6. Seeing all _delight_ is _appetite_, and presupposeth a _further_ end, there can be _no contentment_ but in _proceeding_: and therefore we are not to marvel, when we see, that as men attain to more riches, honour, or other power; so their appetite continually groweth more and more; and when they are come to the utmost degree of some kind of power, they pursue some other, as long as in any kind they think themselves behind any other: of those therefore that have attained to the highest degree of honour and riches, some have affected mastery in some art; as Nero in music and poetry, Commodus in the art of a gladiator; and such as affect not some such thing, must find diversion and recreation of their thoughts in the contention either of play or business: and men justly complain of a great grief, that they know not what to do. _Felicity_, therefore, by which we mean continual delight, consisteth _not_ in _having_ prospered, but in _prospering_.
[Sidenote: Good and evil mixed.]
7. There are few things in this world, but _either_ have _mixture_ of good and evil, _or_ there is a chain of them so necessarily linked together, that the one cannot be taken without the other: as for example, the pleasures of sin, and the bitterness of punishment, are inseparable; as is also labour and honour, for the most part. Now when in the _whole chain_, the _greater part_ is good, the _whole_ is called _good_; and when the _evil_ over-weigheth, the _whole_ is called _evil_.
[Sidenote: Sensual delight, and pain; joy and grief.]
8. There are two sorts of pleasure, whereof the _one_ seemeth to affect the _corporeal_ organ of the sense, and that I call _sensual_; the _greatest_ part whereof, is that by which we are invited to give continuance to our _species_; and the _next_, by which a man is invited to meat, for the preservation of his _individual_ person: the _other sort_ of delight is not particular to any part of the body, and is called the delight of the _mind_, and is that which we call _joy_. Likewise of _pains_, some affect the _body_, and are therefore called the _pains_ of the body; and some _not_, and those are called _grief_.
------- CHAPTER VIII.
1, 2. Wherein consist the pleasures of sense. 3, 4. Of the imagination, or conception of power in man. 5. Honour, honourable, worth. 6. Signs of honour. 7. Reverence. 8. Passions.
[Sidenote: Wherein consist the pleasures of sense.]
1. Having in the first section of the precedent chapter presupposed, that motion and _agitation of the brain_ which we call conception, to be continued _to the heart_, and there to be called _passion_; I have therefore obliged myself, as far forth as I am able, to search out and declare _from what_ conception _proceedeth_ every one of those _passions_ which we commonly take notice of: for, seeing the things that please and displease, are innumerable, and work innumerable ways, men have not taken notice but of a very few, which also are many of them without name.
2. And first, we are to consider, that of conceptions there are _three sorts_, whereof one is of that which is _present_, which is _sense_; another, of that which is _past_, which is _remembrance_; and the third, of that which is _future_, which we call _expectation_: all which have been manifestly declared in the second and third chapters; and every of these conceptions is _pleasure_ or _pain_ _present_. And first for the pleasures of the _body_ which affect the sense of _touch_ and _taste_, as far forth as they be _organical_, their conceptions are _sense_: so also is the pleasure of all _exonerations_ of nature: all which passions I have before named, _sensual pleasures_; and their contrary, _sensual pains_: to which also may be added the pleasures and displeasures of _odours_, if any of them shall be found organical, which for the most part they are not, as appeareth by this experience which every man hath, that the same smells, when they seem to proceed from others, displease, though they proceed from ourselves; but when we think they proceed from ourselves, they displease not, though they come from others: the displeasure of this is a conception of hurt thereby from those odours, as being unwholesome, and is therefore a conception of evil to come, and not present. Concerning the delight of _hearing_, it is diverse, and the organ itself not affected thereby: _simple sounds_ please by _equality_, as the sound of a bell or lute: insomuch as it seems, an equality continued by the percussion of the object upon the ear, is pleasure; the contrary is called _harshness_, such as is grating, and some other sounds, which do not always affect the body, but only sometime, and that with a kind of horror beginning at the teeth. _Harmony_, or many sounds together agreeing, please by the same reason as the _unison_, which is the sound of equal strings equally stretched. Sounds that differ in any _height_, please by _inequality and equality alternate_, that is to say, the higher note striketh