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THE ENGLISH WORKS OF THOMAS HOBBES.
THE ENGLISH WORKS OF THOMAS HOBBES OF MALMESBURY; NOW FIRST COLLECTED AND EDITED BY SIR WILLIAM MOLESWORTH, BART.
--- VOL. IV.
--- LONDON: JOHN BOHN, HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN.
--- MDCCCXL.
LONDON: C. RICHARDS, PRINTER, ST. MARTIN'S LANE.
CONTENTS OF VOL. IV.
------- PAGE TRIPOS; in Three Discourses: I. Human Nature, or the Fundamental Elements of Policy 1 II. De Corpore Politico, or the Elements of Law 77 III. Of Liberty and Necessity 229 An Answer to Bishop Bramhall’s Book, called “The Catching of the Leviathan” 279 An Historical Narration concerning Heresy, and the Punishment thereof 385 Considerations upon the Reputation, Loyalty, Manners, and Religion of Thomas Hobbes 409 Answer to Sir William Davenant’s Preface before “Gondibert” 441 Letter to the Right Honourable Edward Howard 458 HOBBES' TRIPOS IN =Three Discourses.= THE FIRST, HUMAN NATURE: THE SECOND, DE CORPORE POLITICO: THE THIRD, OF LIBERTY AND NECESSITY.
--- BY THOMAS HOBBES OF MALMESBURY.
HUMAN NATURE, OR THE FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENTS OF POLICY.
BEING A DISCOVERY OF THE FACULTIES, ACTS, AND PASSIONS, OF THE SOUL OF MAN, FROM THEIR ORIGINAL CAUSES; ACCORDING TO SUCH PHILOSOPHICAL PRINCIPLES, AS ARE NOT COMMONLY KNOWN OR ASSERTED.
BY THOMAS HOBBES OF MALMESBURY.
TO THE READER.
------- READER, It was thought good to let you know that _Mr. Hobbes_ hath written a body of philosophy, upon such principles and in such order as are used by men conversant in demonstration: this he hath distinguished into three parts; _De Corpore_, _De Homine_, _De Cive_; each of the consequents beginning at the end of the antecedent, and insisting thereupon, as the later Books of _Euclid_ upon the former. The last of these he hath already published in Latin beyond the seas; the second is this now presented: and if these two receive justice in the world, there is hope we may obtain the first. He whose care it is, and labour, to satisfy the _judgment_ and _reason_ of mankind, will condescend so far, we hope, to satisfy the _desire_ of those learned men whom these shall either have found or made; which cannot be, until they shall analytically have followed the grand _phænomena_ of states and kingdoms through the passions of particular men, into the elemental principles of natural and corporeal motions. The former work was published by the Author, and so is out of danger; this by a friend, with leave from him: and to secure this, you are intreated to consider the relations wherein it stands, especially to the book _de Cive_. It was thought a part of religion, not to make any change without the author’s advice, which could not suddenly be obtained; and so it comes forth innocently, supposing nothing to have happened since the Dedication of it; which if it seem a solecism to some, it may to others give satisfaction, in calling to mind those times and opportunities to which we are indebted for these admirable compositions.
F. B.
------- TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE WILLIAM, EARL OF NEWCASTLE, GOVERNOR TO THE PRINCE HIS HIGHNESS, ONE OF HIS MAJESTY'S MOST HONOURABLE PRIVY COUNCIL.
