8. And from this that hath been said, there followeth, that a man can _never know_ he _dreameth_; he _may_ dream he _doubteth_, whether it be a dream or no: but the clearness of the imagination representeth every thing with as many parts as doth sense itself, and consequently, he can take notice of nothing but as present; whereas to think he dreameth, is to think those his conceptions, that is to say dreams, obscurer than they were in the sense: so that he must think them both as clear, and not as clear as sense; which is impossible.
[Sidenote: Why few things seem strange in dreams.]
9. From the same ground it proceedeth, that men _wonder not_ in their dreams at place and persons, as they would do waking: for waking, a man would think it strange to be in a place where he never was before, and remember nothing of how he came there; but in a dream, there cometh little of that kind into consideration. The _clearness_ of conception in a dream, taketh away _distrust_, unless the _strangeness_ be _excessive_, as to think himself fallen from on high without hurt, and then most commonly he _waketh_.
[Sidenote: That a dream may be taken for reality and vision.]
10. Nor is it _impossible_ for a man to be so far deceived, as when his dream is _past_, to think it real: for if he dream of such things as are ordinarily in his mind, and in such order as he useth to do waking, and withal that he laid him down to sleep in the place where he findeth himself when he awaketh; all which may happen: I know no κριτήριον or mark by which he can discern whether it were a dream or not, and therefore do the less wonder to hear a man sometimes to tell his dream for a truth, or to take it for a vision.
------- CHAPTER IV.
1. Discourse. 2. The cause of coherence of thoughts. 3. Ranging. 4. Sagacity. 5. Reminiscence. 6. Experience. 7. Expectation. 8. Conjecture. 9. Signs. 10. Prudence. 11. Caveats of concluding from experience.
[Sidenote: Discourse.]
1. The _succession_ of conceptions in the mind, series or consequence of one after another, may be _casual_ and incoherent, as in dreams for the most part; and it may be _orderly_, as when the former thought introduceth the latter; and this is _discourse_ of the mind. But because the word discourse is commonly taken for the _coherence_ and consequence of words, I will, to avoid equivocation, call it _discursion_.
[Sidenote: The cause of coherence of thoughts.]
2. The _cause_ of the _coherence_ or consequence of one conception to another, is their first _coherence_ or consequence at that _time_ when they are produced by sense: as for example, from St. Andrew the mind runneth to St. Peter, because their names are read together; from St. Peter to a _stone_, for the same cause; from _stone_ to _foundation_, because we see them together; and for the same cause, from foundation to _church_, and from church to _people_, and from people to _tumult_: and according to this example, the mind may run almost from anything to anything. But as in the _sense_ the conception of cause and effect may succeed one another; so may they after sense in the _imagination_: and for the most part they do so; the _cause_ whereof is the _appetite_ of them, who, having a conception of the _end_, have next unto it a conception of the next _means_ to that end: as, when a man, from a thought of _honour_ to which he hath an appetite, cometh to the thought of _wisdom_, which is the next means thereunto; and from thence to the thought of _study_, which is the next means to wisdom.
[Sidenote: Ranging.]
3. To omit that kind of discursion by which we proceed from anything to anything, there are of the _other_ kind _divers_ sorts: as first, in the _senses_ there are certain coherences of conceptions, which we may call _ranging_; examples whereof are; a man casteth his _eye_ upon the _ground_, to look about for some _small_ thing lost; the _hounds_ casting about at a fault in hunting; and the _ranging_ of spaniels: and herein we take a beginning arbitrary.
[Sidenote: Sagacity.]
4. Another sort of discursion is, when the _appetite_ giveth a man his beginning, as in the example before, where honour to which a man hath appetite, maketh him think upon the next means of attaining it, and that again of the next, &c. And this the Latins call _sagacitas_, and we may call _hunting_ or _tracing_, as dogs trace beasts by the smell, and men hunt them by their footsteps; or as men hunt after riches, place, or knowledge.
[Sidenote: Reminiscence.]
5. There is yet another kind of discursion beginning with the appetite to _recover_ something lost, proceeding from the _present backward_, from thought of the place where we _miss_ at, to the thought of the place from whence we came _last_; and from the thought of that, to the thought of a place _before_, till we have in our mind some place, wherein we had the thing we miss: and this is called _reminiscence_.
