than in the particular: universals are better known than particulars; and therefore the knowledge of the most general principles is common to all. Still, even in speculative science, he is more perfect who has not a mere general but a concrete (propriam) knowledge of things. For he who knows in the general only, knows a thing only potentially. Thus the scholar is reduced from a general knowledge of principles to a concrete knowledge of conclusions by his master, who has both knowledges, — as a being is reduced from potentiality to actuality by another being, already in actuality. Much more in practical science is he more perfect, who disposes things for actuality not merely in the universal but in the particular. God's most perfect provi- dence therefore extends even to individuals.
9. Since God is the cause of being, as such (B. II, Chap. XV), He must also be the provider of being, as such. Whatever then in any way is, falls under His providence. But singular things are beings, and indeed more so than universals, because^universals do not subsist by themselves, but are only in singulars.* Divine providence therefore has care also of singulars.
Hence it is said: Two sparrows are sold for a farthing; and not one of them falls to the ground without your Father (Matt, x, 29); and, [Wisdom] reaches from end to end strongly (Wisd. viii, 1), that is, from the highest creatures to the lowest. Also their opinion is condemned who said: The Lord hath abandoned the earth, the Lord doth not see (Ezech. ix, 9): He walketh about the poles of heaven, and doth not consider our things (Job xxii, 14).
CHAPTER LXXVI-That the Providence of God watches immediately over all Individual Things IN matters of human administration, the higher administrator confines his care to the arrangement of general main issues, and leaves details to his subordinates, and that on account of his personal limitations, because, as for the state and condition of lesser things, he is either ignorant of them, or he cannot afford the labour and length of time that would be necessary to arrange for them. But such limitations are far from God: it is no labour for Him to understand, and it takes Him no time, since in understanding Him- self He understands all things else (B. I, Chap. XLIX).
4. In human administrations, the industry and care of the lower officials arranges matters left to their charge by their chief. Their chief does not bestow upon them their faculty of industry and care, but merely allows it free play. If the industry and care came from their superior, the arrangement would be the superior's arrangement; and they would not be authors of the arrangement, but carriers of it into execution. But we have seen (B. I, Chap. LI: B. Ill, Chap. LXVII) that all wisdom and intelligence comes from God above; nor can any intellect understand anything except in the power of God, nor any agent do anything except in the same power. God Himself therefore by His providence immediately disposes all things; and whoever are called providers under Him, are executors of His providence, f * The universal exists in the singular, not as a t How this stands with the permission of evil universal, but as something selectable and unftersaK- government and evil contrivance generally, see Chap. sable by the mind. LXXXI.
7. If God does not by Himself take immediate care of lower individuali- ties, that must be either because He despises them, or because He fears to sully His dignity, as some say.* But that is irrational, for there is greater dignity in devising an arrangement than in working one out. If then God works in all things, as has been shown (Chap. LXVII), and that is not dero- gatory to His dignity, nay rather befits His universal and sovereign power, an immediate providence over individual things is no contemptible occupa- tion for Him either, and throws no slur upon His dignity.
Hence it is said: Thou hast done the things of old, and hast demised one thing after another (Judith ix, 4).
CHAPTER LXXVll-That the Arrangements of Divine Provi- dence are carried into execution by means of Secondary Qauses IT belongs to the dignity of a ruler to have many ministers and diversity of servants to carry his command into execution, the height and greatness of his lordship appearing by the multitude of persons of various ranks who are subject to him: but no dignity of any ruler is comparable with the dignity of the divine government: it is suitable therefore that the arrange- ments of divine providence be carried into execution by divers grades of agents.
6. As the cause is superior to the effect, the order of causes is nobler than that of effects: in that order therefore the perfection of divine providence is better shown. But if there were not intermediate causes carrying divine providence into execution, there would be in creation no order of causes, but only of effects. The perfection therefore of divine providence requires that there should be intermediate causes carrying it into execution.
Hence it is said: Bless the Lord, all his powers, ye ministers that do bis Word (Ps. cii, 21): Fire, hail, snow, stormy winds that do his Word (Ps. cxlviii, 8).
