Whatever may happen during the voyage, whatever may be its ilTue, the (hip, in the eye of reafon, is neither an objedt of approbation nor of blame; becaufe (he docs not adl, but is acfl- ed upon. If the material, in any part, be faulty; Wiio put it to that ufe? If the form; Who made it? If the rules of na- vigation were not oblerved; \\"ho tranfgrefled them? If a ftorm occafioned any difarter, it was no more in the power of the fliip than of the mafler.
Another inftance to illuftrate the nature of mechanical govern- ment may be, That ot the man win) makes and e\hi!)its a puppet- fliow. The puppets, in all their diverting gelticulaiions, do not move, but are moved by an impulfe fecretly conveyed, which they cannot relilL If they do not play their parts properlv, the fault is only in the maker or manager of the machinery. Too much or too little force was applied, or it was wrong direded.
CHAP. V.^ i^Q reafonable man imputes either praife or blame to the puppets, but folely to their maker or their governor.
If we fuppofe for a moment, the puppets to be endowed with underrtanding and will, but without any degree of active power, this will make no change in the nature of their government: For underllanding and will, without fome degree of adlive power, can produce no effedl. They might, upon this fuppofition, be called intelligent machines j but they would be machines ftill as much fubjed: to the laws of motion as inanimate matter, and therefore incapable of any other than mechanical government.
Let us next confider the nature of moral government. This Is the government of perfons who have reafon and adlive power, and have laws prefcribed to them for their condudl, by a legiflator. Their obedience is obedience in the proper fenfe ', it mufl there- fore be their own a6t and deed, and confequently they muft have power to obey or to difobey. To prefcribe laws to them which they have not power to obey, or to require a fei-vice beyond their power, would be tyranny and injuilice in the high- eft degree.
'"' When the laws are equitable, and prefcribed by juft authority, "■ they produce moral obligation in thofe that are fubjed; to them, and dlfobedience is a crime deferving puniihment. But if the obedience be impollible; if the tranfgreflion be neceffary j it is felf-evident, that there can be no moral obligation to what is impollible, that there can be no crime in yielding to neceilky, and that there can be no jullice in punifliing a perfon for what it was not In his power to avoid. There are firft principles in morals and, to every unprejudiced mind, as felf-evident as the axioms of mathematics. The whole fcience of morals muft fland or fall with them.
Having thus explained the nature both of mechanical and of moral LIBERTY CONSISTENT WITH GOVERNMENT. 305 moral government, the only kinds of government I am able to CHAP. v. conceive, it is eafy to fee how far liberty or necelTity aj^rces with either.
On the one hand, I acknowledge that necellky agrees per- fedly with mechanical government. This kind of government is molt perfect when the governor is the fole agent; every thing done is the doing of the governor only. The praife of every thing well done is his fulely; and his is the blame if there be- any thing ill done, becaufe he is the fole agent.
It Is true that, in common language, praife or difpraife is often metaphorically given to the work; but, in propriety, it belongs folely to the author. Every workman underftands this per- fectly, and takes to himfelf very juftly the praife or difpraife of his own work.
On the other hand, it is no lefs evident, that, on the fuppo- fitlon of neceflity in the governed, there can be no moral go- vernment. There can be neither wifdom nor equity in prc- fcribing laws that cannot be obeyed. There can be no moral obligation upon beings that have no a<flive power. There can be no crime in not doing what it was impollible to do; nor can there be jultice in punilhing fuch omilHon.
If we apply thefe theoretical principles to the kinds of go- vernment which do actually exift, whether human or divine, we fhall find that, among men, even mechanical government is imperfed.
Men do not make the matter they work upon. Its various kinds, and the qualities belonging to each kind, are the work of God. The laws of nature, to which it is fubjcd, are the work of God. The motions of the atmofphere and of the fea, the heat and cold of the air, the rain and wind, which are ule- CHAP, V. fyi inflruments in moft human operations, are not in our power. So that, in all the mechanical produdions of men, the work is more to be afcribed to God than to man.
Civil government among men is a £pecies of moral govern- ment, but imperfed, as its lawgivers and its judges are. Hu- man laws may be unwife or unjufl; human judges may be par- tial or unfkilful. But in all equitable civil governments, the max- ims of moral government above mentioned, are acknowledged as rules which ought never to be violated. Indeed the rules of juftice are fo evident to all men, that the mofl tyrannical go- A-ernments profefs to be guided by them, and endeavour to pal- liate what is contrary to them by the plea of neceflity.
