In a very ancient fyftem, love and ftrife were made the canfes of thinG;s. In the Pythagpreau and Platonic fyllem, matter, ideas and an intelligent mind. By Aristotle, matter, form and privation. Des Carti.s thouglit that matter and a certain quantity of motion given ar firll by the Almighty, arc fullicient to ac- count for all the phaenomena of the natural world. Leiunitz, that the uuiverfe is made u]) of monades, a(^^ive and i)recipient, which, by their acT;ive power received at lirft, produce all the changes they undergo.
While men thus wandered in the dark in fearcli of caules, ► unwilling to confefs their difappointment, they vainly conceived every thing they {tumbled upon to be a caufe, and the projjcr notion of a caufe is loft, by giving the name to numberlefs things which neither are nor can be caufes^ This confufion of various things under the name of caufes, is the more eafdy tolerated, bccaufe however hurtful it may be to found philofophy, it has little influence upon the concerns of life. A conftant antecedent, or concomitant of the phaenome- non whofe caufe is fought, may anfwer the purpofe of the en- quirer, as well as if the real caufe were known. Thus a failor defires to know the caufe of the tides, that he may know when to cxped high water: He is told that it is high water when the moon is fo many hours palt the meridian: And now he thinks he knows the caufe of the tides. What he takes for the caufe anl'wrrs his purpofe, and his miftake does him no harm.
Thofe philofophers feem to have had the julleft views of na- ture, as well as of the weaknefs of human uuderftanding, who, giving CHAP, lu. giving up the pretence of difcovering the caufes of the opera- tions of nature, have applied themfelves to difcover, by obferva- tion and experiment, the rules, or laws of nature according to which the phjenomena of nature are produced.
In compliance with cuftom, or perhaps, to gratify the avidity of knowing the caufes of things, we call the laws of nature caufes and adive powers. So we fpeak of the powers of gravi- tation, of magnetifm, of eledricity.
We call them caufes of many of the phaenomena of nature; and fuch they are efteemed by the ignorant, and by the half learned.
But thofe of jufter difcernment fee, that laws of nature are not agents. They are not endowed with adlive power, and therefore cannot be caufes in the proper fenfe. They are on- ly the rules according to which the unknown caufe aiSls.
Thus it appears, that our natural defire to know the caufes of the phaenomena of nature, our inability to difcover them, and the vain theories of Philofophers employed in this fearch, have made the word caufe, and the related words, fo ambiguous, and to fignify fo many things of different natures, that they have In a manner loft their proper and original meaning, and yet we have no other words to exprefs it.
Every thing joined with the effed;, and prior to it, is called its caufe. An inftrument, an occafion, a reafon, a motive, an end, are called caufes. And the related words e^e^^ agent, power ^ are extended in the fame vague manner.
Were it not that the terms caufe and agent have loft their pro- per meaning, in the crowd of meanings that have been given them, OF THE AMBIGUITY OF THOSE WORDS. 289 tneno, weiliould immediately perceive a com radidl ion in the terms chap. hi. neceff'ary caufe and neccffary agent. And althougli the loofe mean- ing of thofe words ib authoriled by cullom, the arbiter of lan- guage, and therefore cannot be ccnfured, [xrhaps cannot always be avoided, yet we ought to be upon our guard, that we be not milled by it to conceive things to be the fame which are eden- tially different.
To fay that man is a free agent, is no more than to fay, that in fome inftanccs he is truly an agent, and a caufe, and is not merely adted upon as a paillve inftrumcnt. On the contrary, to fay that he ads from neceflity, is to fay that he does not adl at all, that he is no agent, and that, for any thing we know, there is only one agent in the univerfe, who does every thing that is done, whether it be good or ill.
If this neceffity be attributed even to the Deity, the confe- quence muft be, that there neither is, nor can be, a caufe at all; that nothing ads, but every thing is aded upon; nothing moves, but every thing is moved; all is pallion without adion; all in- flrument without an agent; and that every thing that is, or •was, or fhall be, has that neceffary exiftence in its feafon, which ■we commonly confider as the prerogative of the Firft Caufe.
This I take to be the genuine, and the mofl tenable fyftem of neceflity. It was the fyftem of Spinosa, though he was not the firft that advanced it; for it is very ancient. And if this fyftem be true, our reafoning to prove the exiftence of a firll caufe of every thing that begins to exift, muft be given up as fallacious.