--- MY MOST HONOURED LORD, From the principal parts of Nature, Reason and Passion, have proceeded two kinds of learning, _mathematical_ and _dogmatical_: the former is free from controversy and dispute, because it consisteth in comparing figure and motion only; in which things, _truth_, and _the interest of men_, oppose not each other: but in the other there is nothing undisputable, because it compareth men, and meddleth with their right and profit; in which, as oft as reason is against a man, so oft will a man be against reason. And from hence it cometh, that they who have written of justice and policy in general, do all invade each other and themselves with contradictions. To reduce this doctrine to the rules and infallibility of reason, there is no way, but, first, put such principles down for a foundation, as passion, not mistrusting, may not seek to displace; and afterwards to build thereon the truth of cases in the law of nature (which hitherto have been built in the air) by degrees, till the whole have been inexpugnable. Now, my Lord, the principles fit for such a foundation, are those which heretofore I have acquainted your Lordship withal in private discourse, and which by your command I have here put into a method. To examine cases thereby between _sovereign_ and _sovereign_, or between _sovereign_ and _subject_, I leave to them that shall find leisure and encouragement thereto. For my part, I present this to your Lordship for the true and only foundation of such science. For the style, it is therefore the worse, because, whilst I was writing, I consulted more with logic than with rhetoric: but for the doctrine, it is not slightly proved; and the conclusions thereof of such nature, as, for want of them, government and peace have been nothing else, to this day, but mutual fears; and it would be an incomparable benefit to commonwealth, that every one held the opinion concerning _law_ and _policy_ here delivered. The ambition therefore of this book, in seeking by your Lordship’s countenance to insinuate itself with those whom the matter it containeth most nearly concerneth, is to be excused. For myself, I desire no greater honour than I enjoy already in your Lordship’s favour, unless it be that you would be pleased, in continuance thereof, to give me more exercise in your commands; which, as I am bound by your many great favours, I shall obey, being, My most honoured Lord, Your most humble and most obliged Servant, THOMAS HOBBES.
_May 9, 1640._ IN LIBELLUM PRÆSTANTISSIMI THOMÆ HOBBII, VIRI VERE PHILOSOPHI, Quæ magna cœli mœnia, et tractus maris Terræque fines, siquid aut ultra est, capit, Mens ipsa tandem capitur: omnia hactenus Quæ nosse potuit, nota jam primum est sibi.
Accede, Lector, disce quis demum sies; Et inquilinam jecoris agnoscas tui, Qua propius hæret nil tibi, et nil tam procul.
Non hic scholarum frivola, aut cassi logi, Quales per annos forte plus septem legit; Ut folle pleno prodeat, rixæ artifex; Vanasque merces futili lingua crepet: Sed sancta rerum pondera, et sensus graves, Quales parari decuit, ipsa cum fuit Pingenda ratio, et vindici suo adstitit.
Panduntur omnes machinæ gyri tuæ, Animæque vectes, trochleæ, cunei, rotæ; Qua concitetur arte, quo sufflamine Sistatur illa rursus, et constet sibi: Nec, si fenestram pectori humano suam Aptasset ipse Momus, inspiceret magis. Hic cerno levia affectuum vestigia, Gracilesque sensus lineas; video quibus Vehantur alis blanduli cupidines, Quibusque stimulis urgeant iræ graves. Hic et dolores, et voluptates suos Produnt recessus; ipse nec timor latet.
Has norit artes, quisquis in foro velit Animorum habenas flectere, et populos cupit Aptis ligatos nexibus jungi sibi. Hic Archimedes publicus figat pedem, Siquando regna machinis politicis Urgere satagit, et feras gentes ciet, Imisque motum sedibus mundum quatit: Facile domabit cuncta, qui menti imperat.
Consultor audax, et Promethei potens Facinoris anime! quis tibi dedit Deus Hæc intueri sæculis longe abdita, Oculosque luce tinxit ambrosia tuos? Tu mentis omnis, at tuæ nulla est capax. Hac laude solus fruere: divinum est opus Animam creare; proximum huic, ostendere.
RAD. BATHURST, A.M. COL. TRIN. OXON.
HUMAN NATURE: OR THE FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENTS OF POLICY.
------- CHAPTER I.
[Sidenote: Introduction.]
1. The true and perspicuous explication of the elements of _laws natural and politic_ (_which is my present scope_) dependeth upon the knowledge of what is _human nature_, what is _body politic_, and what it is we call a _law_; concerning which points, as the _writings_ of men from antiquity downwards have still increased, so also have the _doubts_ and _controversies_ concerning the same: and seeing that true knowledge begetteth not doubt nor controversy, but knowledge, it is manifest from the present controversies, that they, which have _heretofore_ written thereof, have not well understood their own subject.
2. _Harm_ I can do none, though I err no less than they; for I shall leave men but as they are, in doubt and dispute: but, intending not to take any principle upon _trust_, but only to put men in mind of what they _know already_, or _may know_ by their own experience, I hope to err the less; and when I do, it must proceed from too _hasty concluding_, which I will endeavour as much as I can to avoid.
