GOD wills other things inasmuch as He wills His own goodness (Chap. LXXV). Things then come under the will of God accord- ing as they are included in His goodness. But in His goodness all things are one: for they are in Him according to the mode that befits Him; material things, immaterially; and things many, in union (Chapp.LV,LVIII). Thus the multitude of the objefts of the divine will does not multiply the divine substance.
CHAPTER LXXVlIl-That the Divine Will reaches to the good of Individual Existences THE excellence of order in the universe appears in two ways, first, inasmuch as the whole universe is referred to something beyond the universe, as an army to its leader: secondly, inasmuch as the parts of the universe are referred to one another, like the parts of an army; and the second order is for the sake of the first. But God, in willing Himself as an end, wills other things in their reference to Him as an end. He wills therefore the excellence of order in the universe in reference to Himself, and the excellence of order in the universe in mutual reference of its parts to one another. But the excellence of order is made up of the good of individual existences.
This is confirmed by the authority of Scripture: God saw the lights that it V>as good (Gen. i, 4); and similarly of His other works; and lastly of them altogether: God sa*to all things that he had made^ and they were very good 58 OF GOD AS HE IS IN HIMSELF CHAPTER LXXIX-That Qod wills things even that as yet are not SOME one might perhaps think that God wills only the things that are: for correlatives go together; and if one perishes, the other perishes; if then willing supposes a relation of the willing subjeft to the object willed, none can will any but things that are. Besides, the will and its ob- jects are to one another as Creator and creature: now God cannot be called Creator, or Lord, or Father, except of things that are: neither then can He be said to will any but things that are. And it may be further argued, that if the divine will is invariable, as is the divine being, and wills only aflual existences, it wills nothing but what always is.
Let us say then in answer to these objections, that as good apprehended by the intelleft moves the will, the a£t of the will must follow the condition of the mental apprehension. Now the mind apprehends the thing, not only as it is in the mind, but also as it is in its own nature: for we not only know that the thing is understood by us (for that is the meaning of its being c in the mind'), but also that the thing exists, or has existed, or is to exist in its own nature. Though then at the time the thing has no being other than in the mind, still the mind stands related to it, not as it is in the mind, but as it is in its own nature, which the mind apprehends. Therefore the relation of the divine will to a non-existent thing is to the thing according as it is in its own nature, attached to some certain time, and not merely to the thing as it is in the knowledge of God. For God wills the thing, that is not now, to be in some certain time: He does not merely will it inasmuch as He Himself understands it.* Nor is the relation of the will to its objeft similar to the relation of Creator to creature, of Maker to made, of Lord to subje6t. For will, being an immanent a6t, does not involve the aftual external existence of the thing willed: t whereas making and creating and governing do signify an aftion terminated to an external effeCt, such that without its existence such aftion is unintelligible.
CHAPTER LXXX-Thal Go d of necessity wills His own Being and His own Goodness GOD wills His own being and His own goodness as His first objedt and reason for willing all other things (Chap. LXXIV), and this He wills in everything that He does will. Nor is it possible for Him to will it merely potentially: He must will it adtually, as His willing is His being.
4. All things, in so far as they have existence, are likened to God, who is the first and greatest being. But all things, in so far as they have exis- tence, cherish their own being naturally in such manner as they can. Much more therefore does God cherish His own being naturally.
# God wills the thing, not merely to be in His t And yet, " If He willed them, those creatures eternal understanding of it; but to be in rerum na- would exist" (Chap. LXXXI, n. 3), — of course, for tura at some fixed time; and (contrary to what such time as God's will determined for them to exist idealists generally hold) its existence in rerum na- in. This touches the difficult point of the distinction, tura is other than its existence in the divine under- if any is to be drawn, between the will and the standing. power of the Almighty.
59 CHAPTER LXXXl-That God does not of necessity love other things than Himself A WILL does not of necessity tend to the means to an end, if the end can be had without those means. Since then the divine Goodness can be without other beings, — nay, other beings make no addition to it, — God is under no necessity of willing other things from the fa£t of His willing His own goodness.
2. Since good, understood to be such, is the proper objeft of the will, the will may fasten on any objedt conceived by the intelleft in which the notion of good is fulfilled. Hence though the being of anything, as such, is good, and its not-being, as such, is evil; still the very not-being of a thing may become an objeft to the will, though not of necessity, by reason of some notion of good fulfilled: for it is good for a thing to be, even though some other thing is not.* The only good then which the will by the terms of its constitution cannot wish not to be, is the good whose non-existence would destroy the notion of good altogether. Such a good is no other than God. The will then by its constitution can will the non-existence of any- thing else except of God.f But in God there is will according to the fulness of the power of willing. God then can will the non-existence of any other being besides Himself.