twice, for one stroke of the other, whereby they strike together every second time; as is well proved by Galileo, in the first dialogue concerning local motion: where he also sheweth, that two sounds differing a _fifth_, delight the ear by an _equality_ of striking _after two inequalities_; for the higher note striketh the ear thrice, while the other strikes but twice. In like manner he sheweth wherein consisteth the pleasure of concord, and the displeasure of discord, in other difference of notes. There is yet _another_ pleasure and displeasure of sounds, which consisteth in _consequence of one note after another, diversified_ both by _accent_ and _measure_; whereof that which pleaseth is called an _air_; but for what reason one succession in tone and measure is a more pleasing air than another, I confess I know not; but I conjecture the reason to be, for that some of them imitate and revive some passion which otherwise we take no notice of, and the other not; for _no air pleaseth but for a time_, no more doth imitation. Also the pleasures of the _eye_ consist in a certain _equality_ of _colour_: for _light_, the most glorious of all colours, is made by _equal_ operation of the object; whereas _colour_ is _perturbed_, that is to say, unequal light, as hath been said, chapter II. section 8. And therefore colours, the more equality is in them, the more resplendent they are; and as _harmony_ is pleasure to the _ear_, which consisteth of _divers sounds_; so perhaps may some mixture of _divers colours_ be _harmony_ to the _eye_, more than another mixture. There is yet another delight by the _ear_, which happeneth only to men of skill in music, which is of another nature, and not, as these, conception of the present, but rejoicing of their own skill; of which nature are the passions of which I am to speak next.
[Sidenote: Of the imagination, or conception of power in man.]
3. Conception of the _future_, is but a _supposition_ of the _same_, proceeding from _remembrance_ of what is past; and we so far _conceive_ that anything _will be hereafter_, as we _know_ there is _something at the present_ that hath power to produce it: and that anything hath power now to produce another thing hereafter, we cannot conceive, but by remembrance that it hath produced the like heretofore. Wherefore all conception of future, is conception of power able to produce something. Whosoever therefore expecteth pleasure to come, must conceive withal some power in himself by which the same may be attained. And because the passions, whereof I am to speak next, consist in conception of the future, that is to say, in conception of power past, and the act to come; before I go any further, I must in the next place speak somewhat concerning this power.
4. By this power I mean the same with the faculties of the _body_, _nutritive_, _generative_, _motive_, and of the _mind_, _knowledge_; and besides these, such _further_ power as by them is acquired, _viz._ _riches_, _place_ of authority, _friendship_ or _favour_, and _good fortune_; _which_ last is really nothing else but the favour of God Almighty. The _contraries_ of these are _impotencies_, _infirmities_, or _defects_ of the said powers respectively. And because the power of one man resisteth and hindereth the effects of the power of another, _power_ simply is no more, but the _excess_ of the power of one above that of another: for equal powers opposed, destroy one another; and such their opposition is called contention.
[Sidenote: Honour, honourable, worth.]
5. _signs_ by which we know our own _power_, are those _actions_ which proceed from the same; and the signs by which _other men_ know it, are such _actions_, _gesture_, _countenance_ and _speech_, as usually such powers produce: and the _acknowledgment_ of power is called _honour_; and to honour a man inwardly, is to conceive or acknowledge that that man hath the odds or excess of that power above him with whom he contendeth or compareth himself. And honourable are those signs for which one man acknowledgeth power or excess above his concurrent in another: as for example, _beauty_ of person, consisting in a lively aspect of the countenance, and other _signs_ of _natural heat_, are honourable, being signs precedent of power _generative_, and much issue; as also, general reputation among those of the other sex, because signs consequent of the same. And actions proceeding from _strength of body_, and open force, are honourable, as signs consequent of power _motive_, such as are victory in battle or duel; _a d’avoir tué son homme_. Also to adventure upon great exploits and danger, as being a sign consequent of opinion of our own strength, and that opinion a sign of the strength itself. And to teach or persuade are honourable, because they be signs of _knowledge_. And riches are honourable; as signs of the power that acquired them: and gifts, cost, and magnificence of houses, apparel, and the like, are honourable, as signs of riches.
