It oueht likewife to be obferved. That he who has accuftomed himfelf to reftrain his pallions, enlarges by habit his power over them, and confequently over himfelf. When we confider that a Canadian favage can acquire the power of defying death, in its moft dreadful forms, and of braving the moft exquifite torment for many long hours, without loiing the command of himfelf; we may learn froili this, that, in the conflitution of human na- ture, there is ample fcope for the enlargement of that power of felf-command, without which there can be no virtue nor magna- nimity.
There are cafes, however, in which a man's voluntary adlions are thought to be very little, if at all, in his power, on account of the violence of the motive that impels him. The magnani- mity of a hero, or of a martyr, is not expected in every man, and on all occafions.
If a man trufled, by the government, with a fecret, which it is high treafon to difclofe, be prevailed upon by a bribe, we have no mercy for him, and hardly allow the greateft bribe to be any alleviation of his crhne.
But, on the other hand, if the fecret be extorted by the rack, or by the dread of prefent death, we pity him more than we blame FIRST ARGUMENT. 321 blame hiui, and would think it fevere and uncrjuitable to con- CHAP. vi. deuDi him as a traitor.
^^'^Klt is the reafon that all men agree in condemning this man as a traitor in the firfl; cafe, and in the Jail, either excul- pate him, or think his fault greatly alleviated? If he aded neceflarily in both cafes, compelled by an irrellftlblc motive, I can fee no reafou why we Ihould not pafs the fume judgment on both.
But the reafon of thefe dlfTcrent judgments is evidently this, That the love of money, and of what is called a man's intereft, is a cool motive, which leaves to a man the entire power over himfelf: But the torment of the rack, or the dread of prefent death, are fo violent motives, that men, who have not uncom- mon ftrength of mind, are not mafters of themfelves In fuch a Iituation, and therefore what they do is not imputed, or is thought lefs criminal.
If a man refift fuch motives, we admire his fortitude, and think his condud heroical rather than human. If he vields, we impute It to human frailty, and think him rather to be pitied than feverely cenfured.
Inveterate habits are acknowledged to diminifh very confider- ably the power a man has over himfelf. Although we may think him highly blameable In acquiring them, yet, when they are confirmed to a certain degree, we confider him as no longer mailer of himfelf, and hardly reclalmable without a miracle.
Thus we fee, that the power which we are led, by common fcnfe, to afcrlbe to man, refpeds his voluntary actions only, and that It has various limitations even with regard to them. Some adions that depend upon our will are eafy, others very diflicult, rmd fomc, peihaps, beyond our power. In different men, the S f power ESSAY IV.
CHAP. VI. power of felf-government is different, and in the fame man at different times. It may be diminiflied, or perhaps loft, by bad habits; it may be greatly increafed by good habits.
Thefe are fads attefted by experience, and fupported by the common judgment of mankind. Upon the fyftem of liberty, they are perfedly Intelligible; but, I think, irreconcileable to that of neceflity; for. How can there be an eafy and a diffi- cult in adtions equally fubjed: to neceffity? or, How can power be greater or lefs, increafed or diminiflied, in thofe who have no power i^ This natural convidlon of our adling freely, which is acknow- ledged by many who hold the dodlrine of neceffity, ought to throw the whole burden of proof upon that fide: For, by this, the fide of liberty has what lawyers call a Jus quafitiimy or a right of ancient poffeflion, which ought to Hand good till it be overturned. If it cannot be proved that we always ad: from neceffity, there is no need of arguments on the other fide to convince us that we are free agents.
To illuftrate this by a fimilar cafe; If a Philofopher would perfuade me, that my fellow-men with whom I converfe, are not thinking Intelligent beings, but mere machines, though I might be at a lofs to find arguments againft this ftrange opinion, I ffiould think it reafonable to hold the belief which nature gave me before I was capable of weighing evidence, vmtil con- vincing proof is brought againft It.
CHAR SECOND ARGUMEN T. 323 CHAP. VII.
Second Argument.
I'^H AT there is a real andeflentlal dirtincflion between right and wrong condud:, between jufl: and unjufl; that the mod perfe<5l moral reclltude is to be afcribed to the Deity j that man is a moral and accountable being, capable of ading right and wrong, and anfwcrable for his condudl to him who made him, and atllgned him a part to adt upon the Itage of life; are principles proclaimed by every man's confcience; principles upon which the fyftems of morality and natural religion, as well as the fyftem of revelation, are grounded, and which have been generally acknowledged by thofe who hold contrary opinions on the fubjedt of human liberty. I fliall therefore here take them for granted.
