5. Things that are known naturally are known without reasoning, as appears in the case of first principles. But in God there can be no knowledge that is not natural, nay, essential: for His knowledge is His essence.
7. Only in its highest advance does the inferior touch upon the superior. But the highest advance of our knowledge is not reasoning, but intuition (intellectus), which is the starting-point of reasoning. God's knowledge then is not * rational,' in the sense of c argumentative,' but intuitive only. | 8. Reasoning means a lack of intuition: the divine knowledge therefore is not reasoned.
If any should take it amiss that God cannot make a syllogism, let them mark that He has the knowledge how to make syllogisms as one judging of them, not as one arguing syllogistically.
To this there is witness of Holy Scripture in the text: All things are * This latter is the 'habit/ made so much of in considered only dead plants and animals, and underthe Nicomachean Ethics, according to which know- valued life accordingly.
ledge is a habit, and virtue a habit. t Reasoning all rests ultimately on intuitive first t St Thomas's words here and in the next argu- principles. All men ' intue' something: but a man of ment should be considered by any student of J. S. genius intues far beyond other men. His followers take Mill's Logic. Mill judged the syllogism from ready- his word on trust. To the world at large, the sound- made specimens, failing to note that the power of ness of his judgement is vindicated by experience: syllogism and the ability of a syllogiser is displayed, scholars and critics arrive at some appreciation of it by not in the made syllogism, but in syllogising. It is a slow process of reasoning. Instances are found in such a view as would be that of the biologist, who Newton's Trincipia and the campaigns of Marlbro'.
42 na\ed and open to his eyes (Heb. iv, 1 3): whereas things that we know by reasoning are not of themselves naked and open to us, but are opened out and laid bare by reason.
CHAPTER \N\\\-That God does not understand by Combina- tion and Separation of Ideas THINGS mentally combinable and separable are naturally considered by the mind apart from one another: for there would be no need of their combination and separation, if by the mere apprehension of a thing as being it were at once understood what was in it or not in it.* If therefore God understood by a mental process of combination and separation, it would follow that He did not take in all things at one glance, but each thing apart, contrary to what has been shown above (Chap. LV).
3. A mind that combines and separates, forms different judgements bydiffe- rent combinations. For a mental combination does not go beyond the terms of the combination. Hence, in the combination, or affirmative judgement (compositione), whereby the mind judges that man is an animal, it does not judge that a triangle is a figure. Now combination or separation is an opera- tion of the mind. If God therefore views things by mentally combining and separating them, His mental aft will not be one only but manifold; and so His essence will not be one only.
Not for this however must we say that He is ignorant of tenable pro- positions: for His one and simple essence is the pattern of all things mani- fold and compound; and so by it God knows the whole multitude and com- plexity as well of aftual nature as of the ideal world {tarn natura quam rationis).
This is in consonance with the authority of Holy Scripture: for it is said, For my thoughts are not your thoughts (Isa. lv, 8); and yet, The Lord knoVeth the thoughts of men (Ps. xciii, 11), which certainly proceed by combination and separation of ideas.
CHAPTER LIX-Tbattbe Truth to be found in Propositions is not excluded from Qod THOUGH the knowledge of the divine mind is not after the manner of combination and separation of ideas in affirmative and negative propositions, nevertheless there is not excluded from it that truth which, according to the Philosopher, obtains only in such combinations and separations.f For since the truth of the intelledt is an equation of the in- tellect and the thing, inasmuch as the intellect says that to be which is, or that not to be which is not, truth belongs to that in the intelleft which the intelledt says, not to the aft whereby it says it; for it is not requisite to the truth of the intellect that the mere aft of understanding be equated to the thing, but what the mind says and knows by understanding must be equated to the thing, so that the case of the thing shall be as the mind says it is. But God by his simple understanding, in which there is no combination and • If the English language would allow us, we and propositions. How then is there truth in God, might say: 'If from the mere is-ness (esse) of the if He makes no propositions? That is the difficulty, thing we at once knew its vihat-ness (quidditas, es- The answer is, that He knows what might be said of sentiaj.9 everything, all true propositions that might be made t The allusion is to a doctrine, common in the about it, though His mind does not express itself in schools, that truth and falsehood, strictly speaking, propositions, but is one simple apprehension, are not found in ideas and words, but in judgements 43 separation of ideas, knows not only the essence of things, but also the pro- positions that are tenable concerning them (Chap. LVII, LVIII). Thus what the divine mind says by understanding is affirmation and negation.* Therefore the simplicity of the divine mind does not import the shutting out from it of truth.
