By this it appears that reason is not, as sense and memory, born with us; nor gotten by experience only, as prudence is; but attained by industry; first in apt imposing of names; and secondly by getting a good and orderly method in proceeding from the elements, which are names, to assertions made by connexion of one of them to another; and so to syllogisms, which are the connexions of one assertion to another, till we come to a knowledge of all the consequences of names appertaining to the subject in hand; and that is it, men call SCIENCE. And whereas sense and memory are but knowledge of fact, which is a thing past and irrevocable. _Science_ is the knowledge of consequences, and dependance of one fact upon another: by which, out of that we can presently do, we know how to do something else when we will, or the like another time; because when we see how any thing comes about, upon what causes, and by what manner; when the like causes come into our power, we see how to make it produce the like effects.
Children therefore are not endued with reason at all, till they have attained the use of speech; but are called reasonable creatures, for the possibility apparent of having the use of reason in time to come. And the most part of men, though they have the use of reasoning a little way, as in numbering to some degree; yet it serves them to little use in common life; in which they govern themselves, some better, some worse, according to their differences of experience, quickness of memory, and inclinations to several ends; but specially according to good or evil fortune, and the errors of one another. For as for _science_, or certain rules of their actions, they are so far from it, that they know not what it is. Geometry they have thought conjuring: but for other sciences, they who have not been taught the beginnings and some progress in them, that they may see how they be acquired and generated, are in this point like children, that having no thought of generation, are made believe by the women that their brothers and sisters are not born, but found in the garden.
But yet they that have no _science_, are in better, and nobler condition, with their natural prudence; than men, that by mis-reasoning, or by trusting them that reason wrong, fall upon false and absurd general rules. For ignorance of causes, and of rules, does not set men so far out of their way, as relying on false rules, and taking for causes of what they aspire to, those that are not so, but rather causes of the contrary.
To conclude, the light of human minds is perspicuous words, but by exact definitions first snuffed, and purged from ambiguity; _reason_ is the _pace_; increase of _science_, the _way_; and the benefit of mankind, the _end_. And, on the contrary, metaphors, and senseless and ambiguous words, are like _ignes fatui_; and reasoning upon them is wandering amongst innumerable absurdities; and their end, contention and sedition, or contempt.
[Sidenote: Prudence and sapience, with their difference.]
As much experience, is _prudence_; so, is much science _sapience_. For though we usually have one name of wisdom for them both, yet the Latins did always distinguish between _prudentia_ and _sapientia_; ascribing the former to experience, the latter to science. But to make their difference appear more clearly, let us suppose one man endued with an excellent natural use and dexterity in handling his arms; and another to have added to that dexterity, an acquired science, of where he can offend, or be offended by his adversary, in every possible posture or guard: the ability of the former, would be to the ability of the latter, as prudence to sapience; both useful; but the latter infallible. But they that trusting only to the authority of books, follow the blind blindly, are like him that, trusting to the false rules of a master of fence, ventures presumptuously upon an adversary, that either kills or disgraces him.
[Sidenote: Signs of science.]
The signs of science are some, certain and infallible; some, uncertain.
Certain, when he that pretendeth the science of any thing, can teach the same; that is to say, demonstrate the truth thereof perspicuously to another; uncertain, when only some particular events answer to his pretence, and upon many occasions prove so as he says they must. Signs of prudence are all uncertain; because to observe by experience, and remember all circumstances that may alter the success, is impossible.
But in any business, whereof a man has not infallible science to proceed by; to forsake his own natural judgment, and be guided by general sentences read in authors, and subject to many exceptions, is a sign of folly, and generally scorned by the name of pedantry. And even of those men themselves, that in councils of the commonwealth love to show their reading of politics and history, very few do it in their domestic affairs, where their particular interest is concerned; having prudence enough for their private affairs: but in public they study more the reputation of their own wit, than the success of another’s business.
------- CHAPTER VI.
OF THE INTERIOR BEGINNINGS OF VOLUNTARY MOTIONS; COMMONLY CALLED THE PASSIONS; AND THE SPEECHES BY WHICH THEY ARE EXPRESSED.
[Sidenote: Motion, vital and animal.]
