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LEVIATHAN, OR THE MATTER, FORM, AND POWER OF A COMMONWEALTH ECCLESIASTICAL AND CIVIL.
THE ENGLISH WORKS OF THOMAS HOBBES OF MALMESBURY; NOW FIRST COLLECTED AND EDITED BY SIR WILLIAM MOLESWORTH, BART.
--- VOL III.
--- LONDON: JOHN BOHN, HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN.
--- MDCCCXXXIX.
LONDON: C. RICHARDS, PRINTER, ST. MARTIN’S LANE.
TO MY MOST HONOR’D FRIEND MR. FRANCIS GODOLPHIN, OF GODOLPHIN.
------- HONOR’D SIR, Your most worthy brother, Mr. SIDNEY GODOLPHIN, when he lived, was pleased to think my studies something, and otherwise to oblige me, as you know, with real testimonies of his good opinion, great in themselves, and the greater for the worthiness of his person. For there is not any virtue that disposeth a man, either to the service of God, or to the service of his country, to civil society, or private friendship, that did not manifestly appear in his conversation, not as acquired by necessity, or affected upon occasion, but inherent, and shining in a generous constitution of his nature. Therefore, in honour and gratitude to him, and with devotion to yourself, I humbly dedicate unto you this my discourse of Commonwealth. I know not how the world will receive it, nor how it may reflect on those that shall seem to favour it. For in a way beset with those that contend, on one side for too great liberty, and on the other side for too much authority, ’tis hard to pass between the points of both unwounded. But yet, methinks, the endeavour to advance the civil power, should not be by the civil power condemned; nor private men, by reprehending it, declare they think that power too great. Besides, I speak not of the men, but, in the abstract, of the seat of power, (like to those simple and unpartial creatures in the Roman Capitol, that with their noise defended those within it, not because they were they, but there), offending none, I think, but those without, or such within, if there be any such, as favour them. That which perhaps may most offend, are certain texts of Holy Scripture, alleged by me to other purpose than ordinarily they use to be by others.
But I have done it with due submission, and also, in order to my subject, necessarily; for they are the outworks of the enemy, from whence they impugn the civil power. If notwithstanding this, you find my labour generally decried, you may be pleased to excuse yourself, and say, I am a man that love my own opinions, and think all true I say, that I honoured your brother, and honour you, and have presumed on that, to assume the title, without your knowledge, of being, as I am, SIR, Your most humble, and most obedient Servant, THOMAS HOBBES.
THE CONTENTS OF THE CHAPTERS.
------- THE FIRST PART.--OF MAN.
CHAP. PAGE.
Introduction ix 1. Of Sense 1 2. Of Imagination 3 3. Of the Consequence or Train of Imaginations 11 4. Of Speech 18 5. Of Reason and Science 29 6. Of the Interior Beginnings of Voluntary Motions, commonly called the Passions; and the Speeches by which they are expressed 38 7. Of the Ends or Resolutions of Discourse 51 8. Of the Virtues, commonly called Intellectual; and their contrary Defects 56 9. Of the Several Subjects of Knowledge 71 10. Of Power, Worth, Dignity, Honour, and Worthiness 74 11. Of the Difference of Manners 85 12. Of Religion 94 13. Of the Natural Condition of Mankind as concerning their Felicity and Misery 110 14. Of the First and Second Natural Laws, and of Contract 116 15. Of other Laws of Nature 130 16. Of Persons, Authors, and Things Personated 147 THE SECOND PART.--OF COMMONWEALTH.
17. Of the Causes, Generation, and Definition of a Commonwealth 153 18. Of the Rights of Sovereigns by Institution 159 19. Of the several kinds of Commonwealth by Institution; and of Succession to the Sovereign Power 171 20. Of Dominion Paternal, and Despotical 185 21. Of the Liberty of Subjects 196 22. Of Systems Subject, Political, and Private 210 23. Of the Public Ministers of Sovereign Power 226 24. Of the Nutrition, and Procreation of a Commonwealth 232 25. Of Counsel 240 26. Of Civil Laws 250 27. Of Crimes, Excuses, and Extenuations 277 28. Of Punishments, and Rewards 297 29. Of those things that weaken, or tend to the Dissolution of a Commonwealth 308 30. Of the Office of the Sovereign Representative 322 31. Of the Kingdom of God by Nature 343 THE THIRD PART.--OF A CHRISTIAN COMMONWEALTH.
