when he had it; that is to say, to find some certain, and limited time and place, in which to begin a method of seeking. Again, from thence, his thoughts run over the same places and times, to find what action, or other occasion might make him lose it. [Sidenote: Remembrance.] This we call _remembrance_, or calling to mind: the Latins call it _reminiscentia_, as it were a _re-conning_ of our former actions.
[Sidenote: Prudence.]
Sometimes a man knows a place determinate, within the compass whereof he is to seek; and then his thoughts run over all the parts thereof, in the same manner as one would sweep a room, to find a jewel; or as a spaniel ranges the field, till he find a scent; or as a man should run over the alphabet, to start a rhyme.
Sometimes a man desires to know the event of an action; and then he thinketh of some like action past, and the events thereof one after another; supposing like events will follow like actions. As he that foresees what will become of a criminal, re-cons what he has seen follow on the like crime before; having this order of thoughts, the crime, the officer, the prison, the judge, and the gallows. Which kind of thoughts, is called _foresight_, and _prudence_, or _providence_; and sometimes _wisdom_; though such conjecture, through the difficulty of observing all circumstances, be very fallacious. But this is certain; by how much one man has more experience of things past, than another, by so much also he is more prudent, and his expectations the seldomer fail him. The _present_ only has a being in nature; things _past_ have a being in the memory only, but things _to come_ have no being at all; the _future_ being but a fiction of the mind, applying the sequels of actions past, to the actions that are present; which with most certainty is done by him that has most experience, but not with certainty enough. And though it be called prudence, when the event answereth our expectation; yet in its own nature, it is but presumption. For the foresight of things to come, which is providence, belongs only to him by whose will they are to come. From him only, and supernaturally, proceeds prophecy. The best prophet naturally is the best guesser; and the best guesser, he that is most versed and studied in the matters he guesses at: for he hath most _signs_ to guess by.
[Sidenote: Signs.]
A _sign_ is the evident antecedent of the consequent; and contrarily, the consequent of the antecedent, when the like consequences have been observed, before: and the oftener they have been observed, the less uncertain is the sign. And therefore he that has most experience in any kind of business, has most signs, whereby to guess at the future time; and consequently is the most prudent: and so much more prudent than he that is new in that kind of business, as not to be equalled by any advantage of natural and extemporary wit: though perhaps many young men think the contrary.
Nevertheless it is not prudence that distinguisheth man from beast.
There be beasts, that at a year old observe more, and pursue that which is for their good, more prudently, than a child can do at ten.
[Sidenote: Conjecture of the time past.]
As prudence is a _presumption_ of the _future_, contracted from the _experience_ of time _past_: so there is a presumption of things past taken from other things, not future, but past also. For he that hath seen by what courses and degrees a flourishing state hath first come into civil war, and then to ruin; upon the sight of the ruins of any other state, will guess, the like war, and the like courses have been there also. But this conjecture, has the same uncertainty almost with the conjecture of the future; both being grounded only upon experience.
There is no other act of man’s mind, that I can remember, naturally planted in him, so as to need no other thing, to the exercise of it, but to be born a man, and live with the use of his five senses. Those other faculties, of which I shall speak by and by, and which seem proper to man only, are acquired and increased by study and industry; and of most men learned by instruction, and discipline; and proceed all from the invention of words, and speech. For besides sense, and thoughts, and the train of thoughts, the mind of man has no other motion; though by the help of speech, and method, the same faculties may be improved to such a height, as to distinguish men from all other living creatures.
[Sidenote: Infinite.]