And _nobility_ is honourable by reflection, as a sign of power in the ancestors: and _authority_, because a sign of the strength, wisdom, favour or riches by which it is attained. And _good fortune_ or casual prosperity is honourable, because a sign of the favour of God, to whom is to be ascribed all that cometh to us by fortune, no less than that we attain unto by industry. And the contraries and defects of these signs are dishonourable; and according to the signs of honour and dishonour, so we estimate and make the value or worth of a man: for so much worth is every thing, as a man will give for the use of all it can do.
[Sidenote: Signs of honour.]
6. The _signs_ of _honour_ are those by which we perceive that one man acknowledgeth the power and worth of another; such as these, to _praise_, to _magnify_, to _bless_, to call happy, to pray or supplicate to, to thank, to offer unto or present, to obey, to hearken unto with attention, to speak to with consideration, to approach unto in decent manner, to keep distance from, to give way to, and the like, which are the honour the inferior giveth to the superior.
But the _signs of honour_ from the superior to the inferior, are such as these; to _praise_ or prefer him before his concurrent, to hear more willingly, to speak to him more familiarly, to admit him nearer, to employ him rather, to ask his advice rather, to take his opinions, and to give him _any gifts rather than money_; or if money, so much as may _not_ imply his _need_ of a _little_: for need of a little is greater poverty than need of much. And this is enough for examples of the signs of honour and power.
[Sidenote: Reverence.]
7. _Reverence_ is the conception we have concerning another, that he hath the _power_ to do unto us both _good_ and _hurt_, but _not_ the _will_ to do us _hurt_.
[Sidenote: Passions.]
8. In the pleasure men have, or displeasure from the signs of honour or dishonour done unto them, consisteth the nature of the passions, whereof we are to speak in the next chapter.
------- CHAPTER IX.
1. Glory aspiring, false glory, vain glory. 2. Humility and dejection. 3. Shame. 4. Courage. 5. Anger. 6. Revengefulness. 7. Repentance. 8. Hope, despair, diffidence. 9. Trust. 10. Pity and hardness of heart. 11. Indignation. 12. Emulation and envy. 13. Laughter. 14. Weeping. 15. Lust. 16. Love. 17. Charity. 18. Admiration and curiosity. 19. Of the passion of them that flock to see danger. 20. Of magnanimity and pusillanimity. 21. A view of the passions represented in a race.
[Sidenote: Glory aspiring, false glory, vain glory.]
1. Glory, or internal gloriation or triumph of the mind, is the passion which proceedeth from the imagination or conception of our _own power_ above the power of him that contendeth with us; the _signs_ whereof, besides those in the countenance, and other gestures of the body which cannot be described, are, _ostentation_ in words, and _insolency_ in actions: and this passion, of them whom it displeaseth, is called _pride_; by them whom it pleaseth, it is termed a _just valuation_ of himself. This imagination of our power or worth, may be from an assured and certain _experience_ of our own actions; and then is that glory _just_, and well grounded, and begetteth an opinion of _increasing_ the same by other actions to follow; in which consisteth the appetite which we call _aspiring_, or proceeding from one degree of power to another. The same passion may proceed _not_ from any _conscience_ of our own actions, but from fame and trust of _others_, whereby one may think well of himself, and yet be deceived; and this is _false glory_, and the aspiring consequent thereto procureth ill success. Further, the _fiction_, which is also imagination, of actions done by ourselves, which never were done, is _glorying_; but because it begetteth no appetite nor endeavour to any further attempt, it is merely _vain_ and unprofitable; as when a man imagineth himself to do the actions whereof he readeth in some _romance_, or to be like unto some other man whose acts he admireth: and this is called _vain glory_; and is exemplified in the fable, by the fly sitting on the axletree, and saying to himself, What a dust do I make rise! The expression of _vain glory_ is that wish, which some of the Schools mistaking for some appetite distinct from all the rest, have called _velleity_, making a new word, as they made a new passion which was not before. _Signs_ of _vain glory_ in the _gesture_ are, _imitation_ of others, counterfeiting and usurping the signs of virtue they have not, affectation of fashions, captation of honour from their dreams, and other little stories of themselves, from their country, from their names, and from the like.