[Sidenote: Experience.]
6. The _remembrance_ of succession of one thing to another, that is, of what was _antecedent_, and what _consequent_, and what _concomitant_, is called an _experiment_; whether the same be made by us _voluntarily_, as when a man putteth any thing into the fire, to see what effect the fire will produce upon it: or _not_ made by us, as when we remember a fair morning after a red evening. To have had many _experiments_, is that we call _experience_, which is nothing else but _remembrance_ of what antecedents have been followed by what consequents.
[Sidenote: Expectation.]
7. No man can have in his mind a conception of the _future_, for the future is _not yet_: but of our conceptions of the _past_, we make a _future_; or rather, call _past_, _future_ relatively. Thus after a man hath been accustomed to see like antecedents followed by like consequents, whensoever he seeth the like come to pass to any thing he had seen before, he looks there should follow it the same that followed then: as for example, because a man hath often seen offences followed by punishment, when he seeth an offence in present, he thinketh punishment to be consequent thereto; but consequent unto that which is present, men call future; and thus we make _remembrance_ to be the _prevision_ of things to come, or _expectation_ or presumption of the future.
[Sidenote: Conjecture.]
8. In the same manner, if a man seeth in present that which he hath seen before, he thinks that that which was antecedent to that which he saw before, is also antecedent to that he presently seeth: as for example, he that hath seen the ashes remain after the fire, and now again seeth ashes, concludeth again there hath been fire: and this is called again _conjecture_ of the past, or presumption of the fact.
[Sidenote: Signs.]
9. When a man hath _so often_ observed like antecedents to be followed by like consequents, that _whensoever_ he seeth the antecedent, he looketh again for the consequent; or when he seeth the consequent, maketh account there hath been the like antecedent; then he calleth both the antecedent and the consequent, _signs_ one of another, as clouds are signs of rain to come, and rain of clouds past.
[Sidenote: Prudence.]
10. This taking of signs by _experience_, is that wherein men do ordinarily think, the difference stands between man and man in _wisdom_, by which they commonly understand a man’s whole ability or _power cognitive_; but this is an _error_: for the signs are but _conjectural_; and according as they have often or seldom failed, so their _assurance_ is more or less; but _never full_ and _evident_: for though a man have always seen the day and night to follow one another hitherto; yet can he not thence conclude they shall do so, or that they have done so eternally: _experience concludeth nothing universally_. If the signs hit twenty times for one missing, a man may lay a wager of twenty to one of the event; but may not conclude it for a truth. But by this it is plain, that they shall _conjecture best_, that have _most experience_, because they have most signs to conjecture by: which is the reason _old men_ are _more prudent_, that is, conjecture better, _cæteris paribus_, than young: for, being old, they remember more; and experience is but remembrance. And _men_ of _quick_ imagination, _cæteris paribus_, are more _prudent_ than those whose imaginations are slow: for they observe _more_ in _less_ time. Prudence is nothing but conjecture from experience, or taking of signs from experience warily, that is, that the experiments from which he taketh such signs be all remembered; for else the cases are not alike that seem so.
[Sidenote: Caveats of concluding from experience.]
11. As in conjecture concerning things past and future, it is prudence to conclude from experience, what is like to come to pass, or to have passed already; so it is an error to conclude from it, that _it is_ so or so _called_; that is to say, we cannot from experience conclude, that any thing is to be called _just_ or _unjust_, _true_ or _false_, or any proposition _universal_ whatsoever, except it be from remembrance of the use of names imposed arbitrarily by men: for example, to have heard a sentence given in the like case, the like sentence a thousand times is not enough to conclude that the sentence is just; though most men have no other means to conclude by: but it is _necessary_, for the drawing of such conclusion, to _trace_ and _find out_, by many experiences, what men do mean by calling things just and unjust. Further, there is another _caveat_ to be taken in concluding by experience, from the tenth section of the second chapter; that is, that we conclude such things to be without, that are within us.
------- CHAPTER V.