Whatsoever we imagine is _finite_. Therefore there is no idea, or conception of any thing we call _infinite_. No man can have in his mind an image of infinite magnitude; nor conceive infinite swiftness, infinite time, or infinite force, or infinite power. When we say any thing is infinite, we signify only, that we are not able to conceive the ends, and bounds of the things named; having no conception of the thing, but of our own inability. And therefore the name of God is used, not to make us conceive him, for he is incomprehensible; and his greatness, and power are unconceivable; but that we may honour him. Also because, whatsoever, as I said before, we conceive, has been perceived first by sense, either all at once, or by parts; a man can have no thought, representing any thing, not subject to sense. No man therefore can conceive any thing, but he must conceive it in some place; and indued with some determinate magnitude; and which may be divided into parts; nor that any thing is all in this place, and all in another place at the same time; nor that two, or more things can be in one, and the same place at once: for none of these things ever have, nor can be incident to sense; but are absurd speeches, taken upon credit, without any signification at all, from deceived philosophers, and deceived, or deceiving schoolmen.
------- CHAPTER IV.
OF SPEECH.
[Sidenote: Original of speech.]
The invention of _printing_, though ingenious, compared with the invention of _letters_, is no great matter. But who was the first that found the use of letters, is not known. He that first brought them into Greece, men say was Cadmus, the son of Agenor, king of Phœnicia. A profitable invention for continuing the memory of time past, and the conjunction of mankind, dispersed into so many, and distant regions of the earth; and withal difficult, as proceeding from a watchful observation of the divers motions of the tongue, palate, lips, and other organs of speech; whereby to make as many differences of characters, to remember them. But the most noble and profitable invention of all other, was that of SPEECH, consisting of _names_ or _appellations_, and their connexion; whereby men register their thoughts; recall them when they are past; and also declare them one to another for mutual utility and conversation; without which, there had been amongst men, neither commonwealth, nor society, nor contract, nor peace, no more than amongst lions, bears, and wolves. The first author of _speech_ was God himself, that instructed Adam how to name such creatures as he presented to his sight; for the Scripture goeth no further in this matter. But this was sufficient to direct him to add more names, as the experience and use of the creatures should give him occasion; and to join them in such manner by degrees, as to make himself understood; and so by succession of time, so much language might be gotten, as he had found use for; though not so copious, as an orator or philosopher has need of: for I do not find any thing in the Scripture, out of which, directly or by consequence, can be gathered, that Adam was taught the names of all figures, numbers, measures, colours, sounds, fancies, relations; much less the names of words and speech, as _general_, _special_, _affirmative_, _negative_, _interrogative_, _optative_, _infinitive_, all which are useful; and least of all, of _entity_, _intentionality_, _quiddity_, and other insignificant words of the school.
But all this language gotten, and augmented by Adam and his posterity, was again lost at the Tower of Babel, when, by the hand of God, every man was stricken, for his rebellion, with an oblivion of his former language. And being hereby forced to disperse themselves into several parts of the world, it must needs be, that the diversity of tongues that now is, proceeded by degrees from them, in such manner, as need, the mother of all inventions, taught them; and in tract of time grew everywhere more copious.
[Sidenote: The use of speech.]
The general use of speech, is to transfer our mental discourse, into verbal; or the train of our thoughts, into a train of words; and that for two commodities, whereof one is the registering of the consequences of our thoughts; which being apt to slip out of our memory, and put us to a new labour, may again be recalled, by such words as they were marked by. So that the first use of names is to serve for _marks_, or _notes_ of remembrance. Another is, when many use the same words, to signify, by their connexion and order, one to another, what they conceive, or think of each matter; and also what they desire, fear, or have any other passion for. And for this use they are called _signs_.
Special uses of speech are these; first, to register, what by cogitation, we find to be the cause of any thing, present or past; and what we find things present or past may produce, or effect; which in sum, is acquiring of arts. Secondly, to show to others that knowledge which we have attained, which is, to counsel and teach one another.
Thirdly, to make known to others our wills and purposes, that we may have the mutual help of one another. Fourthly, to please and delight ourselves and others, by playing with our words, for pleasure or ornament, innocently.
[Sidenote: Abuses of speech.]