There be in animals, two sorts of _motions_ peculiar to them: one called _vital_; begun in generation, and continued without interruption through their whole life; such as are the _course_ of the _blood_, the _pulse_, which motions there needs no help of imagination: the other is _animal motion_, otherwise called _voluntary motion_; as to _go_, to _speak_, to _move_ any of our limbs, in such manner as is first fancied in our minds. That sense is motion in the organs and interior parts of man’s body, caused by the action of the things we see, hear, &c.; and that fancy is but the relics of the same motion, remaining after sense, has been already said in the first and second chapters. And because _going_, _speaking_, and the like voluntary motions, depend always upon a precedent thought of _whither_, _which way_, and _what_; it is evident, that the imagination is the first internal beginning of all voluntary motion. And although unstudied men do not conceive any motion at all to be there, where the thing moved is invisible; or the space it is moved in is, for the shortness of it, insensible; yet that doth not hinder, but that such motions are. For let a space be never so little, that which is moved over a greater space, whereof that little one is part, must first be moved over that. [Sidenote: Endeavour.] These small beginnings of motion, within the body of man, before they appear in walking, speaking, striking, and other visible actions, are commonly called ENDEAVOUR.
[Sidenote: Appetite. Desire.]
This endeavour, when it is toward something which causes it, is called APPETITE, or DESIRE; the latter, being the general name; [Sidenote: Hunger. Thirst.] and the other oftentimes restrained to signify the desire of food, namely _hunger_ and _thirst_. [Sidenote: Aversion.] And when the endeavour is fromward something, it is generally called AVERSION. These words, _appetite_ and _aversion_, we have from the Latins; and they both of them signify the motions, one of approaching, the other of retiring. So also do the Greek words for the same, which are ὁρμὴ and ἀφορμὴ. For nature itself does often press upon men those truths, which afterwards, when they look for somewhat beyond nature, they stumble at. For the Schools find in mere appetite to go, or move, no actual motion at all: but because some motion they must acknowledge, they call it metaphorical motion; which is but an absurd speech: for though words may be called metaphorical; bodies and motions can not.
[Sidenote: Love. Hate.]
That which men desire, they are also said to LOVE: and to HATE those things for which they have aversion. So that desire and love are the same thing; save that by desire, we always signify the absence of the object; by love, most commonly the presence of the same. So also by aversion, we signify the absence; and by hate, the presence of the object.
Of appetites and aversions, some are born with men; as appetite of food, appetite of excretion, and exoneration, which may also and more properly be called aversions, from somewhat they feel in their bodies; and some other appetites, not many. The rest, which are appetites of particular things, proceed from experience, and trial of their effects upon themselves or other men. For of things we know not at all, or believe not to be, we can have no further desire, than to taste and try. But aversion we have for things, not only which we know have hurt us, but also that we do not know whether they will hurt us, or not.
[Sidenote: Contempt.]
Those things which we neither desire, nor hate, we are said to _contemn_; CONTEMPT being nothing else but an immobility, or contumacy of the heart, in resisting the action of certain things; and proceeding from that the heart is already moved otherwise, by other more potent objects; or from want of experience of them.
And because the constitution of a man’s body is in continual mutation, it is impossible that all the same things should always cause in him the same appetites, and aversions: much less can all men consent, in the desire of almost any one and the same object.
[Sidenote: Good.]
But whatsoever is the object of any man’s appetite or desire, that is it which he for his part calleth _good_: [Sidenote: Evil.] and the object of his hate and aversion, _evil_; and of his contempt, _vile_ and _inconsiderable_. For these words of good, evil, and contemptible, are ever used with relation to the person that useth them: there being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common rule of good and evil, to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves; but from the person of the man, where there is no commonwealth; or, in a commonwealth, from the person that representeth it; or from an arbitrator or judge, whom men disagreeing shall by consent set up, and make his sentence the rule thereof.
[Sidenote: Pulchrum.]
[Sidenote: Turpe.]
The Latin tongue has two words, whose significations approach to those of good and evil; but are not precisely the same; and those are _pulchrum_ and _turpe_. Whereof the former signifies that, which by some apparent signs promiseth good; and the latter, that which promiseth evil. But in our tongue we have not so general names to express them by.