Thefe principles afford an obvious, and, I think, an invincible argument, that man is endowed with moral liberty.
Two things are implied in the notion of a moral and account- able being; underftandi ng and acflive power.
F'trjl, He muft underftand the law to which he is bound, and his obligation to obey it. IMoral obedience murt be voluntary, and muft regard the authority of the law. I may command my horfe to eat when he hungers, and drink when he thirfts. He does fo; but his doing it is no moral obedience. He does not underftand my command, and therefore can have no will to obey it. He has not the conception of moral obligation, and therefore cannot a<ft from the conviction of it. In eating and drinking he is moved by his own appetite onlv, and not by my authority.
CHAP. VII. Brute-animals are Incapable of moral obligation, becaufe thej have not that degree of underftanding which It implies. They have not the conception of a rule of conducft, and of obligation to obey it, and therefore, though they may be noxious, they can- not be criminal.
]\Ian, by his rational nature, is capable both of underftanding the law that is prefcribed to him, and of perceiving its obliga- tion. He knows what it is to be juft and honeft, to injure na raan, and to obey his Maker. From his conftltution, he has an immediate convid:ion of his obligation to thefe things. He has the approbation of his confcience when he ads by thefe rules v and he is confcious of guilt and demerit when he tranfgrefles them. And, without this l<jaowledge of his duty and his obliga- tion, he would not be a moral and accountable being.
Secondly^ Another thing implied in the notion of a moral and accountable being, is power to do what he is accountable for.
That no man can be under a moral obligation to do what it Is Impoflible for him to do, or to forbear what it is impoflible for him to forbear, Is an axiom as felf-evident as any In mathema- tics. It cannot be contradided, without overturning all notion of moral obligation y nor can there be any exception to it, when it is rightly underftood.
Some moralifts have mentioned what they conceive to be an exception to this maxim. The exception is this. When a man, by his own fault, has difabled himfelf from doing his duty, his obligation, they fay, remains, though he is now unable to dis- charge it. Thus, if a man by fumptuous living has become bankrupt, his inability to pay his debt does not take away his obligation.
To To judge whether, in this and Jnnilar cafes, there be any ex- CHAi'.vii. ception to the axiom above mentioned, they mull be ftatcd ac- curately.
No doubt a man is highly criminal in living al)Ovc his for- tune, and his crime is greatly aggravated by the circumftance of his being thereby unable to pay his jufl debt. Let us fup- pofe, therefore, that he is punifhed for this crime as much as it deferves j that his goods are fairly diftributed among his credi- tors, and that one half remains unpaid: Let us fuppofe alfo, that he adds no new crime to what is pad:, that he becomes a new man, and not only fupports himfelf by honefl induflry, but does all in his power to pay what he Hill owes.
I would now aflc, Is he further punifliable, and really guilty for not paying more than he is able? Let every man confult his confcience, and fay whether he can blame this man for not doing more than he is able to do. His guilt before his bank- ruptcy is out of the queftion, as he has received the puniHiment due for it. But that his fubfequent condutt is unblameable, every man mufl allow; and that, in his prefent ftate, he is ac- countable for no more than he is able to do. His obligation is not cancelled, it returns with his ability, and can go no far- ther.
Suppofe a fa'ilor, employed in the navy of his country, and longing for the eafe of a public hofpital as an invalid, to cut off his fingers, fo as to difable him from doing tiie duty of a fail- or j he is guilty of a great crime; but, after he has been pu- niflied according to the demerit of his crime, will his captain in- fill that he fliall ftill do the duty of a failor? Will he command him to go aloft when it is impofllble for him to do it, and pu- nifli him as guilty of difobedience? Surely if there be any fuch thing as juftice and injufticc, this would be unjufl and wanton cruelty.
Suppofe ESSAY IV.
Suppofe ESSAY IV.
Sunix)fe a fervant, through negligence and inattention, mif- takes the orders given him by his mafter, and, from this mi- ftake, does what he was ordered not to do. It is commonly faid that culpable ignorance does not excufe a fault: This de- cifion is inaccurate, becaufe it does not {hew where the fault lies: The fault was folely in that inattention, or negligence, ■vs'hich was the occafion of his miftake: There was no fubfe- quent fault.