To these uses, there are also four correspondent abuses. First, when men register their thoughts wrong, by the inconstancy of the signification of their words; by which they register for their conception, that which they never conceived, and so deceive themselves. Secondly, when they use words metaphorically; that is, in other sense than that they are ordained for; and thereby deceive others. Thirdly, by words, when they declare that to be their will, which is not. Fourthly, when they use them to grieve one another; for seeing nature hath armed living creatures, some with teeth, some with horns, and some with hands, to grieve an enemy, it is but an abuse of speech, to grieve him with the tongue, unless it be one whom we are obliged to govern; and then it is not to grieve, but to correct and amend.
The manner how speech serveth to the remembrance of the consequence of causes and effects, consisteth in the imposing of _names_, and the _connexion_ of them.
[Sidenote: Names, proper and common.]
Of names, some are _proper_, and singular to one only thing, as _Peter_, _John_, _this man_, _this tree_; and some are _common_ to many things, _man_, _horse_, _tree_; every of which, though but one name, is nevertheless the name of divers particular things; [Sidenote: Universal.] in respect of all which together, it is called an _universal_; there being nothing in the world universal but names; for the things named are every one of them individual and singular.
One universal name is imposed on many things, for their similitude in some quality, or other accident; and whereas a proper name bringeth to mind one thing only, universals recall any one of those many.
And of names universal, some are of more, and some of less extent; the larger comprehending the less large; and some again of equal extent, comprehending each other reciprocally. As for example: the name _body_ is of larger signification than the word _man_, and comprehendeth it; and the names _man_ and _rational_, are of equal extent, comprehending mutually one another. But here we must take notice, that by a name is not always understood, as in grammar, one only word; but sometimes, by circumlocution, many words together. For all these words, _he that in his actions observeth the laws of his country_, make but one name, equivalent to this one word, _just_.
By this imposition of names, some of larger, some of stricter signification, we turn the reckoning of the consequences of things imagined in the mind, into a reckoning of the consequences of appellations. For example: a man that hath no use of speech at all, such as is born and remains perfectly deaf and dumb, if he set before his eyes a triangle, and by it two right angles, such as are the corners of a square figure, he may, by meditation, compare and find, that the three angles of that triangle, are equal to those two right angles that stand by it. But if another triangle be shown him, different in shape from the former, he cannot know, without a new labour, whether the three angles of that also be equal to the same. But he that hath the use of words, when he observes, that such equality was consequent, not to the length of the sides, nor to any other particular thing in his triangle; but only to this, that the sides were straight, and the angles three; and that that was all, for which he named it a triangle; will boldly conclude universally, that such equality of angles is in all triangles whatsoever; and register his invention in these general terms, _every triangle hath its three angles equal to two right angles_. And thus the consequence found in one particular, comes to be registered and remembered, as a universal rule, and discharges our mental reckoning, of time and place, and delivers us from all labour of the mind, saving the first, and makes that which was found true _here_, and _now_, to be true But the use of words in registering our thoughts is in nothing so evident as in numbering. A natural fool that could never learn by heart the order of numeral words, as _one_, _two_, and _three_, may observe every stroke of the clock, and nod to it, or say _one_, _one_, _one_, but can never know what hour it strikes. And it seems, there was a time when those names of number were not in use; and men were fain to apply their fingers of one or both hands, to those things they desired to keep account of; and that thence it proceeded, that now our numeral words are but ten, in any nation, and in some but five; and then they begin again.
And he that can tell ten, if he recite them out of order, will lose himself, and not know when he has done. Much less will he be able to add, and subtract, and perform all other operations of arithmetic. So that without words there is no possibility of reckoning of numbers; much less of magnitudes, of swiftness, of force, and other things, the reckonings whereof are necessary to the being, or well-being of mankind.