But for _pulchrum_ we say in some things, _fair_; in others, _nauseous_, and the like, as the subject shall require; all which words, in their proper places, signify nothing else but the _mien_, or countenance, that promiseth good and evil. So that of good there be three kinds; good in the promise, that is _pulchrum_; good in effect, as the end desired, which is called _jucundum_, [Sidenote: Delightful.
Profitable. Unpleasant. Unprofitable.] _delightful_; and good as the means, which is called _utile_, _profitable_; and as many of evil: for _evil_ in promise, is that they call _turpe_; evil in effect, and end, is _molestum_, _unpleasant_, _troublesome_; and evil in the means, [Sidenote: Delight. Displeasure.]
As, in sense, that which is really within us, is, as I have said before, only motion, caused by the action of external objects, but in apparence; to the sight, light and colour; to the ear, sound; to the nostril, odour, &c.: so, when the action of the same object is continued from the eyes, ears, and other organs to the heart, the real effect there is nothing but motion, or endeavour; which consisteth in appetite, or aversion, to or from the object moving. But the apparence, or sense of that motion, is that we either call _delight_, or _trouble of mind_.
[Sidenote: Pleasure.]
This motion, which is called appetite, and for the apparence of it _delight_, and _pleasure_, seemeth to be a corroboration of vital motion, and a help thereunto; and therefore such things as caused delight, were not improperly called _jucunda_, _à juvando_, from helping or fortifying; [Sidenote: Offence.] and the contrary, _molesta_, _offensive_, from hindering, and troubling the motion vital.
_Pleasure_ therefore, or _delight_, is the apparence, or sense of good; and _molestation_, or _displeasure_, the apparence, or sense of evil.
And consequently all appetite, desire, and love, is accompanied with some delight more or less; and all hatred and aversion, with more or less displeasure and offence.
[Sidenote: Pleasures of sense.]
Of pleasures or delights, some arise from the sense of an object present; and those may be called _pleasure of sense_; the word _sensual_, as it is used by those only that condemn them, having no place till there be laws. Of this kind are all onerations and exonerations of the body; as also all that is pleasant, in the _sight_, _hearing_, _smell_, _taste_, or _touch_. Others arise from the expectation, that proceeds from foresight of the end, or consequence of things; whether those things in the sense please or displease.
[Sidenote: Pleasures of the mind.] And these are _pleasures of the mind_ of him that draweth those consequences, [Sidenote: Joy.] and are generally called JOY. In the like manner, displeasures are some in the sense, [Sidenote: Pain.] and called PAIN; others in the expectation of consequences, [Sidenote: Grief.] and are called GRIEF.
These simple passions called _appetite_, _desire_, _love_, _aversion_, _hate_, _joy_, and _grief_, have their names for divers considerations diversified. As first, when they one succeed another, they are diversely called from the opinion men have of the likelihood of attaining what they desire. Secondly, from the object loved or hated. Thirdly, from the consideration of many of them together. Fourthly, from the alteration or succession itself.
[Sidenote: Hope.]
For _appetite_, with an opinion of attaining, is called HOPE.
[Sidenote: Despair.]
The same, without such opinion, DESPAIR.
[Sidenote: Fear.]
_Aversion_, with opinion of HURT from the object, FEAR.
[Sidenote: Courage.]
The same, with hope of avoiding that hurt by resistance, COURAGE.
[Sidenote: Anger.]
Sudden _courage_, ANGER.
[Sidenote: Confidence.]
Constant _hope_, CONFIDENCE of ourselves.
[Sidenote: Diffidence.]
Constant _despair_, DIFFIDENCE of ourselves.
[Sidenote: Indignation.]
_Anger_ for great hurt done to another, when we conceive the same to be done by injury, INDIGNATION.
[Sidenote: Benevolence.]
_Desire_ of good to another, BENEVOLENCE, GOOD WILL, CHARITY. [Sidenote: Good nature.] If to man generally, GOOD NATURE.
[Sidenote: Covetousness.]
_Desire_ of riches, COVETOUSNESS; a name used always in signification of blame; because men contending for them, are displeased with one another attaining them; though the desire in itself, be to be blamed, or allowed, according to the means by which these riches are sought.
[Sidenote: Ambition.]
_Desire_ of office, or precedence, AMBITION: a name used also in the worse sense, for the reason before mentioned.
[Sidenote: Pusillanimity.]