If it be evident to the human underftanding, as 1 take it to be. That what begins to exift muft have an efficient caufe, which had power to give or not to give it exiftence; and if it be true, O o that CHAP. Ill, that effects well and wifely fitted for the befl: purpofes, demon- ftrate intelligence, wifdom, and goodnefs, in the efficient caufe, as well as power, the proof of a Deity from thefe principles is very eafy and obvious to all men that can reafon.
If, on the other hand, our belief that every thing that begins to exift has a caufe, be got only by experience; and if, as Mr Home maintains, the only notion of a caufe be fomething prior to the effed, which experience has fliewn to be coniiantly con- joined with fuch an effedt, I fee not how, from thefe principles, it is poffible to prove the exiftence of an intelligent caufe of the univerfe.
Mr Hume feems to me to reafon juflly from his definition of a caufe, when, in the perfon of an Epicurean, he maintains, that with regard to a caufe of the univerfe, we can conclude no- thing ', becaufe it is a Angular effedt. We have no expe- rience that fuch effedls are always conjoined with fuch a caufe. Nay, the caufe which we aflign to this effedl, is a caufe which no man hath feen, nor can fee, and therefore experience cannot inform us that it has ever been conjoined with any effedt. He feems to me to reafon juflly from his definition of a caufe, when he m'aintains, that any thing may be the caufe of any thing j fince priority and conftant conjundlion is all that can be con- ceived in the notion of a caufe.
Another zealous defender of the dodlrine of neceffity fays, that " A caufe cannot be defined to be any thing hnx. fuch previous " circumjiances as are conjlantly followed by a certain effe^, the conflancy " of the refult making us conclude, that there muft be ^fiffi- " cient recfon, in the nature of things, why it fhould be produced " in thofe circumfl:ances."
This feems to me to be Mr Hume's definition of a caufe in other words, and neither more nor lefs; but I am far from thinking that the Author of it will admit the confequences which OF THE INFLUENCE OF MOTIVES. 291 which Mr Humk draws from it, however necenary they may ap- ch.M'. iv Of the Influence of Motives.
HP HE modern advocates for the dodrine of nccellity la} ■*• the rtrefs of their caufc upon the inlinencc of motives.
" Every deliberate adion, they fay, muft; have a motive. " When there is no motive on the other fide, this motive muft " determine the agent: When there are contrary motives, the " ftrongeft muft prevail: We reafon from men's motives to " their actions, as we do from other caufes to their effeds: " If man be a free agent, and be not governed by motives, all " his adions muft be mere caprice, rewards and punilhments " can have no effed, and fuch a being muft be abfolutely ungo- " vernable."
In order therefore to underftand diftindly, in what fenfe we afcribe moral liberty to man, it is ncceflary to underftand what influence we allow to motives. To prevent mifunderftanding, which has been very common upon this point, I ofler the fol- lowing obfervations: 1. I grant that all rational beings are influenced, and ought to be influenced by motives. But the influence of motives is of a ver^' different nature from that of efticient caufes. They arc neither caufes nor agents. They fuppofe an efficient caufc, and can do nothing without it. AVe cannot, without abfurdity, fup- pofe a motive, either to ad, or to be adcd upon j it is equally O o 2 incapablf ^^^■^' ^^' ii^capable of adlion and of paflion; becaufe it Is not a thing that exifts, but a thing that is conceived; it is \A'hat the fchoolmen called an ens rationis. Motives, therefore, may influence to adion, but they do not adt. They may be compared to advice, or ex- hortation, which leaves a man ftlll at liberty. For in vain is ad- vice given when there is not a power either to do, or to forbear what it recommends. In like manner, motives fuppofe liberty in. the agent, otherwife they have no influence at alU • • It is a law of nature, with refped to matter, That every mo- tion, and change of motion, is proportional to the force im- prefled, and in the diredtion of that force. The fcheme of ne- celTity fuppofes a fimilar law to obtain in all the adlions of intel- ligent beings; which, with little alteration, may be expreffed thus: Every adlion, or change of adtion, in an intelligent beings is proportional to the force of motives imprefled, and in the di- redlion of that force.
The law of nature refpecfting matter. Is grounded upon this principle: That matter is an inert, inad:Ive fubftance, which does not a6t, but is aded upon j and the law of neceflity rauft be grounded upon the fuppofition. That an Intelligent being Is an inert, inadlive fubftance, which does not adt^ but is adted upon.
