The notion of extension is so familiar to us from infancy, and constantly obtruded by every thing we see and feel, that we are apt to think it obvious how it comes into the mind; but upon a narrower examination we shall find it utterly inexplicable. It is true we have feelings of touch, which every moment present extension to the mind; but how they come to do so, is the question; for those feelings do no more resemble extension than they resemble justice or courage: nor can the existence of extended things be inferred from those feelings by any rules of reasoning: so that the feelings we have by touch can neither explain how we get the notion, nor how we come by the belief of extended things.
What hath imposed upon philosophers in this matter is, that the feelings of touch, which suggest primary qua- lities, have no names, nor are they ever reflected upon. They pass through the mind instantaneously, and serve only to introduce the notion and belief of external things, which by our constitution are connected with them. They are natural signs, and the mind immediately passes to the thing signified, without making the least reflection upon the sign, or observing that there was any such thing. Hence it hath always been taken for granted, that the ideas of extension, figure, and motion are ideas of sensa- tion, which enter into the mind by the sense of touch, in the same manner as the sensations of sound and smell do by the ear and nose. The sensations of touch are so con- nected, by our constitution, with the notions of extension, figure, and motion, that philosophers have mistaken the one for the other, and never have been able to discern that they were not only distinct things, but altogether un- like. However, if we will reason distinctly upon this subject, we ought to give names to those feelings of touch; we must accustom ourselves to attend to them, and to re- flect upon them, that we may be able to disjoin them from, and to compare them with, the qualities signified or suggested by them.
The habit of doing this is not to be attained without pains and practice; and till a man hath acquired this 08 OF THE HUMAN MIND. [CHAP. V.
habit, it will be impossible for him to think distinctly, or to judge right, upon this subject.
Let a man press his hand against the table: he feels it hard. But what is the meaning of this? the meaning un- doubtedly is, that he hath a certain feeling of touch, from which he concludes, without any reasoning or comparing ideas, that there is something external really existing, whose parts stick so firmly together, that they cannot be displaced without considerable force.
There is here a feeling, and a conclusion drawn from it, or some way suggested by it. In order to compare these, we must view them separately, and then consider by what tie they are connected, and wherein they resemble one another. The hardness of the table is the conclusion, the feeling is the medium by which we are led to that conclu- sion. Let a man attend distinctly to this medium, and to the conclusion, and he will perceive them to be as unlike as any two things in nature. The one is a sensation of the mind, which can have no existence but in a sentient being; nor can it exist one moment longer than it is felt; the other is in the table, and we conclude, without any difficulty, that it was in the table before it was felt, and continues after, the feeling is over. The one implies no kind of extension, nor parts, nor cohesion; the other im- plies all these. Both indeed admit of degrees; and the feeling, beyond a certain degree, is a species of pain; but adamantine hardness does not imply the least pain.
And as the feeling hath no similitude to hardness, so neither can our reason perceive the least tie or connexion between them; nor will the logician ever be able to show a reason why we should conclude hardness from this feel- in! rather than softness, or any other quality whatsoever. But in reality all mankind are led by their constitution to conclude hardness from this feeling.
The sensation of heat, and the sensation we have by pressing a hard body, are equally feelings; nor can we by reason draw any conclusion from the one, but what may be drawn from the other: but, by our constitution, ye conclude from the first an obscure or occult quality, SECT. VI.] OF TOUCH. 69 of which we have only this relative conception, that it is something adapted to raise in us the sensation of heat; from the second, we conclude a quality of which we have a clear and distinct conception, to wit, the hardness of the body.
SECT. VI.
Of Extension.
To put this matter in another light, it may be proper to try, whether from sensation alone we can collect any no- tion of extension, figure, motion, and space. I take it for granted, that a blind man hath the same notions of exten- sion, figure, and motion, as a man that sees; that Dr. Saunderson had the same notion of a cone, a cylinder, and a sphere, and of the motions and distances of the heavenly bodies, as Sir Isaac Newton.