_Desire_ of things that conduce but a little to our ends, and fear of things that are but of little hindrance, PUSILLANIMITY.
[Sidenote: Magnanimity.]
_Contempt_ of little helps and hindrances, MAGNANIMITY.
[Sidenote: Valour.]
_Magnanimity_, in danger of death or wounds, VALOUR, FORTITUDE.
[Sidenote: Liberality.]
_Magnanimity_ in the use of riches, LIBERALITY.
[Sidenote: Miserableness.]
_Pusillanimity_ in the same, WRETCHEDNESS, MISERABLENESS, or PARSIMONY; as it is liked or disliked.
[Sidenote: Kindness.]
_Love_ of persons for society, KINDNESS.
[Sidenote: Natural lust.]
_Love_ of persons for pleasing the sense only, NATURAL LUST.
[Sidenote: Luxury.]
_Love_ of the same, acquired from rumination, that is, imagination of pleasure past, LUXURY.
[Sidenote: The passion of love.]
[Sidenote: Jealousy.]
_Love_ of one singularly, with desire to be singularly beloved, THE PASSION OF LOVE. The same, with fear that the love is not mutual, JEALOUSY.
[Sidenote: Revengefulness.]
_Desire_, by doing hurt to another, to make him condemn some fact of his own, REVENGEFULNESS.
[Sidenote: Curiosity.]
_Desire_ to know why, and how, CURIOSITY; such as is in no living creature but _man_: so that man is distinguished, not only by his reason, but also by this singular passion from other _animals_; in whom the appetite of food, and other pleasures of sense, by predominance, take away the care of knowing causes; which is a lust of the mind, that by a perseverance of delight in the continual and indefatigable generation of knowledge, exceedeth the short vehemence of any carnal pleasure.
[Sidenote: Religion.]
[Sidenote: Superstition.]
[Sidenote: True religion.]
_Fear_ of power invisible, feigned by the mind, or imagined from tales publicly allowed, RELIGION; not allowed, SUPERSTITION. And when the power imagined, is truly such as we imagine, TRUE RELIGION.
[Sidenote: Panic terror.]
_Fear_, without the apprehension of why, or what, PANIC TERROR, called so from the fables, that make Pan the author of them; whereas, in truth, there is always in him that so feareth, first, some apprehension of the cause, though the rest run away by example, every one supposing his fellow to know why. And therefore this passion happens to none but in a throng, or multitude of people.
[Sidenote: Admiration.]
_Joy_, from apprehension of novelty, ADMIRATION; proper to man, because it excites the appetite of knowing the cause.
[Sidenote: Glory.]
_Joy_, arising from imagination of a man’s own power and ability, is that exultation of the mind which is called GLORYING: which if grounded upon the experience of his own former actions, is the same with _confidence_: [Sidenote: Vain-glory.] but if grounded on the flattery of others; or only supposed by himself, for delight in the consequences of it, is called VAIN-GLORY: which name is properly given; because a well grounded _confidence_ begetteth attempt; whereas the supposing of power does not, and is therefore rightly called _vain_.
[Sidenote: Dejection.]
_Grief_, from opinion of want of power, is called DEJECTION of mind.
The _vain-glory_ which consisteth in the feigning or supposing of abilities in ourselves, which we know are not, is most incident to young men, and nourished by the histories, or fictions of gallant persons; and is corrected oftentimes by age, and employment.
[Sidenote: Sudden glory.]
[Sidenote: Laughter.]
_Sudden glory_, is the passion which maketh those _grimaces_ called LAUGHTER; and is caused either by some sudden act of their own, that pleaseth them; or by the apprehension of some deformed thing in another, by comparison whereof they suddenly applaud themselves. And it is incident most to them, that are conscious of the fewest abilities in themselves; who are forced to keep themselves in their own favour, by observing the imperfections of other men. And therefore much laughter at the defects of others, is a sign of pusillanimity. For of great minds, one of the proper works is, to help and free others from scorn; and compare themselves only with the most able.
[Sidenote: Sudden dejection.]
[Sidenote: Weeping.]