3. On the other side, if _reasoning aright_ win not _consent_, which may very easily happen, from them that being confident of their own knowledge weigh not what is said, the _fault_ is not mine, but theirs; for as it is my part to _shew_ my reasons, so it is theirs to bring _attention_.
4. Man’s _nature_ is the _sum of his natural faculties and powers_, as the faculties of _nutrition_, _motion_, _generation_, _sense_, _reason_, _&c._ These powers we do unanimously call _natural_, and are contained in the definition of man, under these words, _animal_ and _rational_.
5. According to the two principal parts of man, I divide his faculties into two sorts, faculties of the _body_, and faculties of the _mind_.
6. Since the minute and distinct anatomy of the powers of the _body_ is nothing necessary to the present purpose, I will only sum them up in these three heads, power _nutritive_, power _motive_, and power _generative_.
7. Of the powers of the _mind_ there be two sorts, _cognitive_, _imaginative_, or _conceptive_ and _motive_; and first of _cognitive_.
For the understanding of what I mean by the power _cognitive_, we must remember and acknowledge that there be in our minds continually certain _images_ or conceptions of the things without us, insomuch that if a man could be alive, and all the rest of the world annihilated, he should nevertheless retain the _image_ thereof, and all those things which he had before seen or perceived in it; every one by his own experience knowing, that the _absence_ or _destruction_ of things once imagined doth not cause the _absence_ or _destruction_ of the _imagination_ itself. This _imagery_ and _representations_ of the qualities of the thing without, is that we call our _conception_, _imagination_, _ideas_, _notice_ or _knowledge_ of them; and the _faculty_ or power by which we are capable of such knowledge, is that I here call _cognitive power_, or _conceptive_, the power of knowing or conceiving.
------- CHAPTER II.
2. Definition of sense. 4. Four propositions concerning the nature of conceptions. 5. The first proved. 6. The second proved. 7, 8. The third proved. 9. The fourth proved. 10. The main deception of sense.
1. Having declared what I mean by the word _conception_, and other words equivalent thereunto, I come to the _conceptions_ themselves, to shew their _differences_, their _causes_, and the _manner of the production_, so far as is necessary for this place.
[Sidenote: Definition of sense.]
2. Originally all _conceptions_ proceed from the _action_ of the thing itself, whereof it is the conception: now when the action is _present_, the conception it produceth is also called _sense_; and the thing by whose action the same is produced, is called the _object of the sense_.
3. By our several _organs_ we have several _conceptions_ of several qualities in the objects; for by _sight_ we have a conception or image composed of _colour_ and _figure_, which is all the notice and knowledge the object imparteth to us of its nature by the eye. By _hearing_ we have a conception called _sound_, which is all the knowledge we have of the quality of the object from the ear. And so the rest of the senses are also conceptions of several qualities, or natures of their objects.
[Sidenote: Four propositions concerning the nature of conceptions.]
4. Because the _image_ in vision consisting of _colour_ and _shape_ is the knowledge we have of the qualities of the object of that sense; it is no hard matter for a man to fall into this opinion, that the same _colour_ and _shape_ are the _very qualities themselves_; and for the same cause, that _sound_ and _noise_ are the _qualities of the bell_, or of the air. And this opinion hath been so long received, that the _contrary_ must needs appear a great paradox; and yet the introduction of _species visible_ and _intelligible_ (which is necessary for the maintenance of that opinion) passing to and fro from the _object_, is _worse_ than any paradox, as being a plain _impossibility_. I shall therefore endeavour to make plain these points: That the subject wherein colour and image are inherent, is _not_ the _object_ or thing seen.
That there is nothing _without us_ (really) which we call an _image_ or colour.
That the said image or colour is but an _apparition_ unto us of the _motion_, agitation, or alteration, which the _object_ worketh in the _brain_, or spirits, or some internal substance of the head.
That as in _vision_, so also in conceptions that arise from the _other senses_, the subject of their _inherence_ is not the _object_, but the _sentient_.
[Sidenote: The first proved] 5. Every man hath so much experience as to have seen the _sun_ and the other visible objects by reflection in the _water_ and _glasses_; and this alone is sufficient for this conclusion, that _colour_ and _image_ may be there where the _thing seen_ is _not_. But because it may be said that notwithstanding the _image_ in the water be not in the object, but a thing merely _phantastical_, yet there may be _colour_ really in the thing itself: I will urge further this experience, that divers times men see directly the _same_ object _double_, as _two candles_ for _one_, which may happen from distemper, or otherwise without distemper if a man will, the organs being either in their right temper, or equally distempered; the _colours_ and _figures_ in two such images of the same thing _cannot be inherent_ therein, because the thing seen cannot be in _two places_.