That a man cannot be under an obligation to what is impoH- fible; that he cannot be criminal in yielding to neceflity, nor juflly puniftied for what he could not avoid, are maxims admit- ted, in all criminal courts, as fundamental rules of juflice.
In oppofition to this, it has been faid by fome of the moft able defenders of neceflity, That human laws require no more to conftitute a crime, but that it be voluntary; whence it is infer- red that the criminality confifts in the determination of the will, whether that determination be free or neceflliry. This, I think indeed, is the only poflible plea by which criminality can be made confiftent with neceflity, and therefore it deferves to be confidered.
I acknowledge that a crime mufl; be voluntary; for, if it be not voluntary, it is no deed of the man, nor can be juflly im- puted to him J but it Is no lefs necefliiry that the criminal have moral liberty. In men that are adult, and of a found mind, this liberty is prefumed. But in every cafe where it cannot be prefumed, no criminality is imputed, even to voluntary anions.
This LIBERTY CONSISTENT WITH GOVERNMENT. 307 This is evident from the following inftanccs: Fhj}, The CHAr. v, a«5lions of brutes apj^car to be voluntary; yet they are never conceived to be criminal, though they may be noxious. Sccoud- /)', Children in nonage a<Sl voluntarily, but they are not charge- able with crimes. 'thirdly. Madmen have both underllandlng and will, but they have not moral liberty, and therefore are not chargeable with crimes. Fourthly, Even in men that arc adult, and of a found mind, a motive that is thought irrefiflible by any ordinary degree of felf-command, fuch as the rack, or the dread of prefent death, either exculpates, or very much alle- viates a voluntary action, which, in other circumflances, would be highly criminal; whence it is evident, that if the motive were abfolutely irrefiflible, the exculpation would be complete. So far is it from being true in itfelf, or agreeable to the common fenfe of mankind, that the criminality of an adtion depends fole- ly upon its being voluntary.
The government of brutes, fo far as they are fubjcd to man, is a fpecies of mechanical government, or fomething very like to it, and has no refemblance to moral government. As inani- mate matter is governed by our knowledge of the qualities which God hath given to the various productions of nature, and our knowledge of the laws of nature which he hath eftabliflicd; fo brute-animals are governed by our knowledge of the natural Inltincbs, appetites, affections and pallions, which God hath given them. By a Ikilfid application of thefe fprings of their actions, they may be trained to many habits ufeful to man. After all, we find that, from caufes unknown to us, not only fome fpecies, but fome individuals of the fame fpecies, are more tradable than others.
Children under age are governed much in the fame way as the mofl: fagacious brutes. The opening of their intelledual and moral powers, which may be much aided by proper inllruc- Q^q 2 tion CHAP, v^ jJq,^ jjnd example, is that which makes them by.degrees, ca- pable of moral government.
Reafon teaches us to afcrlbe to the Supreme Being a govern- ment of the inanimate and inadlive part of his creation, analo- gous to that mechanical government which men exerclfe, but hifinitely more perfed. This, I think, is what we call God's nati/ral government of the univerfe. In this part of the divine government, whatever is done is God's doing. He is the fole caufe, and the fole agent, whether he act immediately, or by in- ftruments fubordinate to him; and his will is always done: For mllruments are not caufes, they are not agents, though we fome- times improperly call them fo.
It is therefore no lefs agreeable to reafon, than to the lan- guage of holy writ, to impute to the Deity whatever is done in the natural world. When we fay of any thing, that it is the work of nature, this is faying that it is the work of God, and can have no other meaning.
The natural world is a grand machine, contrived, made, and governed by the wifdom and power of the Almighty: And If there be in this natural world, beings that have life, intelligence, and will, without any degree of adtive power, they can only be fubjedt to the fame kind of mechanical government, Their de- terminations, whether we call them good or ill, muft be the actions of the Supreme Being, as much as the produdlions of the earth: For, life, intelligence, and will, without adive power, can do nothing, and therefore nothing can juftly be imputed to it.