As sight, therefore, is not necessary for our acquiring those notions, we shall leave it out altogether in our in- quiry into the first origin of them; and shall suppose a blind man, by some strange distemper, to have lost all the experience and habits and notions he had got by touch; nor to^iave the least conception of the existence, figure, dimensions, or extension, either of his own body or of any other; but to have all his knowledge of external things to acquire anew, by means of sensation, and the power of reason, which we suppose to remain entire.
We shall, first, suppose his body fixed immovable in one place, and that he can only have the feelings of touch, by the application of other bodies to it. Suppose him first to be pricked with a pin; this will, no doubt, give a smart sensation: he feels pain; but what can he infer from it? Nothing surely with regard to the existence or figure of a pin. He can infer nothing from this species of pain, which he may not as well infer from the gout or sciatica. Common sense may lead him to think that this 70 OF THE HUMAN MIND. [CHAP. V.
pain has a cause: but whether this cause is body or spirit, extended or unextended, figured or not figured, he cannot possibly, from any principles he is supposed to have, form the least conjecture. Having had formerly no notion of body or of extension, the prick of a pin can give him none.
Suppose, next, a body not pointed, but blunt, is applied to his body with a force gradually increased until it bruises him. What has he got by this, but another sensation, or train of sensations, from which he is able to conclude as little as from the former? A scirrhous tumour in any in- ward part of the body, by pressing upon the adjacent parts, may give the same kind of sensation as the pres- sure of an external body, without conveying any notion but that of pain, which surely hath no resemblance to extension.
Suppose, thirdly, that the body applied to him touches a larger or a lesser part of his body. Can this give him any notion of its extension or dimensions? To me it seems impossible that it should, unless he had some previous no- tion of the dimensions and figure of his own body, to serve him as a measure. When my two hands touch the ex- tremities of a body; if I know them to be a foot asunder, I easily collect that the body is a foot long; and if I know them to be five feet asunder, that it is five feet long; but if I know not what the distance of my hand^ is, I cannot know the length of the object they grasp; and if I have no previous notion of hands at all, or of distance between them, I can never get that notion by their being touched.
Suppose, again, that a body is drawn along his hands or face, while they are at rest: Can this give him any notion of space or motion? It no doubt gives a new feel- ing; but how it should convey a notion of space or motion, to one who had none before, I cannot conceive. The blood moves along the arteries and veins, and this motion, when violent, is felt: but I imagine no man, by this feel- ing, could get the conception of space or motion, if he had it not before. Such a motion may give a certain succes- SECT. VI.] OF TOUCH. 71 sion of feelings, as the^colic may do; but no feelings, nor any combination of feelings, can ever resemble space or motion.
Let us next suppose, that he makes some instinctive effort to move his head or his hand; but that no motion follows, either on account of external resistance or of palsy. Can this effort convey the notion of space and motion to one who never had it before? Surely it cannot.
Last of all, let us suppose, that he moves a limb by instinct, without having had any previous notion of space or motion. He has here a new sensation, which accompanies the flexure of joints, and the swelling of muscles. But how this sensation can convey into his mind the idea of space and motion is still altogether mysterious and unin- telligible. The motions of the heart and lungs are all per- formed by the contraction of muscles, yet give no concep- tion of space or motion. An embryo in the womb has many such motions, and probably the feelings that accom- pany them, without any idea of space or motion.
Upon the whole, it appears, that our philosophers have imposed upon themselves and upon us, in pretending to deduce from sensation the first origin of our notions of external existences, of space, motion, and extension, and all the primary qualities of body, that is, the qualities whereof we have the most clear and distinct conception. These qualities do not at all tally with any system of the human faculties that hath been advanced. They have no resemblance to any sensation or to any operation of our minds; and therefore they cannot be ideas either of sen- sation or of reflection. The very conception of them is ir- reconcilable to the principles of all our philosophic systems of the understanding. The belief of them is no less so.
72 OF THE HUMAN MIND. [CHAP. V.
SECT. VII.
Of the Existence of a Material World.
