3. As physical things are subject to the order of divine providence, so also human a6ts. In regard to both the one and the other the due order may be observed, or it may be transgressed. But there is this difference, that the observation or transgression of the due order lies in the power of the human will, but not in the power of physical things. As then in physical things, when due order is observed in them, there follows of natural necessity their preservation and good, but their destruction and evil when the due and natural order is departed from; so in human things it needs must be that when a man voluntarily observes the order of law by Heaven imposed upon him, • If the dead body 4 remains immovable/ how for when a man in mortal sin is led on by grace to comes it to decay? St Thomas means that it moves make such an ac\ — which is possible enough,— his sin no longer as one organism to any purpose of human is instantly taken away.
life, but breaks up into disgregate organisms and in- Nor is St Thomas in disagreement with these organic parts. propositions. See Sum. Theol. la-iae, q. 71, art. 4; t The theology of the Catholic Church on this aa-aa;, q. a3, art. 7 ad 1 (Aquinas Etkicus, I, 199, point stands as follows in the light of controversies 355).
and decisions subsequent to the age of St Thomas. On the other hand, the Church has condemned (a) A man in mortal sin may do acts of natural the following: — virtue, such as tHu the heatbtn do (Matt, v, 47). (*) Of Michael Le Bay: " Everything that the (£) He may also do supernaturally good acls by sinner, or the slave of sin, does is a sin. He is of the aid of 4 an exterior principle,' i.e., the actual grace party of Pelagius, who recognises any natural good- sent him by God. This St Thomas presently de- ness, that is, any goodness arising from the mere dares (Chap. CLVII). power of nature."
(c) These supernatural ads, done by a soul in (3) Of Paschal Quesnel, the Jansenist: "What deadly sin need not proceed from fear alone: they remains to the soul that has lost God and His grace, may be motived by hope, by some sense of shame or but sin and the consequences of sin, a proud poverty Gratitude, or even by some initial love of God and a lazy indigence, that is, a general incapacity for (Council of Trent, Sess. 6, Cap. vi). labour, prayer, or any good work?" (Denziger, En- (J) An aa of perfea love of God is excluded by Mriiiou Symbokrum et Vefintttonum, nn. 680, 915, the supposition of the soul being still in mortal sin: 917, 1 a 16.)
3" he gains good, not of necessity, but by the dispensation of the ruler, — that is to say, he gains reward; and conversely, when the order of law is neglefted, he comes to evil, that is to say, is punished.
4. It is part of the perfection of God's goodness to have no part of nature in disorder. Hence we see in the physical world that every evil is part of an orderly arrangement to some good, as the killing of the sheep is the feeding of the wolf. Since then human adts are subje6t to the order of divine provi- dence as well as physical events, the evil that happens in human a<5ts must lead up in an orderly way to good. But this is most aptly brought about by the punishment of sins: for thus excesses beyond the due amount are embraced under the order of justice, which restores equality. Man exceeds the due degree and proper amount by preference of his own will to that of God, satisfying himself against the ordinance of God: this inequality is removed by his being compelled to suffer something against his will according to the same ordinance.
6. Divine providence has arranged things so that one shall profit another. But it is most fitting for man to be advanced to his final good as well by the good as by the evil of his fellow-man, being excited to do well by seeing well-doers rewarded, and withheld from evil-doing by seeing evil-doers punished.
Hence it is said: 1 am the Lord thy God...visiting the iniquities of the fathers upon the children...and doing mercy a thousandfold upon them that love me and keep my commandments (Exod. xx, 5,6): Thou wilt render to every- one according to his worlds (Ps. lxi, 1 3): To them who, according to patience in good work, see\ glory and honour and incorruption, life everlasting: but to them who...obey not the truth, but give credit to iniquity, Wrath and indignation (Rom.
CHAPTER CXLII-OftAe Difference and Order of Punishments EVIL is the privation of good: hence the order and difference of punish- ments must be according to the difference and order of good things. The chief good and final end of man is happiness: the higher good for him then is that which comes nearer to this end. Coming nearest to it of all is virtue, and whatever else advances man to good a6ts leading to happiness: next is a due disposition of reason and of the powers subje6t to it: after that, soundness of bodily health, which is necessary to unfettered action: lastly, exterior goods, as accessory aids to virtue, f The greatest punishment therefore for man will be exclusion from happiness: after that, the privation of virtue, and of any perfe&ion of supernatural (supernaturalium) powers in his soul for doing well: then the disorder of the natural powers of his soul: after that, the harm of his body; and finally the taking away of exterior goods.