1. Of marks. 2. Names or appellations. 3. Names positive and privative. 4. Advantage of names maketh us capable of science. 5. Names universal and singular. 6. Universals not in _rerum natura_. 7. Equivocal names. 8. Understanding. 9. Affirmation, negation, proposition. 10. Truth, falsity. 11. Ratiocination. 12. According to reason, against reason. 13. Names causes of knowledge, so of error. 14. Translation of the discourse of the mind into the discourse of the tongue, and of the errors thence proceeding.
[Sidenote: Of marks.]
1. Seeing the _succession_ of conceptions in the _mind_ are caused, as hath been said before, by the succession they _had_ one to another when they were produced by the _senses_, and that there is no conception that hath not been produced immediately before or after innumerable others, by the innumerable acts of sense; it must needs follow, that one _conception_ followeth _not_ another, according to our election, and the need we have of them, _but_ as it _chanceth_ us to hear or see such things as shall bring them to our mind. The experience we have hereof, is in such brute beasts, which, having the providence to hide the remains and superfluity of their meat, do nevertheless want the remembrance of the place where they hid it, and thereby make no benefit thereof in their hunger: but man, who in this point beginneth to rank himself somewhat above the nature of beasts, hath observed and remembered the cause of this defect, and to amend the same, hath imagined or devised to set up a visible or other sensible mark, the which, when he seeth it again, may bring to his mind the thought he had when he set it up. A _mark_ therefore is a _sensible object_ which a man erecteth voluntarily to himself, to the end to _remember_ thereby somewhat past, when the same is objected to his sense again: as men that have passed by a rock at sea, set up some mark, thereby to remember their former danger, and avoid it.
[Sidenote: Names or appellations.]
2. In the number of these _marks_, are those _human voices_, which we call the _names_ or appellations of things sensible by the ear, by which we recall into our mind some conceptions of the things to which we gave those names or appellations; as the appellation _white_ bringeth to remembrance the quality of such objects as produce that colour or conception in us. A _name_ or appellation therefore is the _voice_ of a man _arbitrary_, imposed for a _mark_ to bring into his mind some conception concerning the thing on which it is imposed.
[Sidenote: Names positive and privative.]
3. Things named, are either the _objects_ themselves, as a man; or the _conception_ itself that we have of man, as shape and motion: or some privation, which is when we conceive that there is something which we conceive, not in him; as when we conceive he is not just, not finite, we give him the name of unjust, of infinite, which signify privation or defect; and to the privations themselves we give the names of injustice and infiniteness: so that here be _two sorts_ of names; one of _things_, in which we conceive something; or of the conceptions themselves, which are called _positive_: the other of things wherein we conceive _privation_ or defect, and those names are called _privative_.
[Sidenote: Advantage of names maketh us capable of science.]
4. By the advantage of _names_ it is that we are capable of _science_, which beasts, for want of them are not; nor man, without the use of them: for as a beast misseth not one or two out of many her young ones, for want of those names of order, one, two, and three, and which we call _number_; so neither would a man, without repeating orally or mentally the words of number, know how many pieces of money or other things lie before him.
[Sidenote: Names universal and singular.]
5. Seeing there be _many_ conceptions of _one_ and the same thing, and for _every_ conception we give it a _several_ name; it followeth that for one and the same thing, we have many names or attributes; as to the same man we give the appellations of _just_, _valiant_, &c. for divers _virtues_; of _strong_, _comely_, &c. for divers _qualities_ of the _body_. And again, because from divers things we receive like conceptions, many things must needs have the same appellation: as to all things we _see_, we give the same name of _visible_; and to all things we _see moveable_, we give the appellation of _moveable_: and those names we give to _many_, are called _universal_ to them all; as the name of man to every particular of mankind: such appellation as we give to _one_ only thing, we call _individual_, or singular; as Socrates, and other proper names: or, by circumlocution, he that writ the _Iliads_, for Homer.
[Sidenote: Universals not in _rerum natura_.]