IT is beyond our power to say, when or in what order we came by our notions of these qualities. When we trace the operations of our minds as far back as memory and reflection can carry us, we find them already in possr of our imagination and belief, and quite familiar to the mind; but how they came first into its acquaintance, or what has given them so strong a hold of our belief, and what regard they deserve, are no doubt very import:int questions in the philosophy of human nature.
Shall we, with the Bishop of Cloyne, serve them with 0 Quo warranto, and have them tried at the bar of philoso- phy, upon the statute of the ideal system? Indeed, in this trial they seem to have come off very pitifully. For although they had very able counsel, learned in the law, viz. Des Cartes, Malebranche, and Locke, who said every thing they could for their clients; the Bishop of Cloyne, be- lieving them to be aiders and abettors of heresy and schism, prosecuted them with great vigour, fully answered all that had been pleaded in their defence, and silenced their ablest advocates, who seem for half a century past to decline the argument, and to trust to the favour of the jury rather than to the strength of their pleadings.
Thus, the wisdom of philosophy is set in opposition to the common sense of mankind. The first pretends to de- monstrate, a priori, that there can be no such thing as a material world; that sun, moon, stars, and earth, vegeta- ble and animal bodies, are, and can be nothing else but sensations in the mind, or images of those sensations in the memory and imagination; that, like pain and joy, they can have no existence when they are not thought of. The last can conceive no otherwise of this opinion than as a kind of metaphysical lunacy; and concludes, that too SECT. VII.] OF TOUCH. 73 much learning; is apt to make men mad; and that the man who seriously entertains this belief, though in other re- spects he may be a very good man, as a man may be who believes that he is made of glass; yet surely he hath a soft place in his understanding, and hath been hurt by much thinking.
This opposition betwixt philosophy and common sense, is apt to have a very unhappy influence upon the philoso- pher himself. He sees human nature in an odd, unami- able, and mortifying light. He considers himself, and the rest of his species, as born under a necessity of believing ten thousand absurdities and contradictions, and endowed with such a pittance of reason as is just sufficient to make this unhappy discovery: and this is all the fruit of his pro- found speculations. Such notions of human nature tend to slacken every nerve of the soul, to put every noble purpose end sentiment out of countenance, and spread a melancholy gloom over the whole face of things.
If this is wisdom, let me be deluded with the vulgar. 1 iind something within me that recoils against it, and in- spires more reverent sentiments of the human kind and of the universal administration. Common sense and reason have both one author; that almighty Author, in all whose other works we observe a consistency, uniformity, and beauty, which charm and delight the understanding; there must therefore be some order and consistency in the human faculties, as well as in other parts of his workmanship. A man that thinks reverently of his own kind, and esteems true wisdom and philosophy, will not be fond, nay, will be veiy suspicious, of such strange and paradoxical opinions. If they are false, they disgrace philosophy; and if they are true, they degrade the human species, and make us justly ashamed of our frame.
To what purpose is it for philosophy to decide against common sense in this or any other matter? The belief of a material world is older, and of more authority, than any principles of philosophy. It declines the tribunal of rea- son, and laughs at all the artillery of the logician. It retains its sovereign authority in spite of all the edicts of E t4 OF THE HUMAN MIND* [CHAP. V.
philosophy, and reason itself must stoop to its orders. Even those philosophers who have disowned the authority of our notions of an external material world, confess, that they find themselves under a necessity of submitting to their power.
Methinks, therefore, it were better to make a virtue of necessity; and, since we cannot get rid of the vulgar notion and belief of an extenial world, to reconcile our reason to it as well as we can: for if Reason should stomach and fret ever so much at this yoke, she cannot throw it off; if she will not be the servant of Common Sense, she must be her slave.
