7. When it is said, 4 God knows, or knew, this coming event/ an inter- vening medium is supposed between the divine knowledge and the thing known, to wit, the time to which the utterance points, in respeft to which that which is said to be known by God is in the future. But really it is not in the future in respeft of the divine knowledge, which existing in the in- stant of eternity is present to all things. In respeft of such knowledge, if we set aside the time of speaking, it is impossible to say that so-and-so is known as non-existent; and the question never arises as to whether the thing pos- sibly may never occur. As thus known, it should be said to be seen by God as already present in its existence. Under this aspeft, the question of the possibility of the thing never coming to be can no longer be raised: what already £f, in respe6t of that present instant cannot but be. The fallacy then arises from this, that the time at which we speak, when we say 4 God knows,' co-exists with eternity; or again the past time that is marked when we say 4 God knew '; and thus a relation of time, past or present, to future is attributed to eternity, which attribution does not hold; and thus we have fallacia accidentis\ 8. Since everything is known by God as seen by Him in the present, the necessity of that being true which God knows is like the necessity of Socra- tes's sitting from the fact of his being seen seated. This is not necessary absolutely, 'by necessity of the consequent,' as the phrase is, but con- ditionally, or 4 by necessity of the consequence.' For this conditional pro- position is necessary: 4 He is sitting, if he is seen seated.' Change the condi- tional proposition into a categorical of this form: 4 What is seen sitting, is necessarily seated ': it is clear that the proposition is true as a phrase, when its elements are taken together (compdsitam) 9 but false as a faft, when its ele- ments are separated (drvisam).$ AH these objections against the divine know- ledge of contingent fadts are fallacia compositionis et dfoisionis.
# The * contingent ' is nothing else than the hy- t Fallacia accidents is when an irrelevant accident pothetically necessary. A wide range of causative ele- is introduced into the conclusion, as, ' You ate what ments and conditions, as well negative as positive, is you bought: but you bought raw fish.' Time is an requisite and must be presupposed to the sequence of irrelevant accident to the divine knowledge, a contingent ' event. But, when all requisite condi- § This distinction appears in modern logic books tions are fulfilled, the sequence of a * contingent ' as in sensu composite and in sensu diviso. It has its value event in physical causation is as necessary as that of in the disputes on efficacious grace. There is a tradiany ' necessary ' event from its cause. tion of Father Gregory de Valentia, S.J., feinting t 'Contingently' upon the whole array of proxi- away when it was administered to him by a Do- mate causes being present, and every effectual let or minican disputant. Bolsover Castle in Derbyshire was hindrance being absent. built by " the building countess," of whom it was 50 That God knows future contingencies is shown also by the authority of Holy Scripture: for it is said of Divine Wisdom, // fyiolfis signs and portents beforehand, and the issues of times and ages (Wisd. viii, 8): and, There is nothing bidden from his eyes: from age to age he regardetb (Ecclus xxxix, 24, 25).
CHAPTER LXVIII-That God knows the Motions of the Will GOD knows the thoughts of minds and the volitions of hearts in vir- tue of their cause, as He is Himself the universal principle of being. All that in any way is, is known by God in His knowledge of His own essence (Chap. XLIX). Now there is a certain reality in the soul, and again a certain reality in things outside the soul. The reality in the soul is that which is in the will or thought. God knows all these varieties of reality.
3. As God by knowing His own being knows the being of everything, so by knowing His own aft of understanding and will He knows every thought and volition.
5. God knows intelligent substances not less well than He knows or we know sensible substances, seeing that intelligent substances are more know- able, as being better aftualised.