2. Rational beings, in proportion as they are wife and good, will adl according to the beft motives; and every rational being,, who does otherwife, abufes his liberty. The raoft perfedl be- ing. In every thing where there Is a right and a wrong, a better and a worfe, always infallibly adls according to the beft motives. This indeed is little elfe than an identical propohtion: For it is a contradidtion to fay. That a perfedt being does what is wrong or unreafonable. But to fay, that he does not adt freely, becaufe he always does what is beft, is to fay. That the OF THE INFLUENCE OF MOTIVES. 293 the proper ufe of liberty deflroys liberty, and that liberty cou- chap, iv. fifts only in its abufe.
The moral perfection of the Deity confills, not in having no power to do ill, otherwife, as Dr Clark. julHy obfcrves, there would be no ground to thank him for his goodnefs to us any more than for his eternity or immenfity; but his moral perfection confifts in this, that, when he has power to do every thing, a power which cannot be refirted, he exerts that power only in doing what is wifeft and bcft. To be fubjed to neceflity j,s to have no power at all; for power and neceflity arc oppofites. We grant, therefore, that motives have inlluence, funllar to that of advice or perfualion; but this inHuence is perfectly confiitent witli liberty, and indeed fuppofes liberty.
3. Whether every deliberate adion muft have a motive, de- pends on the meaning we put upon the word deliberate. If, by a deliberate adtion, we mean an aftion wherein motives are weighed, which feems to be the original meaning of the word, furely there mud be motives, and contrary motives, otherwife they could not be weighed. But if a deliberate a(llion means only, as it commonFy does, an action done by a cool and calm determination of the mind, with forethought and will, I believe there are innumerable fuch actions done without a motive.
This muli be appealed to every man's confcioufnefs. 1 do many trifling actions every day, in which, upon the moft care- ful refledion, I am confcious of no motive; and to fay that 1 may be influenced by a motive of which 1 am not confcious, is, in the firft place, an arbitrary fuppofition without any evidence, aifd then, it is to fay, that 1 may be convinced by an argument which never entered into my thought.
Cafes frequently occur, in which an end, that is of fume im- portance, may be aufwered equally well by any one of fevcral dilTcrenr ESSAY IV.
CHAP. IV. (llfferent means. In fuch cafes, a man who Intends the end finds not the leaft difficulty In taking one of thefe means, though he be firmly perfuaded, that It has no title to be preferred to any of the others.
To fay that this is a cafe that cannot happen, is to con- tradict the experience of mankind; for furely a man who has occafion to lay out a fliilllng, or a guinea, may have two hundred that are of equal value, both to the giver and to the re- ceiver, any one of which will anfwer his purpofe equally well. To fay, that, if fuch a cafe fliould happen, the man could not execute his purpofe, Is ftill more ridiculous, though it have the authority of fome of the fchoolmen, who determined, that the afs, between two equal bundles of hay, would ftand fllll till it died of hunger.
If a man could not adl without a motive, he would have no power at all j for motives are not in our power, and he that has not power over a neceflary mean, has not power over the end.
That an adion, done without any motive, can neither have merit nor demerit. Is much infifted on by the writers for necef- fity, and triumphantly, as if it were the very hinge of the con- troverfy. I grant it to be a felf-evident propofitlon, and I know no author that ever denied it.
How Infignlficant foever, in moral efi;imation, the adions may be which are done without any motive, they are of mo- ment in the queftion concerning moral liberty. For, if there ever was any adion of this kind, motives are not the fole caufes of human adions. And If we have the power of ading without a motive, that power, joined to a weaker motive, may counterbalance a fl:ronger.
OF THE INFLUENCE OF MOTIVES. 295 4. It can never be proved, That when there is a motive on fMAljl^- one fule only, tliat motive muft determine the adion.
According to the laws of reafoning, the proof is incumbent on thofe who hold the affirmative; and I have never feen a fha- dow of argument, which does not take for granted the thing ii» queftion, to wit, that motives are the fole caufes of actions.
Is there no fuch thing as wilfulnefs, ca[)rice or obftinacy, among mankind? If there be not, it is wonderful that they fhould have nsimes in all languages. If there be fuch things, a fmgle motive, or even many motives, may be refilled.