In order, therefore, to reconcile reason to common sense in this matter, I beg leave to offer to the consideration of philosophers these two observations. First, That in all this debate about the existence of a material world, it hath been taken for granted on both sides, that this same mate- rial world, if any such there be, must be the express image of our sensations; that we can have no conception of any material thing which is not like some sensation in our minds; and particularly, that the sensations of touch are images of extension, hardness, figure, and motion. Every argument brought against the existence of a mate- rial world, either by the Bishop of Cloyne or by the author of the Treatise of Human Nature, supposeth this. If this is true, their arguments are conclusive and unanswer- able: but, on the other hand, if it is not true, there is no shadow of argument left. Have those philosophers, then, given any solid proof of this hypothesis, upon which the whole weight of so strange a system rests? No. They have not so much as attempted to do it. But, because ancient and modern philosophers have agreed in this opinion, they have taken it for granted. But let us, as becomes philosophers, lay aside authority; we need not surely consult Aristotle or Locke, to know whether pain be like the point of a sword. I have as clear a concep- tion of extension, hardness, and motion, as I have of the point of a sword; and, with some pains and practice, I can form as clear a notion of the other sensations of SECT. VII.] OF TOUCH. 75 touch, as 1 have of pain. When I do so, and compare them together, it appears to me clear as daylight, that the former are not of kin to the latter, nor resemble them in any one feature. They are as unlike, yea, as certainly and manifestly unlike as pain is to the point of a sword. It may be true, that those sensations first introduced the material world to our acquaintance; it may be true, that it seldom or never appears without their company; but, for all that, they are as unlike as the passion of anger is to those features of the countenance which attend it.
So that, in the sentence those philosophers have passed against the material world, there is an error persona?. Their proof touches not matter, or any of its qualities; but strikes directly against an idol of their own imagination, a material world made of ideas and sensations, which never had nor can have an existence.
Secondly, The very existence of our conceptions, of extension, figure, and motion, since they are neither ideas of sensation nor reflection, overturns the whole ideal sys- tem, by which the material world hath been tried and con- demned: so that there hath been likewise in this sentence an error juris.
It is a very fine and a just observation of Locke, That as no human art can create a single particle of matter, and the whole extent of our power over the material world consists in compounding, combining, and disjoining the matter made to our hands; so in the world of thought, the materials are all made by nature, and can only be vari- ously combined and disjoined by us. So that it is impos- sible for reason or prejudice, true or false philosophy, to produce one simple notion or conception, which is not the work of nature, and the result of our constitution. The conception of extension, motion, and the other attributes of matter cannot be the effect of error or prejudice; it must be the work of nature. And the power or faculty, by which we acquire those conceptions, must be some- thing different from any power of the human mind that hath been explained, since it is neither sensation nor reflection.
E2 76 OF THE HUMAN MIND. [CHAP. V.
Thus I would therefore humbly propose as an cxperi- mentum crucis, by which the ideal system must stand or fall; and it brings the matter to a short issue: Extension, figure, motion, may, any one or all of them, be taken for the subject of this experiment. Either they are ideas of sensation or they are not. If any one of them can be shown to be an idea of sensation, or to have the least resemblance to any sensation, I lay my hand upon my mouth, and give up all pretence to reconcile reason to common sense in this matter, and must suffer the ideal scepticism to triumph. But if, on the other hand, they are not ideas of sensation, nor like any sensation, then the ideal system is a rope of sand, and all the laboured argu- ments of the sceptical philosophy against a material world, and against the existence of every thing but impressions and ideas, proceed upon a false hypothesis.
If our philosophy concerning the mind be so lame with regard to the origin of our notions of the clearest, most simple, and most familiar objects of thought, and the powers from which they are derived, can we expect that it should be more perfect in the account it gives of the origin of our opinions and belief? We have seen already some instances of its imperfection in this respect: and perhaps that same nature which hath given us the power to conceive things altogether unlike to any of our sensa- tions, or to any operation of our minds, hath likewise pro- vided for our belief of them by some part of our constitu- tion hitherto not explained.