This is confirmed by the testimony of Holy Scripture: — Qod searcher of hearts and reins (Ps. vii, 1 o): Hell and perdition are before the Lord: hoV> much more the hearts of the sons of men? (Prov. xi, 11): He needed not that any one should bear testimony of Tthat Has in man: for he himself fyteVt what Has in man The dominion of the will over its own afts, whereby it has it in its power to will and not to will, is inconsistent with will-force being determined to one fixed mode of action: it is inconsistent also with the violent interference of any external agency; but it is not inconsistent with the influence of that Higher Cause, from whence it is given to the will both to be and to a<5t. And thus in the First Cause, that is, in God, there remains a causal influence over the motions of the will, such that, in knowing Himself, God is able to know these motions.* CHAPTER LXIX-TAat God knows Infinite Things t BY knowing Himself as the cause of things, He knows things other than Himself (Chap. XLIX). But He is the cause of infinite things, if beings are infinite, for He is the cause of all things that are. J 2. God knows His own power perfeftly (Chapp. XL VII, XLIX). But power cannot be perfeftly known, unless all the objedts to which it extends are known, since according to that extent the amount of the power may be said to be determined. But His power being infinite (Chap. XLIII) extends to things infinite, and therefore also His knowledge.
said that she would never die, while she kept on t See Qemral {Metaphysics, Stonyhurst Series, building. True in sensu composite only. In point of pp. 207-220.
fad the lady died in a great frost, which stopped her X At the end of this chapter, St Thomas tells us building and her breath together. that beings are not infinite: i.e., there is not an infi- # This or that actual motion of this individual nite multitude of actual existences, and by no pro- will, not being determinately contained in its cause, cess of creation ever will there be. God's knowledge since " will-force " is not "determined to any fixed of infinite things then can only refer to an infinite mode of action," how can God, by any knowledge of multitude of things possible, but non-existent. Then causes, gain cognisance of this particular motion of the curious question comes: how far do things, purely free-will as actually taking place? By " a causal in- possible and never existent, make number, or multi- fluence over the motions of the will," says St Thomas, tude? Are ten purely possible soldiers ten distinct enti- The discussion of this obscure "causal influence" ties? I think not, if they are taken to be perfectly alike, made the strife of Thomist and Molinist in the seven- But possible differences are infinite. The question has teenth century. a bearing on the reality of the abstract science of number.
51 51 3. If the knowledge of God extends to all things that in any sort of way are, He must not only know actual being, but also potential being. But in the physical world there is potential infinity, though not a6tual infinity, as the Philosopher proves. God therefore knows infinite things, in the way that unity, which is the principle of number, would know infinite species of number if it knew whatever is in its potentiality: for unity is in promise and potency every number.* 4. God in His essence, as in a sort of exemplar medium, knows other things. But as He is a being of infinite perfe&ion, there can be modelled upon Him infinite copies with finite perfections, because no one of these copies, nor any number of them put together, can come up to the perfection of their exemplar; and thus there always remains some new way for any copy taken to imitate Him.
10. The infinite defies knowledge in so far as it defies counting. To count the parts of the infinite is an intrinsic impossibility, as involving a contradic- tion. To know a thing by enumeration of its parts is characteristic of a mind that knows part after part successively, not of a mind that comprehends the several parts together. Since then the divine mind knows all things together without succession, it has no more difficulty in knowing things infinite than in knowing things finite.
1 1. All quantity consists in a certain multiplication of parts; and there- fore number is the first of quantities, f Where then plurality makes no dif- ference, no difference can be made there by anything that follows upon quan- tity. But in God's knowledge many things are known in one, not by many different presentations, but by that one species, or presentation, which is the essence of God. Hence a multitude of things is known by God all at once; and thus plurality makes no difference in God's knowledge: neither then does infinity, which follows upon quantity.
In accordance with this is what is said in Psalm cxlvi: *And of his wisdom there is no telling.
From what has been said it is clear why our mind does not know the infinite as the divine mind does. Our mind differs from the divine mind in four respects; and they make all the difference. The first is that our mind is simply finite, the divine mind infinite. The second is that as our mind knows different things by different impressions, it cannot extend to an infinity of things, as the divine mind can. The third results in this way, that as our mind is cognisant of different things by different impressions, it cannot be actually cognisant of a multitude of things at the same time; J and thus it could not know an infinity of things except by counting them in succession, — which is not the case with the divine mind, which discerns many things at once as seen by one presentation. The fourth thing is that the divine mind is cogni- sant of things that are and of things that are not (Chap. LXVI).
