When that is done, we ought to hope in God's providence, by whom even the birds and herbs are sustained.* To feel solicitude on such points seems to appertain to the error of the Gentiles who deny divine providence. Therefore the Lord concludes that we should taJ(e no thought for the morrow (Matt, vi, 34), by which He has not forbidden us to lay up betimes things needful for the morrow; but He forbids that solicitude about future events which goes with a sort of despair of the divine assistance, as also the allow- ing of the solicitude that will have to be entertained to-morrow to come in before its time perversely to-day:f for every day brings its own solicitude; hence it is added, Sufficient for the day is the e**il thereof possibility of a divine deliverance." It will be seen But as these religious lived in public, and their pro- that St Thomas agrees with this Criticism, and makes fession and mode of life was known, their very going no defence of this Fifth Mode. I think it likely to about, preaching and working for souls, was a virtual have been extracted from Friar Gerard's IntroduBion appeal to charity. The Theatines flourished for three to the Eternal Gospel^ which was vehemently attacked hundred years, and still had houses in Italy in 1845. by William of St Amour, and condemned also by St * This passage is obscurely worded, and would Thomas: indeed it is the first utterance of the then not make English, if rendered literally. The text nascent seer of the Fraticelli. In the Breviary Legend too needs correction, as I have marked, of St Cajetan, the founder of Theatines, who were t Read, ne male occupet hodie soUcitudo (not scUcitu- approved by Clement VII, we read: "He instituted dinem) quae erit babenda in crastino. The sense of being an Order of Clerks Regular, who should lay aside the beforehand is radical in the Latin oceupo: e.g. Horace, solicitude of all temporal things, and neither possess Sat. I, ix, 6, numquidYu? oceupo (I cut in with a goodrevenues, nor beg the means of subsistence from the bye), faithful, but live solely on alms spontaneously offered."
GOD THE END OF CREATURES CHAPTER CXXXIV-7* what the Good of Poverty consists LET us observe in riches what is to be thought of poverty. Exterior riches are necessary to the good of virtue inasmuch as by them we support the body and succour other people. Means to an end must derive their goodness from the end. Exterior riches therefore must be some sort of a good to man, still not a principal but a secondary good: for the principal good is the end, — other things are good as subordinate to the end. Therefore it has been held that the virtues are the greatest of good things to man, and exterior riches the least. Now the means to any end must be checked by the requirements of that end.* Riches therefore are so far forth good as they make for the exercise of virtue. But if that measure is exceeded, and the exercise of virtue impeded by them, they are no longer to be counted among good but among evil things. Hence it comes about that the possession of riches is a good thing for some men, who turn them to a virtuous use; and an evil thing for other men, who thereby are withdrawn from virtue, either by excessive solicitude or excessive affe6tion for their wealth, or by elation of mind thence arising.
But there are virtues of the a6tive life and virtues of the contemplative life; and these two orders of virtues make use of riches in different ways. The contemplative virtues need riches solely for the sustenance of nature:t the a6tive virtues as well for this purpose as also for the further purpose of helping a neighbour. Hence the contemplative life is more perfe£l in this, that it requires fewer earthly aids, its attention being wholly given to divine things. Hence the Apostle says: Having food* and wherewith to be clothed* with these let us be content (i Tim. vi, 8).