CHAPTER LX-That God is Truth TRUTH is a perfeftion of the understanding and of its a<5t. But the understanding of God is His substance; and the very a6t of under- standing, as it is the being of God, is perfect as the being of God is perfect, not by any superadded perfedtion, but by itself. It remains there- fore that the divine substance is truth itself.
4. Though truth is properly not in things but in the mind, nevertheless a thing is sometimes called true, inasmuch as it properly attains the actua- lity of its proper nature. Hence Avicenna says that the truth of a thing is a property of the fixed and appointed being of each thing, inasmuch as such a thing is naturally apt to create a true impression of itself, and inasmuch as it expresses the proper idea of itself in the divine mind.f But God is His own essence: therefore, whether we speak of truth of the intellect or truth of the objeft, God is His own truth.
This is also confirmed by the authority of our Lord saying of Himself: J am the way and the truth and the life (John xiv, 6).
CHAPTER LXI-That Qodis pure Truth THE understanding is not liable to error in its knowledge of abstraft being, as neither is sense in dealing with the proper object of each sense. J But all the knowledge of the divine mind is after the manner of a mind knowing abstract being (Chap. LVIII): it is impossible therefore for error or deception or falsehood to creep into the cognitive aft of God.
3. The intellect does not err over first principles, but over reasoned con- clusions from first principles. But the divine intellect is not reasoning or argumentative (Chap. LVII), and is therefore not liable to deception.§ 4. The higher any cognitive faculty is, the more universal and far- reaching is its proper object: hence what sight is cognisant of accidentally, || general sensibility or imagination seizes upon as a content of its proper ob- ject. But the power of the divine mind is the acme of cognitive power: therefore all things knowable stand to it as proper and ordinary objefts of knowledge, not as accidental objects. But over proper and ordinary objects of knowledge a cognitive faculty never makes a mistake.
* That is to say, it is equivalent to all the know- § Man is never out in his intuitions, only in his ledge that can ever be got into any affirmative or ne- reasonings: but the divine mind is one all-compregative propositions. hensive intuition. Such is the argument. But man is t As we speak of a * true soldier.' out in his intuitions often, when he ventures on in- X If an ear mistakes a sound or the eye a colour, tuition of complex matter, taking for self-evident the aurist, or the oculist, at once infers that the what is not even true. Next door to the intuitions of organ is unhealthy; as sound is the " proper object " a genius are the blunders of a fool. An 'error of of hearing, and colour of sight. But a mistake about judgement,' as it is called, is not usually a wrong the direction of a sound, or the distance of a hill, piece of reasoning, but a bad attempt at intuition, shows, not an unhealthy, but an untrained ear or eye; St Thomas might reply that this comes of man atas direction and distance are u accidental objects " of tempting intuitions beyond his sphere of vision. But hearing and sight. In like manner the understanding the sphere of divine vision embraces all things, in health, or the normal understanding, never errs II ' Accidentally,' i.e., not merely by sight, but by when it says, * Here's something ': this is the cogni- association with some other faculty, as when we see tion of "abstract being," the "proper object" of the that a dog looks fierce, understanding.
44 OF GOD AS HE IS IN HIMSELF 5. An intellectual virtue is a perfection of the understanding in knowing. It never happens that the understanding utters anything false, but its utter- ance is always true, when prompted by any intellectual virtue; for it is the part of virtue to render an act good, and to utter truth is the good act of the understanding. But the divine mind, being the acme of perfection, is more perfect by its nature than the human mind by any habit of virtue.
6. The knowledge of the human mind is in a manner caused by things: hence it comes to be that things knowable are the measure of human know- ledge: for the judgement of the mind is true, because the thing is so. But the divine mind by its knowledge is the cause of things.* Hence God's knowledge must be the measure of things, as art is the measure of products of art, whereof the perfection of each varies according to its agreement with art. Thus the divine mind stands to things as things stand to the human mind. But any error that arises out of any inequality between the human mind and the thing, is not in things, but in the mind. If therefore there were not an absolutely perfect correspondence of the divine mind with things, the error would be in the things, not in the divine mind. There is however no error in the things that be: because each has so much of truth as it has of being. There is then no failure of correspondence between the divine mind and the things that be.
Hence it is said: Qod is truthful (Rom. iii, 4): Qod is not li\e many that be should lie (Num. xxiii, 19): Qod is lights and there is no darkness in him CHAPTER LXII-Thatthe Truth of Qod is the First and Sovereign Truth THE standard in every genus is the most perfect instance of the genus. But the divine truth is the standard of all truth. The truth of our mind is measured by the object outside the mind: our understanding is called true, inasmuch as it is in accordance with that object. And again the truth of the object is measured by its accordance with the divine mind, which is the cause of all things (B. II, Chap. XXIV), as the truth of arti- ficial objects is measured by the art of the artificer. Since then God is the first understanding and the first object of understanding, the truth of every understanding must be measured by His truth, as everything is measured by the first and best of its kind.