_One_ of these images therefore is _not inherent_ in the object: but seeing the organs of the sight are then in equal temper or distemper, the _one_ of them is no more inherent than the _other_; and consequently _neither_ of them both are in the object; which is the first proposition, mentioned in the precedent number.
[Sidenote: The second proved.]
6. Secondly, that the image of any thing by _reflection_ in a _glass_ or _water_ or the like, is _not_ any thing _in_ or _behind_ the glass, or _in_ or _under_ the water, every man may grant to himself; which is the second proposition.
[Sidenote: The third proved.]
7. For the third, we are to consider, first that upon every _great agitation_ or _concussion_ of the _brain_ (as it happeneth from a stroke, especially if the stroke be upon the eye) whereby the optic nerve suffereth any great violence, there _appeareth_ before the _eyes_ a certain light, which light is _nothing without_, but an apparition only, all that is real being the concussion or motion of the parts of that nerve; from which experience we may conclude, that _apparition of light is really nothing but motion_ within. If therefore from _lucid bodies_ there can be derived _motion_, so as to affect the optic nerve in such manner as is proper thereunto, there will follow an _image_ of light somewhere in that line by which the motion was last derived to the eye; that is to say, in the object, if we look directly on it, and in the glass or water, when we look upon it in the line of reflection, which in effect is the third proposition; namely, that image and colour is but an apparition to us of that motion, agitation, or alteration which the object worketh in the brain or spirits, or some _internal_ substance in the head.
8. But that _from all lucid_, shining and illuminate bodies, there is a _motion produced_ to the eye, and, through the eye, to the _optic_ nerve, and so into the _brain_, by which that apparition of _light_ or _colour_ is affected, is not hard to prove. And first, it is evident that the _fire_, the only lucid body here upon earth, worketh by _motion_ equally every way; insomuch as the motion thereof _stopped_ or inclosed, it is presently _extinguished_, and no more fire. And further, that that motion, whereby the fire worketh, is _dilation_, and _contraction_ of itself _alternately_, commonly called _scintillation_ or glowing, is manifest also by experience. From such _motion_ in the fire must needs arise a _rejection_ or casting from itself of that part of the _medium_ which is _contiguous_ to it, whereby that part also rejecteth the _next_, and so successively one part beateth back another to the very _eye_; and in the same manner the _exterior_ part of the eye presseth the _interior_, (the laws of refraction still observed). Now the interior coat of the eye is nothing else but a piece of the _optic_ nerve; and therefore the motion is still continued thereby into the _brain_, and by _resistance_ or reaction of the brain, is also a _rebound_ into the optic nerve again; which we _not conceiving_ as motion or rebound from _within_, do think it is _without_, and call it _light_; as hath been already shewed by the experience of a stroke. We have no reason to doubt, that the fountain of light, the _sun_, worketh by any other ways than the _fire_, at least in this matter. And thus all _vision_ hath its original from such _motion_ as is here described: for where there is no light, there is no sight; and therefore _colour_ also must be the same thing with _light_, as being the effect of the lucid bodies: their _difference_ being only this, that when the light cometh _directly_ from the fountain to the eye, or _indirectly_ by reflection from _clean_ and _polite_ bodies, and such as have _not_ any particular motion internal to alter it, we call it _light_; but when it cometh to the eye by reflection from _uneven_, _rough_, and coarse bodies, or such as are affected with internal motion of their own that may alter it, then we call it _colour_; colour and light differing only in this, that the one is _pure_, and the other _perturbed_ light. By that which hath been said, not only the truth of the third proposition, but also the whole manner of producing light and colour, is apparent.
[Sidenote: The fourth proved.]