Poverty then is praiseworthy, inasmuch as it delivers a man from the vices in which some men are entangled by riches. Again, inasmuch as it removes the solicitude that goes with wealth, it is useful to some persons, namely, to those who have the gift of occupying themselves with better things; but hurtful to others, who, set free from this solicitude, busy them- selves about worse things. J But in so far as poverty takes away the good that comes of riches, namely, the helping of other people, and hinders self- support, it is simply an evil, except in so far as the loss of the power of helping neighbours in temporals may be compensated by the advantage of a free attention to divine and spiritual things. But the good of one's own subsistence is so necessary, that the lack of it can be compensated by no other good: for on the offer of no other good should a man deprive himself of the means of supporting his own life. Poverty therefore is praiseworthy, when # This is the great Aristotelian and Ignatian and quiet,* — it is to be remarked that persons of maxim, " the end in view prescribes limits to the strong passionate inclinations, which tempt them to means" (Politics I, \xi Spiritual Exercises, Fundamen- impetuous actions, are, absolutely speaking, better tal Principle: also the quotation in note, p. 299). fitted for an a&ive life, owing to the restlessness of t Not also for the purchase of boob and scientific their spirit. Hence Gregory says: ' Some are so rest- instruments? or again for the building and furnishing less that if they get rest from labour, they labour of the glorious churches, which some contemplative all the more grievously, because the more liberty and Orders erect, to the glory of God, and the joy of men free time they have for their own thoughts, the worse to whom it is given to see their glory? storms they endure in their hearts/ Others again I " On the saying of Gregory, ' Often they who have naturally a purity and peace of soul fitting them might have contemplated God in peace and quiet, for contemplation; and if these persons are totally set have fallen and given way under the burden of occu- aside for adive occupations, they will suffer loss " pations; and others who, had they had occupation, ($**. TbeoL aa-2ae, q. 182, art. 4: Aquinas Etkicus, would have lived well and profitably to mankind, II, 390). have perished under the sword of their own peace GOD & HIS CREATURES BOOK III it delivers a man from earthly cares, and he thereby arrives to give his mind more freely to divine and spiritual things, yet so that he retains the means of lawful self-support, whereunto not much provision is requisite. And the less solicitude any method of poverty involves, the more praiseworthy is that poverty. But poverty is not more praiseworthy, the greater it is:* for poverty is not good in itself, but only inasmuch as it removes from a man's path the obstacles of his freely applying himself to spiritual things: hence the measure of such removal of obstacles is the measure of the goodness of poverty. And this is a general principle with respeft to all creatures: they are good only in so far as they lead to virtue, not in themselves, t CHAPTER CXXXVII- Arguments against Perpetual Continence with Replies ARG. i. The good of the species is more godlike than the good of the individual. He then who abstains altogether from the adl whereby the species is perpetuated, sins more than he would by abstaining from the a<5l whereby the individual is preserved, namely, eating and drinking.
Reply. Things that belong to the necessity of the individual stand on a different footing from things that belong to the necessity of the community. In the necessities of the individual, individual provision must be made: every one must make use of meat and drink. But in the necessities of the commu- nity it is neither needful nor possible for the office of meeting such needs to be assigned to every individual. Many things are necessary to a multitude of men, which no one individual can attend to: therefore there must be different offices for different persons, as in the body the several members have their several fundlions. Since then procreation is not a necessity of the individual, but a necessity of the species, there is no need for all men to be procreants; but some men may abstain, and devote themselves to other offices, as to the life of a soldier or a contemplative.
Arg. 2. By divine ordinance there are given to man members apt for procreation, and a force of appetite inciting him thereto: whoever then altogether abstains from procreation seems to resist the ordinance of God.
Reply. Divine providence gives to man endowments necessary for the species as a whole: still there is no call upon every individual man to make use of every one of these endowments. Thus man has a building capacity and a fighting capacity: yet all men need not be builders or soldiers; neither need every one apply himself to procreation. J Arg. 3. If it is good for one man to lead a life of continence, it is better for many so to do, and the best thing of all would be for all to do it: so the human race would become extin6t.§ * Again, probably, a remark directed against the X No economist desires this in our time. A cor- Fraticelli. The reader of the Nicomachean Ethics nipt society is threatened by a precisely opposite peril, will recognise the Aristotelianism of this paragraph, § If it is good for one man to blow a horn, it the " outfit sufficient for happiness." would be a good thing for the whole population to t St Thomas here speaks of moral, not of physi- turn horn-blowers. — This precious style of argument, cal goodness. All creatures are physically good in by no means an uncommon style, assumes that you themselves (Chap. VII); but what is morally good cannot have too much of a good thing; which is true for us is not the mere having and enjoying of this or of faith, hope, and charity, and of all ends, as such, that particular creature, but the use that we put it but never of means (notes, pp. 290, 299, 305).
to. Possessions perish and change hands: the credit Celibacy, like poverty, is not an end in itself, of the use we put them to alone is eternal. Their worl(s JoUow them (Apoc. xiv, 13).
v Reply. From things necessary to the community, though it be better for individuals to abstain, when one is given to better things, still it is not good for all to abstain. This is apparent in the order of the universe. Though a pure spirit is better than a bodily substance, still that would not be a better but a more imperfeft universe, in which there were pure spirits alone. Though the eye is better than the foot, it would not be a perfe6t animal that had not both eye and foot. So neither would the state of the commonwealth of man- kind be perfect, unless there were some applied to a£ts of procreation, and others abstaining from such a6ts and given to contemplation.