CHAPTER LXXVIII-Jto Intelligent Qreatures are the Medium through which other Qreatures are governed by God SINCE the preservation of order in creation is a concern of divine pro- vidence, and it is a congruous order to descend by steps of due propor- tion from highest to lowest,f divine providence must reach by a certain rule of proportion to the lowest things. The rule of proportion in this, that as the highest creatures are under God and are governed by Him, so lower creatures should be under the higher and be governed by them. But of all creatures intelligent creatures are the highest (Chap. XLIX). Therefore the plan of divine providence requires that other creatures should be governed by rational creatures. J * St Thomas refers to Averroes's Comments on J St Thomas has live more a priori arguments to what was then counted the twelfth book of Aristotle's the same effect, none of which, when tested by expe- Metaphysics. Against the same Commentator are direc- rience, evinces more than this, that rational creatures ted B. I, Chapp. LXI V, LXV, LXX. have some partial control over the rest of creation. A t Such was the order of the feudal system, the partial control, — for, so far as we can pronounce, order of the political world for centuries, not yet what rational or intelligent creature has anything to broken up when St Thomas wrote; and he made out say to the ice at the North Pole, to the inner fires of the order of nature and of divine providence on the the earth, to the courses of the stars? principle of feudalism. See Chap. XCI.
CHAPTER LXXXl-Of the Subordination of Men one to another SINCE man is endowed with understanding and sense and bodily power, these faculties are arranged in order in him by the disposition of divine providence according to the plan of the order that obtains in the uni- verse, bodily power being put under that of sense and intellect as carrying out their command, and the sentient faculty itself under the faculty of intel- lect. And similar is the order between man and man. Men pre-eminent in understanding naturally take the command; while men poor in understand- ing, but of great bodily strength, seem by nature designate for servants, as Aristotle says in his Politics* with whom Solomon is of one mind, saying: The fool shall serve the wise (Prov. xi, 29). But as in the works of one man disorder is born of intellect following sense, so in the commonwealth the like disorder ensues where the ruler holds his place, not by pre-eminence of under- standing, but by usurpation of bodily strength, or is brought into power by some burst of passion. Nor is Solomon silent upon this disorder: There is an evil that I have seen under the sun, a fool set in high estate (Eccles x, 5, 6). But even such an anomaly does not carry with it the entire perversion of the natural order: for the dominion of fools is weak, unless strengthened by the counsel of the wise. Hence it is said: A wise man is strong, and a knowing man stout ind Valiant: because war is 'managed by due ordering, and there shall be safety Where there are many counsels (Prov. xxiv, 5, 6). And because he who gives counsel rules him who takes it, and becomes in a manner his master, is is said: A wise servant shall be master o^er foolish sons (Prov. xvii, 2).
CHAPTER LXXXVlIl-That other Subsistent Intelligences cannot be direct Causes of our Elections and Volitions t NOR is it to be thought that the souls of the heavens, if any such souls there be, or any other separately subsisting created intelligences, can directly thrust a volition in upon us, or be the cause of our choice. For the actions of all creatures are contained in the order of divine provi- dence, and cannot act contrary to the conditions of action which providence has laid down. J Now it is a law of providence that everything be immediately induced to action by its own proximate cause. But the proximate cause of volition is good apprehended by the understanding: that is the proper object of the will, and the will is moved by it as sight by colour. No subsistent crea- ture therefore can move the will except through the medium of good grasped by the understanding. That is done by showing it that something is good to • <f>wr€i &n)\oi, ToKtics I, v. will makes its free choice: nor do they even deter-* t In Chapp. LXXXII-LXXXVII St Thomas mine the course of other terrestrial events absolutely, argues that the heavenly bodies, which he says are since much depends upon the condition and capaci- " perfect without blending of contraries, being neither ties of terrestrial physical causes, light nor heavy, nor hot nor cold," are the instru- Repeatedly in this work St Thomas shows his ments whereby God prompts and controls all move- grievous misgivings as to the later Platonic position, ment and change in material bodies on earth: that that stars are animals and heavenly spheres have souls, nevertheless they exercise no direct action upon the He considered that the stars and their containing human understanding, which is something nobler spheres, if they were not themselves animate, were than they, as the incorporeal is nobler than the in- moved by angels, which is another thing. Cf. Plato corporeal: nor are they arbiters of human will and Rep. X, 616 C, sq.
conduct, except remotely and by occasion, as they X Thus even in sinning the will cannot but fix affect the human body, under which affection the upon some apparent aspect of good (Chap. X).
do, which is called persuasion. No subsistent creature therefore can act upon our will, or be the cause of our choice, otherwise than by means or persuasion.