# Sin then " leads up in an orderly way" to hell, telian x°PV7ich scorned of Cynic and Stoic. Such and hell is " good " for sin. Arguments such as those adminlcula might be called buttresses (afpodiacula, of this chapter explain what man can explain; and Chap. XXVI) to the tower of happiness, whereof when the explanation is done, sin and hell remain physical and moral virtue is the lower storey, intel- mysteries. The mystery precisely is, not that sin leclual virtue the spire, and the ad of contemplation should be punished, but that it should be at all. the crowning point, final end and realisation of the t Jdminicukntibus utimur ad Virtutem, the Aristo- entire construction.
But because it belongs to the idea of pain not only that it should be a privation of good, but also that it should be contrary to the will, and not every man's will esteems goods as they really are, but sometimes the priva- tion of the greater good is less contrary to the will, and therefore seems less of a punishment, it so comes about that the majority of men, esteeming sensible and corporeal things more and knowing them better than the good things of the intelle6t and the spirit, dread corporeal penalties more than spiritual ones: thus in their estimation the order of punishments is the very reverse of that aforesaid. With them, injuries to the body and losses of exterior things make the greatest punishment: but as for disorder of the soul and loss of virtue and forfeiture of the enjoyment of God, in which the final happiness of man consists, all this they count little or nothing. Hence it is that they do not consider the sins of men to be punished by God, because they see usually sinners enjoying good health and the blessings of exterior fortune, of which sometimes virtuous men are deprived. This ought not to appear surprising to persons who look straight at the fadts. For since all exterior things are referable to things interior, and the body to the soul, exterior and corporeal good things are really good for man in so far as they turn to the good of reason within him; and turn to his evil so far as they hinder that good of reason. Now God, the disposer of all things, knows the measure of human virtue: hence He sometimes supplies a virtuous man with corporeal and exterior good things to aid his virtue, and does him a favour in so doing: sometimes again He withdraws the aforesaid things, considering them to be an obstacle to man's virtue and enjoyment of God. Where they are such an obstacle, exterior good things turn to a man's prejudice, and the loss of them to his gain. If then punishment in every case means the infli&ion of some evil, and it is not an evil for a man to be deprived of exterior and corporeal good things so far as is conducive to his advancement in virtue, such depriva- tion will not be a punishment to a virtuous man: on the other hand a real punishment to the wicked will be the concession to them of exterior goods, whereby they are incited to evil. Hence it is said: The creatures of God are turned to hate, and to a temptation to the souls of men, and a trap for the feet of the unwise (Wisd. xiv, 1 1). But because it is of the notion of punishment not only to be an infliction of evil, but further an evil contrary to the will, the loss of corporeal and exterior goods, even when it makes for advance- ment in virtue and not for evil, is called punishment by a stretch of language, inasmuch as it is contrary to the will.
CHAPTER CXLlll-TAat not all Punishments nor all Rewards are equal AS there are degrees in virtuous actions and in sins (Chap. CXL), so there must be degrees of rewards and punishments: for so the equality of distributive justice requires, that unequal returns be made for un- equal services.
Hence it is said: According to the measure of the sin shall also be the measure of the stripes (Deut. xxv, 2).
CHAPTER CXIAV-Ofthe Punishment due to Mortal and Venial Sin respe&ively in regard to the Last 8nd A MAN may sin in either of two ways, either so that the intention of his mind be quite turned away from subordination to God, the final good, and that is a mortal sin: or otherwise so that, while the mind's intention remains fixed on the final end, some obstacle is put in the way to retard its free movement to the end, and that is a venial sin.* As then the difference of punishments must be according to the difference of sins, it fol- lows that whoever sins mortally must have for his punishment to be cast out from the attainment of his end; but he who sins venially is punished, not by being cast out, but by being retarded or experiencing difficulty in gaining his end; for so the equality of justice is preserved, in that as man, by sinning [venially], voluntarily turns aside from his end, so in suffering punishment, against his will, he should be impeded in the gaining of that end.f 3. When any one attains a good thing that he was not intending, that is by luck and chance. If then he whose intention is turned away from the last end were to gain that last end, it would be by luck and chance, — which is an absurd thing to suppose, seeing that the last end is a good of intelligence, and luck and chance are inconsistent with intelligent a<5tion, because chance events come about without the diredtion of intelligence: it is absurd then to suppose intelligence gaining its end by an unintelligent method. He then will not gain his end, who by sinning mortally has his intention turned away from his last end.