This grand machine of the natural" world, difplays the power and wifdom of the artificer. But in it, there can be no difplay of moral attributes, which have a relation to moral condud in his creatures, fuch as juftice and equity in rewarding or punifli- LIBERTY CONSISTENT WITH GOVERNMENT. 309 ing, the love of virtue unci abhorrence of wickednefs: For, as CHAT. v. every thing in it is God's doing, tliere can be no vice to be pu- niflied or abhorred, no virtue in his creatures to be rewarded.
According to the fyftem of neceflity, the whole univerfe of creatures is this natural world; and of everything done in it, God is the fole agent. There can be no moral government, nor moral obligation. Laws, rewards, and punilhments, are only mechanical engines, and the will of the lawgiver is obeyed as much when his laws are tranfgreired, as when they are ob- ferved. Such mufl be our notions of the government of the world, ui)on the fuppolition of necellity. It mull be purely me- chanical, and there can be no moral government upon that hy- pothefis.
Let us confider, oi> the other hand, what notion of the divine government we are naturally led into by the fuppofition of li- berty.
Tliey who adopt this fyflem conceive, that in that fmall por- tion of the univerfe which falls under our view, as a great part has no adtive power, but moves, as it is moved, by necelTity, and therefore mufl be fubje<fl to a mechanical government, fo it has pleafed the Almighty to beftow upon fome of his creatures, par- ticularly upon man, fome degree of active power, and of reafon, to diredl him to the right ufe of his power.
What connedion there may be, in the nature of things, be- tween reafon and adlive power, we know not. But we fee evi- dently that, as reafon without adlive power can do nothing, fo adive power without reafon has no guide to diredt it to any end.
Thefc two conjoined make moral liberty, which, in how fmall a degree foever it is polfeired, raifes man to a fuperior rank in the CHAP. V. tjie creation of God. He is not merely a tool in the hand of the mafter, but a fervant, in the proper fenfe, who has a certain truft, and is accountable for the dilcharge of it. Within the fphere of his power, he has a fubordinate dominion or government, and therefore may be fiid to be made after the image of God, the Supreme Governor. But as his dominion is fubordinate, he is under a moral obligation to make a right ufe of it, as far as the reafon which God hath given him can dired: him. When he does fo, he is a juft objed: of moral approbation; and no lefs an object: of dlfapprobation and jufl; puniftiment when he abufes the power with which he is entrufled. And he muft finally render an ac- count of the talent committed to him, to the fupreme Governor and righteous Judge.
This Is the moral government of God, which, far from being inconfiftent with liberty, fuppofes liberty in thofe that are fub- jeO. to it, and can extend no farther than that liberty extends; for accountablenefs can no more agree with neceffity than light with darknefs.
It ought likewife to be obferved, that as adlive power in man, and in every created being, is the gift of God, it depends en- tirely on his pleafure for its exiftence, its degree and its conti- nuance, and therefore can do nothing which he does not fee fit to permit.
Our power to adl does not exempt us from being adled upon, and refiralned or compelled by a fuperior power; and the power of God is always fuperior to that of man.
It would be great folly and prefumption In us to pretend to know all the w^ays in which the government of the Supreme Being Is carried on, and his purpofes accomplifhed by men, ad:- ing freely, and having different or oppofite purpofes in their view. For, as the heavens are high above the earth, fo are his thoughts above our thoughts, and his ways above our ways.
That LIBERTY CONSISTENT WITH GOVERNMENT. 311 That a man may have great influence upon the voluntary de- <^Hap. v. terminations of other men, by means of education, eNannplc and ' "^ pcrtliafion, Is a facil: uhith iniift be granted, whether \vc ado])t the fyftc-m of liberty or necefllty. How far fuch determinations ought to be imputed to the perfon who applied thofe means, how far to the perfon influenced by them, we know not, but God knows, and will judge righteoufly.
But what I would here obferve is, That if a man of fuperior talents may have fo great influence over the adions of his fel- low-creatures, without taking away their liberty, it is furely rca- fonable to allow a much greater influence of the fame kind to him who made man. Nor can it ever be proved, that the wif- dom and power of the Almighty are infuflicient for governing free agents, fo as to anfwer his purpofes.
He who made man -may have ways of governing his detenni- nations, confident with moral liberty, of which we have no con- ception. And he who gave this liberty freely, may lay anv re- llraint upon it that is neceflary for anfwering his wife and bene- volent purpofes. The juftice of his government requires, that his creatures (hould be accountable only for what they have re- ceived, and not for what was never entrufted to them. And we are fure that the Judge of all the earth will do what is right.