4. " The violent is that the origin whereof is from without, without the subject of violence in any way contributing thereto."* Were then the will to be moved by any exterior principle, that motion would be violent. I call that an exterior principle of motion, which moves as an efficient cause, and not as a final cause. But violence is inconsistent with voluntariness. It is impossible therefore for the will to be moved to voluntary action by an exterior principle acting as an efficient cause, but every motion of the will must proceed from within. Now no subsistent creature is in touch with the interior of an intelligent soul: God alone is in such close connexion with the soul, as He alone is cause of its being and maintains it in existence. Therefore by God alone can a motion of the will be efficiently caused.
Hence it is said: The Ring's heart is in the band of the Lord: he shall turn it whithersoever he will (Prov. xxi, 1); and, God it is who worfeth in us both to will and to accomplish according to his good pleasure (Phil, ii, 1 3).
CHAPTER LXXXIX-That the Motion of the Will is caused by Qod) and not merely by the Tower of the TV ill SOME, not understanding how God can cause the movement of the will in us without prejudice to the freedom of the will,f have endeavoured to pervert the meaning of these texts, saying that God causes in us to will and to accomplish, inasmuch as He gives us the power of willing, but not as making us will this or that. Hence some have said that providence is not concerned with the subject-matter of free will, that is, with choices, but with extrinsic issues: for he who makes choice of something to gain or something to accomplish, for instance, building or the amassing of wealth, will not always be able to attain his end, and thus the issues of our actions are not subject to free will, but are disposed by providence. J 1. But this theory runs manifestly counter to texts of Holy Scripture. For it is said: All our works thou hast wrought in us, O Lord (Isai. xxvi, 1 2): hence we have of God not merely the power of willing, but also the act. And the above quoted saying of Solomon, he shall turn it whithersoever he will, shows that the divine causality extends at once to will-power and to actual volition.
2. Nothing can act in its own strength unless it act also in the power of God (Chap. LXVI): therefore man cannot use the will-power given to him except in so far as he acts in the power of God.
4. God is the cause of all action, and works in every agent (Chap. LXX): therefore He is cause of the motives of the will.
* Aristotle, Nic. EtS. Ill, i. member that man is upheld by God in a&ion as he t This is precisely the point upon which Tho- is upheld by God in existence: that esse, posse, agere mists and Molinists, not understanding it, or at any in man are all of God. Sin is a certain defect of rate not agreeing in one understanding of it, opened action, a lack of proportion, of order, or opportune- aeon troversy which has stood open for three centuries, ness. But on its physical side sin is not evil, and as a X This reads like an early version of the saying, physical thing it is wrought by God and man jointly, Man proposes, but God disposes, interpreted to mean like any other aclion. that man's proposing is not of God. We must re- CHAPTER XC-That Human Choices and Volitions are subject to Divine Providence THE government of providence proceeds from the divine love where- with God loves His creatures. Loveconsists chiefly in the lover wishing good to the loved one. The more God loves things, then, the more they fall under His providence. This Holy Writ teaches, saying: God guards all that Icfte Aim (Ps. cxliv, 20); and the Philosopher also teaches that God has especial care of those who love understanding, and considers them His friends.* Hence He loves especially subsistent intelligences, and their volitions and choices fall under His providence.
6. The inward good endowments of man, which depend on his will and choice, are more proper to man than external endowments, as the gaining of riches: hence it is according to the former that man is said to be good, not according to the latter. If then human choices and motions of the will do not fall under divine providence, but only external advantages, it will be more true to say that human aflairs are beyond providence than that they are under providence.
CHAPTER XCl-How Human Things are reducea to Higher Causes t FROM what has been shown above we are able to gather how human things are reducible to higher causes, and do not proceed by chance. For choices and motives of wills are arranged immediately by God: human intellectual knowledge is directed by God through the intermediate agency of angels: corporeal events, whether interior (to the human body) or exterior, that serve the need of man, are adjusted by God through the inter- mediate agency of angels and of the heavenly bodies.