Arg. 4. Chastity, like other virtues, lies in the mean. Therefore he afts against virtue, who altogether abstains from the gratification of his appetites.* Reply. This objedlion has been already solved in treatingof poverty (Chapp. CXXXII, CXXXV, arg. 6). Irrational abstinence from all [lawful] sexual pleasures is called the vice of insensibility: but a rational abstinence [from all even lawful forms of such gratification] is a virtue exceeding the com- mon measure of man, for it puts man in some sort of participation of the likeness of God. Hence virginity is said to be allied to angels.f But though we say in general that it is better for one individual to observe continence than to use marriage, it may very well be that for some other indi- vidual the second course is the better. Hence the Lord says: Not all men tafy this Word: whoever can ta\ey let him take (Matt, xix, 11, 12).
CHAPTER GXXXlX-Against those who find fault with Vows SOME have taken it for a folly to bind oneself by vow to obey another, or to observe any pradtice: for there is more of virtue in a good a6t as there is more of freedom: hence the praiseworthiness of virtuous a£ts seems to be diminished by their being done under necessity of obedience or vow.
But these cavillers seem to be ignorant of the nature of necessity. For there is a twofold necessity: a necessity of constraint, and this diminishes the praiseworthiness of virtuous a6ts, as telling against their voluntariness: for that is done under constraint, which is contrary to the will. There is again a necessity springing out of interior inclination; and this, far from diminish- ing, increases the credit of a virtuous att: for it makes the will tend to the a6t of virtue all the more earnestly. For evidently, the more perfe6t the habit of virtue is, with all the more force does it urge the will to the aft of virtue and leaves it less chance of swerving. Nay, if it attains to the highest pitch of perfe6tion, it induces a sort of necessity of well-doing, as will appear in the case of the Blessed, who cannot sin (B. IV, Chap. XCII); nor yet is there anything thereby lost either to the freedom of the will or to the goodness of the a6t. There is another necessity derived from the bearing of the means on * He may or may not be acting virtuously, but t Celibacy can be justified on mere natural and at least he is not acting against the cardinal virtue of rational grounds in this sense, that no cogent reasons temperance, of which chastity is a part. Temperance are apparent making it a man's duty under ordinary is a negative virtue: its sole office is to restrain: it circumstances to marry. But celibacy does not amount never urges any one to any gratification of appetite: to a virtue except when it is embraced on super- " for inclination to the proper objects of any facul- natural grounds, that is to say, on grounds of faith ties does not belong to the habit, but rather is of the and love of God in Christ.
very essence of the said faculties " (Sum. Theol. la-2se, The chapter next translated is the justification of q. 51, art. I, in corp.) Cf. Arriaga De habitibus et the vow of obedience. virtutibuj, disp. 36, nn. 4, 5, 6; and Ethics and Statural Law, pp. 91, 95, ed. 3, a curious and little noticed point of Ethics.
the end in view, as when it is said to be necessary for one to find a ship in order to cross the sea. But neither does this necessity diminish the free- dom of the will or the goodness of the a6ts: nay rather, for one to a<5t as doing something necessary to an end is in itself praiseworthy, and all the more praiseworthy the better the end. But it will be seen that the necessity of observing what one has vowed to observe, or obeying the superior under whom one has placed oneself, is not a necessity of constraint: nor again is it a necessity arising out of interior inclination, but out of the bearing of means on the end: for it is necessary for the votary to do this or that, if the vow is to be fulfilled, or the obedience kept. Since then these are praiseworthy ends, inasmuch as they are a6ts whereby a man. submits himself to God, the aforesaid necessity takes off nothing from the praise of virtue.
From yet another point of view the fulfilment of a vow, or of a superior's commands, for God's sake, is worthy of greater praise or reward. For as one a£t may be an a6t of two vices, in that the aft of one vice is directed to the end of another vice, — e.g., when one steals to commit fornication, in which case the a6t is specifically one of avarice, but intentionally one of lust,* — so in the same way the a<5l of one virtue may be direfted to the aft of another virtue, as when one gives for charity, in which case the a6t is specifically one of liberality, but finally one of charity: such an adt is more praiseworthy for the greater virtue of charity than for liberality: hence, though the liberality come to fall short, the a<5t will be more praiseworthy, inasmuch as it is re- ferred to charity, and worthy of greater reward, than if it were done with greater liberality, but not in view of charity.f Let us suppose then a man doing some a<5t of virtue, say, fasting, or restraining his sexual passion: if he does this without a vow, it will be an aft of chastity, or abstinence: but if he does it under a vow, it is further referable to another virtue, that virtue to which it belongs to vow and pay one's vows to God, which is called the virtue of religion, a higher virtue than chastity, or abstinence, as putting us in a right relation with God. The aft of abstinence therefore, or continence, will be more praiseworthy inasmuch as it is done under vow, even though the doer of it does not take so much delight in his abstinence, or continence: that deficiency is made up by his taking delight in a higher virtue, which is religion.