# Unity is ' the principle of number,' but is not t Other quantities are extension, time and moitself number. The first number, as the Greeks saw, tion: but their parts are not so well marked off.
is two. Infinity is no number either. It is not the X" The understanding can understand many things crowning number of a series of finite quantities, for together, taking them as one, but not many things toit can never be got at by counting. As compared with gether, taking them as many. By 'taking them as one an infinity of a higher order, the infinity of a lower or many 9 I mean, by one or by several intellectual order again is no number: it is (relatively) zero, presentations Whatsoever things therefore the Neither in lateral extension, then, nor in vertical mind can understand by one presentation, it can unsuperimposition, is infinity a number. The numbers derstand together. Hence God sees all things by one are two, three > four, and so on as far as you can count, thing, which is His essence." — St Thomas, Sum.TbeoL Each of these terms is called by the schoolmen * a species 1, q. 8 5, art. 4. of number.'
52 It is also clear how the saying of the Philosopher, that the infinite, as infinite, is unknowable, is in no opposition with the opinion now put forth: because the notion of infinity attaches to quantity; consequently, for infinite to be known as infinite, it would have to be known by the measurement of its parts, for that is the proper way of knowing quantity: but God does not know the infinite in that way. Hence, so to say, God does not know the infinite inasmuch as it is infinite, but inasmuch as, to His knowledge, it is as though it were finite.* It is to be observed however that God does not know an infinity of things with the 4 knowledge of vision,' because infinite things neither actually are, nor have been, nor shall be, since, according to the Catholic faith, there are not infinite generations either in point of time past or in point of time to come. But He does know an infinity of things with the 1 knowledge of simple understanding': for He knows infinite things that neither are, nor have been, nor shall be, and yet are in the power of the creature; f and He also knows infinite things that are in His own power, which neither are, nor shall be, nor have been. Hence to the question of the knowledge of parti- cular things it may be replied by denial of the major: for particular things are not infinite: if however they were, God would none the less know them. J CHAPTER LXX-That God knows <Base and Mean 1 kings % THE stronger an active power is, to the more remote objedts does it extend its action. But the power of the divine mind in knowing things is likened to a&ive power: since the divine mind knows, not by receiving aught from things, but rather by pouring its influence upon things. Since then God's mind is of infinite power in understanding (Chap. XLIII), its knowledge must extend to the remotest objects. But the degree of nobility or baseness in all things is determined by nearness to or distance from God, who is the fulness of nobility. Therefore the very vilest things in being are known to God on account of the exceeding great power of His understanding.
2. Everything that is, in so far as it has place in the category of sub- stance or quality, is in adtuality: it is some sort of likeness of the prime Adtuality, and is ennobled thereby. Even potential being, from its reference to a&uality shares in nobility, and so comes to have the name of 'being.' It follows that every being, considered in itself, is noble; and is only mean and vile in comparison with some other being, nobler still. But the noblest # The reference is to Aristotle, Thysia III, 6. elicited, but in point of fa& never will be elicited, by The whole chapter is worth reading, but these words men and angels, has been the theme of a mighty disin particular: "The infinite, as such, is unknowable, pute between Thomists saying no and Molinists say-...We must not take the infinite to be any one ing yes, definite reality, as a man, or a house, but in the sense t The reference is to the fifth argument objected in which we speak of 'the day' and 'the performance,' in Chap. LXIII, which might take this form: entities of which is predicated no substantial reality, The infinite is unknowable.
but a reality that consists in perpetually coming to be But particular things are infinite.
and ceasing to be; a reality which, though limited, is Therefore particular things are unknowable — even continually other and other...For the infinite to God.
is not that, beyond which is nothing, but beyond The major, which St Thomas speaks of denying, which there is always something." Aristotle then does is really the minor premise of this syllogism, not admit the possibility of the aftual infinite, full and § Against Averroes, who says {^DestruBio destrucomplete, but only of the series running on without 8'tonum, disp. 3): "The meaner does not understand stopping, and never reaching a final term, which is of the nobler that which the nobler understands of called potential infinity. himself; nor does the nobler understand what the t Whether this knowledge includes aft of free meaner understands of himself." will, which under certain conditions would have been 53 creatures are removed from God at a distance not less than that which separates the highest in the scale of creation from the lowest. If then the one distance were to bar God's knowledge, much more would the other; and the consequence would be that God would know nothing beyond Himself.