5. When it is faid, that of contrary motives the ftrongefl always prevails, this can neither be aflirmed nor denied with under- ftanding, until we know diftinctly what is meant by the ftrongeft motive.
I do not find, that thofe who have advanced this as a felf- evident axiom, have ever attempted to explain what they meant by the Orongeft motive, or have given any rule by which we may judge which of two motives is the ftrongeft.
How Ihall we know whether the ilrongeft motive always pre- vails, if we know not which is rtrongeft? There muft be fome teft by which their ilrength is to be tried, fome balance in which they may be weighed, otherwife, to fay that the ftrongeft motive always prevails, is to fpcak without any meaning. We mull therefore fearch for this tell or balance, fince they who have laid fo much llrefs upon tliis axiom, have left us wholly in the dark as to its meaning. 1 grant, that when the contrary motives are of the fame kind, antl dilfer only in quan- tity, it may be eafy to fay which is the (Irongefi. Thus a bribe of a thoufand pounds is a ftronger motive than a bribe of a hun- dred pounds. But when the motives are of di/lf^rcnt kinds, as, money CHAP. IV. money and fame, duty and worldly intereft, health and flrength, riches and honour, by what rule fhall we judge which is the ftrongeft motive?
Either we meafure the flrength of motives, merely by their prevalence, or by fome other flandard diftincS from their preva- lence.
If we meafure their ftrength merely by their prevalence, and by the ftrongeft motive mean only the motive that prevails, it will be true indeed that the ftrongeft motive prevails j but the propofition will be identical, and mean no more than that the ftrongeft motive is the ftrongeft motive. From this furely no conclulion can be drawn.
If It ftiould be faid. That by the ftrength of a motive is not meant its prevalence, but the caufe of its prevalence; that we meafure the caufe by the effed:, and from the fuperiority of the effeft conclude the fuperiority of the caufe, as we conclude that to be the heavieft weight which bears down the fcale; I anfwer, That, according to this explication of the axiom, it takes for o-ranted that motives are the caufes, and the fole caufes of ac- tions. Nothing is left to the agent, but to be adled upon by the motives, as the balance is by the weights. The axiom fuppofes, that the agent does not ad, but is adted upon j and, from this fuppofition, It is concluded that he does not adt. This is to rea- fon in a circle, or rather it is not reafoning but begging the que- ftion.
Contrary motives may very properly be compared to advo- cates pleading the oppofite fides of a caufe at the bar. It would be very weak reafoning to fay, that fuch an advocate is the moft powerful pleader, becaufe fentence was given on his fide. The fen- tence is in the power of the judge, not of the advocate. It is equally weak reafoning, in proof of necellity, to fay, fuch a motive pre- vailed, OF THE INFLUENCE OF MOTIVES. 29; vailed, therefore it is the flrongcft; fince the ckfeiulcrs of liber- CHAP. iv. ty maintain that the determination was made l)y the man, and not by the motive.
We are therefore brought to this ifTuc, that nnltfs fome mea- fure of the ftrength of motives can be found dillinct from their prevalence, it cannot be determined, whether tlie ftrongefl: mo- tive always prevails or not. If fuch a meafure can be found and applied, we may be able to judge of the truth of this max- im, but not otherwife.
Every thing that can be called a motive, is addreflcd either to the animal or to the rational part of our nature. Motives of the former kind are common to us with the brutes; thofe of the latter are peculiar to rational beings. We fliall beg leave, for diftin(5tiou's fake, to call the former, rtw/wa/ motives, and the latter, rational.
Hunger is a motive in a dog to eat; fo is it in a man. Ac- cording to the ftrength of the appetite, it gives a ftronger or a weaker impulfe to eat. And the fame thing may be faid of eve- ry other appetite and pafTion. Such animal motives give an im- pulfe to the agent, to which he yields with eafe; and, if the im- pulfe be ftrong, it cannot be refifled without an effort which re- quires a greater or a lefs degree of felf-command. Such mo- tives are not addrelfed to the rational powers. Their intluence is immediately upon the will. We feel their influence, and judge of their flrength, by the confcious effort which is neceJla- ry to relift them.
When a man is aded upon by contrary motives of this kind, he finds it eafy to yield to the ftrongefl. They are like two forces pufliing him in contrary diredlions. To yield to the ftrongeft, he needs only to be pillive. By exerting his own force, he may refift; l)ut this requires an effort of which he is P p confcious.