If any one does anything for God, he offers the aft to God, such as it is: but if hedoes it under a vow, he offers to God not only the aft but also the power: thus he clearly has the intention of rendering to God some greater service. Therefore his aft will be the more virtuous by reason of the greater good intended, even though another shows himself more fervent in the execution.
Moreover, the will that goes before a deed, virtually endures throughout the whole course of the doing of it; and renders it praiseworthy, even when the agent in the execution of his work is not thinking of the purpose for which he began: for it is not necessary for him who has undertaken a journey for God's sake, to be aftually thinking of God at every step of the journey. But clearly he who has vowed to do a thing has willed it more intensely than another who simply has a purpose of doing it; because he has not only willed * Or when, a too familiar example, a poor area- t A very anti-utilitarian conclusion. But surely I ture goes upon the streets to earn money to get drunk; am more obliged to a man who gives me half-a-crown, she is an inebriate rather than otherwise a bad woman, because he wants to make friends with me, than to another who gives me a sovereign, desiring never to see my face again.
GOD THE END OF CREATURES to do it, but also has willed to fortify himself against failing to do it. This original earnestness of will renders the fulfilment of the vow, with more or less of earnestness, praiseworthy, even when the >fcill is not a&ually fixed on the work, or is fixed on it but languidly. Thus what is done under vow is more praiseworthy than what is done without vow, other conditions how- ever being equal.* CHAPTER CXL-That neither all Qood Works nor all Sins are equals COUNSELS are not given except of the better good. But in the divine law there are given counsels of poverty and continency: these then are better than the use of matrimony and the possession of temporal estate, which things however are quite consistent with virtuous a6tion.
2. A6ts are specified by their obje&s. The better therefore the objeft, the more virtuous will be the aft according to its species. But the end is better than the means thereto; and in the category of means the better is that which comes nearer to the end. Therefore among human a<5ls that is the best, which tends straight to God, the last end; and after that, an a6t is better in its species according as its objeft is nearer to God.
3. Good is in human afts according as they are regulated by reason. But some a<5ls come nearer to reason than others: a<5ls which are a6ts of reason itself have more of the good of reason in them than the afts of the lower powers commanded by reason. J 4. The commandments of the law are best fulfilled by love (Chap. CXXVIII). But one man may do his duty out of greater love than another.
6. The better a£t is the a6t of the better virtue. But one virtue is better than another: thus munificence is better than liberality, and high-souled conduct in a high position (magnanimitas) than decency in a lowly state (moderantia, i.e., ^p^rnc).
Hence it is said: He who joineth his virgin in marriage doth Veil: but be who joineth her not doth better (1 Cor. vii, 38).
By the same reasons it appears that not all sins are equal: for one sin goes wider of the last end than another sin, is a greater perversion of the order of reason, and does greater harm to one's neighbour. Hence it is said: Thou hast done more nicked things than they in all thy nays (Ezech. xvi, 47).
But there may seem to be some reason in the position that all virtuous * Nevertheless it remains in the highest degree desirable that the vows of religion be heartily observed and never regretted. To serve this end, a novitiate is prefixed to the taking of them, that they may be appreciated, desired, and made matter of habitual practice before they come to bind. And after they are taken, the love of them is kept up by constant meditation and prayer. Like the words of our Saviour in the Gospel, the vows of religion are misinterpreted and misjudged in the abstract, away from the concrete facts which attend their first pronouncement and their habitual observance.
t Contrary to one of the paradoxes of the Stoics, refuted also in Sum. TheoL, ia-2se, q. 73, art. 2 (Aquinas Ethicus, I, 2 1 1, 212). The text, James ii, 10, may refer to the breaking of even one commandment contumaciously and contemptuously. Now there is a certain contumaciousness in every mortal sin; and one such sin is enough to destroy sanctity and superna- tural righteousness; cf. Ezechiel xxviii, 12, 13.