32. Of the Principles of Christian Politics 359 33. Of the Number, Antiquity, Scope, Authority, and Interpreters of the Books of Holy Scripture 366 34. Of the Signification of Spirit, Angel, and Inspiration, in the Books of Holy Scripture 380 35. Of the Signification in Scripture of the Kingdom of God, of Holy, Sacred, and Sacrament 396 36. Of the Word of God, and of Prophets 407 37. Of Miracles, and their Use 427 38. Of the Signification in Scripture of Eternal Life, Hell, Salvation, the World to Come, and Redemption 437 39. Of the Signification in Scripture of the word Church 458 40. Of the Rights of the Kingdom of God, in Abraham, Moses, the High-Priests, and the Kings of Judah 461 41. Of the Office of Our Blessed Saviour 475 42. Of Power Ecclesiastical 485 43. Of what is Necessary for a Man’s Reception into the Kingdom of Heaven 584 THE FOURTH PART.--OF THE KINGDOM OF DARKNESS.
44. Of Spiritual Darkness, from Misinterpretation of Scripture 603 45. Of Demonology, and other Relics of the Religion of the Gentiles 637 46. Of Darkness from Vain Philosophy, and Fabulous Traditions 664 47. Of the Benefit proceeding from such Darkness; and to whom it accrueth 688 A Review and Conclusion 701 THE INTRODUCTION.
------- Nature, the art whereby God hath made and governs the world, is by the _art_ of man, as in many other things, so in this also imitated, that it can make an artificial animal. For seeing life is but a motion of limbs, the beginning whereof is in some principal part within; why may we not say, that all _automata_ (engines that move themselves by springs and wheels as doth a watch) have an artificial life? For what is the _heart_, but a _spring_; and the _nerves_, but so many _strings_; and the _joints_, but so many _wheels_, giving motion to the whole body, such as was intended by the artificer? _Art_ goes yet further, imitating that rational and most excellent work of nature, _man_. For by art is created that great LEVIATHAN called a COMMONWEALTH, or STATE, in Latin CIVITAS, which is but an artificial man; though of greater stature and strength than the natural, for whose protection and defence it was intended; and in which the _sovereignty_ is an artificial _soul_, as giving life and motion to the whole body; the _magistrates_, and other _officers_ of judicature and execution, artificial _joints_; _reward_ and _punishment_, by which fastened to the seat of the sovereignty every joint and member is moved to perform his duty, are the _nerves_, that do the same in the body natural; the _wealth_ and _riches_ of all the particular members, are the _strength_; _salus populi_, the _people’s safety_, its _business_; _counsellors_, by whom all things needful for it to know are suggested unto it, are the _memory_; _equity_, and and _covenants_, by which the parts of this body politic were at first made, set together, and united, resemble that _fiat_, or the _let us make man_, pronounced by God in the creation.
To describe the nature of this artificial man, I will consider First, the _matter_ thereof, and the _artificer_; both which is _man_.
Secondly, _how_, and by what _covenants_ it is made; what are the _rights_ and just _power_ or _authority_ of a _sovereign_; and what it is that _preserveth_ or _dissolveth_ it.
Thirdly, what is a _Christian commonwealth_.
Lastly, what is the _kingdom of darkness_.
Concerning the first, there is a saying much usurped of late, that _wisdom_ is acquired, not by reading of _books_, but of _men_.
Consequently whereunto, those persons, that for the most part can give no other proof of being wise, take great delight to show what they think they have read in men, by uncharitable censures of one another behind their backs. But there is another saying not of late understood, by which they might learn truly to read one another, if they would take the pains; that is, _nosce teipsum_, _read thyself_: which was not meant, as it is now used, to countenance, either the barbarous state of men in power, towards their inferiors; or to encourage men of low degree, to a saucy behaviour towards their betters; but to teach us, that for the similitude of the thoughts and passions of one man, to the thoughts and passions of another, whosoever looketh into himself, and considereth what he doth, when he does _think_, _opine_, _reason_, _hope_, _fear_, &c. and upon what grounds; he shall thereby read and know, what are the thoughts and passions of all other men upon the like occasions. I say the similitude of _passions_, which are the same in all men, _desire_, _fear_, _hope_, &c.; not the similitude of the _objects_ of the passions, which are the things _desired_, _feared_, _hoped_, &c.: for these the constitution individual, and particular education, do so vary, and they are so easy to be kept from our knowledge, that the characters of man’s heart, blotted and confounded as they are with dissembling, lying, counterfeiting, and erroneous doctrines, are legible only to him that searcheth hearts. And though by men’s actions we do discover their design sometimes; yet to do it without comparing them with our own, and distinguishing all circumstances, by which the case may come to be altered, is to decypher without a key, and be for the most part deceived, by too much trust, or by too much diffidence; as he that reads, is himself a good or evil man.