Thus, I think, it appears, that, upon the fuppofition of nccef- fity, there can be no moral government of the univerfe. Its government muft be perfedly mechanical, and every thing done in it, whether good or IH, mufl be God's doing; and that, up- on the fuppofition of liberty, there may be a perfed moral go- vernment of the univerfe, confident with his atcompliiliing all his purpofes, in its creation and government.
The arguments to prove that man is endowed with moral li- berty, which have the grcateft weight with me, are three; FirJ}, Becauft CHAP. VI. Becaufe he has a natural convidion or belief, that, In many- cafes, he ads freely; fecondly, Becaufe he is accountable; and, thirdly, Becaufe he is able to profecute an end by a long feries of means adapted to it.
Firjl Argument, X'T^'E have, by our conflitution, a natural convidlion or be- W lief that we adl freely: A convidion fo early, fo uni- verfal and fo neceflary in mofl of our rational operations, that it muft be the refult of our conflitution, and the work of him that made us.
Some of the mofl flrenuous advocates for the dodrlne of ne- ceffity acknowledge that it is impoffible to ad upon it. They fay that we have a natural fenfe or convidion that we ad freely, but that this is a fallacious fenfe.
This dodrlne is difhonourable to our Maker, and lays a foun- dation for univerfal fcepticifm. It fuppofes the Author of our being to have given us one faculty on purpofe to deceive us, and another by which we may deted the fallacy, and find that he impofed upon us.
If any one of our natural faculties be fallacious, there can be no reafon to trufl to any of them; for he that made one made all.
The genuine didate of our natural faculties is the voice of God, no lefs than what he reveals from heaven j and to fay that it is fallacious is to impute a lie to the God of truth.
If If candour and veracity be not an cnLniial part of moral excel- chap vr. lence, there is no fuch thinj^ as moral excellence, nor any reafon to rely on the declarations and promifes of the Almis;hty. A man may be tempted to lie, but not without being confcious of guilt and of meaimefs. Shall we impute to the Almighty what we cannot impute to a man without a heinous affi'ont?
Failing this opinion, therefore, as fliocking to an ingenuous mind, and, in its confequences, fubverfive of all religion, all morals and all knowledge, let us proceed to coulider the evi- dence of our having a natural conviction that we have fome de- gree of adive power.
The very conception or idea of adive power muft be derived from fomething in our own conftitution. It is impoflible to ac- count for it otherwife. We fee events, but we fee not the power that produces them. We perceive one event to fol- low another, but we perceive not the chain that binds them to- gether. The notion of power and caufation, therefore, cannot be got from external objeds.
Yet the notion of caufes, and the belief that every event muft have a caufe which had power to produce it, is found in every human mind fo firmly eftablifhed, that it cannot be rooted out.
This notion and this belief mufl have its origin from fome- thing in our conftitution; and that it is natural to man, appears from the following obfervations.
I. We are confcious of many voluntary exertions, fome eafy, others more dilHcult, fome requiring a great cITort. Thefc are exertions of power. And though a man may be unconfcious of his power when he does not exert it, he muft have both the con- R r ccption 3H ESSAY IV.
CHAP. VI. ception and the belief of it, when he knowingly and willingly exerts it, with intention to produce Ibme cffed:.
2. Deliberation about an adion of moment, whether we fliall do it or not, implies a conviction that it is in our power. To deliberate about an end, we mull be convinced that the means are in our power j and to deliberate about the means, we muft be convinced that we have power to chufe the mofl proper.
3. Suppofe our deliberation brought to an iflue, and that we refolve to do what appeared proper, Can we form fuch a refolu- tion or purpofe, without any convi6tion of power ta execute it? No J it is impoflible. A man cannot refolve to lay out a fum of money, which he neither has, nor hopes ever to have.
4. Again, when I plight my faith in any promife or contraft, I muft believe that I fhall have power to perform what I pro- mile. Without this perfuafion, a promife would be downright fraud.
There Is a condition implied in every promife, if we live, and if God continue with us the power •which he hath given us. Our eonvidion, therefore, of this power derogates not in the leaft from our dependence upon God. The rudeft favage is taught by nature to admit tliis condition in all promifes, whether it be exprefTed or not. For it is a didtate of common fcnfe, that we can be under no obligation to do what it is impoflible for us to do.