This becomes evident, when we vary^the cafe fo far as to fup- pofe, that he was unavoidably led into the miftake without any fault on his part. His miftake is now invincible, and, in the opinion of all moralifts, takes aw-ay all blame; yet this new cafe fuppofes no change, but in the caufe of his miftake. His fubfequent condud: was the fame in both cafes. The fault therefore lay folely in the negligence and inattention which was the eaufe of his miftake.
The axiom. That invincible ignorance takes away all blame, is only a particular cafe of the general axiom. That there can be no moral obligation to what is impoftlble j the former is grounded upon the latter, and can have no other foundation.
I ftiall put only one cafe more. Suppofe that a man, by ex- cefs and intemperance, has entirely deftroyed his rational fa- culties, fo as to have become perfedlly mad or idiotical j fuppofe him forewarned of his danger, and that, though he forefaw that this muft be the confequence, he went on ftill in his criminal indulgence. A greater crime can hardly be fuppofed, or more deferving of fevere puniftiment? Suppofe him puniftied as he deferves; will it be faid, that the duty of a man is incumbent upon him now, when he has not the faculties of a man, or that he incurs new guilt when he is not a moral agent? Surely we may as well fuppofe a plant, or a clod of earth, to be a fubjedl of moral duty.
The SECOND ARGUMENT. 527 Tli€ tlecifions I have given of thefe cafes, are grounded upon CHAi'. vir. the fundamental principles of morals, the niofl; immediate dic- tates of confcience. If ihefe principles are given up, all mo- ral reafoning is at an end, and no diflinclion is left between what is jull and what is unjulh And it is evident, that none of thefe cafes furniflies any exception to the axiom above mention- ed. No moral obligation can be confident with impollibility in the performance.
A(f\ive power, therefore, is neceflltrily implied in the very no- tion of a moral accountable being. And if man be fuch a be- ing, he muft have a degree of acftive power proportioned to the account he is to make. He may have a model of perfedion let before him which he is unable to reach; but, if he does to the utmoft of his power, this is all he can be anfwerable for. To incur guilt, by not going beyond his power, is Impollible.
What was faid, in the firft argnmient, of the limitation of our power, adds much ftrength to the prefent argument. A man's power, it was obferved, extends only to his voluntary ac- tions, and has many limitations, even with refpecfl to them.
His accountablenefs has the fame extent and the fime limita- tions.
In the rage of madnefs he has no power over himfelf, neither Is he accountable, or capable of moral obligation. In ripe age, man is accountable in a greater degree than in non-age, becaufe his power over himfelf is greater. Violent paflions, and violent motives alleviate what is done through their influence, in the fame proportion as they diminilh the power of reliftance.
There is, therefore, a perfedl correfpondence between power, • on the one hand, and moral obligation and accountablenefs, on the other. They not only correfpond in general, as they refped voluntary J CHAP.vir. voluntary actions only, but every limitation of the firft produces a correfponding limitation of the two laft. This, indeed, amounts to nothing more than that maxim of common fenfe, confirmed by Divine authority, That to whom much is given, of him much will be required.
The fum of this argument is. That a certain degree of ac- tive power is the talent which God hath given to every rational accountable creature, and of which he will requii*e an account. If man had no power, he would have nothing to account for. All wife and all foolifh condud, all virtue and vice, confift in the right ule or in the abufe of that power which God hath given us. If man had no power, he could neither be wife nor foolifli, virtuous nor vicious.
If we adopt the fyftem of neceflity, the terms moral obligation and accountableuefs^ praife and blame^ inerit and demerit, jujiice and injujlice, reward and punijljment, •wifdom and Jolly, virtue and vice, ought to be difufed, or to have new meanings given to them when they are ufed in religion, In morals, or In civil govern- ment J for upon that fyftem, there can be no fuch things as they have been always ufed to fignify.
C HAP.
THIRD ARGUMENT. 329 CHAP.VIII.
Third Argument.
THAT man has po\ver over his own niflions and volition* appears, becaufc he is capable of carrying on, wifely and prudently, ai fyftem of condud, which he has before conceived in his mind, and refolved to profecute.