6. The universality of _one name_ to many things, hath been the cause that men think the _things_ are themselves universal; and so seriously contend, that besides Peter and John, and all the rest of the men that are, have been, or shall be in the world, there is yet something else that we call _man_, viz. _man in general_, deceiving themselves, by taking the universal, or general appellation, for the thing it signifieth: for if one should desire the painter to make him the picture of a man, which is as much as to say, of a man in general; he meaneth no more, but that the painter should choose what man he pleaseth to draw, which must needs be some of them that are, or have been, or may be, none of which are _universal_. But when he would have him to draw the picture of the king, or any particular person, he limiteth the painter to that one person he chooseth. It is plain therefore, that there is _nothing universal_ but _names_; which are therefore called _indefinite_; because we limit them not ourselves, but leave them to be applied by the hearer: whereas a singular name is limited and restrained to one of the many things it signifieth; as when we say, this man, pointing to him, or giving him his proper name, or by some such other way.
[Sidenote: Equivocal names.]
7. The appellations that be _universal_, and common to many things, are _not_ always given to all the _particulars_, (as they ought to be) for like conceptions, and like considerations in them all; which is the cause that many of them are _not_ of _constant_ signification, but bring into our mind other thoughts than those for which they were ordained, and these are called equivocal. As for example, the word faith signifieth the same with belief; sometimes it signifieth particularly that belief which maketh a Christian; and sometime it signifieth the keeping of a promise. Also all _metaphors_ are by profession _equivocal_: and there is scarce any word that is not made _equivocal_ by divers contextures of speech, or by diversity of pronunciation and gesture.
[Sidenote: Understanding.]
8. This _equivocation_ of names maketh it _difficult_ to recover those conceptions for which the name was ordained; and that not only in the language of other men, wherein we are to consider the _drift_, and _occasion_, and _contexture_ of the speech, as well as the _words_ themselves; but also in our discourse, which being derived from the custom and common use of speech, representeth unto us not our own conceptions. It is therefore a great ability in a man, out of the words, contexture, and other circumstances of language, to deliver himself from _equivocation_, and to find out the true meaning of what is said: and this is it we call _understanding_.
[Sidenote: Affirmation, negation, proposition.]
9. Of two _appellations_, by the help of this little verb _is_, or something equivalent, we make an _affirmation_ or _negation_, either of which in the Schools we call also a _proposition_, and consisteth of two appellations joined together by the said verb _is_: as for example, man is a living creature; or thus, man is not righteous: whereof the former is called an _affirmation_, because the appellation, living creature, is _positive_; the latter a _negative_, because not righteous is _privative_.
[Sidenote: Truth, falsity.]
10. In _every proposition_, be it affirmative or negative, the latter appellation either comprehendeth the former, as in this proposition, charity is a virtue, the name of virtue comprehendeth the name of charity, and many other virtues beside; and then is the proposition said to be _true_, or _truth_: for, _truth_, and a _true proposition_, is all one. Or _else_ the _latter_ appellation comprehendeth _not_ the former; as in this proposition, every man is just; the name of just comprehendeth not every man; for unjust is the name of the far greater part of men: and the proposition is said to be _false_, or falsity: _falsity_ and a _false proposition_ being also the same thing.
[Sidenote: Ratiocination.]
11. In what manner of two propositions, whether _both_ affirmative, or _one_ affirmative, the _other_ negative, is made a _syllogism_, I forbear to write. All this that hath been said of names or propositions, though _necessary_, is but _dry_ discourse: and this place is not for the whole art of logic, which if I enter further into, I ought to pursue: besides, it is not needful; for there be few men which have not so much natural logic, as thereby to discern well enough, whether any conclusion I shall make in this discourse hereafter, be well or ill collected: only thus much I say in this place, that _making of syllogisms_ is that we call _ratiocination_ or _reasoning_.
[Sidenote: According to reason, against reason.]
12. Now when a man _reasoneth_ from _principles_ that are _found_ indubitable by experience, all deceptions of sense and equivocation of words avoided, the conclusion he maketh is said to be _according to right reason_: but when from his conclusion a man may, by good ratiocination, derive that which is _contradictory_ to any evident truth whatsoever, then he is said to have concluded _against reason_: and such a conclusion is called _absurdity_.
[Sidenote: Names causes of knowledge, so of error.]
13. As the _invention_ of _names_ hath been _necessary_ for the drawing men _out of_ ignorance, by calling to their remembrance the necessary _coherence_ of one conception to another; so also hath it on the other side precipitated men into _error_: insomuch, that whereas by the benefit of _words_ and ratiocination they exceed _brute beasts_ in knowledge, and the commodities that accompany the same; so they exceed them also in _error_: for _true_ and _false_ are things not incident to beasts, because they adhere not to propositions and language; nor have they ratiocination, whereby to multiply one untruth by another, as men have.