5. In an orderly course of means leading up to an end such a relation obtains that, if the end is or is to be, the means thereto must be: if the means to the end are not forthcoming, neither will the end be forthcoming: for if the end could be secured without the means to the end being taken, it would be labour lost to seek the end by the taking of such means. But it is by a6ts of virtue, the chief4 element in which is an intention of the due end, that man attains to his last end and happiness (Chap. CXLI). Whoever then a6ts against virtue, and turns his back on his last end, it is proper for him to suffer deprivation of that end.
Hence it is said: Depart from me \ all ye workers of iniquity (Matt, vii, 23).
the position of a soul in venial sin; q the position of a soul in mortal sin. It will be seen that the soul at/ has travelled pneterfinm^ but not contra finm: it will have to be reduced to order by penance and pain, represented by the value of the ordinate / along the axis of Y. On the other hand, q represents a soul that has wan- dered away in a negative direction, quite contra finm: if it leaves the body at that point, that soul is lost. By penance it has to be brought back to the origin at 0, and so on to the positive side. Thus represented at the last day, by points moving to the left and to the right along the axis of X, as well as upwards along Y, the histories of human lives must make figures of wonder- ful complexity.
* Presently described by St Thomas thus (n. a): " The intention remains turned to the end, but is somewhat impeded by over-much adherence to the means."
t A fine se a?Pertit9 but not avertit.
Let O be the origin of co-ordinates, representing man's start in life. Let /be the last end. Let / be GOD THE END OF CREATURES CHAPTER CXLV-That the Punishment whereby one is deprived of his Last End is Interminable* THERE is no privation except of that which naturally belongs to the subjedt: a puppy at birth cannot be said to lie under any privation of sight. But man is not apt to attain his last end in this life (Chap. XLVIII). Therefore any privation of such end must come as a punishment after this life. But after this life there remains to man no ability of gaining his last end, since it is through the body that he gains perfection alike in knowledge and in virtue, t And once the soul is separated from the body, it returns not again to this state of receiving perfection from the body, as we have argued above (B. II, Chap. LXXXIII) against the advocates of the transmigration of souls (transcorporationem ponentes). Whoever then incurs this punishment must be deprived of his last end, and remain eternally deprived of it.
3. Natural equity seems to require every one to be deprived of the good against which he takes adtion, as thereby he renders himself unworthy of that good. Hence by process of civil justice whoever offends against the common* wealth is deprived of the society of the commonwealth altogether, either by death or by perpetual banishment. Nor is the time taken by his offence con- sidered, but the power against which he has offended. He then who sins against his last end and against charity, which is the foundation of the society of the Blessed and of wayfarers on the road to Blessedness, ought to be punished eternally, though his sin took only a short space of time.
4. In the divine judgement the will is taken for the deed: because as men see what is done outwardly, so does God view the hearts of men. But who- ever for the sake of some temporal good has turned himself away from the final end, which is possessed for ever, has preferred the temporal enjoyment of that good to the eternal enjoyment of the last end: much more then, it clearly appears, would he have willed the enjoyment of that temporal good for all eternity. Therefore according to the divine judgement he ought to be punished as though he had gone on sinning for eternity. And beyond ques- tion, for eternal sin eternal punishment is due.
Hence it is said: These shall go into everlasting punishment \ but the just into life everlasting (Matt, xxv, 46).
Hereby is excluded the error of them who say that the punishment of the wicked will at some time come to an end. This position seems to have had its foundation in the position of certain philosophers \ who said that all # Cf. Sum. Tkeol. 1 a- a*, q. 87, art. 3 {Aquinas t In modern phraseology, St Thomas would say Etbicus, I, 154). Interminable here may have two mean- that death sets a bound to man's moral evolution, at ings. (1) It may mean final, in the sense that the per- least in respecl of all specific change. That is true, but son punished shall never be brought to his last end; can philosophers prove it? What is the proof of the but whether he shall exist for ever under privation of present allegation? St Thomas always seems to regard it, is left an open question (notwithstanding B. II, the soul as, to some extent, crippled by separation from Chap. LXXIX). (2) Or it may mean eternal, connot- the body. Cf. B. II, Chap. LXXV, arg. i, reply: B. II, ing the existence of the soul for ever under privation Chap. XCIV, nn. 3, 4. For the capabilities of the of the last end. That punishment is interminable in the soul after death, a priori arguments go very little way; second sense, is a revealed truth of faith. But, revela- and as for experience, it comes to us all, but too late, tion apart, it is questionable whether the a priori I In other words, the Origenist position is founded arguments of philosophers evince more than inter- on the Pla ton ist, for which see Ethics and "Natural Law, minability in the sense of finality, as explained under p. 176; and on the whole question, ib. pp. 168 sq., the former head. See EtbUs and Natural La*, pp. 164- Section III, Of Punishment RetrospeQffe and Retri- 1 66. The reader will consider how far the arguments butive. of this chapter carry him beyond finality to positive eternal duration.