3. God in willing His own goodness wills also other things than Himself as sharing His goodness. But since the divine goodness is infinite, and par- takable in infinite ways, if by the willing of His own goodness He of neces- sity willed the beings that partake of it, the absurdity would follow that He must will the existence of infinite creatures sharing His goodness in infinite ways: because, if He willed them, those creatures would exist, since His will is the principle of being to creatures.
We must consider therefore why God of necessity knows other beings than Himself, and yet does not of necessity will them to exist, notwithstand- ing that His understanding and willing of Himself involves His under- standing and willing other beings. The reason of it is this: an intelligent agent's understanding anything arises from a certain condition of the under- standing,— for by a thing being actually understood its likeness is in the mind: but a volitional agent's willing anything arises from a certain condi- tion of the objeft willed, — for we will a thing either because it is an end, or because it is a means to an end. Now the divine perfection necessarily requires that all things should so be in God as to be understood in Him. But the divine goodness does not of necessity require that other things should exist to be referred to Him as means to an end; and therefore it is neces- * How can mere not-being, as such, be an ob- antecedent necessity of decreeing the existence of any jedt of the will at all? St Thomas perhaps is speaking creature, because He is well enough without creaof two existences incompatible with one another, tures, supremely self-sufficient and independent of But it is well to remark, there is a difference be- all creation: which independence and self-sufficiency tween not-willing, which is a mere vacuity of will, is the root of the divine free-will ad extra: which and willing-not, which is a positive act of will. The free-will again alone bars pantheism, disconcerts question may be raised, whether for things possible, idealism (by taking away the determinism to which but eternally non-existent, any divine decree is re- it leads), saves the notion of a Personal God, and quisite to keep them out of existence. Is it not with it prayer, miracles, Christianity, enough that there is no decree to call them into t A perverse will can will the non-existence of existence? Or is such a decree of exclusion rendered God Himself. St Thomas is speaking of the normal requisite by the conjunction of a perfect will with a will, which takes a right view of God, as the perperfecl actual knowledge? Anyhow God is under no verse will does not.
60 sary that God should know other things, but not that He should will other things.* Hence neither does He will all things that are referable to His goodness: but He knows all things which are in any way referable to His essence, whereby He understands.
CHAPTER LXXXll-Arguments against the aforesaid Doctrine, and Solutions of the same THESE awkward consequences seem to follow, if any things that God wills He does not will of necessity, i. If the will of God in respe6t of certain objects of will is not determined by any of them, it seems to be indifferent. But every faculty that is indifferent is in a manner in potentiality.
2. Since potential being, as such, is naturally changeable, — for what can be can also not be, — it follows that the divine will is variable, t 4. Since what hangs loose, indifferent between two alternatives, does not tend to one rather than to the other, unless it be determined by one or other, either God wills none of the things to which He is indifferent, or He is determined by one or other of them, in which case there must be something antecedent to God to determine Him.
But none of the above objections can stand.
1. The indifference, or indeterminateness, of a faculty may be attributable either to the faculty itself or to its object. To the faculty itself, when its in- determinateness comes from its not having yet attained to its perfection: this argues imperfection in the faculty, and an unfulfilled potentiality, as we see in the mind of a doubter, who has not yet attained to premises sufficient to determine him to take either of two sides. To the object of the faculty, when the perfect working of the faculty does not depend on its adoption of either alternative, and yet either alternative may be adopted, as when art may employ different instruments to do the same work equally well. This argues no imperfection in the faculty, but rather its pre-eminent excellence, inasmuch as it rises superior to both opposing alternatives, and therefore is indifferent to both and determined by neither. Such is the position of the divine will with respect to things other than itself. Its perfection depends on none of them; being as it is intimately conjoined with its own last end and final perfection. J 2. In the divine will there is no potentiality. Unnecessitated, it prefers one alternative to another respecting the creatures which it causes to be. It is not to be looked upon as being in a potential attitude to both alternatives, so as first to be potentially willing both, and then to be actually willing one. It is for ever actually willing whatever it wills, as well its own self as the creatures which are the objects of its causation. But whatever creature God wills to exist, that creature stands in no necessary relation to the divine good- ness, which is the proper object of the divine will.