P p confcious.
CHAP. IV. confcious. The ftrength of motives of this kind is perceived, not by our judgment, but by our feeling; and that is the ftrongeft of contrary motives, to which he can yield with eafe, or which it requires an effort of felf-command to refiftj and this we may call the animal tejl of flie ftrength of motives.
If it be afked, whether, in motives of this kmd, the ftrongeft always prevails? I would anfwer, That in brute-animals 1 be- lieve it does. They do not appear to have any felf-command \. an appetite or paiTion in them is overcome only by a ftronger contrary one. On this account, they are not accountable for their adions, nor can they be the fubjeds of law.
But in men who are able to exercife their rational powers, and have any degree of felf-command, the ftrongeft animal mo- tive does not always prevail. The flefti does not always prevail againft the fpirit, though too often it docs. And if men were necefllirlly determined by the ftrongeft animal motive, they could no more be accountable, or capable of being governed by law, than brutes are.
Let us next confider rational motives, to which the name of tnotive is more commonly and more properly given. Their in- fluence is upon the judgment, by convincing us that fuch an ac- tion ought to be done, that it is our duty, or conducive to our real good, or to ibme end which we have determined to purfue.
They do not give a blind impulfe to the will as animal mo- tives do. They convince, but they do not impel, unlels, as may often happen, they excite fome paflion of hope, or fear, or de- fire. Such paflious may be excited by convidion, and may ope- rate in its aid as other animal motives do. But there may bg, convidion without pallion; and the convidion of what we ought to do, in order to fome end which we have judged fit to be purfiied, is what 1 call a rational motive.
Brutes, OF THE INFLUENCE OF MOTIVES.
Brutes, I think, cannot be influenced by fuch motives. They t:HAP. IV. have not the conception of ought and ought not. Children ac- quire thcfe conceptions as their rational powers advance; and they are found in all of ripe age, who have the human facul- ties.
If there be any competition between rational motives, it is evident, that the Itrongell, in the eye of reafon, is that which it is moft our duty and our real happinefs to follow. Our duty and our real happinefs are ends which are infeparable; and they are the ends which every man, endowed with reafon, is confci- ous he ought to purine in preference to all others. This we may call the rational teft of the ftrength of motives. A motive which is the ftrongeft, according to the animal teft, may be, and very often is the weakeft according to the rational.
The grand and the important competition of contrary mo- tives is between the animal, on the one hand, and the rational on the other. This is the conflid: between the flefli and the fpirit, upon the event of which the charadter of men depends.
If it be afked, which of thefe is the ftrongeft motive? The anfwer is. That the firft is commonly ftrongeft, when they are tried by the animal teft. If it were not fo, human life would be no ftate of trial. It would not be a warfare, nor would vir- tue require any effort or felf-command. No man would have any temptation to do wrong. But, when we try the contrary motives by the rational teft, it is evident, that the rational mo- tive is always the ftrongeft.
And now, I think, it appears, that the ftrongeft motive, ac- cording to either of the tefts I have mentioned, does not always prevail.
In every wife and virtuous a(ftion, the motive that prevails is P p 2 the ESSAY IV.
CHAP. IV. tiie ftrongefl according to the rational teft, but commonly the weakeft according to the animal. In every fooliih, and in eve- ry vicious adtion, the motive that prevails is commonly the ftrongefl according to the animal teft, but always the weakeft according to the rational.
6. It is true, that we reafon from men's motives to their ac- tions, and, in many cafes, with great probability, but never with abfolute certainty. And to infer from this, that men are necef- farily determined by motives, is very weak reafoning.
For let us fuppofe, for a moment, that men have moral liber- ty, I would afk, what ufe may they be expedted to make of this liberty? It may furely be expedted, that, of the various adions within the fphere of their power, they will chufe what pleafes them moft for the prefent, or what appears to be moft for their real, though dlftant good. When there is a competition between thefe motives, the foolifh will prefer prefent gratification; the wife the greater and more diftant good.
Now, is not this the very way in which we fee men adl? Is it not from the prefumption that they adl in this way, that we rea- fon from their motives to their adions? Surely it is. Is it not weak reafoning, therefore, to argue, that men have not liberty, becaufe they ad in that very way in which they would ad if they had liberty? It would furely be more like reafoning to draw the contrary conclufion from the fame premifes.
y. Nor is it better reafoning to conclude, that, if men are not neceflarily determined by motives, all their adions muft be capricious.