9. As colour is not inherent in the object, but an effect thereof upon us, caused by such motion in the object, as hath been described: so neither is _sound_ in the thing we hear, but in ourselves. One manifest sign thereof is, that as a man may _see_, so also he may _hear double_ or _treble_, by multiplication of _echoes_, which echoes are sounds as well as the original; and _not_ being in one and the _same place_, cannot be _inherent_ in the body that maketh them. Nothing can make any thing which is not in itself: the _clapper_ hath no _sound_ in it, but _motion_, and maketh motion in the internal parts of the bell; so the _bell_ hath motion, and not sound, that imparteth _motion_ to the _air_; and the _air_ hath motion, but not sound; the _air_ imparteth motion by the _ear_ and _nerve_ unto the _brain_; and the brain hath motion but not sound; from the _brain_, it reboundeth back into the nerves _outward_, and thence it becometh an _apparition without_, which we call _sound_. And to proceed to the _rest_ of the _senses_, it is apparent enough, that the _smell_ and _taste_ of the _same thing_, are _not_ the _same_ to _every man_; and therefore are not in the thing _smelt_ or _tasted_, but in the men. So likewise the _heat_ we feel from the fire is manifestly in _us_, and is quite _different_ from the heat which is in the _fire_: for _our_ heat is _pleasure_ or _pain_, according as it is _great_ or _moderate_; but in the _coal_ there is no such thing. By this the fourth and last proposition is proved, _viz._ that as in vision, so also in conceptions that arise from _other_ senses, the subject of their inherence is not in the object, but in the sentient.
[Sidenote: The main deception of sense.]
10. And from hence also it followeth, that _whatsoever accidents_ or qualities our senses make us think there be in the _world_, they be _not_ there, but are _seeming_ and _apparitions_ only: the things that really _are_ in the world without us, are those _motions_ by which these seemings are caused. And this is the _great deception of sense_, which also is to be by sense _corrected_: for as sense telleth me, when I see _directly_, that the colour seemeth to _be_ in the object; so also sense telleth me, when I see by _reflection_, that colour is not in the object.
------- CHAPTER III.
1. Imagination defined. 2. Sleep and dreams defined. 3. Causes of dreams. 4. Fiction defined. 5. Phantasms defined. 6. Remembrance defined. 7. Wherein remembrance consisteth. 8. Why in a dream a man never thinks he dreams. 9. Why few things seem strange in dreams. 10. That a dream may be taken for reality and vision.
[Sidenote: Imagination defined.]
1. As standing water put into motion by the stroke of a _stone_, or blast of wind, doth _not presently_ give over moving as soon as the wind ceaseth, or the stone settleth: so _neither_ doth the _effect_ cease which the _object_ hath wrought upon the _brain_, so soon as ever by turning aside of the organs the _object ceaseth_ to work; that is to say, though the _sense_ be _past_, the _image_ or _conception_ remaineth; but more _obscure_ while we are _awake_, because some _object_ or other continually _plieth_ and soliciteth our eyes, and ears, _keeping_ the mind in a _stronger_ motion, whereby the _weaker_ doth not easily _appear_. And this obscure conception is that we call _phantasy_, or _imagination_: _imagination_ being, to define it, _conception remaining, and by little and little decaying from and after the act of sense_.
[Sidenote: Sleep and dreams defined.]
2. But when _present_ sense is _not_, as in _sleep_, there the _images_ remaining after sense, when there be many, as in dreams, are _not obscure_, but _strong_ and _clear_, as in sense itself. The reason is, that which obscured and made the conceptions weak, namely sense, and present _operation_ of the object, is _removed_: for _sleep_ is the _privation of the act of sense_, (the power remaining) and _dreams_ are the _imagination_ of them that _sleep_.
[Sidenote: Causes of dreams.]
3. The _causes_ of dreams, if they be natural, are the _actions_ or violence of the _inward_ parts of a man upon his _brain_, by which the _passages_ of sense by sleep _benumbed_, are _restored_ to their motion. The signs by which this appeareth to be so, are the _differences_ of dreams (old men commonly dream oftener, and have their dreams more painful than young) proceeding from the _different_ accidents of man’s body, as dreams of _lust_, as dreams of _anger_, according as the heart, or other parts within, work more or less upon the brain, by more or less _heat_; so also the descents of different _sorts of phlegm_ maketh us a dream of different tastes of meats and drinks; and I believe there is a _reciprocation_ of motion from the brain to the vital parts, and back from the vital parts to the brain; whereby not only _imagination_ begetteth _motion_ in those parts; but also motion in those parts begetteth imagination like to that by which it was begotten. If this be true, and that _sad_ imaginations nourish the _spleen_, then we see also a cause, why a strong _spleen_ reciprocally causeth _fearful dreams_, and why the effects of _lasciviousness_ may in a dream produce the image of some person that had _caused_ them. Another sign that dreams are caused by the action of the inward parts, is the _disorder_ and casual consequence of one conception or image to another: for when we are _waking_, the _antecedent_ thought or conception introduceth, and is cause of the _consequent_, as the water followeth a man’s finger upon a dry and level table; but in _dreams_ there is commonly _no coherence_, and when there is, it is by chance, which must needs proceed from this, that the _brain_ in dreams is _not restored_ to its motion in every part alike; whereby it cometh to pass, that our thoughts appear like the stars between the flying clouds, not in the order which a man would choose to observe them, but as the uncertain flight of broken clouds permits.