[Sidenote: Humility and dejection.]
2. The passion _contrary to glory_, proceeding from apprehension of our own infirmity, is called _humility_ by those by whom it is approved; by the rest, _dejection_ and poorness: which conception may be well or ill grounded; if well, it produceth fear to attempt any thing rashly; if ill, it utterly cows a man, that he neither dares speak publicly, nor expect good success in any action.
[Sidenote: Shame.]
3. It happeneth sometimes, that he that hath a _good_ opinion of himself, and upon good ground, may nevertheless, by reason of the _frowardness_ which that passion begetteth, discover in himself some _defect_ or infirmity, the remembrance whereof dejecteth him; and this passion is called _shame_; by which being cooled and checked in his frowardness, he is more wary for the time to come. This passion, as it is a sign of _infirmity_, which is _dishonour_; so also it is a sign of _knowledge_, which is _honour_. The sign of it is _blushing_, which appeareth less in men conscious of their own defect, because they less betray the infirmities they acknowledge.
[Sidenote: Courage.]
4. _Courage_, in a _large_ signification, is the _absence_ of _fear_ in the presence of any evil whatsoever: but in a _strict_ and more common meaning, it is _contempt_ of _wounds_ and _death_, when they oppose a man in the way to his end.
[Sidenote: Anger.]
5. _Anger_ or sudden courage is nothing but the _appetite_ or desire of _overcoming present_ opposition. It hath been defined commonly to be grief proceeding from an opinion of contempt; which is confuted by the often experience which we have of being moved to anger by things inanimate, and without sense, and consequently incapable of contemning us.
[Sidenote: Revengefulness.]
6. _Revengefulness_ is that passion which ariseth from an expectation or _imagination_ of _making_ him that hath _hurt_ us, _find_ his _own action hurtful_ to himself, and to _acknowledge_ the same; and this is the height of revenge: for though it be not hard, by returning evil for evil, to make one’s adversary displeased with his own fact; yet to make him acknowledge the same, is so difficult, that many a man had rather die than do it. Revenge aimeth not at the death, but at the captivity or subjection of an enemy; which was well expressed in the exclamation of Tiberius Cæsar, concerning one, that, to frustrate his revenge, had killed himself in prison; _Hath he escaped me?_ To _kill_, is the aim of them that _hate_, to _rid_ themselves out of fear: _revenge_ aimeth at _triumph_, which over the dead is not.
[Sidenote: Repentance.]
7. _Repentance_ is the passion which proceedeth from _opinion_ or knowledge that the _action_ they have done is _out of the way_ to the _end_ they would attain: the effect whereof is, to pursue that way no longer, but, by the consideration of the end, to direct themselves into a better. The first motion therefore in this passion is _grief_; but the expectation or conception of returning again into the way, is _joy_; and consequently, the passion of _repentance_ is compounded and allayed of both: but the _predominant_ is _joy_; else were the whole grief, which cannot be, forasmuch as he that proceedeth towards the end, he conceiveth good, proceedeth with appetite; and appetite is joy, as hath been said, chapter VII. section 2.
[Sidenote: Hope, despair, diffidence.]
8. _Hope_ is _expectation_ of _good_ to come, as fear is the expectation of evil: but when there be causes, some that make us expect good, and some that make us expect evil, alternately working in our mind; if the causes that make us expect good, be greater than those that make us expect evil, the whole passion is hope; if contrarily, the whole is fear. Absolute _privation_ of hope is _despair_, a degree whereof is _diffidence_.
[Sidenote: Trust.]
[Sidenote: Trust.]
9. _Trust_ is a passion proceeding from the _belief of_ him from whom we _expect_ or _hope_ for good, so _free_ from _doubt_ that upon the same we pursue no other way to attain the same good; as _distrust_ or diffidence is _doubt_ that maketh him endeavour to provide himself by other means. And that this is the meaning of the words trust and distrust, is manifest from this, that a man never provideth himself by a second way, but when he mistrusteth that the first will not hold.
[Sidenote: Pity and hardness of heart.]