Bishop Berkeley hath proved, beyond the possibility of reply, that we cannot by reasoning infer the existence of matter from our sensations: and the author of the Trea- tise of Human Nature hath proved no less clearly, that we cannot by reasoning infer the existence of our own or other minds from our sensations. But are we to admit nothing but what can be proved by reasoning? Then wo must be sceptics indeed, and believe nothing at all. The author of the Treatise of Human Nature appears to me to be but a half sceptic. He hath not followed his prin- ciples so far as they lead him: but after having, with un- SECT. VII.] OF TOUCH. 77 paralleled intrepidity and success, combated vulgar preju- dices; when he had but one blow to strike, his courage fails him, he fairly lays down his arms, and yields himself a captive to the most common of all vulgar prejudices, I mean the belief of the existence of his own impressions and ideas.
I beg, therefore, to have the honour of making an addi- tion to the sceptical system, without which, I conceive, it cannot hang together. I affirm, that the belief of the ex- istence of impressions and ideas is as little supported by reason as that of the existence of minds and bodies. No man ever did or could offer any reason for this belief. Des Cartes took it for granted that he thought, and had sensations and ideas; so have all his followers done. Even the hero of scepticism hath yielded this point, I crave leave to say, weakly and imprudently. I say so, because I am persuaded that there is no principle of his philosophy that obliged him to make this concession. And what is there in impressions and ideas so formidable that this all conquering philosophy, after triumphing ovei every other existence, should pay homage to him? Be- sides, the concession is dangerous: for belief is of such a nature, that if you leave any root it will spread, and you may more easily pull it up altogether, than say, Hitherto shalt thou go and no farther: the existence of impressions and ideas I give up to thee; but see thou pretend to nothing more. A thorough and consistent sceptic will never, therefore, yield this point; and while he holds it, you can never oblige him to yield any thing else.
To such a sceptic I have nothing to say; but of the semi-sceptics, I should beg leave to know, why they believe the existence of their impressions and ideas. Tho true reason I take to be, because they cannot help it; and the same reason will lead them to believe many other things.
All reasoning must be from first principles; and for first principles no other reason can be given but this, that, by the constitution of our nature, we are under a neces- sity of assenting to them. Such principles are parts of 78 OF THE HUMAN MIND. [CHAP. V.
our constitution, no less than the power of thinking: rea- son can neither make nor destroy them; nor can it do any tiling without them: it is like a telescope, which may help a man to see farther, who hath eyes; but without eyes a telescope shows nothing at all. A mathematician cannot prove the truth of his axioms, nor can he prove any thing, unless he takes them for granted. We cannot prove the existence of our minds, nor even of our thoughts and sen- sations. An historian or a witness can prove nothing, unless it is taken for granted that the memory and senses may be trusted. A natural philosopher can prove nothing, unless it is taken for granted that the course of nature is steady and uniform.
How or when I got such first principles, upon which I build all my reasoning, I know not; for I had them before I can remember: but I am sure they are parts of my con- stitution, and that I cannot throw them off. That our thoughts and sensations must have a subject, which we call ourself, is not therefore an opinion got by reasoning, but a natural principle. That our sensations of touch indi- cate something external, extended, figured, hard, or soft, is not a deduction of reason, but a natural principle. The belief of it and the very conception of it are equally parts of our constitution. If we are deceived in it, we are de- ceived by Him that made us, and there is no remedy.
I do not mean to affirm, that the sensations of touch do from the very first suggest the same notions of body and its qualities which they do when we are grown up. Per- haps nature is frugal in this, as in her other operations. The passion of love, with all its concomitant sentiments and desires, is naturally suggested by the perception of beauty in the other sex. Yet the same perception does not suggest the tender passion, till a certain period of life. A blow given to an infant raises grief and lamentation; but when he grows up, it as naturally stirs resentment, and prompts him to resistance. Perhaps a child in the womb, or for some short period of its existence, is merely a sen- tient being: the faculties, by which it perceives an exter- nal world, by which it reflects on its own thoughts and SECT. VII.] OF TOUCH. 79 existence, and relation to other things, as well as its rea- soning and moral faculties, unfold themselves by degrees: so that it is inspired with the various principles of common sense, as with the passions of love and resentment, when it has occasion for them.
SECT. VIII.
Of the Systems of Philosophers concerning the Senses.