CHAPTER LXlll— The Arguments of those who wish to withdraw from Qod the Knowledge of Individual Things t THE first argument is drawn from the very condition of individuality. For as matter (materia signata) \ is the principle of individuality, it seems that individuals cannot be known by any immaterial faculty, in- asmuch as all knowledge is a certain assimilation, and hence even in us those powers alone apprehend individual obje&s, that make use of material organs, as do the imagination and senses, but our understanding, which is imma- * Understand, in the ideal order of possibility See Erdmann's History of Tbilosopby, Eng. transl., and conceptual truth, a necessary order, — but for vol. I, p. 365; Avicenney par le Baron Carra de contingent a&ual things there must be some reference Vaux, pp. 246 sq. (Alcan, Paris, 1900). to the divine will. Of a&ual things, the divine mind t "Materia signata means matter as referred to by its knowledge is the exemplar, but not the effi- definite quantity and definite dimensions; or matter cient cause. as capable of certain dimensions." — De Backer, S.J., t These chapters, LXIII-LXXI, along with L- Cosmokgia, pp. 72, 75. Cf. Father Bodder, Psycho- LIV, form a monograph, directed against Avicenna. Iogia, ed. 2, p. 583.
45 terial, does not recognise individuals as such: much less then is the divine understanding apt to take cognisance of individuals, being, as it is, the furthest removed from matter, 2. The second argument is that individual things do not always exist. Either then they will always be known by God, or they will sometimes be known and sometimes not known. The former alternative is impossible, be- cause there can be no knowledge of that which is not: for knowledge is only of things true, and things that are not cannot be true. The second alternative is also impossible, because the knowledge of the divine mind is absolutely invariable (Chap. XLV).
3. The third argument is from the consideration that not all individual things come of necessity, but some are by contingency: hence there can be no certain knowledge of them except when they exist. For that knowledge is certain, which is infallible: but all knowledge of contingent being is fal- lible while the thing is still in the future; for the opposite may happen of that which is held in cognition: for if the opposite could not happen, the thing would be a necessity: hence there can be no science in us of future contingencies, only a conje&ural reckoning. On the other hand we must suppose that all God's knowledge is most certain and infallible (Chap. LXI). It is also impossible for God to begin to know anything, by reason of His immutability. From this it seems to follow that He does not know indi- vidual contingencies.
4. The fourth argument is from this, that some individual effects have their cause in will. Now an effect, before it is produced, can be known only in its cause: for so only can it have being before it begins to have being in kself. But the motions of the will can be known with certainty by none other than the willing agent, in whose power they are. It is impossible therefore that God should have certain knowledge of such individual effects as derive their causation from a created will.
5. The fifth argument is from the infinite multitude of individual things. The infinite as such is unknown: for all that is known is measured in a manner by the comprehension of the knower, measurement being nothing else than a marking out and ascertaining of the thing measured: hence every art repudiates infinities. But individual existences are infinite, at least potentially.
6. The sixth argument is from the vileness of individual things. As the nobility of knowledge is weighed according to the nobility of the thing known, so the vileness also of the thing known seems to redound to the vileness of the knowledge. Therefore the excellent nobility of the divine mind does not permit of God knowing sundry most vile things that have individual existence.
7. The seventh argument is from the evil that is found in sundry indi- vidual things. Since the objeft known is in some manner in the knowing mind, and evil is impossible in God, it seems to follow that God can have no know- ledge at all of evil and privation: only the mind that is in potentiality can know that, as privation can be only in potentiality.* * Privation, e.g. hunger, is the being in potentiality to have something, and not having it.
46 CHAPTER LXI V— A list of things to be said concerning the Divine Knowledge TO the exclusion of the above error we will show first that the divine mind docs know individual things; secondly, that it knows things which actually are not; thirdly, that it knows future contingencies with infallible knowledge; fourthly, that it knows the motions of the will; fifthly, that it knows infinite things; sixthly, that it knows the vilest and least of things that be; seventhly, that it knows evils and all manner of pri- vations or defeats.
CHAPTER LXV-That Qod knows Individual Things GOD knows things in so far as He is the cause of them. But the sub- stantial effects of divine causation are individual things, universals not being substantial things, but having being only in individuals. 2. Since God's cognitive a£l is His essence, He must know all that is in any way in His essence; and as this essence is the first and universal prin- ciple of being and the prime origin of all, it virtually contains in itself all things that in any way whatsoever have being.