When two names are joined together into a consequence, or affirmation, as thus, _a man is a living creature_; or thus, _if he be a man, he is a living creature_; if the latter name, _living creature_, signify all that the former name _man_ signifieth, then the affirmation, or consequence, is _true_; otherwise _false_. For _true_ and _false_ are attributes of speech, not of things. And where speech is not, there is neither _truth_ nor _falsehood_; _error_ there may be, as when we expect that which shall not be, or suspect what has not been; but in neither case can a man be charged with untruth.
[Sidenote: Necessity of definitions.]
Seeing then that truth consisteth in the right ordering of names in our affirmations, a man that seeketh precise truth had need to remember what every name he uses stands for, and to place it accordingly, or else he will find himself entangled in words, as a bird in lime twigs, the more he struggles the more belimed. And therefore in geometry, which is the only science that it hath pleased God hitherto to bestow on mankind, men begin at settling the significations of their words; which settling of significations they call _definitions_, and place them in the beginning of their reckoning.
By this it appears how necessary it is for any man that aspires to true knowledge, to examine the definitions of former authors; and either to correct them, where they are negligently set down, or to make them himself. For the errors of definitions multiply themselves according as the reckoning proceeds, and lead men into absurdities, which at last they see, but cannot avoid, without reckoning anew from the beginning, in which lies the foundation of their errors. From whence it happens, that they which trust to books do as they that cast up many little sums into a greater, without considering whether those little sums were rightly cast up or not; and at last finding the error visible, and not mistrusting their first grounds, know not which way to clear themselves, but spend time in fluttering over their books; as birds that entering by the chimney, and finding themselves enclosed in a chamber, flutter at the false light of a glass window, for want of wit to consider which way they came in. So that in the right definition of names lies the first use of speech; which is the acquisition of science: and in wrong, or no definitions, lies the first abuse; from which proceed all false and senseless tenets; which make those men that take their instruction from the authority of books, and not from their own meditation, to be as much below the condition of ignorant men, as men endued with true science are above it. For between true science and erroneous doctrines, ignorance is in the middle. Natural sense and imagination are not subject to absurdity. Nature itself cannot err; and as men abound in copiousness of language, so they become more wise, or more mad than ordinary. Nor is it possible without letters for any man to become either excellently wise, or, unless his memory be hurt by disease or ill constitution of organs, excellently foolish. For words are wise men’s counters, they do but reckon by them; but they are the money of fools, that value them by the authority of an Aristotle, a Cicero, or a Thomas, or any other doctor whatsoever, if but a man.
[Sidenote: Subject to names.]
_Subject to names_, is whatsoever can enter into or be considered in an account, and be added one to another to make a sum, or subtracted one from another and leave a remainder. The Latins called accounts of money _rationes_, and accounting _ratiocinatio_; and that which we in bills or books of account call _items_, they call _nomina_, that is _names_; and thence it seems to proceed, that they extended the word _ratio_ to the faculty of reckoning in all other things. The Greeks have but one word, λόγος, for both _speech_ and _reason_; not that they thought there was no speech without reason, but no reasoning without speech: and the act of reasoning they called _syllogism_, which signifieth summing up of the consequences of one saying to another. And because the same thing may enter into account for divers accidents, their names are, to show that diversity, diversly wrested and diversified. This diversity of names may be reduced to four general heads.
[Sidenote: Names.]
First, a thing may enter into account for _matter_ or _body_; as all which names the word _matter_, or _body_, is understood; all such being names of matter.
Secondly, it may enter into account, or be considered, for some accident or quality which we conceive to be in it; as for _being moved_, for _being so long_, for _being hot_, &c.; and then, of the name of the thing itself, by a little change or wresting, we make a name for that accident, which we consider; and for _living_ put into the account and the like: and all such names are the names of the accidents and properties by which one matter and body is distinguished from another.
These are called _names abstract_, because severed, not from matter, but from the account of matter.