All this arrangement proceeds upon one general axiom, which is this: 4 Everything manifold and mutable and liable to fail may be reduced to some principle uniform and immutable and unfailing.'J But everything about our- selves proves to be manifold, variable, and defectible. Our choices are evidently manifold, since different things are chosen by different persons in different circumstances. They are likewise mutable, as well on account of the fickle- ness of our mind, which is not confirmed in its last end, as also on account of changes of circumstance and environment. That they are defectible, the sins of men clearly witness. On the other hand, the will of God is uniform, because in willing one thing He wills all other things: it is also immutable * Aristotle, Eth. Nic. X, ix, 13: " I£ as is com- t So the imperfect and fickle beauties on earth monly supposed, the gods have any care of men, we are reduced to the Self- Beauty. Upon this axiom Plato may well believe them to take delight in that which constructed his theory of Ideas. And though the Ideas is best and most akin to themselves:...the intel- were exaggerated and then discarded, the axiom held lectual worker then will be best loved of heaven." its ground throughout the Middle Ages, and often This is not Christianity, but may be turned that way. appears in St Thomas. The axiom has little vogue in 1 1 translate this chapter, every word, as a specimen modern philosophy. It may be stated thus: 'There is of the thought of the thirteenth century, also as a speci- ever some perfect being somewhere at the back of the men of the need in which St Thomas's work often imperfect.' The axiom is enforced with reference to stands of restoration and reconstruction at the hands the Old Covenant, as compared with the New, in the of some modern Aquinas. It will not do simply to Epistle to the Hebrews ix and x. If I may add a pile up quotations from the Angelic Doctor, adding criticism, I should say that the axiom is more readily nothing and altering nothing. St Thomas himself did apparent in exemplar causes than in efficient causes, — not go to work in that way upon his predecessors. not that I deny it of the latter. See note, p. 238.
and indefectible (B. I, Chapp. XXIII, LXXV). Therefore all motions of volition and choice must be reduced to the divine will, and not to any other cause, because God alone is the cause of our volitions and elections.
In like manner our intelligence is liable to multiplicity, inasmuch as we gather intelligible truth from many sensible objects. It is also mutable, inas- much as it proceeds by reasoning from one point to another, passing from known to unknown. It is also defectible from the admixture of phantasy and sense, as the errors of mankind show. But the cognitions of the angels are uniform, as they receive the knowledge of truth from the one fountain of truth, God (B. II, Chapp. XCVIII, C, with notes). It is also immutable, because not by any argument from effects to causes, nor from causes to effects, but by simple intuition do they gaze upon the pure truth of things. It is also indefectible, since they discern the very natures of things, or their quiddities in themselves, about which quiddities intelligence cannot err, as neither can sense err about the primary objects of the several senses. But we learn the quiddities (essences) of things from their accidents and effects. Our intellectual knowledge then must be regulated by the knowledge of the angels.* Again, about human bodies and the exterior things which men use, it is manifest that there is in them the multiplicity of mixture and contrariety; and that they do not always move in the same way, because their motions cannot be continuous; and that they are defectible by alteration and corrup- tion. But the heavenly bodies are uniform, as being simple and made up without any contrariety of elements. Their motions also are uniform, con- tinuous, and always executed in the same way: nor can there be in them corruption or alteration. Hence our bodies, and other things that come under our use, must necessarily be regulated by the motion of the heavenly bodies, t in order to salvation, descend from God to men. But that man owes his ordinary knowledge of mathematics, chemistry, sanitation, railway management, or even of religion, to any action whatsoever of angelic intelli- gence upon his mind, — I do not know any man liv- ing who thinks so. For all that I can tell, I should know all that I do know, just as I know it now, if if there were no angels at all. The psychological dis- covery of which I have spoken, remains to be made, for he discovers who proves. Yet St Thomas seems to have accepted it.
t We cannot exaggerate our dependence on one heavenly body, the sun. As well have no earth as no sun. To the moon we owe the tides; and to the planets it is just possible that we stand indebted for some of our weather. The fixed stars are of use to us in navigation. Otherwise, so far as we can see, Mother Earth would go her way and carry all her children safe, with no other companions than sun and moon, or, for that matter, the sun only, though all other * heavenly bodies' were wiped out of existence.