[Sidenote: Translation of the discourse of the mind into the discourse of the tongue, and of the errors thence proceeding.]
14. It is the _nature_ almost of every _corporal_ thing, being _often moved_ in one and the same manner, to receive continually a _greater_ and _greater easiness_ and aptitude to the _same_ motion, insomuch as in time the same becometh so _habitual_, that, to _beget_ it, there needs no more than to _begin_ it. The _passions_ of man, as they are the beginning of _voluntary_ motions; so are they the beginning of _speech_, which is the motion of the tongue. And men desiring to shew others the knowledge, opinions, conceptions, and passions which are in themselves, and to that end having invented _language_, have by that means transferred all that _discursion_ of their _mind_ mentioned in the former chapter, by the _motion_ of their _tongues_, into _discourse_ of _words_: and _ratio_ now is but _oratio_, for the most part, wherein custom hath so great a power, that the mind suggesteth only the first word; the rest follow _habitually_, and are not followed by the mind; as it is with beggars, when they say their _paternoster_, putting together such words, and in such manner, as in their education they have learned from their nurses, from their companies, or from their teachers, having _no images_ or _conceptions_ in their mind, answering to the words they speak: and as they have learned themselves, so they teach posterity. Now, if we consider the power of those _deceptions_ of the sense, mentioned chapter II. section 10, and also how _unconstantly_ names have been settled, and how subject they are to _equivocation_, and how _diversified_ by _passion_, (scarce two men agreeing what is to be called good, and what evil; what liberality, what prodigality; what valour, what temerity) and how subject men are to paralogism or fallacy in reasoning, I may in a manner conclude, that it is impossible to _rectify_ so many errors of any one man, as must needs proceed from those causes, without beginning _anew_ from the very first grounds of all our knowledge and sense; and instead of books, reading over orderly one’s own conceptions: in which meaning, I take _nosce te ipsum_ for a precept worthy the reputation it hath gotten.
------- CHAPTER VI.
1. Of the two kinds of knowledge. 2. Truth and evidence necessary to knowledge. 3. Evidence defined. 4. Science defined. 5. Supposition defined. 6. Opinion defined. 7. Belief defined. 8. Conscience defined. 9. Belief, in some cases, no less from doubt than knowledge.
[Sidenote: Of the two kinds of knowledge.]
1. There is a story somewhere, of one that pretends to have been miraculously cured of blindness, wherewith he was born, by St. Alban or other Saints, at the town of St. Alban’s; and that the Duke of Gloucester being there, to be satisfied of the truth of the miracle, asked the man, What colour is this? who, by answering, it was green, discovered himself, and was punished for a counterfeit: for though by his sight newly received he might distinguish between green, and red, and all other colours, as well as any that should interrogate him, yet he could not possibly know at first sight which of them was called green, or red, or by any other name. By this we may understand, there be _two kinds_ of knowledge, whereof the _one_ is nothing else but _sense_, or knowledge _original_, as I have said in the beginning of the second chapter, and _remembrance_ of the same; the _other_ is called _science_ or knowledge of the _truth of propositions_, and how things are called, and is derived from _understanding_. Both of these sorts are but _experience_; the former being the experience of the effects of things that work upon us from _without_; and the latter experience men have from the proper use of _names_ in language: and all experience being, as I have said, but remembrance, all knowledge is remembrance: and of the _former_, the register we keep in books, is called _history_; but the registers of the _latter_ are called the _sciences_.
[Sidenote: Truth and evidence necessary to knowledge.]
2. There are _two things_ necessarily implied in this word _knowledge_; the one is _truth_, the other _evidence_; for what is not truth, can never be known. For, let a man say he knoweth a thing never so well, if the same shall afterwards appear false, he is driven to confession, that it was not knowledge, but opinion. Likewise, if the truth be not evident, though a man holdeth it, yet is his knowledge thereof no more than theirs who hold the contrary: for if truth were enough to make it knowledge, all truth were known; which is not so.
[Sidenote: Evidence defined.]