If we adl upon the fyftem of necefllty, there muft be another condition implied in all deliberation, in every refolution, and in every promife j and that is, if wc fhall be willing. But the will not being in our power, we cannot engage for it.
If this condition be underftood, as It muft be underftood if we ad;'' act upon the lyflem of nccefllty, there can be no deliberation, chap, vi or rciolution, nor any obligation in a promife. A man might as well deliberate, refolve and promife, upon the aif\ions of other men as upon his own.
It is no lefs evident, that we have a convicliou of pov/er in other men, when we advife, or perfuade, or command, or con- ceive them to be under obligation by their promifcs.
5. Is it pofllble for any man to blame himfclf for yielding to nccefllty? Then he may blame himfelf for dying, or for being a man. Blame fiippofes a wrong ufe of power; and when a man does as well as it was pollible for him to do, wherein is he to be blamed? Therefore all convi<flion of wrong conduct, all re- morfe and felf-condemnation, imply a conviction of our power to have done better. Take away this conviction, and there may be a fenfe of mifery, or a dread of evil to come, but there can be no fenfe of guilt or refolution to do better.
Many who hold the dodtrine of neceflity difown thefe confe- quences of it, and think to evade them. To fuch they ought not to be imputed; but their infeparable connection with that dodtrine appears felf-evident: And therefore fome late patrons of it have had the boldnefs to avow them. " They cannot ac- " cufe themfelves of having done any thing wrong in the ulti- " mate fenfe of the words. In a ftridt fenfe, they have nothing *' to do with repentance, confeiTion and pardon, thefe being " adapted to a fallacious view of things."
Thofe who can adopt thefe fentiments, may indeed celebrate, with high encomiums, the great and glorious doBr'tne of nccef- fity. It reflores them, in their own conceit, to the Hate of in- nocence. It delivers them from all the pangs of guilt and re- morfe, and from all fear about their future conduct, thouo;h not about their fate. They may be as fecurc that they fiiall do no- R r 2 thint', CHAP. VI. thing wrong, as thofe who have finiflied their courfe. A doc- trine fo flattering to the mind of a finncr is very apt to give ftrength to weak arguments.
After all, it is acknowledged by thofe who boaft of this glo- rious dodrine, " That every man, let him ufe what efforts he *' can, will necelfanly feel the fentiments of fhame, remorfe, •' and repentance, and, oppreiled with a fenfe of guilt, will " have recourfe to that mercy of which he ftands in need."
The meaning of this feems to me to be, That although the dod:rine of necellity be fupported by invincible arguments, and though it be the moft confolatory dodtrine in the world; yet no man, in his moft ferious moments, when he fifts himfelf before the throne of his Maker, can poflibly believe it, but muft then neceffarily lay afide this glorious dodlrine, and all its flattering confequences, and return to the humiliating convidlion of his having made a bad ufe of the power which God had given him.
If the belief of our having adtive power be neceflarily im- plied in thofe rational operations we have mentioned, it mufl: be coeval with our reafon j it mufl; be as univerfal among men, and as necefl^ary in the conduct of life, as thofe operations are.
We cannot recoiled: by memory when it began. It cannot be a prejudice of education, or of f;\lfe philofophy. It mufl; be a part of our conftitution, or the necefl^ary refult of our confl;itU' tion, and therefore the work of God.
It refembles, in this refpedt, our belief of the exiflence of a material world j our belief that thofe we converfe with are li^ ving and intelligent beings 3 our belief that thofe things did really happen which we diftindlly remember, and our belief that we continue the fame identical perfons.
We FIRST ARGUMENT. ^17 We find difFiculty in accounting for our belief of thefe things; and fomc Philolbi^hcrs think, that they have difcovcred good reafons for throwing it olT. But it flicks fart, and the grcatert; fccptic finds, that he muft yield to it in his praclice, while he wages war with it in fpeculation.
If it be objeded to this argnment, That the belief of our adling freely cannot be im])lied in the operations we have men- tioned, becaufe thofe operations are performed by them who be- lieve, that we are, in all our actions, governed by necellity. The anfwer to this objedion is, That men in their pracflice may be governed by a belief which in fjjeculation they rejecft.