But let one man read another by his actions never so perfectly, it serves him only with his acquaintance, which are but few. He that is to govern a whole nation, must read in himself, not this or that particular man; but mankind: which though it be hard to do, harder than to learn any language or science; yet when I shall have set down my own reading orderly, and perspicuously, the pains left another, will be only to consider, if he also find not the same in himself. For this kind of doctrine admitteth no other demonstration.
PART I.
OF MAN.
------- CHAPTER I.
OF SENSE.
[Sidenote: Sense.]
Concerning the thoughts of man, I will consider them first singly, and afterwards in train, or dependence upon one another. Singly, they are every one a _representation_ or _appearance_, of some quality, or other accident of a body without us, which is commonly called an _object_.
Which object worketh on the eyes, ears, and other parts of a man’s body; and by diversity of working, produceth diversity of appearances.
The original of them all, is that which we call SENSE, for there is no conception in a man’s mind, which hath not at first, totally, or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of sense. The rest are derived from that original.
To know the natural cause of sense, is not very necessary to the business now in hand; and I have elsewhere written of the same at large.
Nevertheless, to fill each part of my present method, I will briefly deliver the same in this place.
The cause of sense, is the external body, or object, which presseth the organ proper to each sense, either immediately, as in the taste and touch; or mediately, as in seeing, hearing, and smelling; which pressure, by the mediation of the nerves, and other strings and membranes of the body, continued inwards to the brain and heart, causeth there a resistance, or counter-pressure, or endeavour of the heart to deliver itself, which endeavour, because _outward_, seemeth to be some matter without. And this _seeming_, or _fancy_, is that which men call _sense_; and consisteth, as to the eye, in a _light_, or _colour figured_; to the ear, in a _sound_; to the nostril, in an _odour_; to the tongue and palate, in a _savour_; and to the rest of the body, in _heat_, _cold_, _hardness_, _softness_, and such other qualities as we discern by _feeling_. All which qualities, called _sensible_, are in the object, that causeth them, but so many several motions of the matter, by which it presseth our organs diversely. Neither in us that are pressed, are they any thing else, but divers motions; for motion produceth nothing but motion. But their appearance to us is fancy, the same waking, that dreaming. And as pressing, rubbing, or striking the eye, makes us fancy a light; and pressing the ear, produceth a din; so do the bodies also we see, or hear, produce the same by their strong, though unobserved action. For if those colours and sounds were in the bodies, or objects that cause them, they could not be severed from them, as by glasses, and in echoes by reflection, we see they are; where we know the thing we see is in one place, the appearance in another. And though at some certain distance, the real and very object seem invested with the fancy it begets in us; yet still the object is one thing, the image or fancy is another. So that sense, in all cases, is nothing else but original fancy, caused, as I have said, by the pressure, that is, by the motion, of external things upon our eyes, ears, and other organs thereunto ordained.
But the philosophy-schools, through all the universities of Christendom, grounded upon certain texts of Aristotle, teach another doctrine, and say, for the cause of _vision_, that the thing seen, sendeth forth on _apparition_, or _aspect_, or _a being seen_; the receiving whereof into the eye, is _seeing_. And for the cause of _hearing_, that the thing heard, sendeth forth an _audible species_, that is an _audible aspect_, or _audible being seen_; which entering at the ear, maketh _hearing_.
Nay, for the cause of _understanding_ also, they say the thing understood, sendeth forth an _intelligible species_, that is, an _intelligible being seen_; which, coming into the understanding, makes us understand. I say not this, as disproving the use of universities; but because I am to speak hereafter of their office in a commonwealth, I must let you see on all occasions by the way, what things would be amended in them; amongst which the frequency of insignificant speech is one.
------- CHAPTER II.
OF IMAGINATION.
[Sidenote: Imagination.]