• It is necessary that He should know other God's will is a thing that may be or may not be, God's things as intelligible and possible, not that He should will also of creating it may be or may not be. will other things to come to adlual existence. Once I God in willing His own goodness is not there- more the ideal order is necessary, but not the aclual by necessitated to will the existence of, let us say, St order of creation. The one necessary actuality is God. Augustine, as though, if there were no Augustine, the Though creatures are means to God's end, they are goodness of God would be incomplete. This argu- not necessary means to any necessary end of His: ment of God's absolute self-sufficiency, His supreme therefore their existence is not necessarily willed by independence of creation, and consequent perfect Him, albeit their possibility is necessarily discerned, liberty to create or not, is, I am informed, the tenet t The difficulty is, that if the created objeel of of some at least of the wisest Brahmins of India.
61 4. We cannot admit that either the divine will wills none of the effects of its causation, or that its volition is determined by some exterior objedt. The proper object of the will is good apprehended as such by the under- standing. Now the divine understanding apprehends, not only the divine being, or divine goodness, but other good things likewise (Chap. XLIX); and it apprehends them as likenesses of the divine goodness and essence, not as constituent elements of the same. Thus the divine will tends to them as things becoming its goodness, not as things necessary to its goodness. So it happens also in our will: which, when it inclines to a thing as absolutely necessary to its end, tends to it with a certain necessity; but when it tends to a thing solely on account of its comeliness and appropriateness, does not tend to it necessarily. 9 CHAPTER LXXXlll-That God wills anything else than Himself with an Hypothetical Necessity* IN every unchangeable being, whatever once is, cannot afterwards cease to be. Since then God's will is unchangeable, supposing Him to will anything, He cannot on that supposition not will it.
2. Everything eternal is necessary. But God's will for the causation of any effeft is eternal: for, as His being, so His willing is measured by eter- nity. That will therefore is necessary, yet not absolutely so, since the will of God has no necessary connexion with this objeftion willed. It is therefore necessary hypothetically, on a supposition.
3. Whatever God once could do, He can still. His power does not grow less, as neither does His essence. But He cannot now not-will what He is already supposed to have willed, because His will cannot change: therefore He never could not-will whatever He once willed (nunquam potuit non velle quid- quid yo/uit).f It is therefore hypothetically necessary for Him to have willed whatever He has willed, as it is for Him to will whatever He does will: but in neither case is the necessity absolute.
4. Whoever wills anything, necessarily wills all that is necessarily requi- site to that purpose, unless there be some defe6t on his part, either by igno- rance, or because his will sometimes is drawn away by some passion from a right choice of means to the end: nothing of which can be said of God. If God then in willing Himself wills anything else besides Himself, He needs must will all that is necessarily required to the effecting of the thing willed, as it is necessary that God should will the being of a rational soul, if He wills the being of a man.j # Otherwise called a consequent, as distinguished repugnant! Is it possible under any circumstances, from an antecedent, or absolute, necessity. or under what circumstances, for man's final happiness t Once God wills absolutely, even though freely, to be secured without toil and trial, a crown without He wills irrevocably. He never has to change His a cross?
mind upon any unforeseen obstacle or intercession. This is not a difficult chapter, but it suggests a He threatened the Ninivites, whose repentance He great difficulty: how God, willing from eternity this foresaw, and whose pardon upon repentance He had present creation, is perfectly the same God as He decreed. might have been from eternity willing no such t And, possibly, the human shape, if He wishes thing; or how, there being not the slightest entithe being of a rational animal. Or is a rational ani- tative difference between God willing to create and mal possible in the shape of a pig? Who shall reckon God having no such will, creation, which was noor particularise the essential connexions and repug- thing to begin with, ever came to be rather than not nances of things? How much, that we might wish to to be. The difficulty has its foundation in this, that, cast out, cleaves to nature and must be, if natural within our experience, every new effect involves some things are to be at all! How thoughtlessly may we mur- antecedent change either in the agent or in the mur at God for not severing two elements essentially matter acted upon. The more powerful the agent, inseparable, or not conjoining two others mutually the less change is required, as when a strong man 62 OF GOD AS HE IS IN HIMSELF CHAPTER LXXXIV- That the Will of God is not of things in themselves Impossible THOSE things are in themselves impossible, which involve an incon- sistency, as that man should be an ass, which involves the rational being irrational. But what is inconsistent with a thing, excludes some one of the conditions requisite to it, as being an ass excludes a man's reason. If therefore God necessarily wills the things requisite to that which by supposition He does will, it is impossible for Him to will what is incon- sistent therewith.