3. The good of the order of the universe is nobler than any part of the universe. If then God knows any other noble nature, most of all must He know the order of the universe. But this cannot be known without taking cognisance at once of things nobler and things baser: for in the mutual distances and relations of these things the order of the universe consists.
4. The vileness of the obje&s of knowledge does not of itself redound on to the knower; for it is of the essence of knowledge that the knower should contain within himself impressions of the objedt known according to his own mode and manner. Accidentally however the vileness of the objedts known may redound upon the knower, either because in knowing base and mean things he is withdrawn from the thought of nobler things, or because from the consideration of such vile objects he is inclined to some undue affe&ions: which cannot be the case with God.
5. A power is not judged to be small, which extends to small things, but only that which is limited to small things. A knowledge therefore that ranges alike over things noble and things mean, is not to be judged mean; but that knowledge is mean, which ranges only over mean things, as is the case with us: for we make different studies of divine and of human things, and there is a different science of each. But with God it is not so; for with the same knowledge and the same glance He views Himself and all other beings.
With this agrees what is said of the Divine Wisdom: // jindeth place everywhere on account of its purity^ and nothing defiled stealetb in to corrupt it CHAPTER LXXI-r^/ God knows Evil Things WHEN good is known, the opposite evil is known. But God knows all particular good things, to which evil things are opposed: therefore God knows evil things.
2. The ideas of contraries, as ideas in the mind, are not contrary to one another: otherwise they could not be together in the mind, or be known together: the idea therefore whereby evil is known is not inconsistent with good, but rather belongs to the idea of good ( ratio qua cognoscitur malum ad rationem boni pertinetj.* If then in God, on account of His absolute perfec- tion, there are found all ideas of goodness (rationes honitatisj, as has been proved (Chap. XL), it follows that there is in Him the idea (ratio) whereby evil is known.
3. Truth is the good of the understanding: for an understanding is called good inasmuch as it knows the truth. But truth is not only to the effect # " Evil is not knowablc by itself, because it is of mutually complementary. Thus, though darkness exthe essence of evil to be a privation of good; and eludes light, and good evil, the idea of darkness is thus it can neither be defined nor known except complementary to that of light, and the idea of evil through good" (Sum, TheoL i, q. 14, art. 10, ad 4). complementary to that of good. This difference be- " Vinegar and oil," as Aeschylus says {Agam. twecn the ideal and the actual order, that in actuality 322-3), "poured into the same vessel, stand apart in contraries are mutually exclusive, while as thoughts unfriendly separation." But in the vessel of the mind they are mutually complementary, I do not rememcontraries do not indeed blend, but stand together, ber to have seen noticed elsewhere, and even call for one another's presence, as elements 54 that good is good, but also that evil is evil: for as it is true that what is, is, so it is true that what is not, is not. The good of the understanding there- fore consists even in the knowledge of evil. But since the divine understand- ing is perfeft in goodness, there cannot be wanting to it any of the perfe&ions of understanding; and therefore there is present to it the knowledge of things evil.
4. God knows the distinftion of things (Chap. L). But in the notion of distindtion there is negation: for those things are distindt, of which one is not another: hence the first things that are of themselves distinft, mutually involve the exclusion of one another, by reason of which fa<5t negative pro- positions are immediately verified of them, e.g., 'No quantity is a substance.' God then knows negation. But privation is a sort of negation: He therefore knows privation, and consequently evil, which is nothing else than a priva- tion of due perfeftion.
8. In us the knowledge of evil things is never blameworthy in mere point of knowledge, that is in the judgement that is passed about evil things, but accidentally, inasmuch as by the observation of evil things one is some- times inclined to evil. But that cannot be in God; and therefore there is nothing to prevent His knowing evil.
With this agrees what is said, that Eppil surpassetb not [God's] wisdom (Wisd. vii, 30); and, Hell and perdition are before the Lord (Prov. xv, 11); and, My offences are not bidden from thee (Ps. lxviii, 6); and, He {noweth the vanity of men^ and seeing doth be not consider iniquity? (Job xi, 1 1.)