10. _Pity_ is _imagination_ or _fiction_ of _future_ calamity to _ourselves_, proceeding from the sense of _another_ man’s calamity. But when it lighteth on such as we think have not deserved the same, the compassion is greater, because then there appeareth more probability that the same may happen to us: for, the evil that happeneth to an innocent man, may happen to every man. But when we see a man suffer for great crimes, which we cannot easily think will fall upon ourselves, the pity is the less. And therefore men are apt to pity those whom they love: for, whom they love, they think worthy of good, and therefore not worthy of calamity. Thence it is also, that men pity the vices of some persons at the first sight only, out of love to their aspect. The contrary of pity is _hardness of heart_, proceeding either from _slowness_ of imagination, or some extreme great _opinion_ of their own _exemption_ from the like calamity, or from hatred of all or most men.
[Sidenote: Indignation.]
11. _Indignation_ is that _grief_ which consisteth in the conception of _good success_ happening to them whom they think _unworthy_ thereof. Seeing therefore men think all those unworthy whom they hate, they think them not only unworthy of the good fortune they have, but also of their own virtues. And of all the passions of the mind, these two, indignation and pity, are most raised and increased by eloquence: for, the _aggravation_ of _the calamity_, and _extenuation_ of the _fault_, augmenteth _pity_; and the _extenuation_ of the _worth_ of the person, together with the magnifying of his success, which are the parts of an orator, are able to turn these two passions into _fury_.
[Sidenote: Emulation and envy.]
12. _Emulation_ is _grief_ arising from seeing _one’s self exceeded_ or excelled by his _concurrent_, together with _hope_ to _equal_ or exceed him in time to come, by his own ability. But, _envy_ is the same _grief_ joined with _pleasure_ conceived in the imagination of some _ill_ fortune that may befall him.
[Sidenote: Laughter.]
13. There is a passion that hath _no name_; but the sign of it is that distortion of the countenance which we call _laughter_, which is always _joy_: but what joy, what we think, and wherein we triumph when we laugh, is not hitherto declared by any. That it consisteth in _wit_, or, as they call it, in the _jest_, experience _confuteth_: for men laugh at mischances and indecencies, wherein there lieth no wit nor jest at all. And forasmuch as the same thing is no more ridiculous when it groweth stale or usual, whatsoever it be that moveth laughter, it must be _new_ and _unexpected_. Men laugh often, especially such as are greedy of applause from every thing they do well, at their own actions performed never so little beyond their own expectations; as also at their own _jests_: and in this case it is manifest, that the passion of laughter proceedeth from a _sudden conception_ of some _ability_ in himself that laugheth. Also men laugh at the _infirmities_ of others, by comparison wherewith their own abilities are set off and illustrated. Also men laugh at _jests_, the _wit_ whereof always consisteth in the elegant _discovering_ and conveying to our minds some _absurdity_ of _another_: and in this case also the passion of laughter proceedeth from the _sudden_ imagination of our own odds and eminency: for what is else the recommending of ourselves to our own good opinion, by comparison with another man’s infirmity or absurdity? For when a jest is broken upon ourselves, or friends of whose dishonour we participate, we never laugh thereat. I may therefore conclude, that the passion of laughter is nothing else but _sudden glory_ arising from some sudden _conception_ of some _eminency_ in ourselves, by _comparison_ with the _infirmity_ of others, or with our own formerly: for men laugh at the follies of themselves past, when they come suddenly to remembrance, except they bring with them any present dishonour. It is no wonder therefore that men take heinously to be laughed at or derided, that is, triumphed over. Laughter _without offence_, must be at _absurdities_ and infirmities _abstracted_ from persons, and when all the company may laugh together: for laughing to one’s-self putteth all the rest into jealousy and examination of themselves. Besides, it is vain glory, and an argument of little worth, to think the infirmity of another, sufficient matter for his triumph.
[Sidenote: Weeping.]