To refift the ftrongeft animal motives when duty requires, is fo far from being capricious, that it is, in the higheft degree, wife and virtuous. And we hope this is often done by good men.
To OF THE INFLUENCE OF MOTIVES.
To ad agalnll rational motives, iiuift always be foolidi, vi- cious, or capricious. And, it cannot be denied, that there are too many fuch adions done. But is it reafonable to conclude, that becaufe liberty may be abufed by the foolilh and the vici- ous, therefore it can never be put to its proper ufe, which is to ad wilt'ly and virtuoufly?
8. It is equally unreafonable to conclude, That if men are not neceflarily determined by motives, rewards and punifhments would have no eflc-d. With wife men they will have their due effed i but not always with the foolifh and the vicious.
Let us confulerwhat effed rewards and punirtiments do really, and in fad, produce, and what may be inferred from that ef- fed, upon each of the oppofite fyftems of liberty and of necef- fity.
I take it for granted that, in fad, the heft; and wifeft laws, both human and divine, are often traufgreffed, notwithflanding the rewards and punifliments that are annexed to them. If any man fliould deny this fad, I know not how to reafon with him.
From this fad, it may be inferred with certainty, upon the fuppofition of nccelTity, That, in every inllance of tranfgreflion, the motive of reward or punifliment was not of fufTicient llrerjgth to produce obedience to the law. This implies a fault in the lawgiver; but there can be no fault in the tranfgreflbr, who ads mechanically by the force of motives. We might as well impute a fault to the balance, when it does not raife a weight of two pounds by the force of one pound.
Upon the fuppofition of ncccHlty, there can be neither reward nor punifhmcnt, in the proper Cenfe, as ihofe words imply good and ill dcfcrt. Reward and punifhmcnt arc only tools employ- ed CHAP. IV. Q^ fo produce a mechanical effedl. When the eSeO: is not pro- duced, the tool muft be unfit or wrong applied.
Upon the fuppofitlon of liberty, rewards and punifhments will have a proper effedt upon the wife and the good; but not fo up- on the foolifh and the vicious, when oppofed by their animal pallions or bad habits; and this is juft what we fee to be the fad:. Upon this fuppofition the tranfgrefllon of the law im- plies no defeft in the law, no fault in the lawgiver; the fault is folely in the tranfgrefTor. And it is upon this fuppofition on- ly, that there can be either reward or punifhment, in the pro- per fenfe of the words, becaufe it is only on this fuppofition, that there can be good or ill defert.
Liberty consent with Government.
WHEN it is f.id that liberty would make us abfolute- ly ungovernable by God or man; to underftand the ftrength of this conclufion, it is neceflary to know diftindt- ly what is meant by government. There are two kinds of govern- ment, very different in their nature. The one we may, for diftindlion's fake, call mechanical government, the other moral. The firll is the government of beings which have no adlive power, but are merely pallive and aded upon; the fecond, of intelligent and attive beings.
An inflance of mechanical government may be that of a maf- ter or commander of a fhip at fea. Suppofing her ikilfuUy built, and furnifhed with every thing proper for the deiHned voyage, to govern her properly for this purpofe requires much art and attention; And, as every art has its rules, or laws, fo has this.
But LIBERTY CONSISTENT WITH GOVERNMENT. 303 But by whom are thofe laws to be obeyed, or thofe rules ob- CfTAP. v. fcrved? not by the (hip, fureiy, for flic is anina<5tive being, but by the governor. A fallor may fay that flie does not obey the rudder; and he has a diilindt meaning when he fays fo, and is j)erfe(5lly underftood. But he means not obedience in the pro- per, but in a metaphorical fcnfe: For, in the proper fen(e, the ihip can no more obey the rudder, than flie can give a com- mand. Every motion, both of the (hip and rudder, is exadly proportioned to the force impreffed, and in the direction of that force. The fliip never difobeys the laws of motion, even in the metaphorical linfe j and they arc the only laws fhe can be fub- jecl to.
The failor, perhaps, curfcs her for not obeying the rudder; but this is not the voice of reafon, but of pallion, like that of the lofing gamerter, when he curfes the dice. The fliip is as innocent as the dice.