5. In the gradation of faculties it is commonly found that the higher fa- culty extends to more terms, and yet is one; while the range of the lower faculty extends to fewer terms, and even over them it is multiplied, as we see in the case of imagination and sense, for the single power of the imagination extends to all that the five senses take cognisance of, and to more. But the cognitive faculty in God is higher than in man: whatever therefore man knows by the various faculties of understanding, imagination and sense, God is cognisant of by His one simple intuition. God therefore is apt to know the individual things that we grasp by sense and imagination.
6. The divine mind, unlike ours, does not gather its knowledge from things, but rather by its knowledge is the cause of things; and thus its knowledge of things is a practical knowledge. But practical knowledge is not perfect unless it descends to individual cases: for the end of practical knowledge is work, which is done on individuals.
9. As the Philosopher argues against Empedocles, God would be very wanting in wisdom, if He did not know individual instances, which even men know.
This truth is established also by the authority of Holy Scripture, for it is said: There is no creature invisible in his sight: also the contrary error is ex- cluded by the text: Say not, I sLili be bidden from God; and from the height of heaven l»bo mill mind me? (Ecclus xvi, 16).
From what has been said it is evident how the objection to the con- trary (Chap. LXIII, 1) is inconclusive: for though the mental presentation whereby divint understanding understands is immaterial, it is still a type both of matter and form, as being the prime productive principle of both.
CHAPTER LXVI~That Qod knows things which are not* THE knowledge of the divine mind stands to things as the know- ledge of the artificer to the products of his art. But the artificer by the knowledge of his £rt knows even those products of it which are not yet produced.
# The difficulty is that untraclableness of the tentially, though not actually, it is knowablc by man, concept of Not Being, which is enlarged upon by and still more by God. In fact the proper objects of Plato, Sophisty 237 sq. In so far as Not Being is po- abstract science are in this potential and ideal order, 47 3. God knows other things besides Himself by His essence, inasmuch as His essence is the type of other things that come forth from Him (Chap. LIV). But since the essence of God is infinitely perfect (Chap. XLIII), while of every other thing the being and perfection is limited, it is impos- sible for the whole sum of other things to equal the perfection of the divine essence. Therefore the representative power of that essence extends to many more things than the things that are. As then God knows entirely the power and perfection of His essence, His knowledge reaches not only to things that are, but also to things that are not.
6. The understanding of God has no succession, as neither has His being: it is all together, ever abiding, which is the essential notion of eternity, whereas the duration of time extends by succession of before and after. The proportion of eternity to the whole duration of time is as the proportion of an indivisible point to a continuous surface, — not of that indivisible point which is a term of the surface, and is not in every part of its continuous ex- tent: for to such a point an instant of time bears resemblance; but of that indivisible point which lies outside of the surface, and yet co-exists with every part or point of its continuous extent: * for since time does not run beyond motion, eternity, which is altogether beyond motion, is no function of time. Again, since the being of the eternal never fails, eternity is present to every time or instant of time. Some sort of example of this may be seen in a circle: for a point taken on the circumference does not co-incide with every other point; but the centre, lying away from the circumference, is directly opposite to every point on the circumference.f Whatever therefore is in any portion of time, co-exists with the eternal, as present to it, although in respect to another portion of time it be past or future. But nothing can co-exist in presence with the eternal otherwise than with the whole of it, because it has no successive duration. Whatever therefore is done in the whole course of time, the divine mind beholds it as present throughout the whole of its eternity; and yet it cannot be said that what is done in a defi- nite portion of time has always been an existing fa6t. The conclusion is that God has knowledge of things that in the course of time as yet are not.
By these reasons it appears that God has knowledge of nonentities. But all nonentities do not stand in the same regard to His knowledge. Things that neither are, nor shall be, nor have been, are known by God as possible to His power: hence He does not know them as being anywise in them- selves, but only as being within the compass of divine power. These sort of things are said by some to be known by God with the 'knowledge of simple understanding' (notitia simplicis intelligently). But as for those things that are present, past, or future to us, God knows them as they are within the com- pass of His power; and as they are within the compass of their own several created causes; and as they are in themselves; and the knowledge of such things is called the 'knowledge of vision' (notitia Visionis). For of the things that are not yet with us, J God sees not only the being that they have in their causes, but also the being that they have in themselves, inasmuch as His eternity is indivisibly present to all time. We must remember that God of which the a&ual furnishes illustrations. Cf. Plato, t As between any two points you can draw a Rep. VII, 529 c.d. As St Thomas says presently: straight line, every point in space is 'dire&ly oppo- " Our mind could grasp the ideal essence of a lion or a site ' every other point. What St Thomas means is horse, even though all such animals were destroyed." that the line drawn from the centre of the circle to # The " continuous surface " is that of a ring, any point in the circumference makes a right angle and the " point which lies outside of the surface " is with the tangent at that point, the centre of the ring. \ e.g., children yet unborn.