14. The passion opposite hereunto, whose signs are another distortion of the face with tears, called _weeping_, is the _sudden falling out with_ ourselves, or sudden conception of defect; and therefore _children_ weep often; for seeing they think that every thing ought to be given them which they desire, of necessity every repulse must be a check of their expectation, and puts them in mind of their too much weakness to make themselves masters of all they look for. For the same cause _women_ are more apt to weep than men, as being not only more accustomed to have their wills, but also to measure their powers by the power and love of others that protect them. Men are apt to weep that prosecute revenge, when the revenge is suddenly stopped or frustrated by the repentance of their adversary; and such are the tears of _reconciliation_. Also revengeful men are subject to this passion upon the beholding those men they pity, and suddenly remember they cannot help. Other weeping in men proceedeth for the most part from the same cause it proceedeth from in women and children.
[Sidenote: Lust.]
[Sidenote: Lust.]
15. The appetite which men call _lust_, and the fruition that appertaineth thereunto, is a _sensual_ pleasure, but _not only_ that; there is in it also a delight of the mind: for it consisteth of two appetites together, to _please_, and to _be pleased_; and the delight men take in delighting, is not sensual, but a pleasure or joy of the mind consisting in the imagination of the power they have so much to please. But the name _lust_ is used where it is condemned; otherwise it is called by the general word _love_: for the passion is one and the same indefinite desire of different sex, as natural as hunger.
[Sidenote: Love.]
16. Of _love_, by which is understood the joy man taketh in the fruition of any _present_ good, hath been already spoken of in the first section, chapter VII. under which is contained the _love_ men bear to one _another_, or pleasure they take in one another’s company; and by which nature, men are said to be sociable. But there is another kind of love, which the Greeks call Ἔρως, and is that which we mean, when we say that a man is in love: forasmuch as this passion cannot be without diversity of sex, it cannot be denied but that it _participateth_ of that indefinite _love_ mentioned in the former section. But there is a great difference betwixt the desire of a man _indefinite_, and the same desire _limited ad hunc_; and this is that _love_ which is the great theme of poets: but notwithstanding their praises, it must be defined by the word _need_: for it is a conception a man hath of his need of _that one person_ desired. The cause of this passion is _not_ always _nor_ for the most part _beauty_, or other quality in the beloved, unless there be withal _hope_ in the person that loveth: which may be gathered from this, that in great difference of persons, the _greater_ have often fallen in love with the _meaner_; but not contrary. And from hence it is, that for the most part they have much better fortune in love, whose hopes are built upon something _in_ _their person_, than those that trust to their _expressions_ and _service_; and they that _care less_, than they that _care more_: which not perceiving, many men cast away their services, as one arrow after another, till, in the end, together with their hopes, they lose their wits.
[Sidenote: Charity.]
17. There is yet another passion sometimes called _love_, but more properly _good will_ or _charity_. There can be no greater argument to a man, of his own power, than to find himself able not only to accomplish his own desires, but also to _assist_ other men in theirs: and this is that conception wherein consisteth _charity_. In which, first, is contained that _natural affection_ of parents to their children, which the Greeks call Στοργὴ, as _also_, that affection wherewith men seek to _assist_ those that adhere unto them. But the affection wherewith men many times bestow their benefits on _strangers_, is not to be called charity, but either _contract_, whereby they seek to purchase friendship; or _fear_, which maketh them to purchase peace. The opinion of Plato concerning honourable love, delivered according to his custom in the person of Socrates, in the dialogue intituled _Convivium_, is this, that a man full and pregnant with wisdom and other virtues, naturally seeketh out some beautiful person, of age and capacity to conceive, in whom he may, without sensual respects, engender and produce the like. And this is the _idea_ of the then noted _love_ of Socrates wise and continent, to Alcibiades young and beautiful: in which, love is not the sought honour, but the issue of his knowledge; contrary to the common love, to which though issue sometimes follows, yet men seek not that, but to please, and to be pleased. It should be therefore this charity, or desire to assist and advance others. But why then should the wise seek the ignorant, or be more charitable to the beautiful than to others? There is something in it savouring of the use of that time: in which matter though Socrates be acknowledged for continent, yet the _continent_ have the passion they _contain_, as _much_ and more than they that _satiate_ the appetite; which maketh me suspect this _platonic_ love for merely sensual; but with an honourable pretence for the old to haunt the company of the young and beautiful.
[Sidenote: Admiration and curiosity.]