Thirdly, we bring into account the properties of our own bodies, whereby we make such distinction; as when anything is seen by us, we reckon not the thing itself, but the sight, the colour, the idea of it in the fancy: and when anything is heard, we reckon it not, but the hearing or sound only, which is our fancy or conception of it by the ear; and such are names of fancies.
[Sidenote: Use of names positive.]
Fourthly, we bring into account, consider, and give names, to _names_ themselves, and to _speeches_: for _general_, _universal_, _special_, _equivocal_, are names of names. And _affirmation_, _interrogation_, other such, are names of speeches. And this is all the variety of names _positive_; which are put to mark somewhat which is in nature, or may be feigned by the mind of man, as bodies that are, or may be conceived to be; or of bodies, the properties that are, or may be feigned to be; or words and speech.
[Sidenote: Negative names, with their uses.]
There be also other names, called _negative_, which are notes to signify that a word is not the name of the thing in question; as these words, like; which are nevertheless of use in reckoning, or in correcting of reckoning, and call to mind our past cogitations, though they be not names of any thing, because they make us refuse to admit of names not rightly used.
[Sidenote: Words insignificant.]
All other names are but insignificant sounds; and those of two sorts.
One when they are new, and yet their meaning not explained by definition; whereof there have been abundance coined by schoolmen, and puzzled philosophers.
Another, when men make a name of two names, whose significations are contradictory and inconsistent; as this name, an _incorporeal body_, or, which is all one, an _incorporeal substance_, and a great number more.
For whensoever any affirmation is false, the two names of which it is composed, put together and made one, signify nothing at all. For example, if it be a false affirmation to say _a quadrangle is round_, the word _round quadrangle_ signifies nothing, but is a mere sound. So likewise, if it be false to say that virtue can be poured, or blown up and down, the words _in-poured virtue_, _inblown virtue_, are as absurd and insignificant as a _round quadrangle_. And therefore you shall hardly meet with a senseless and insignificant word, that is not made up of some Latin or Greek names. A Frenchman seldom hears our Saviour called by the name of _parole_, but by the name of _verbe_ often; yet _verbe_ and _parole_ differ no more, but that one is Latin, the other French.
[Sidenote: Understanding.]
When a man, upon the hearing of any speech, hath those thoughts which the words of that speech and their connexion were ordained and constituted to signify, then he is said to understand it; _understanding_ being nothing else but conception caused by speech. And therefore if speech be peculiar to man, as for aught I know it is, then is understanding peculiar to him also. And therefore of absurd and false affirmations, in case they be universal, there can be no understanding; though many think they understand then, when they do but repeat the words softly, or con them in their mind.
What kinds of speeches signify the appetites, aversions, and passions of man’s mind; and of their use and abuse, I shall speak when I have spoken of the passions.
[Sidenote: Inconstant names.]
The names of such things as affect us, that is, which please and displease us, because all men be not alike affected with the same thing, nor the same man at all times, are in the common discourses of men of _inconstant_ signification. For seeing all names are imposed to signify our conceptions, and all our affections are but conceptions, when we conceive the same things differently, we can hardly avoid different naming of them. For though the nature of that we conceive, be the same; yet the diversity of our reception of it, in respect of different constitutions of body, and prejudices of opinion, gives every thing a tincture of our different passions. And therefore in reasoning a man must take heed of words; which besides the signification of what we imagine of their nature, have a signification also of the nature, disposition, and interest of the speaker; such as are the names of virtues and vices; for one man calleth _wisdom_, what another calleth _fear_; and one _cruelty_, what another _justice_; one _prodigality_, what another _magnanimity_; and one _gravity_, what another _stupidity_, &c. And therefore such names can never be true grounds of any ratiocination. No more can metaphors, and tropes of speech; but these are less dangerous, because they profess their inconstancy; which the other do not.
------- CHAPTER V.
OF REASON AND SCIENCE.
[Sidenote: Reason, what it is.]