2. God, in willing His own being, wills all other things, that He does will, in so far as they have some likeness to it. But in so far as anything is inconsistent with the notion of being as such, there cannot be stand therein any likeness to the first or divine being, which is the fountain of being. God therefore cannot will anything that is inconsistent with the notion of being as such, as that anything should be at once being and not being, that affirmation and negation should be true together, or any other such essen- tial impossibility, inconsistency, and implied contradiction.
3. What is no objedt of the intellect, can be no objedt of the will. But essential impossibilities, involving notions mutually inconsistent, are no ob- jects of intellect, except perchance through the error of a mind that does not understand the proprieties of things, which cannot be said of God.
CHAPTER LXXXV-That the Divine Will does not take away Contingency from things * HYPOTHETICAL necessity in the cause cannot lead to absolute necessity in the effect. But God's will about a creature is not abso- lutely necessary, but hypothetically so (Chap. LXXXIII). There- fore the divine will is no argument of absolute necessity in creatures. But only this absolute necessity excludes contingency: for even a contingent fadt may be extended either way into an hypothetical necessity: thus it is neces- sary that Socrates moves, if he runs. It does not therefore follow that a thing happens of necessity, if God wills it: all that holds is the necessary truth of this conditional: 4 If God wills anything, the thing will be *: but the ' con- sequent * (as distinguished from the ' consequence ') need not be a necessary truth.f CHAPTER LXXXVl-That Reason can be assigned for the Divine Willi THE end is a reason for willing the means. But God wills His own goodness as an end, and all things else as means thereto: His good- ness therefore is a reason why He wills other things different from Himself.
with little or no effort lifts a weight, which a weaker t Thus in the proposition: 'If I find the money, one would have to strain himself to raise from the I shall pay twenty shillings in the pound': the truth ground. Hence we may faintly surmise how 'in the of the 'consequence ' is small comfort to my rueful limit' an Almighty agent would aft without being creditors for the falsity of the 'consequent.' in the least altered by his a&ion from the being that I Reason is absolutely assignable for the volitions he would have been, had he remained at rest. Not of God regarding the universe: but relatively to us, that I take this suggestion to remove the whole dim- we can assign it but vaguely, and, revelation apart, culty. with much uncertainty. By aid of the Aristotelian • A 4 contingent' thing, be it remembered, is a and Ptolemaic cosmogonies, mediaeval writers had thing that actually is, but absolutely might not be. much to say of " the perfection of the universe," Except God, all actuality is ultimately contingent, over which sayings the modern astronomer stands however it be often hypothetically necessary. amazed, murmuring low to himself, if he is a pious 63 2. The good of a part is ordained to the end of the good of the whole, as the imperfeft to the perfeft. But things become objects of the divine will according as they stand in the order of goodness. It follows that the good of the universe is the reason why God wills every good of any part of the universe.
3. Supposing that God wills anything, it follows of necessity that He wills the means requisite thereto. But what lays on others a necessity for doing a thing, is a reason for doing it. Therefore the accomplishment of a purpose, to which such and such means are requisite, is a reason to God for willing those means.
We may therefore proceed as follows. God wishes man to have reason, to the end that he may be man: He wishes man to be, to the end of the completion of the universe: He wishes the good of the universe to be, be- cause it befits His own goodness.* The same proportion however is not ob- servable in all three stages of this ratiocination. The divine goodness does not depend on the perfection of the universe, and receives no accession thereby. The perfection of the universe, though depending necessarily on the good of some particular components, which are essential parts of the universe, has no necessary dependence on others, although even from them some goodness or beauty accrues to the universe, such things serving solely for the fortification (munimentum) or embellishment of the rest. But any particular good depends absolutely on the elements that are requisite to it: and still even such goods have adjuncts that go merely to better their condition. Sometimes therefore the reason of the divine will involves mere becomingness, sometimes utility, sometimes also hypothetical necessity, but never absolute necessity, except when the obje6t of God's volition is God Himself.
CHAPTER LXXXVll-That nothing can he a £ause to the Divine Will THOUGH some reason may be assigned for the divine will, yet it does not follow that there is any cause of that will's volition. For the cause of volition is the end in view: now the end in view of the divine will is its own goodness: that then is God's cause of willing, which is also His own a6t of willing. But of other objects willed by God none is to God a cause of willing, but one of them is cause to another of its being referred to the divine goodness, and thus God is understood to will one for the sake of another. But clearly we must suppose no passing from point to point of God's will, where there is only one aft, as shown above of the di- vine intelle£t (Chap. LVII). For God by one adt wills His own goodness and all other things, as His aftion is His essence.