48 OF GOD AS HE IS IN HIMSELF knows the being of everything through His own essence: for His essence is representahle by many things that are not, nor ever shall be, nor ever have been. That same essence is the type of the power of every cause, in virtue of which power effe&s pre-exist in their causes. Again the being of every- thing, that it has in itself, is modelled upon the being of the divine essence. Thus then God knows nonentities inasmuch as in some way they have being, either in the power of God, or in their (creature) causes, or in themselves.* To this the authority of Holy Scripture also gives testimony: *All things are known to the Lord our Qod before their creation; as a/so, after they are fully made, he regardeth all (Ecclus xxiii, 29): and, ^Before I formed thee in the womb, I knew thee (Jer. i, 5).
CHAPTER LXVW-That God knows Individual Contingent Events\ HENCE we may gather some inkling of how God has had an infalli- ble knowledge of all contingent events from eternity, and yet they cease not to be contingent. For contingency is not inconsistent with certain and assured knowledge except so far as the contingent event lies in the future, not as it is present. While the event is in the future, it may not be; and thus the view of him who reckons that it will be may be mistaken: but once it is present, for that time it cannot but be. Any view therefore formed upon a contingent event inasmuch as it is present, may be a certi- tude. But the intuition of the divine mind rests from eternity upon each and every of the events that happen in the course of time, viewing each as a thing present. There is nothing therefore to hinder God from having from eternity an infallible knowledge of contingent events.
2. A contingent event differs from a necessary event in point of the way in which each is contained in its cause. A contingent event is so contained in its cause as that it either may not or may ensue therefrom: \ whereas a necessary event cannot but ensue from its cause. But as each of these events is in itself, the two do not differ in point of reality; and upon reality truth is founded. In a contingent event, considered as it is in itself, there is no question of being or not being, but only of being: although, looking to the future, a contingent event possibly may not come off. But the divine mind knows things from eternity, not only in the being which they have in their causes, but also in the being which they have in themselves.
* "In themselves" so far as there is question of Chap. XXX should be compared: see also B. II, things that now are not, but have been or shall be. Chap. LV, footnote. Human acts, or acls of free t A ' contingent event ' is an event that depends will, which are not even hypothecically necessary, are on what Mill calls a 'plurality of causes': that is to not included in the category of contingent events say, a certain number of causes being jointly present; here spoken of.
and again preventing causes, almost innumerable, X This uncertainty, as I have argued in the prebeing all absent. The absence of any of the requisite vious note, is a mere incident of the ignorance and joint causes, or the presence of any of the preventing infirmity of our minds in dealing with a complex causes, is enough to wreck the sequence; and as we case of causality. To an omniscient mind there would cannot well know what cause will be present, and be no uncertainty. Such a mind would read the conwhat absent, the event to us looking forward is an tingent event as necessarily contained in and necesuncertainty, something that mayor may not be; and sarily following from its causes. I speak of events of looking back upon it, after it has happened, we re- pure physical causation: for, as I have said, of such gard it as something which has been, but might not only is there question here. I allow for the depenhave been. But, to an omniscient mind, all events, so dence of all physical nature upon the free will of God, far as they iiftohe mere physical causation, are hypo- creating things, preserving them in being and activity, thetically necessary: they must be, causes and condi- fixing a certain collocation of causes from the first, tions standing as they do. This hypothetical neces- and occasionally by His own special action intersity of physical causation is otherwise called 4 the fering (as man in an inferior way also interferes) with uniformity of nature.' With this chapter, Book II, the course of nature, by what is called a miracle.
49 3. As from a necessary cause the effeft follows with certainty, with like certainty does it follow from a contingent cause, when the cause is com- plete, provided no hindrance be placed. But as God knows all things (Chap. L), He knows not only the causes of contingent events, but like- wise the means whereby they may be hindered from coming off. He knows therefore with certitude whether they are going to come off or not.* 6. The knowledge of God would not be true and perfedt, if things did not happen in the way that God apprehends them to happen. But God, cognisant as He is of all being of which He is the principle, knows every event, not only in itself, but also in its dependence on any proximate causes on which it happens to depend: but the dependence of contingent events upon their proximate causes involves their ensuing upoirthem contingently. f God therefore knows sundry events to happen, and to happen contingently: thus the certitude and truth of divine knowledge does not remove the con- tingency of events.