On the contrary, _sudden dejection_, is the passion that causeth WEEPING; and is caused by such accidents, as suddenly take away some vehement hope, or some prop of their power: and they are most subject to it, that rely principally on helps external, such as are women, and children. Therefore some weep for the loss of friends; others for their unkindness; others for the sudden stop made to their thoughts of revenge, by reconciliation. But in all cases, both laughter, and weeping, are sudden motions; custom taking them both away. For no man laughs at old jests; or weeps for an old calamity.
[Sidenote: Shame.
Blushing.]
_Grief_, for the discovery of some defect of ability, is SHAME, or the passion that discovereth itself in BLUSHING; and consisteth in the apprehension of some thing dishonourable; and in young men, is a sign of the love of good reputation, and commendable: in old men it is a sign of the same; but because it comes too late, not commendable.
[Sidenote: Impudence.]
The _contempt_ of good reputation is called IMPUDENCE.
[Sidenote: Pity.]
_Grief_, for the calamity of another, is PITY; and ariseth from the imagination that the like calamity may befall himself; and therefore is called also COMPASSION, and in the phrase of this present time a FELLOW-FEELING: and therefore for calamity arriving from great wickedness, the best men have the least pity; and for the same calamity, those hate pity, that think themselves least obnoxious to the same.
[Sidenote: Cruelty.]
_Contempt_, or little sense of the calamity of others, is that which men call CRUELTY; proceeding from security of their own fortune. For, that any man should take pleasure in other men’s great harms; without other end of his own, I do not conceive it possible.
[Sidenote: Emulation.]
[Sidenote: Envy.]
_Grief_, for the success of a competitor in wealth, honour, or other good, if it be joined with endeavour to enforce our own abilities to equal or exceed him, is called EMULATION: but joined with endeavour to supplant, or hinder a competitor, ENVY.
[Sidenote: Deliberation.]
When in the mind of man, appetites, and aversions, hopes, and fears, concerning one and the same thing, arise alternately; and divers good and evil consequences of the doing, or omitting the thing propounded, come successively into our thoughts; so that sometimes we have an appetite to it; sometimes an aversion from it; sometimes hope to be able to do it; sometimes despair, or fear to attempt it; the whole sum of desires, aversions, hopes and fears continued till the thing be either done, or thought impossible, is that we call DELIBERATION.
Therefore of things past, there is no _deliberation_; because manifestly impossible to be changed: nor of things known to be impossible, or thought so; because men know, or think such deliberation vain. But of things impossible, which we think possible, we may deliberate; not knowing it is in vain. And it is called _deliberation_; because it is a putting an end to the _liberty_ we had of doing, or omitting, according to our own appetite, or aversion.
This alternate succession of appetites, aversions, hopes and fears, is no less in other living creatures than in man: and therefore beasts also deliberate.
Every _deliberation_ is then said to _end_, when that whereof they deliberate, is either done, or thought impossible; because till then we retain the liberty of doing, or omitting; according to our appetite, or aversion.
[Sidenote: The will.]
In _deliberation_, the last appetite, or aversion, immediately adhering to the action, or to the omission thereof, is that we call the WILL; the act, not the faculty, of _willing_. And beasts that have _deliberation_, must necessarily also have _will_. The definition of the _will_, given commonly by the Schools, that it is a _rational appetite_, is not good.
For if it were, then could there be no voluntary act against reason. For a _voluntary act_ is that, which proceedeth from the _will_, and no other. But if instead of a rational appetite, we shall say an appetite resulting from a precedent deliberation, then the definition is the same that I have given here. _Will_ therefore _is the last appetite in deliberating_. And though we say in common discourse, a man had a will once to do a thing, that nevertheless he forbore to do; yet that is properly but an inclination, which makes no action voluntary; because the action depends not of it, but of the last inclination, or appetite.
For if the intervenient appetites, make any action voluntary; then by the same reason all intervenient aversions, should make the same action involuntary; and so one and the same action, should be both voluntary and involuntary.
By this it is manifest, that not only actions that have their beginning from covetousness, ambition, lust, or other appetites to the thing propounded; but also those that have their beginning from aversion, or fear of those consequences that follow the omission, are _voluntary actions_.
[Sidenote: Forms of speech, in passion.]
The forms of speech by which the passions are expressed, are partly the same, and partly different from those, by which we express our thoughts.
And first, generally all passions may be expressed _indicatively_; as _I some of them have particular expressions by themselves, which nevertheless are not affirmations, unless it be when they serve to make other inferences, besides that of the passion they proceed from.