When a man _reasoneth_, he does nothing else but conceive a sum total, from _addition_ of parcels; or conceive a remainder, from _subtraction_ of one sum from another; which, if it be done by words, is conceiving of the consequence of the names of all the parts, to the name of the whole; or from the names of the whole and one part, to the name of the other part. And though in some things, as in numbers, besides adding and subtracting, men name other operations, as _multiplying_ and _dividing_, yet they are the same; for multiplication, is but adding together of things equal; and division, but subtracting of one thing, as often as we can. These operations are not incident to numbers only, but to all manner of things that can be added together, and taken one out of another. For as arithmeticians teach to add and subtract in _numbers_; so the geometricians teach the same in _lines_, _figures_, solid and _force_, _power_, and the like; the logicians teach the same in _consequences of words_; adding together two _names_ to make an _affirmation_, and two _affirmations_ to make a _syllogism_; and _many syllogisms_ to make a _demonstration_; and from the _sum_, or _conclusion_ of a _syllogism_, they subtract one _proposition_ to find the other. Writers of politics add together _pactions_ to find men’s _duties_; and lawyers, _laws_ and _facts_, to find what is _right_ and _wrong_ in the actions of private men. In sum, in what matter soever there is place for _addition_ and _subtraction_, there also is place for _reason_; and where these have no place, there _reason_ has nothing at all to do.
[Sidenote: Reason defined.]
Out of all which we may define, that is to say determine, what that is, which is meant by this word _reason_, when we reckon it amongst the faculties of the mind. For REASON, in this sense, is nothing but _reckoning_, that is adding and subtracting, of the consequences of general names agreed upon for the _marking_ and _signifying_ of our thoughts; I say _marking_ them when we reckon by ourselves, and _signifying_, when we demonstrate or approve our reckonings to other men.
[Sidenote: Right reason, where.]
And, as in arithmetic, unpractised men must, and professors themselves may often, err, and cast up false; so also in any other subject of reasoning, the ablest, most attentive, and most practised men may deceive themselves, and infer false conclusions; not but that reason itself is always right reason, as well as arithmetic is a certain and infallible art: but no one man’s reason, nor the reason of any one number of men, makes the certainty; no more than an account is therefore well cast up, because a great many men have unanimously approved it. And therefore, as when there is a controversy in an account, the parties must by their own accord, set up, for right reason, the reason of some arbitrator, or judge, to whose sentence they will both stand, or their controversy must either come to blows, or be undecided, for want of a right reason constituted by nature; so is it also in all debates of what kind soever. And when men that think themselves wiser than all others, clamour and demand right reason for judge, yet seek no more, but that things should be determined, by no other men’s reason but their own, it is as intolerable in the society of men, as it is in play after trump is turned, to use for trump on every occasion, that suite whereof they have most in their hand. For they do nothing else, that will have every of their passions, as it comes to bear sway in them, to be taken for right reason, and that in their own controversies bewraying their want of right reason, by the claim they lay to it.
[Sidenote: The use of reason.]
The use and end of reason, is not the finding of the sum and truth of one, or a few consequences, remote from the first definitions, and settled significations of names, but to begin at these, and proceed from one consequence to another. For there can be no certainty of the last conclusion, without a certainty of all those affirmations and negations, on which it was grounded and inferred. As when a master of a family, in taking an account, casteth up the sums of all the bills of expense into one sum, and not regarding how each bill is summed up, by those that give them in account; nor what it is he pays for; he advantages himself no more, than if he allowed the account in gross, trusting to every of the accountants’ skill and honesty: so also in reasoning of all other things, he that takes up conclusions on the trust of authors, and doth not fetch them from the first items in every reckoning, which are the significations of names settled by definitions, loses his labour; and does not know anything, but only believeth.
[Sidenote: Of error and absurdity.]