That when a thing lies still, unless somewhat else stir it, it will lie still for ever, is a truth that no man doubts of. But that when a thing is in motion, it will eternally be in motion, unless somewhat else stay it, though the reason be the same, namely, that nothing can change itself, is not so easily assented to. For men measure, not only other men, but all other things, by themselves; and because they find themselves subject after motion to pain, and lassitude, think every thing else grows weary of motion, and seeks repose of its own accord; little considering, whether it be not some other motion, wherein that desire of rest they find in themselves, consisteth. From hence it is, that the schools say, heavy bodies fall downwards, out of an appetite to rest, and to conserve their nature in that place which is most proper for them; ascribing appetite, and knowledge of what is good for their conservation, which is more than man has, to things inanimate, absurdly.
When a body is once in motion, it moveth, unless something else hinder it, eternally; and whatsoever hindreth it, cannot in an instant, but in time, and by degrees, quite extinguish it; and as we see in the water, though the wind cease, the waves give not over rolling for a long time after: so also it happeneth in that motion, which is made in the internal parts of a man, then, when he sees, dreams, &c. For after the object is removed, or the eye shut, we still retain an image of the thing seen, though more obscure than when we see it. And this is it, the Latins call _imagination_, from the image made in seeing; and apply the same, though improperly, to all the other senses. But the Greeks call it _fancy_; which signifies _appearance_, and is as proper to one sense, as to another. IMAGINATION therefore is nothing but _decaying sense_; and is found in men, and many other living creatures, as well sleeping, as waking.
The decay of sense in men waking, is not the decay of the motion made in sense; but an obscuring of it, in such manner as the light of the sun obscureth the light of the stars; which stars do no less exercise their virtue, by which they are visible, in the day than in the night. But because amongst many strokes, which our eyes, ears, and other organs receive from external bodies, the predominant only is sensible; therefore, the light of the sun being predominant, we are not affected with the action of the stars. And any object being removed from our eyes, though the impression it made in us remain, yet other objects more present succeeding, and working on us, the imagination of the past is obscured, and made weak, as the voice of a man is in the noise of the day. From whence it followeth, that the longer the time is, after the sight or sense of any object, the weaker is the imagination. For the continual change of man’s body destroys in time the parts which in sense were moved: so that distance of time, and of place, hath one and the same effect in us. For as at a great distance of place, that which we look at appears dim, and without distinction of the smaller parts; and as voices grow weak, and inarticulate; so also, after great distance of time, our imagination of the past is weak; and we lose, for example, of cities we have seen, many particular streets, and of actions, many particular circumstances. This _decaying sense_, when we would express the thing itself, I mean _fancy_ itself, we call _imagination_, as I said before: but when we would express the decay, and signify that the sense is fading, old, and past, it is called _memory_. So that imagination and memory are but one thing, which for divers considerations hath divers names.
[Sidenote: Memory.]
Much memory, or memory of many things, is called _experience_. Again, imagination being only of those things which have been formerly perceived by sense, either all at once, or by parts at several times; the former, which is the imagining the whole object as it was presented to the sense, is _simple_ imagination, as when one imagineth a man, or horse, which he hath seen before. The other is _compounded_; as when, from the sight of a man at one time, and of a horse at another, we conceive in our mind a Centaur. So when a man compoundeth the image of his own person with the image of the actions of another man, as when a man imagines himself a Hercules or an Alexander, which happeneth often to them that are much taken with reading of romances, it is a compound imagination, and properly but a fiction of the mind. There be also other imaginations that rise in men, though waking, from the great impression made in sense: as from gazing upon the sun, the impression leaves an image of the sun before our eyes a long time after; and from being long and vehemently attent upon geometrical figures, a man shall in the dark, though awake, have the images of lines and angles before his eyes; which kind of fancy hath no particular name, as being a thing that doth not commonly fall into men’s discourse.
[Sidenote: Dreams.]
The imaginations of them that sleep are those we call _dreams_. And these also, as all other imaginations, have been before, either totally or by parcels, in the sense. And because in sense, the brain and nerves, which are the necessary organs of sense, are so benumbed in sleep, as not easily to be moved by the action of external objects, there can happen in sleep no imagination, and therefore no dream, but what proceeds from the agitation of the inward parts of man’s body; which inward parts, for the connexion they have with the brain, and other organs, when they be distempered, do keep the same in motion; whereby the imaginations there formerly made, appear as if a man were waking; saving that the organs of sense being now benumbed, so as there is no new object, which can master and obscure them with a more vigorous impression, a dream must needs be more clear, in this silence of sense, than our waking thoughts. And hence it cometh to pass, that it is a hard matter, and by many thought impossible, to distinguish exactly between sense and dreaming. For my part, when I consider that in dreams I do not often nor constantly think of the same persons, places, objects, and actions, that I do waking; nor remember so long a train of coherent thoughts, dreaming, as at other times; and because waking I often observe the absurdity of dreams, but never dream of the absurdities of my waking thoughts; I am well satisfied, that being awake, I know I dream not, though when I dream I think myself awake.