By this and the previous chapter the error is excluded of some who say that all things proceed from God by sheer will, so that no reason is to be rendered of anything that He does beyond the fa6t that God so wills. Which position is even contrary to divine Scripture, which tells us that God has done all things according to the order of His wisdom: ^fbou bast done all man, Nimis profunda facta sunt cogitation** tua is wise and good; and much of the wisdom and (Ps. xci). A characteristic of the Middle Ages is beauty of His work is manifest to our eyes; but the idealisation of unity, permanence, and systematic entirety is beyond us. We cannot comprehend it, as completeness in the social, political, religious, and we cannot comprehend Him.
even in the cosmic order. To us " the perfection of * So St Thomas's autograph, Quia decet bonitatem the universe " is a less obvious ground of argument, ipsius. There is such a perfection, doubtless, as the Creator 64 OF GOD AS HE IS IN HIMSELF things in wisdom (Ps. ciii, 24); and God has shed wisdom over all bis worfy (Ecclus i, 10).
CHAPTER LXXXVIII-Zto there is a Free Will in God GOD does not necessarily will things outside Himself (Chap. LXXXI). 3. Will is of the end: choice of the means* Since then God wills Himself as end, and other things as means, it follows that in respect of Himself He has will only, but in respect of other things choice. But choice is always an a<5t of free will.
4. Man by free will is said to be master of his own afts. But this mas- tery belongs most of all to the Prime Agent, whose act depends on no other, f CHAPTER LXXXIX-Thal there are no Passions in God PASSION is not in the intellectual appetite, but only in the sensitive. But in God there is no sensitive appetite, as there is no sensible know- ledge.
2. Every passion involves some bodily alteration, \ a thing impossible in the incorporeal Deity.
3. In every passion the subject is more or less drawn out of his essential condition or connatural disposition: which is not possible in the unchange- able God.§ 4. Every passion fixes determinedly on some one object, according to the mode and measure of the passion. Passion, like physical nature, rushes blindly at some one thing: that is why passion needs repressing and regulating by reason. But the divine will is not determined of itself to any one object in creation: but proceeds according to the order of its wisdom (Chap. LXXXII).
5. Every passion is the passion of a subject that is in potentiality. But God is altogether free from potentiality, being pure actuality.
Thus every passion, generically as such, is removed from God. But cer- tain passions are removed from God, not only generically, but also specifically. For every passion takes its species from its object: if then an objeft is alto- gether unbefitting for God, the passion specified by that obje6t is removed from God also on specific grounds. Such a passion is Sadness and Grief, the object of which is evil already attaching to the sufferer. Hope, again, though it has good for its object, is not of good obtained, but to be obtained, a relation to good which is unbefitting for God by reason of His so great perfection, to which addition is impossible. Much more does that perfection exclude any potentiality in the way of evil. But Fear regards an evil that may be imminent. In two ways then Fear, specifically as such, is removed from God, both because it supposes a subject that is in potentiality, and because it has for its objeft some evil that may come to be in the subject. Regret again, or Repentance, is repugnant to God, as well because it is a species of sadness, as also because it involves a change of will.
# The terminology is from Aristotle, Eth. Nic. Ill, and logically He is no longer free. Pushed to ex- 1 1 13. What St Thomas here calls Voluntas, and else- tremity, Idealism means Pantheism, and Pantheism where intentio, is the Aristotelian /Joi-A^im. Choice, Determinism. For if God has no free will, still less electio, is irpocujpco-t?. See my Ethics and Natural Law, has man.
pp. 31 sq.; 203 sq.; Aquinas Ethicus I, 52-54. X What Alexander Bain calls "the diffusive wave t For Scripture authority St Thomas might have of emotion." Bodily expression is of the essence of a quoted: The Lord is high abo^e all nations, and his glory passion. A passion is as much corporeal as a sensation.
above the heavens (Ps. CXII). God's free will is con- § Passion is a disturbance of physical equilibrium, tained in His real physical distinctness from the uni- Hence it comes to be forbidden by physicians; and verse, His sovereign pre-eminence over it, and absolute may, as St Thomas says, accelerate dissolution, independence of it. Identify God with the universe, 65