GOD & HIS CREATURES BOOK III punishments were purgatorial, and consequently at some time terminable. And this position seems plausible, as well by the custom of mankind, for human laws inflidt penalties as means and in a manner medicines for the amendment of vices; as also by reason, for if punishment were inflifted, not for the sake of something else, but for its own sake, it would follow that the authority punishing took delight in punishments for their own sake, which is inconsistent with the goodness of God: it needs must be then that punish- ment is infli6ted for the sake of something else, and no more suitable end appears than the amendment of vices. There seems therefore reason for say- ing that all punishments are purgatorial, and consequently terminable, since whatever is matter of purgation is accidental in regard of the creature, and can be removed without consumption of its substance.
In reply it must be allowed that punishments are infli&ed by God, not for their own sake, as though God took delight in them, but for the sake of something else, namely, in view of the order which He wishes to impose on creatures, in which order the good of the universe consists (B. II, Chap. XLV). The order of the universe requires all things to be dispensed by God in due proportion, in Weighty number \ and measure (Wisd. xi, 21). But as rewards answer proportionably to virtuous a6tions, so punishments to sins; and to some sins everlasting punishments are proportionable. God then infli6ts eternal punishments on some sins, that the due order may be observed in things, which order proves His wisdom.
But even though one were to allow that all punishments are applied to the amendment of vices, and to no other purpose, not on that account are we obliged to suppose that all punishments are purgatorial and terminable. For even by human laws some men are punished by death, not for their amendment, but for the amendment of others: hence it is said: For the scourg- ing of the pestilent man, the fool shall be wiser (Prov. xix, 25).* Sometimes also human laws drive men out of the State into perpetual banishment, that the State may be purer by being rid of them: hence it is said: Cast out the scorner, and the quarrel will go out with him, and suits and brow-beatings will cease (Prov. xxii, 10). Even then though punishments be employed only for the reforma- tion of manners, it may very well be that by the judgement of God some men ought to be for ever separated from the society of the good and eternally punished, that by the fear of everlasting punishment men may cease to sin, and the society of the good may be the purer for their separation, as it is said: There shall not enter therein anything unclean, or making abomination or lying (Apoc. xxi, 27). f * Would this procedure be just, if the pestilent from vengeance, the former being "for the sake of man did not deserve the scourge? And is not the very him who suffers it," the latter " for his sake who mention of deserting a retrospective and retributive takes it " (Rhet. I, x, 17). And we read of One who consideration? says, Vengeance is mine (Rom. xii, 19). All this notion t Even Plato consigns to everlasting punishment of vindictive, retrospective, or retributive punishment the " incurably wicked " tyrant, Ardiseus (Rep, proceeds upon the doctrine of free will: it is incon- 615-6; Gorgias, 525D.C.; Phaedo, H3e), as an ex- sistent with determinism. And that is one of the ample to others. Aristotle distinguishes chastisement objections to determinism.
CHAPTER CXLVI-That Sins are Punished also by the Experience of something Painful PUNISHMENT ought to be proportionate to the fault. But in a fault not only is there an aversion of the mind from the last end, but also an undue conversion of it to other objefts as ends. Not only then should the sinner be punished by exclusion from the end, but also by other things turning to his pain.
2. No one is afraid to lose what he does not desire to gain. They then who have their will turned away from their last end, have no fear of being shut out from it. Consequently that mere exclusion would not be enough to call them off from sinning. Some other punishment then must be employed, which sinners may fear.
3. One who puts to undue use the means to a certain end, not only is deprived of the end, but incurs some other hurt besides. Thus inordinate taking of food not only does not bring health, but further induces sickness. But whoever sets up his rest in creatures does not use them as he ought: he does not refer them to their last end. Not only then ought he to be punished by going without happiness, but also by experiencing some pain from creatures.
Hence divine Scripture not only threatens sinners with exclusion from glory, but also with afflidtion in other ways. Depart from me, ye cursed, into ever lasting Jire (Matt, xxv, 41). He shall rain nets on sinners: Jire and brimstone and the breath of stormy winds shall be the portion of their cup (Ps. x, 7).* CHAPTER CXLVII-That it is lawful for Judges to inflict Punishments MEN who on earth are set over others are ministers of divine provi- dence. But it is the order of providence that the wicked be punished. 4. Good stands in no need of evil, but the other way about (Chap. XI). Whatever then is of necessity for the preservation of good, cannot be of itself evil. f But for the preservation of concord among men it is necessary for penalties to be inflicted on the wicked.