It is to be observed however that if God's knowledge were so limited as that His knowledge of Himself did not involve His knowing other beings of finite and partial goodness, at that rate He would nowise know privation or evil: because to the good which is God Himself there is no privation opposed, since privation and its opposite are naturally about the same object; and so to that which is pure actuality no privation is opposed, and conse- quently no evil either. Hence on the supposition that God knows Himself alone, by knowing the excellences of His own being, He will not know evil.* But because in knowing Himself He knows beings in which priva- tions naturally occur, He must know the opposite privations, and the evils opposite to particular goods.
It must be further observed that as God, without any argumentative pro- cess, knows other beings by knowing Himself, so there is no need of His knowledge being argumentative in coming to the knowledge of evil things through good things: for good is as it were the ground of the knowledge of evil, evil being nothing else than privation of good: hence what is evil is known through what is good as things are known through their definitions, not as conclusions through their premises.
# As pure actuality, God is incapable of potenti- reveal to Him that of which His own being is in- ality, and therefore of privation. Thus the contem- capable, — potentiality, privation, evil, plation of His own being, merely as His own, will not 55 CHAPTER \,XX\\-7hatGodhasaWill FROM the faft that God has understanding, it follows that He has a will. Since good apprehended in understanding is the proper object of the will, understood good, as such, must be willed good. But any- thing understood involves an understanding mind. A mind then that under- stands good, must, as such, be a mind that wills good.
3. What is consequent upon all being, is a property of being, as such. Such a property must be found in its perfeftion in the first and greatest of beings. Now it is a property of all being to seek its own perfeftion and the preservation of its own existence. Every being does this in its own way: intelligent beings, by their will: animals, by their sensitive appetite: un- conscious nature, by a certain physical nisus.* It makes a difference however whether the thing craved for is possessed or not. Where it is not possessed, the nisus of desire proper to each several kind goes out to seek what is want- ing: where the thing is possessed, it is rested in and clung to. This charac- teristic of all being cannot be wanting in the first of beings, which is God. Since then God has understanding, He has also a will, whereby He takes complacency in His own being and His own goodness.
4. The more perfeft the aft of understanding is, the more delightful to the understanding mind. But God has understanding and a most perfeft aft thereof (Chap. XLIV): therefore that aft yields Him the utmost delight. But as sensible delight is through the concupiscible appetite, so is intelleftual delight through the will. God then has a will.
This will of God the testimonies of Holy Scripture confess: All things whatsoever he hath willed^ the Lord hath done (Ps. cxxxiv, 6): Who rests teth his CHAPTER LXXIU-Thatthe mil of God is His Essence GOD has will inasmuch as He has understanding. But He has under- standing by His essence (Chapp. XLIV, XLV), and therefore will in like manner.
2. The aft of will is the perfeftion of the agent willing. But the divine being is of itself most perfeft, and admits of no superadded perfeftion (Chap. XXIII): therefore in God the aft of His willing is the aft of His being.
3. As every agent afts inasmuch as it is in aftuality, God, being pure aftuality, must aft by His essence. But to will is an aft of God: therefore God must will by His essence.
4. If will were anything superadded to the divine substance, that sub- stance being complete in being, it would follow that will was something adventitious to it as an accident to a subjeft; also that the divine substance stood to the divine will as potentiality to actuality; and that there was com- position in God: all of which positions have been rejefted (Chapp. XVI, XVIII, XXIII).t * Appetitum naturalem. It is not easy to kill a t Does not this argument prove too much, either willow tree, nor to break up an atom of water. Un- that in man too essence and will are the same, or stable compounds are easily broken up; but the more that the human will is an accident to human sub- perfect and stable, with difficulty. This resistance stance? St Thomas would reply by a distinction be- offered to destruction is the i physical nisusf often tween aft and faculty. In God, the distinction does spoken of by the schoolmen under the name of not obtain. Act and faculty are one in Him, one appetitus naturalis. The will is appetitus rationalis; and with His essence. But in man aft and faculty are dis- the region of soul in which passion dwells is appeti- tindt. The act of volition is accidental in man, it tus sensibilis. comes and it goes: but the faculty or power of will- 56 OF GOD AS HE IS IN HIMSELF CHAPTER LXXlV-That the Obje&oftbe Will of God in the first place is God Himself GOOD understood is the object of the will. But what is understood by God in the first place is the divine essence: therefore the divine essence is the first object of the divine will. 3. The objeft in the first place willed is the cause of willing to every willing agent. For when we say, 4 1 wish to walk for the benefit of my health,' we consider that we are assigning a cause; and if we are further asked, 4 Why do you wish to benefit your health?' we shall go on assigning causes until we come to the final end, which is the objeft willed in the first place, and is in itself the cause of all our willing. If then God wills anything else than Himself in the first place, it will follow that that 'something else' is to Him a cause of willing. But His willing is His being (Chap. LXXIII), therefore something else will be the cause of His being, which is contrary to the notion of the First Being.