When a man reckons without the use of words, which may be done in particular things, as when upon the sight of any one thing, we conjecture what was likely to have preceded, or is likely to follow upon it; if that which he thought likely to follow, follows not, or that which he thought likely to have preceded it, hath not preceded it, this is called _error_; to which even the most prudent men are subject. But when we reason in words of general signification, and fall upon a general inference which is false, though it be commonly called _error_, it is indeed an _absurdity_, or senseless speech. For error is but a deception, in presuming that somewhat is past, or to come; of which, though it were not past, or not to come, yet there was no impossibility discoverable. But when we make a general assertion, unless it be a true one, the possibility of it is inconceivable. And words whereby we conceive nothing but the sound, are those we call _absurd_, _insignificant_, and _nonsense_. And therefore if a man should talk to me of a _round quadrangle_; or, _accidents of bread in cheese_; or, _immaterial substances_; or of _a free subject_; _a free will_; or any _free_, but free from being hindered by opposition, I should not say he were in an error, but that his words were without meaning, that is to say, absurd.
I have said before, in the second chapter, that a man did excel all other animals in this faculty, that when he conceived any thing whatsoever, he was apt to inquire the consequences of it, and what effects he could do with it. And now I add this other degree of the same excellence, that he can by words reduce the consequences he finds to general rules, called _theorems_, or _aphorisms_; that is, he can reason, or reckon, not only in number, but in all other things, whereof one may be added unto, or subtracted from another.
But this privilege is allayed by another; and that is, by the privilege of absurdity; to which no living creature is subject, but man only. And of men, those are of all most subject to it, that profess philosophy.
For it is most true that Cicero saith of them somewhere; that there can be nothing so absurd, but may be found in the books of philosophers. And the reason is manifest. For there is not one of them that begins his ratiocination from the definitions, or explications of the names they are to use; which is a method that hath been used only in geometry; whose conclusions have thereby been made indisputable.
[Sidenote: Causes of absurdity.]
I. The first cause of absurd conclusions I ascribe to the want of method; in that they begin not their ratiocination from definitions; that is, from settled significations of their words: as if they could cast account, without knowing the value of the numeral words, _one_, _two_, and _three_. And whereas all bodies enter into account upon divers considerations, which I have mentioned in the precedent chapter; these considerations being diversely named, divers absurdities proceed from the confusion, and unfit connexion of their names into assertions.
And therefore, II. The second cause of absurd assertions, I ascribe to the giving of names of _bodies_ to _accidents_; or of _accidents_ to _bodies_; as they do, that say, _faith is infused_, or _inspired_; when nothing can be _poured_, or _breathed_ into anything, but body; and that, _extension_ III. The third I ascribe to the giving of the names of the _accidents_ of _bodies without us_, to the _accidents_ of our _own bodies_; as they do that say, the _colour is in the body_; _the sound is in the air_, &c.
IV. The fourth, to the giving of the names of _bodies_ to _names_, or _speeches_; as they do that say, that _there be things universal_; that _a living creature is genus_, or _a general thing_, &c.
V. The fifth, to the giving of the names of _accidents_ to _names_ and _speeches_; as they do that say, _the nature of a thing is its definition_; _a man’s command is his will_; and the like.
VI. The sixth, to the use of metaphors, tropes, and other rhetorical figures, instead of words proper. For though it be lawful to say, for example, in common speech, _the way goeth, or leadeth hither, or thither_; _the proverb says this or that_, whereas ways cannot go, nor proverbs speak; yet in reckoning, and seeking of truth, such speeches are not to be admitted.
VII. The seventh, to names that signify nothing; but are taken up, and learned by rote from the schools, as _hypostatical_, _transubstantiate_, _consubstantiate_, _eternal-now_, and the like canting of schoolmen.
To him that can avoid these things it is not easy to fall into any absurdity, unless it be by the length of an account; wherein he may perhaps forget what went before. For all men by nature reason alike, and well, when they have good principles. For who is so stupid, as both to mistake in geometry, and also to persist in it, when another detects his error to him?
[Sidenote: Science.]