thou wilt destroy all who utter falsehood: the man of blood and deceit the Lord shall abominate (Ps. v, 7).* CHAPTER XCVll-That Qod is Living IT has been shown that God is intelligent and willing: but to understand and will are functions of a living being only. 2. Life is attributed to beings inasmuch as they appear to move of themselves, and not to be moved by another. Therefore things that seem to move of themselves, the moving powers of which the vulgar do not perceive, are figuratively said to live, as we speak of the * living ' (running) water of a flowing stream, but not so of a cistern or stagnant pool; and we call ' quick- silver 9 that which seems to have a motion of its own. This is mere popular speech, for properly those things alone move of themselves, which do so by virtue of their composition of a moving force and matter moved, as things with souls; hence these alone are properly said to live:f all other things are moved by some external force, a generating force, or a force removing an obstacle, or a force of impa&.J And because sensible activities are attended with movement, by a further step everything that determines itself to its own modes of aftivity, even though unattended with movement, is said to live; hence to understand and desire and feel are vital aftions. But God, of all beings, is determined to aftivity by none other than Himself, as He is prime agent and first cause; to Him therefore, of all beings, does it belong to live.
3. The divine being contains the perfection of all being (Chap. XXVIII). But living is perfeft being; hence animate things in the scale of being take precedence of inanimate. With God then to be is to live.
This too is confirmed by authority of divine Scripture: / will raise to heaven my hand, and sWear by my right hand, and say: I live for ever (Deut. xxxii, 40): My heart and my fesh haTt>e rejoiced in the Irving God (Ps. lxxiii, 3).
CHAPTER XCVUI-That God is His own Life IN living things, to live is to be: for a living thing is said to be alive in- asmuch as it has a soul; and by that soul, as by its own proper form, it has being: living in fadl is nothing else than living being, arising out of a living form.§ But, in God, Himself is His own being (Chap. XXII): Him- self therefore is His own life.
* In this view, the wicked and their punishment X A ' generating force ' was St Thomas's notion form part of the order of the universe, one side of the of the forces of chemistry. The fall of a stone he put eternal antithesis of good and evil. St Thomas's ex- down to removens prohibens, the support being removed, position is succinct enough. Further elucidations must and the stone left free to gratify its natural appetite be sought from theologians; who, even when ortho- for rest on earth. The motion of the heavenly bodies dox, are far from consentient here. Who has found he attributed, not without hesitation, to their being the answer to Job's question: Why then do the mc\ed animated by a soul (Book II, Chap. LXX). Had he live? (Job xxi, 7.) followed out the idea, here obscurely expressed, of the t It must be remembered that the schoolmen inertia of matter, he might have been led to divine assign some sort of soul, an anima tegetatiya, to plants. the force of gravitation.
Others have thought that soul goes no further than $ Hence of a dead man we say truly: ' He is no consciousness. more.'
72 OF GOD AS HE IS IN HIMSELF 2. To understand is to live: but God is His own adt of understanding (Chap. XLV).
3. If God is living, there must be life in Him. If then He is not His own life, there will be something in Him that is not Himself,* and thus He will be compound, — a rejected conclusion (Chap. XVIII).
And this is the text: I am life (John xiv, 6).f CHAPTER XClX-T6at the Life of Qod is everlasting IT is impossible for God to cease to live, since Himself He is His own life (Chap. XCVIII). 2. Everything that at one time is and at another time is not, has existence through some cause. But the divine life has no cause, as neither has the divine being. God is therefore not at one time living and at another not living, but always lives.
3. In every activity the agent remains, although sometimes the activity passes in succession: hence in motion the moving body remains the same in subjedt throughout the whole course of the motion, although not the same in our consideration. Where then the aftion is the agent himself, nothing there can pass in succession, but all must be together at once. But God's adt of understanding and living is God Himself (Chapp. XLV, XCVIII): there- fore His life has no succession, but is all together at once, and everlasting. Hence it is said: This is the true God and life everlasting (1 John v, 20).
CHAPTER G-That Qod is Hafty