CHAPTER LXXV-That God in willing Himself wills also other things besides Himself* EVERY one desires the perfe&ion of that which for its own sake he wills and loves: for the things which we love for their own sakes we wish to be excellent, and ever better and better, and to be multiplied as much as possible. But God wills and loves His essence for its own sake. Now that essence is not augmen table and multipliable in itself (Chap. XLII), but can be multiplied only in its likeness, which is shared by many. God therefore wills the multitude of things, inasmuch as He wills and loves His own perfedtion.
3. Whoever loves anything in itself and for itself, wills consequently all things in which that thing is found: as he who loves sweetness in itself must love all sweet things. But God wills and loves His own being in itself and for itself; and all other being is a sort of participation by likeness of His being.
6. The will follows the understanding. But God with His understanding understands Himself in the first place, and in Himself understands all other things: therefore in like manner He wills Himself in the first place, and in willing Himself wills all other things.
This is confirmed by the authority of Holy Scripture: Thou lovest all things that arey and hatest nothing of the things that thou hast made (Wisd. xi, 25).
CHAPTER LXXVI-That with one and the same A&ofthe Will God wills Himself and all other Beings EVERY power tends by one and the same activity to its objeft and to that which makes the said objeft an object to such a power, as with the same vision we see light and the colour which is made aftually visible by light. But when we wish a thing for an end, and for that alone, that which is desired for the end receives from the end its character of an ing is not an accident to human substance, it is an necessarily creates them. These conclusions are re- essential property of the same. jecled in Chap. LXXXI. Though God understands * Taken by itself, this chapter might seem to all things possible, He docs not will them all. If He argue that God wills the existence of all things that willed them all, they would all be, which is absurd: He understands as possible, and that He necessarily it is impossible for all things severally possible ever wills the existence of things outside Himself, and so to come to be conjunctively realised in actuality.
57 57 obje6t of volition. Since then God wills all things for Himself (Chap. LXXIV), with one aft of will He wills Himself and other things.
2. What is perfe&ly known and desired, is known and desired to the whole extent of its motive power. But a final end is a motive not only inas- much as it is desired in itself, but also inasmuch as other things are rendered desirable for its sake. He therefore who perfectly desires an end, desires it in both these ways. But it is impossible to suppose any volitional a6t of God, by which He should will Himself, and not will Himself perfe&ly: since there is nothing imperfedt in God. By every aft therefore by which He wills Himself, He wills Himself and other things for His own sake abso- lutely; and other things besides Himself He does not will except inasmuch as He wills Himself.
3. As promises are to conclusions in things speculative, so is the end to the means in things practical and desirable: for as we know conclusions by premises, so from the end in view proceeds both the desire and the carrying out of the means. If then one were to wish the end apart, and the means apart, by two separate adts, there would be a process from step to step in his volition (Chap. LVII). But this is impossible in God, who is beyond all movement.
7. To will belongs to God inasmuch as He has understanding. As then by one a<5t He understands Himself and other beings, inasmuch as His essence is the pattern of them all, so by one a<5t He wills Himself and all other beings, inasmuch as His goodness is the type of all goodness.
CHAPTER LXXVII-r>W the multitude of the Obje&s of God's JVill is not inconsistent with the Simplicity of His Substance