I Aristotle probably reckoned an act of specula- tive wisdom, or a scientific discovery, to be a better thing than an act of fortitude or temperance. St Thomas uses Aristotelian language, but can hardly mean more by it than this, that, other things being equal, an ad is morally better, the more fully it repre- sents the choice of ' reason,' that is, of the ' rational will.' On the ethical value of acts of pure intellect, as compared with acts of the conative faculties — a diffi- cult point, generally neglected — cf. Ethics and Natural a£ls are equal, if we consider that every virtuous a6t is dire<5ted to a final good: hence, if there is the same final good for all virtuous a6ts, they must all be equally good. — It is to be replied that, though there is one final end of goodness, nevertheless there is a difference of degree in the good things that are referred to that end, some of them being better than others and nigher to the last end. Hence there will be degrees of goodness in the will and its a<5ls according to the diversity of good obje6ts to which the will and its a6ts are terminated, though the ultimate end be the same.* Or again it may be argued that all sins are equal, because sin in human a<5ts comes solely of overpassing the rule of reason: but he overpasses the rule of reason who swerves from it in a small matter, equally with him who swerves from it in a great one; just as, if a line be drawn, not to be over- stepped, it comes to the same thing in court whether the trespasser has overstepped it little or much; or as a boxer is cast, once he has gone outside the limits of the ring, little or much: so then, once a man has overstepped the bounds of reason, the amount of his transgression makes no difference. On careful consideration, however, it appears that in all cases where perfec- tion and goodness consists in a certain conformity to measure, the evil will be the greater, the greater the departure from that due conformity. Thus health consists in a due blending of humours, and beauty in a due propor- tion of features and limbs, and truth in a conformity of thought or speech to fa<5i. The greater the unevenness of humours, the greater the sickness: the greater the incongruity of features or limbs, the greater the ugliness; and the greater the departure from truth, the greater the falsehood: thus the reckoning is not so false that brings in 5 for 3 as that which brings in 100 for 3. But the good of virtue consists in a certain conformity to measure: for virtue is a mean, according to due limitation under the circumstances, between contrary vices. Wickedness then is greater, the further it is out of this harmony. Nor is transgressing the limits of virtue like transgressing bounds fixed by a court. For virtue being of itself good, the transgression of it is of itself evil; and therefore the greater the departure from virtue, the greater the evil. But the transgression of a limit fixed by a court is not of itself evil, but only accidentally so, inasmuch as it is forbidden. But in these accidental connexions, though the being of one thing at all follows upon another's being at all, it does not follow that the being of the one thing in a higher degree follows upon the other's coming to be in a higher degree- Thus if a white body is musical, it does not follow that the whiter the body, the more musical: but it does follow that if whiteness is distindtive of vision, a stronger whiteness will be more distin&ive.t A noteworthy difference between sins is that between mortal and venial sin. A mortal sin is one that deprives the soul of spiritual life. The essence of spiritual life consists in two things, according to the likeness of natural life. Just as the body lives naturally by its union with the soul, which is the principle of life; and again, quickened by the soul, the body moves of itself, while a dead body either remains immovable, or is moved only by an exterior * One proximate objeft of volition may be better tion, that white is disgregatiVum Visnsf buucpcrucbv than another, though the remote and ultimate objedt 6\^u>q9 and black congregatfpnm, ovyicpcrcxor; but never be the same. It is clearly better to swim to the rescue explain it. It means that white, as representing light, of a drowning neighbour than to swim for my own is distinctive of Vision, i.e., causes distinct vision; and recreation, though both adb be done finally for the black, as representing darkness, is confmstu of Vision.
love of God. So, if all things were black — the sun included, — we t So Aristotle, Tofica, III, 5; cf. Metaph. IX, vii, 7. should see nothing. St Thomas and Aristotle are fond of this illustra- 3lO power:* so is man's will alive, when conjoined by a right intention with its last end, which is its objeft and, as it were, its form; and in thus cleaving by love to God and to its neighbour, it is moved by an interior principle of adtion. But when a right intention of the last end and love is gone, the soul is, as it were, dead, and no longer moves of itself to do any right a&ions, but either wholly gives over doing them, or is led to do them only by an exterior principle, to wit, the fear of punishment.! Whatever sins therefore stand not with a right intention of the last end and love, are mortal sins: but, so long as these finalities are attended to, any deficiency in point of right order of reason will not be a mortal sin, but venial CHAPTER CXLI-TAat a Maris AEts are punished or rewarded by God TO him it belongs to punish or reward, to whom it belongs to lay down the law. But it belongs to divine providence to lay down the law for men (Chap. CXI V): therefore also to punish or reward.
2. Whenever there is due order to an end, that order must lead to the end, and departure from that order must shut out the end: for things that are according to an end derive their necessity from the end, in such way that they must be, if the end is to follow, and while they are without impediment, the end ensues. But God has imposed upon men's a£ts an order in respeft of their final good. If then that order is duly laid down, it must be that they who walk according to it shall gain their final good, that is, be rewarded, and they who depart from that order by sin shall be shut out from their final good, that is, punished.