However ftrange and unaccountable this may appear, there are many well known inrtances of it.
I knew a man who was as much convinced as any man of the folly of the popular belief of apparitions in the dark, yet he could not fleep in a room alone, nor go alone into a room in the dark. Can it be faid, that his fear did not imply a beleif of danger? This is impofUble. Yet his philofophy convinced him, that he was In no more danger in the dark when alone, than with company.
Here an unreafonable belief, which was merely a prejudice of the nurfery, fluck fo fart as to govern his condud:, in oppofition to his fpeculative belief as a Philofopher and a man of fenfe.
There are few perfons who can look down from the battlement of a very high tower without fear, while their reafon convinces them that they are in no more danger than when Handing upon the ground.
There have been perfons who profefltd to believe that tlicrr CFIAP.vr.
CHAP. VI. Is no diftindioa between virtue and vice, yet in their practice they refented injuries, and efteemed noble and virtuous actions.
There have been fceptics who profefled to difbelieve their fenfes, and every human facuky; but no fceptic was ever known, who did not, in pradlice, pay a regard to his fenfes and to his other faculties.
There are fome points of belief fo neceflary, that, without them, a man would not be the being which God made him. Thefe may be oppofed in fpeculation, but it is impolTible to root them out. In a fpeculative hour they feem to vanifh, but in practice they refume their authority. This feems to be the cafe of thofe who hold die dodlriue of neceflity, and yet adl as if they were free.
This natural convidlion of fome degree of power in ourfelves and in other men, refpedts voluntary adions only. For as all our power is directed by our will, we can form no conception of power, properly fo called, that is not under the diredlion of will. And therefore our exertions, our deliberations, our pur- pofes, our promifes, are only in things that depend upon our will. Our advices, exhortations and commands, are only in things that depend upon the will of thofe to whom they are ad- drefled. We impute no guilt to ourfelves, nor to others, in things where the will is not concerned.
But it deferves our notice, that we do not conceive every thing, without exception, to be in a man's power which depends upon his will. There are many exceptions to this general rule. The mofi: obvious of thefe I fhall mention, becaufe they both ferve to illuftrate the rule, and are of importance In the que- ftion concerning the liberty of man.
In the rage of madnefs, men are abfolutely deprived of the power power of felf-government. They adl voluntarily, but their will CHAP, vi. is driven as by a tempeft, which, in lucid intervals, they rcfolve to oppofe with all their might, but are overcome when the fit of madnefs returns.
Idiots are like men Malking in the dark, who cannot be faid to have the power of chulinir their way, becaufe they cannot diftinguiOi the good road from the bad. Having no light in their underflanding, they mufl either fit llill, or be carried on by fome blind impulfc.
Between the darknefs of infxncy, which is equal to that of idiots, and the maturity of reafon, there is a long twilight, which, by infenfible degrees, advances to the perfedl day.
In this period of life, man has but little of the power of felf- government. His actions, by nature, as well as by the laws of fociety, are in the power of others more than in his own. His folly and indifcretion, his levity and inconftancy, are confidered as the fault of youth, rather than of the man. We confider him as half a man and half a child, and expedl that each by turns fliould play its part. He would be thought a fcvere and wnequltable cenfor of manners, who required the fame cool de- liberation, the flmne fteady condudl, and the fame maftery over himfelf in a boy of thirteen, as in a man of thirty.
It is an old adage. That violent anger is a fhort fit of madtiefs. If this be literally true in any cafe, a man, in fuch a fit of paf- lion, cannot be faid to have the command of himfelf. If real madnefs could be proved, it muil have the cffecl of madnefs while it lafts, whether it be for an hour or for life. But the madnefs of a (hort fit of palHon, if it be really madnefs, is inca- pable of proof; and therefore is not admitted in human tribu- nals as an exculpation. And, I believe, there is no cafe where a man can fatisfy his own mind tliat his paflion, both in its beginning ESSAY IV.
GHAP, VI. ginning and in its progrefs, was irrefiflible. The Searcher of hearts alone knows infallibly what allowance is due in cafes of this kind.
But a violent paflion, though it may not be irrefiftible, is dif- ficult to be refifted: And a man, furely, has not the fame power over himfelf in palTion, as when he is cool. On this account it is allowed by all men to alleviate, when it cannot exculpate; and has its weight in criminal courts, as well as in private judg- ment.