* Is this true? Is there any intelligence, or group of intelligences, intermediate between men and God, such that man's understanding, insufficient in itself, is dependent on this intermediary for all that it knows? If so, the 'separate intellect' of Averroesand Avicenna, — higher than human, yet short of divine, at least ac- cording to Averroes, — is not ' the baseless fabric of a vision ' after all, but the blurred and ill-apprehended outline of a profound truth (B. II, Chapp. LIX sq.). This would be a discovery indeed in psychology, if it could be established. It might empty all the yirus of pantheism out of the doctrine of the Absolute, showing that the Absolute, while real, is not God. It might assign their true places in creation to the Arian Logos, to the Gnostic Aeons, as also to the Platonic Ideas. — Modern Psychology meanwhile is serenely oblivious of angels. Catholics still believe in them, dread the evil ones (devils), and pray to the good ones, who now see the face of God. Catholics believe that good angels are often the vehicles through which ' actual graces,' that is, warnings and impulses CHAPTER XCII- In what sense one is said to be Fortunate^ and how Man is aided by Higher Qauses* GOOD fortune is said to befall a man, when something good happens to him beyond his intention, as when one digging in a field finds a treasure that he was not looking for. Now an agent may do some- thing beyond his own intention, and yet not beyond the intention of some agent whom he is under: as if a master were to bid a servant go to some place, to which he had sent another servant without the first servant knowing of it, the meeting with his fellow-servant would be beyond the intention of the servant sent, and yet not beyond the intention of the master sending: in refe- rence to the servant it will be luck and chance, but not in reference to the master, — to him it is an arrangement. Since then man is subordinate in body to the forces of physical nature {corporibus coelestibus), subordinate in intellect to the angels, and subordinate in will to God, a thing may happen beside the intention of man, which is nevertheless according to the order of physical nature {corporum coelestium) y or according to the arrangement of angels, or again of God. But though God alone works directly upon man's choice, yet the action of an angel does something for that choice by way of persuasion, while the action of the heavenly body (of the forces of physical nature) does something by way of predisposition, inasmuch as the bodily impressions of the heavenly bodies (physical forces) upon our bodies predispose us to certain choices, t When then under the impression of the physical forces of nature {coelestium corporum) one is swayed to certain choices that prove useful to him, though his own reason does not discern their utility; and simulta- neously under the light shed on him by separately subsistent intelligences, his understanding is enlightened to do those acts, and his will is swayed by a divine act to choose the useful course, the utility whereof goes unperceived by him, — then he is said to be a 4 fortunate man/ J But here a difference is to be noted. For the action of the angel and of the physical force {corporis coelestis) merely predisposes the man to choose, but the action of God accomplishes the choice. And since the predisposition that comes of the bodily affection, or of the persuasion of the understanding, does not induce necessity of choice, man does not always choose that which his guardian angel intends, nor that to which physical nature {corpus coeleste) inclines, but man always chooses that which God works in his will.§ Hence the guardianship of the angels sometimes comes to nought, according to the text: We hate tended Habylon, but she is not healed (Jerem. li, 9). And much more may physical inclination {inclinatio coelestium corporum) come to nought: but divine providence always holds firm.
It is further to be observed that good or ill fortune may befall a man as a matter of luck, so far as his intention goes, and so far as the working of * ' Fortunate,' bene fortunatus, a literal rendering t Thus under stress of thirst, prompted by his of evruxfc. The 'higher causes' here contemplated angel guardian, and impelled by God, a man may are the causes which exist above this sublunary world, turn out of his way for a glass of ale, and so escape a namely, the heavenly bodies, the angels, and God. motor-car, which otherwise would have run him down.
For the 'heavenly bodies' we may henceforth substi- § Semper tamen hoc homo e/igit9 quod Deus operator in ejus tute the 'forces of physical nature,' the working of voluntate. See the opening words of Chap. LXXXIX, which was attributed in St Thomas' day mainly to with note, p. 250. It would be equally true to tzy,Semthe action of the stars and spheres. per hoc Deus operator, quod homo ehgit in sua Voluntate.
t The rays of that heavenly body the sun, for instance, striking and predisposing us to drink.
GOD & HIS CREATURES BOOK III the prime forces of nature (corpora coelestia) goes, and so far as the mind of angels goes, but not in regard of God: for in reference to God nothing is by chance, nothing unforeseen, either in human life or anywhere else in creation.
CHAPTER XClll-Of Fate, whether there be such a thing, and if so, what it is SOME, when they say that all things are done by fate, mean by fate the destiny* that is in things by disposition of divine providence. Hence Boethius says: " Fate is a disposition inherent in changeable things, whereby providence assigns them each to their several orders." In this de- scription of fate c disposition * is put for ' destiny.' It is said to be ' inherent in things/ to distinguish fate from providence: for destiny as it is in the divine mind, not yet impressed on creation, is providence; but inasmuch as it is already unfolded in creatures, it is called ' fate/ He says c in changeable things * to show that the order of providence does not take away from things their contingency and changeableness. In this understanding, to deny fate is to deny divine providence. But because with unbelievers yre ought not even to have names in common, lest from agreement in terminology there be taken an occasion of error, the faithful should not use the name of c fate,' not to appear to fall in with those who construe fate wrongly, subjecting all things to the necessity imposed by the stars, t Hence Augustine says: " If any man calls by the name of fate the might or power of God, let him keep his opinion, but mend his speech " (De chit. Dei> V, i). And Gregory: "Far be it from the minds of the faithful to say that there is such a thing as fate" (Horn. 10 in Epiphan.)