3. What _truth_ is, hath been defined in the precedent chapter; what _evidence_ is, I _now_ set down: and it is the concomitance of a man’s _conception_ with the _words_ that signify such conception in the act of ratiocination: for when a man reasoneth with his lips only, to which the mind suggesteth only the beginning, and followeth not the words of his mouth with the conceptions of his mind, out of custom of so speaking; though he begin his ratiocination with true propositions, and proceed with certain syllogisms, and thereby make always true conclusions; yet are not his conclusions _evident_ to him, for want of the _concomitance of conception_ with his words: for if the words alone were sufficient, a _parrot_ might be taught as well to know truth, as to speak it. Evidence is to truth, as the sap to the tree, which, so far as it creepeth along with the body and branches, keepeth them alive; where it forsaketh them, they die: for this evidence, which is meaning with our words, is the life of truth.
[Sidenote: Science defined.]
4. Knowledge thereof, which we call _science_, I define to be _evidence of truth_, from some beginning or principle of _sense_: for the truth of a proposition is never evident, until we conceive the meaning of the words or terms whereof it consisteth, which are always conceptions of the mind: nor can we remember those conceptions, without the thing that produced the same by our senses. The _first_ principle of knowledge is, that we have such and such _conceptions_; the _second_, that we have thus and thus _named_ the things whereof they are conceptions; the _third_ is, that we have _joined_ those _names_ in such manner as to make true propositions; the _fourth_ and last is, that we have _joined_ those _propositions_ in such manner as they be concluding, and the truth of the conclusion said to be known. And of these two kinds of knowledge, whereof the former is _experience of fact_, and the latter _evidence of truth_; as the _former_, if it be great, is called _prudence_; so the _latter_, if it be much, hath usually been called, both by ancient and modern writers, _sapience_ or wisdom: and of this _latter_, _man_ only is capable; of the _former_, _brute beasts_ also participate.
[Sidenote: Supposition defined.]
5. A proposition is said to be _supposed_, when, being _not evident_, it is nevertheless _admitted for a time_, to the end, that, joining to it other propositions, we may _conclude_ something; and to _proceed_ from conclusion to conclusion, for a _trial_ whether the same will lead us into any _absurd_ or impossible conclusion; which if it _do_, then we know such supposition to have been false.
[Sidenote: Opinion defined.]
6. But if running through _many_ conclusions, we come to _none_ that are _absurd_, then we think the proposition _probable_; likewise we think probable whatsoever proposition we _admit_ for truth by error of reasoning, or from trusting to other men: and all such propositions as are admitted by _trust_ or error, we are not said to _know_, but to _think_ them to be true; and the admittance of them is called _opinion_.
[Sidenote: Belief defined.]
7. And particularly, when the opinion is admitted out of _trust_ to _other_ men, they are said to _believe_ it; and their admittance of it is called _belief_, and sometimes _faith_.
[Sidenote: Conscience defined.]
8. It is either _science_ or _opinion_ which we commonly mean by the word _conscience_: for men say that such and such a thing is true in or upon their conscience; which they _never_ do, when they think it _doubtful_; and therefore they _know_, or _think_ they know it to be true. But men, when they say things upon their conscience, are not therefore presumed certainly to know the truth of what they say; it remaineth then, that that word is used by them that have an _opinion_, _not_ only of the _truth_ of the thing, _but_ also of their _knowledge_ of it, to which the _truth_ of the proposition is consequent. _Conscience_ I therefore define to be _opinion of evidence_.
[Sidenote: Belief, in some cases, no less from doubt than knowledge.]
9. _Belief_, which is the admitting of propositions upon _trust_, in many cases is no less free from _doubt_, than perfect and manifest _knowledge_: for as there is nothing whereof there is not some cause; so, when there is doubt, there must be some cause thereof conceived. Now there be many things which we receive from _report of others_, of which it is impossible to imagine any cause of _doubt_: for what can be opposed against the consent of all men, in things they can know, and have no cause to report otherwise than they are, such as is a great part of our _histories_, unless a man would say that all the world had _conspired_ to deceive him.