Deliberation is expressed _subjunctively_; which is a speech proper to signify suppositions, with their consequences; as, _if this be done, then this will follow_; and differs not from the language of reasoning, save that reasoning is in general words; but deliberation for the most part is of particulars. The language of desire, and aversion, is _imperative_; as _do this_, _forbear that_; which when the party is obliged to do, or forbear, is _command_; otherwise _prayer_; or else _counsel_. The language of vain-glory, of indignation, pity and revengefulness, _optative_: but of the desire to know, there is a peculiar expression, called _interrogative_; as, _what is it_, _when shall it_, _how is it done_, and _why so?_ other language of the passions I find none: for cursing, swearing, reviling, and the like, do not signify as speech; but as the actions of a tongue accustomed.
These forms of speech, I say, are expressions, or voluntary significations of our passions: but certain signs they be not; because they may be used arbitrarily, whether they that use them, have such passions or not. The best signs of passions present, are either in the countenance, motions of the body, actions, and ends, or aims, which we otherwise know the man to have.
[Sidenote: Good and evil apparent.]
And because in deliberation, the appetites, and aversions, are raised by foresight of the good and evil consequences, and sequels of the action whereof we deliberate; the good or evil effect thereof dependeth on the foresight of a long chain of consequences, of which very seldom any man is able to see to the end. But for so far as a man seeth, if the good in those consequences be greater than the evil, the whole chain is that which writers call _apparent_, or _seeming good_. And contrarily, when the evil exceedeth the good, the whole is _apparent_, or _seeming evil_: so that he who hath by experience, or reason, the greatest and surest prospect of consequences, deliberates best himself; and is able when he will, to give the best counsel unto others.
[Sidenote: Felicity.]
_Continual success_ in obtaining those things which a man from time to time desireth, that is to say, continual prospering, is that men call FELICITY; I mean the felicity of this life. For there is no such thing as perpetual tranquillity of mind, while we live here; because life itself is but motion, and can never be without desire, nor without fear, no more than without sense. What kind of felicity God hath ordained to them that devoutly honour Him, a man shall no sooner know, than enjoy; being joys, that now are as incomprehensible, as the word of school-men _beatifical vision_ is unintelligible.
[Sidenote: Praise.]
The form of speech whereby men signify their opinion of the goodness of any thing, is PRAISE. [Sidenote: Magnification.] That whereby they signify the power and greatness of any thing, is MAGNIFYING. [Sidenote: Μακαρισμός.] And that whereby they signify the opinion they have of a man’s felicity, is by the Greeks called Μακαρισμός, for which we have no name in our tongue. And thus much is sufficient for the present purpose, to have been said of the PASSIONS.
------- CHAPTER VII.
OF THE ENDS, OR RESOLUTIONS OF DISCOURSE.
Of all _discourse_, governed by desire of knowledge, there is at last an _end_, either by attaining, or by giving over. And in the chain of discourse, wheresoever it be interrupted, there is an end for that time.
If the discourse be merely mental, it consisteth of thoughts that the thing will be, and will not be; or that it has been, and has not been, alternately. So that wheresoever you break off the chain of a man’s discourse, you leave him in a presumption of _it will be_, or, _it will not be_; or, _it has been_, or, _has not been_. All which is _opinion_.
And that which is alternate appetite, in deliberating concerning good and evil; the same is alternate opinion, in the enquiry of the truth of _past_, and _future_. [Sidenote: Judgment, or sentence final.] And as the last appetite in deliberation, is called the _will_; so the last opinion in search of the truth of past, and future, is called the JUDGMENT, or _resolute_ and _final sentence_ of him that _discourseth_.
And as the whole chain of appetites alternate, in the question of good, or bad, is called _deliberation_; [Sidenote: Doubt.] so the whole chain of opinions alternate, in the question of true, or false, is called DOUBT.
No discourse whatsoever, can end in absolute knowledge of fact, past, or to come. For, as for the knowledge of fact, it is originally, sense; and ever after, memory. And for the knowledge of consequence, which I have said before is called science, it is not absolute, but conditional. No man can know by discourse, that this, or that, is, has been, or will be; which is to know absolutely: but only, that if this be, that is; if this has been, that has been; if this shall be, that shall be: which is to know conditionally; and that not the consequence of one thing to another; but of one name of a thing, to another name of the same thing.