And seeing dreams are caused by the distemper of some of the inward parts of the body, divers distempers must needs cause different dreams.
And hence it is that lying cold breedeth dreams of fear, and raiseth the thought and image of some fearful object, the motion from the brain to the inner parts and from the inner parts to the brain being reciprocal; and that as anger causeth heat in some parts of the body when we are awake, so when we sleep the overheating of the same parts causeth anger, and raiseth up in the brain the imagination of an enemy. In the same manner, as natural kindness, when we are awake, causeth desire, and desire makes heat in certain other parts of the body; so also too much heat in those parts, while we sleep, raiseth in the brain an imagination of some kindness shown. In sum, our dreams are the reverse of our waking imaginations; the motion when we are awake beginning at one end, and when we dream at another.
[Sidenote: Apparitions or visions.]
The most difficult discerning of a man’s dream, from his waking thoughts, is then, when by some accident we observe not that we have slept: which is easy to happen to a man full of fearful thoughts, and whose conscience is much troubled; and that sleepeth, without the circumstances of going to bed or putting off his clothes, as one that noddeth in a chair. For he that taketh pains, and industriously lays himself to sleep, in case any uncouth and exorbitant fancy come unto him, cannot easily think it other than a dream. We read of Marcus Brutus, (one that had his life given him by Julius Cæsar, and was also his favourite, and notwithstanding murdered him), how at Philippi, the night before he gave battle to Augustus Cæsar, he saw a fearful apparition, which is commonly related by historians as a vision; but considering the circumstances, one may easily judge to have been but a short dream. For sitting in his tent, pensive and troubled with the horror of his rash act, it was not hard for him, slumbering in the cold, to dream of that which most affrighted him; which fear, as by degrees it made him wake, so also it must needs make the apparition by degrees to vanish; and having no assurance that he slept, he could have no cause to think it a dream, or any thing but a vision. And this is no very rare accident; for even they that be perfectly awake, if they be timorous and superstitious, possessed with fearful tales, and alone in the dark, are subject to the like fancies, and believe they see spirits and dead men’s ghosts walking in churchyards; whereas it is either their fancy only, or else the knavery of such persons as make use of such superstitious fear, to pass disguised in the night, to places they would not be known to haunt.
From this ignorance of how to distinguish dreams, and other strong fancies, from vision and sense, did arise the greatest part of the religion of the Gentiles in time past, that worshipped satyrs, fawns, nymphs, and the like; and now-a-days the opinion that rude people have of fairies, ghosts, and goblins, and of the power of witches. For as for witches, I think not that their witchcraft is any real power; but yet that they are justly punished, for the false belief they have that they can do such mischief, joined with their purpose to do it if they can; their trade being nearer to a new religion than to a craft or science.
And for fairies, and walking ghosts, the opinion of them has, I think, been on purpose either taught or not confuted, to keep in credit the use of exorcism, of crosses, of holy water, and other such inventions of ghostly men. Nevertheless, there is no doubt, but God can make unnatural apparitions; but that he does it so often, as men need to fear such things, more than they fear the stay or change of the course of nature, which he also can stay, and change, is no point of Christian faith. But evil men under pretext that God can do any thing, are so bold as to say any thing when it serves their turn, though they think it untrue; it is the part of a wise man, to believe them no farther, than right reason makes that which they say, appear credible. If this superstitious fear of spirits were taken away, and with it, prognostics from dreams, false prophecies, and many other things depending thereon, by which crafty ambitious persons abuse the simple people, men would be much more fitted than they are for civil obedience.
And this ought to be the work of the schools: but they rather nourish such doctrine. For, not knowing what imagination or the senses are, what they receive, they teach: some saying, that imaginations rise of themselves, and have no cause; others, that they rise most commonly from the will; and that good thoughts are blown (inspired) into a man by God, and evil thoughts by the Devil; or that good thoughts are poured (infused) into a man by God, and evil ones by the Devil. Some say the senses receive the species of things, and deliver them to the common sense; and the common sense delivers them over to the fancy, and the fancy to the memory, and the memory to the judgment, like handing of things from one to another, with many words making nothing understood.