And thus much of _sense_, _imagination_, _discursion_, _ratiocination_, and _knowledge_, which are the acts of our _power cognitive_, or _conceptive_. That power of the _mind_ which we call _motive_, differeth from the power _motive_ of the _body_; for the power _motive_ of the _body_ is that by which it _moveth other_ bodies, and we call _strength_: but the power motive of the _mind_, is that by which the mind giveth _animal motion_ to that _body_ wherein it existeth; the acts hereof are our _affections_ and _passions_, of which I am to speak in general.
------- CHAPTER VII.
1. Of delight, pain, love, hatred. 2. Appetite, aversion, fear. 3. Good, evil, pulchritude, turpitude. 4. End, fruition. 5. Profitable, use, vain. 6. Felicity. 7. Good and evil mixed. 8. Sensual delight, and pain; joy and grief.
[Sidenote: Of delight, pain, love, hatred.]
1. In the eighth section of the second chapter is shewed, _that conceptions_ and _apparitions_ are nothing _really_, but _motion_ in some internal substance of the _head_; which motion _not stopping_ there, but proceeding to the _heart_, of necessity must there either _help_ or _hinder_ the motion which is called _vital_; when it _helpeth_, it is called _delight_, _contentment_, or _pleasure_, which is nothing really but motion about the heart, as conception is nothing but motion in the head: and the _objects_ that cause it are called _pleasant_ or _delightful_, or by some name equivalent; the Latins have _jucundum_, _a juvando_, from helping; and the same delight, with reference to the object, is called _love_: but when such motion _weakeneth_ or hindereth the vital motion, then it is called _pain_; and in relation to that which causeth it, hatred, which the Latins express sometimes by _odium_, and sometimes by _tædium_.
[Sidenote: Appetite, aversion, fear.]
2. This motion, in which consisteth _pleasure_ or _pain_, is also a _solicitation_ or provocation either to draw _near_ to the thing that pleaseth, or to _retire_ from the thing that displeaseth; and this solicitation is the _endeavour_ or internal beginning of _animal_ motion, which when the object _delighteth_, is called _appetite_; when it _displeaseth_, it is called _aversion_, in respect of the displeasure _present_; but in respect of the displeasure _expected_, _fear_. So that _pleasure_, _love_, and _appetite_, which is also called desire, are _divers names_ for divers considerations of the _same thing_.
[Sidenote: Good, evil, pulchritude, turpitude.]
3. Every man, for his own part, calleth that which _pleaseth_, and is delightful to himself, _good_; and that _evil_ which _displeaseth_ him: insomuch that while every man _differeth_ from another in _constitution_, they differ also from one another concerning the common distinction of good and evil. Nor is there any such thing as absolute goodness, considered without relation: for even the goodness which we apprehend in God Almighty, is _his goodness to us_. And as we call _good_ and _evil_ the _things_ that please and displease; so call we _goodness_ and _badness_, the _qualities_ or powers whereby they do it: and the signs of that goodness are called by the Latins in one word _pulchritudo_, and the signs of evil, _turpitudo_; to which we have no words precisely answerable.
As all conceptions we have immediately by the _sense_, are, _delight_, or _pain_, or _appetite_, or _fear_; so are all the _imaginations_ after sense. But as they are weaker imaginations, so are they also weaker pleasures, or weaker pain.
[Sidenote: End, fruition.]
4. As _appetite_ is the beginning of _animal_ motion towards something that pleaseth us; so is the _attaining_ thereof, the _end_ of that motion, which we also call the _scope_, and aim, and final cause of the same: and when we attain that end, the delight we have thereby is called the _fruition_: so that _bonum_ and _finis_ are different names, but for different considerations of the same thing.
[Sidenote: Profitable, use, vain.]
5. And of _ends_, some of them are called _propinqui_, that is, near at hand; others _remoti_, far off: but when the ends that be nearer attaining, be compared with those that be further off, they are called not ends, but _means_, and the _way_ to those. But for an _utmost_ end, in which the ancient _philosophers_ have placed _felicity_, and disputed much concerning the way thereto, there is no such thing in this world, nor way to it, more than to Utopia: for while we live, we have desires, and desire presupposeth a further end. Those things which please us, as the way or _means_ to a further end, we call _profitable_; and the _fruition_ of them, _use_; and those things that profit not, _vain_.
[Sidenote: Felicity.]