[Sidenote: Science.]
And therefore, when the discourse is put into speech, and begins with the definitions of words, and proceeds by connexion of the same into general affirmations, and of these again into syllogisms; the end or last sum is called the conclusion; and the thought of the mind by it signified, is that conditional knowledge, or knowledge of the consequence of words, which is commonly called SCIENCE. [Sidenote: Opinion.] But if the first ground of such discourse, be not definitions; or if the definitions be not rightly joined together into syllogisms, then the end or conclusion, is again OPINION, namely of the truth of somewhat said, though sometimes in absurd and senseless words, without possibility of being understood. [Sidenote: Conscious.] When two, or more men, know of one and the same fact, they are said to be CONSCIOUS of it one to another; which is as much as to know it together. And because such are fittest witnesses of the facts of one another, or of a third; it was, and ever will be reputed a very evil act, for any man to speak against his _conscience_: or to corrupt or force another so to do: insomuch that the plea of conscience, has been always hearkened unto very diligently in all times. Afterwards, men made use of the same word metaphorically, for the knowledge of their own secret facts, and secret thoughts; and therefore it is rhetorically said, that the conscience is a thousand witnesses. And last of all, men, vehemently in love with their own new opinions, though never so absurd, and obstinately bent to maintain them, gave those their opinions also that reverenced name of conscience, as if they would have it seem unlawful, to change or speak against them; and so pretend to know they are true, when they know at most, but that they think so.
When a man’s discourse beginneth not at definitions, it beginneth either at some other contemplation of his own, and then it is still called opinion; or it beginneth at some saying of another, of whose ability to know the truth, and of whose honesty in not deceiving, he doubteth not; and then the discourse is not so much concerning the thing, as the person; [Sidenote: Belief. Faith.] and the resolution is called BELIEF, and FAITH: _faith_, _in_ the man; _belief_, both _of_ the man, and _of_ the truth of what he says. So that in belief are two opinions; one of the saying of the man; the other of his virtue. To _have faith in_, or _trust to_, or _believe a man_, signify the same thing; namely, an opinion of the veracity of the man: but to _believe what is said_, signifieth only an opinion of the truth of the saying. But we are to observe that this phrase, _I believe in_; as also the Latin, _credo in_; and the Greek, πιστέυω ἐις, are never used but in the writings of divines. Instead of them, in other writings are put, _I believe him_; _I trust him_; _I have faith in him_; _I rely on him_: and in Latin, _credo illi_: _fido illi_: and in Greek, πιστέυω αὐτω: and that this singularity of the ecclesiastic use of the word hath raised many disputes about the right object of the Christian faith.
But by _believing in_, as it is in the creed, is meant, not trust in the person; but confession and acknowledgment of the doctrine. For not only Christians, but all manner of men do so believe in God, as to hold all for truth they hear him say, whether they understand it, or not; which is all the faith and trust can possibly be had in any person whatsoever: but they do not all believe the doctrine of the creed.
From whence we may infer, that when we believe any saying whatsoever it be, to be true, from arguments taken, not from the thing itself, or from the principles of natural reason, but from the authority, and good opinion we have, of him that hath said it; then is the speaker, or person we believe in, or trust in, and whose word we take, the object of our faith; and the honour done in believing, is done to him only. And consequently, when we believe that the Scriptures are the word of God, having no immediate revelation from God himself, our belief, faith, and trust is in the church; whose word we take, and acquiesce therein. And they that believe that which a prophet relates unto them in the name of God, take the word of the prophet, do honour to him, and in him trust, and believe, touching the truth of what he relateth, whether he be a true, or a false prophet. And so it is also with all other history. For if I should not believe all that is written by historians, of the glorious acts of _Alexander_, or _Cæsar_; I do not think the ghost of _Alexander_, or _Cæsar_, had any just cause to be offended; or any body else, but the historian. If _Livy_ say the Gods made once a cow speak, and we believe it not; we distrust not God therein, but _Livy_. So that it is evident, that whatsoever we believe, upon no other reason, than what is drawn from authority of men only, and their writings; whether they be sent from God or not, is faith in men only.
------- CHAPTER VIII.