[Sidenote: Fiction defined.]
4. As when the _water_, or any liquid thing moved at once by _divers_ movents, receiveth _one_ motion compounded of them all; so also the _brain_ or spirit therein, having been stirred by _divers_ objects, composeth an imagination of _divers_ conceptions that appeared single to the sense. As for example, the sense sheweth at one time the figure of a _mountain_, and at another time the colour of _gold_; but the imagination afterwards hath them both at once in a _golden mountain_. From the same cause it is, there appear unto us _castles_ in the _air_, _chimeras_, and other monsters which are _not_ in _rerum natura_, _but_ have been conceived by the sense in pieces at several times. And this composition is that which we commonly call _fiction_ of the mind.
[Sidenote: Phantasms defined.]
5. There is yet another kind of imagination, which for _clearness contendeth_ with _sense_, as well as a _dream_; and that is, when the _action_ of sense hath been _long_ or _vehement_: and the experience thereof is more frequent in the sense of seeing, than the rest. An example whereof is, the _image_ remaining before the _eye_ after looking upon the _sun_. Also, those little images that appear before the eyes in the _dark_ (whereof I think every man hath experience, but they most of all, who are _timorous_ or superstitious) are examples of the same. And these, for distinction-sake, may be called _phantasms_.
[Sidenote: Remembrance defined.]
6. By the _senses_, which are numbered according to the _organs_ to be _five_, we take notice (as hath been said already) of the objects _without_ us; and that _notice_ is our _conception_ thereof: but we take _notice_ also some way or other _of our conceptions_: for when the conception of the same thing cometh _again_, we take notice that it is _again_; that is to say, that we have had the same conception _before_; which is as much as to imagine a thing _past_; which is impossible to the _sense_, which is only of things _present_. This therefore may be accounted a _sixth sense_, but _internal_, (not _external_, as the rest) and is commonly called _remembrance_.
[Sidenote: Wherein remembrance consisteth.]
7. For the _manner_ by which we take notice of a conception _past_, we are to remember, that in the _definition_ of _imagination_, it is said to be a conception by _little_ and _little decaying_, or growing more _obscure_. An _obscure_ conception is that which representeth the _whole object_ together, but _none_ of the _smaller parts_ by themselves; and as _more_ or _fewer_ parts be represented, so is the conception or representation said to be _more_ or _less clear_. Seeing then the _conception_, which when it was _first_ object _distinctly_; and when it cometh _again_ is _obscure_, we find _missing_ somewhat that we expected; by which we judge it _past_ and _decayed_. For example, a man that is present in a foreign _city_, seeth not only _whole_ streets, but can also distinguish particular _houses_, and _parts_ of houses; but departed thence, he cannot distinguish them so particularly in his mind as he did, some _house_ or turning escaping him; yet is this to _remember_: when _afterwards_ there escape him _more_ particulars, this is also to _remember_, but _not_ so well. In process of time, the _image_ of the city _returneth_ but as a _mass_ of building _only_, which is _almost_ to have _forgotten_ it. Seeing then remembrance is _more_ or _less_, as we find more or less _obscurity_, why may not we well think _remembrance_ to be nothing else but the _missing of parts_, which every man expecteth should succeed after they have a conception of the whole? To see at a great distance of place, and to remember at a great distance of time, is to have like conceptions of the thing: for there wanteth distinction of parts in both; the one conception being weak by operation at distance, the other by decay.
[Sidenote: Why in a dream a man never thinks he dreams.]