5. The common good is better than the good of the individual. There- fore some particular good must be withdrawn for the preservation of the common good. But the life of certain pestilent fellows is a hindrance to the common good, that is, to the concord of human society. Such persons there- fore are to be withdrawn by death from the society of men. J * We live by the light and heat of the central fire rism to the latter case would make it into an assertion of the sun. Electricity, which we may call a fire, is of the end justifying the means, a doctrine read into now taken to be the essential basis of all matter. All the utterances of Catholic authors by persons who in the bright and delicious things of life come of fire, malice or ignorance misconstrue passages like the Without fire, no civilisation, no humanity, no joy on present.
earth. If then the saying holds that " in the things \ Writing later, St Thomas saw the need of wherein a man has sinned, in the same shall he be qualifying this argument, which, taken absolutely, punished," fire forms not an unfit punishment for would make short shrift of lunatics and troublesome one who has abuse3 the good things of our present invalids generally, and would consecrate the principle existence. of lynch-law. He puts in therefore these two qualit St Thomas speaks of a general and ordinary fications: — necessity, e.g., of food for the individual, of the union of the sexes for the race, not of an accidental neces- (0 " Man by sinning withdraws from the order sity, or particular emergency. To extend the apho- of rcason' and thereby foils from human dignity, so Hence the Apostle says: He bearetb not the sword in tain (Rom. xiii, 4: Hereby is excluded the error of those who say that corporal punishments are unlawful, and quote in support of their error such texts as, Tbou shalt not kill (Exod. xx, 1 3): Let both grow until the hardest (Matt, xiii, 30). But these are frivolous allegations. For the same law which says, Tbou shalt not %i//9 adds afterwards: Tbou shalt not suffer poisoners (maleJicos,+aptuiK<n>%) to live (Exod. xxii, 18). And as for both growing until the hardest, how that is to be under- stood appears from what follows: lest perchance in gathering the tares ye root out along with them the wheat also: in this passage then the killing of the wicked is forbidden where it cannot be done without danger to the good, as happens when the wicked are not yet clearly marked off from the good by manifest sins, or when there is ground for apprehension that the wicked may involve many good men in their ruin.
The fa6t of the wicked being open to conversion so long as they live does not preclude their being open also to the just punishment of death. Indeed the danger threatening the community from their life is greater and more certain than the good expe&ed by their conversion. Besides, in the hour of death, they have every facility for turning to God by repentance. And if they are so obstinate that even in the hour of death their heart will not go back upon its wickedness, a fairly probable reckoning may be made that they never would have returned to a better mind.
CHAPTER CXLVIII-Z2*/ Man stands in need of the Divine Assistance for the gaining of Happiness IT has already been shown (Chapp. CXI-CXHI) that divine providence disposes of rational creatures otherwise than of other things, inasmuch as their nature stands on a different footing from that of others. It remains to be shown that also in view of the dignity of their end divine providence employs a higher method of government in their regard. Their nature clearly fits them for a higher end. As being intelligent, they can attain to intelligible truth, which other creatures cannot. So far as they attain this truth by their own natural a6livity, God provides for them otherwise than for other crea- tures, giving them understanding and reason, and further the gift of speech, whereby they can aid one another in the knowledge of truth. But beyond this, the last end of man is fixed in a certain knowledge of truth which exceeds his natural faculties, so that it is given to him to see the First Truth in itself.* To creatures lower than man it is not given to arrive at an end far as that consists in man being naturally free and 2a-2%, q. 64, artt. 2 and 3 {Aquinas Etbicus, II, pp.
existent for his own sake; and falls in a manner into 40-42), whence these extracts are taken, the state of servitude proper to beasts...And there- * In the ' beatific vision,' cf. Chapp. L-LII, which fore, though to kill a man, while he abides in his should here be re-read. This beatific vision is the native dignity, be a thing of itself evil, yet to kill a 'supernatural end' of man; and all that properly man who is a sinner may be good, as to kill a beast." and of itself leads to that end belongs to the ' super- (2) " A beast is naturally distinguishable from a natural order.' The study of the supernatural order man: hence on this point there is no need of judge- belongs to ' revealed,' or 'dogmatic, theology,' not to ment...But a sinner is not naturally distinguish- philosophy, which deals with man, as man, — with able from just men; and therefore he needs a public man in the natural order; and does not presuppose judgement to make him out, and determine whether any revelation. In the above-mentioned chapters, he ought to be slain for the benefit of the common Chapp. L-LII, St Thomas has argued that after death