[Sidenote: Understanding.]
The imagination that is raised in man, or any other creature indued with the faculty of imagining, by words, or other voluntary signs, is that we generally call _understanding_; and is common to man and beast. For a dog by custom will understand the call, or the rating of his master; and so will many other beasts. That understanding which is peculiar to man, is the understanding not only his will, but his conceptions and thoughts, by the sequel and contexture of the names of things into affirmations, negations, and other forms of speech; and of this kind of understanding I shall speak hereafter.
------- CHAPTER III.
OF THE CONSEQUENCE OR TRAIN OF IMAGINATIONS.
By _Consequence_, or TRAIN of thoughts, I understand that succession of one thought to another, which is called, to distinguish it from discourse in words, _mental discourse_.
When a man thinketh on any thing whatsoever, his next thought after, is not altogether so casual as it seems to be. Not every thought to every thought succeeds indifferently. But as we have no imagination, whereof we have not formerly had sense, in whole, or in parts; so we have no transition from one imagination to another, whereof we never had the like before in our senses. The reason whereof is this. All fancies are motions within us, relics of those made in the sense: and those motions that immediately succeeded one another in the sense, continue also together after sense: insomuch as the former coming again to take place, and be predominant, the latter followeth, by coherence of the matter moved, in such manner, as water upon a plane table is drawn which way any one part of it is guided by the finger. But because in sense, to one and the same thing perceived, sometimes one thing, sometimes another succeedeth, it comes to pass in time, that in the imagining of any thing, there is no certainty what we shall imagine next; only this is certain, it shall be something that succeeded the same before, at one time or another.
[Sidenote: Train of thoughts unguided.]
This train of thoughts, or mental discourse, is of two sorts. The first is _unguided_, _without design_, and inconstant; wherein there is no passionate thought, to govern and direct those that follow, to itself, as the end and scope of some desire, or other passion: in which case the thoughts are said to wander, and seem impertinent one to another, as in a dream. Such are commonly the thoughts of men, that are not only without company, but also without care of any thing; though even then their thoughts are as busy as at other times, but without harmony; as the sound which a lute out of tune would yield to any man; or in tune, to one that could not play. And yet in this wild ranging of the mind, a man may oft-times perceive the way of it, and the dependance of one thought upon another. For in a discourse of our present civil war, what could seem more impertinent, than to ask, as one did, what was the value of a Roman penny? Yet the coherence to me was manifest enough. For the thought of the war, introduced the thought of the delivering up the king to his enemies; the thought of that, brought in the thought of the delivering up of Christ; and that again the thought of the thirty pence, which was the price of that treason; and thence easily followed that malicious question, and all this in a moment of time; for thought is quick.
[Sidenote: Train of thoughts regulated.]
The second is more constant; as being _regulated_ by some desire, and design. For the impression made by such things as we desire, or fear, is strong, and permanent, or, if it cease for a time, of quick return: so strong it is sometimes, as to hinder and break our sleep. From desire, ariseth the thought of some means we have seen produce the like of that which we aim at; and from the thought of that, the thought of means to that mean; and so continually, till we come to some beginning within our own power. And because the end, by the greatness of the impression, comes often to mind, in case our thoughts begin to wander, they are quickly again reduced into the way: which observed by one of the seven wise men, made him give men this precept, which is now worn out, _Respice finem_; that is to say, in all your actions, look often upon what you would have, as the thing that directs all your thoughts in the way to attain it.
The train of regulated thoughts is of two kinds; one, when of an effect imagined we seek the causes, or means that produce it: and this is common to man and beast. The other is, when imagining any thing whatsoever, we seek all the possible effects, that can by it be produced; that is to say, we imagine what we can do with it, when we have it. Of which I have not at any time seen any sign, but in man only; for this is a curiosity hardly incident to the nature of any living creature that has no other passion but sensual, such as are hunger, thirst, lust, and anger. In sum, the discourse of the mind, when it is governed by design, is nothing but _seeking_, or the faculty of invention, which the Latins called _sagacitas_, and _solertia_; a hunting out of the causes, of some effect, present or past; or of the effects, of some present or past cause. Sometimes a man seeks what he hath lost; and from that place, and time, wherein he misses it, his mind runs back, from place to place, and time to time, to find where, and