I take it for granted, that, among the various charaders of men, there have been fome, who, after they came to years of underftanding, deliberately laid down a plan of condud:, which they refolved to pnrUie through life; and that of thefe, fome have fteadily purfued the end they had in view, by the proper means.
It Is of no confequence in this argument, whether one has made the beft choice of his main end or not; whether his end be riches, or power, or fiime, or the approbation of his Maker. I fiippofe only, that he has pioidently and fteadily purfued it; that, in a long courfe of deliberate adions, he has taken the means that appeared moll conducive to his end, and avoided whatever might crofs it.
That fuch condud in a man demonftrates a certain degree of wifdom and underftanding, no man ever doubted j and, I fay, it demonltrates, with equal force, a certain degree of power over his voluntary determinations.
This will appear evident, if we conlidcr, that underftanding without power may projed, but can execute nothing. A regular plan of condud, as it cannot be contrived without underftand- ing, fo it cannot be carried into execution without power; and, T t therefore, CHAP.viii. therefore, the execution, as an effedl, demonflrates, with equal force, both power and underflandlng in the caufe. Every indi- cation of wifdom, taken from the effed, is equally an indication of power to execute what wifdom planned. And, if we have any evidence, that the wifdom which formed the plan is in the man, we have the very fame evidence, that the power which ex- ecuted it is in him alfo.
In this argument, we reafon from the fame principles, as in demonftrating the being and perfedlons of the FIrft Caufe of all things.
The effedls we obferve In the courfe of nature require a caufe. EfFedls wifely adapted to an end, require a wife caule. Every Indication of the wifdom of the Creator Is equally an indication of his power. His wifdom appears only In the works done by his power; for wifdom without power may fpeculate, but it cannot aft j it may plan, but It cannot execute its plans.
The fame reafoning we apply to the works of men. In a ftately palace we fee the wifdom of the archited:. His wifdom contrived It, and wifdom could do no more. The execution re- quired, both a diftind conception of the plan, and power to operate according to that plan.
Let us apply thefe principles to the fuppofition we have made. That a man, in a long courfe of condud:, has determined and adled prudently In the profecutlon of a certain end. If the man had both the wifdom to plan this courfe of condud, and that power over his own adions that was neceill^ry to carry It Into execution, he is a free agent, and ufed his liberty. In this inftance, with underftanding.
But if all his particular determinations, which concurred in the execution of this plan were produced, not by himfelf, but . by THIRD ARGUMENT. 331 by fome caufe aclint;; necefliirily upon liiui, then there is no cvi- CHAP.vin. clcncL" left that he contrived tliis plan, or that he ever fpent a thought about it.
The caufe that direcled all thefe determinations fo wifely, what- ever it was, muft be a wife and intelligent caufe; It muft have underltood the plan, and have intended the execution of it.
If it be faid, that all this courfe of determinations was pro- duced by motives; motives llirely have not underftanding to conceive a plan, and intend its execution. We muft therefore go back beyond motives to fome intelligent being who had the power of arranging thofe motives^ and applying them, in their proper order and feafon, fo as to bring about the end.
This intelligent being muft have underftood the plan, and in- tended to execute it. If this be fo, as the man had no hand in the execution, we have not any evidence left, that he had any hand in the contrivance, or even that he is a thinking being.
If we can believe, that an extenfive feries of means may con- fpire to promote an end without a caufe that intended the end, and had power to chufe and apply thofe means for the purpofe, we may as well believe, that this world was made by a fortui- tous concourfe of atoms, without an intelligent and powerful caufe.
If a lucky concourfe of motives could produce the condudl of an Alexander or a JuLtus C^sar, no reafon can be given wliy a lucky concourfe of atoms might not produce the plane- tary fyftem.
If, therefore, wife condudl in a man demonftrates that he has fome degree of wifdom, it demonftrates, with equal force and T t 2 evidence, CHAP. VI LI. evidence, that he has fome degree of power over his own deter- mi nations.
All the reafon we can aflign for believing that our fellow-men think and reafon, Is grounded upon their adions and fpeeches. If they are not the caufe of thefe, there Is no reafon left to conclude that they think and reafon.
Des Cartes thought that the human body is merely ame- chanical engine, and that all its motions and aftlons are pro- duced by mechanifm. If fuch a machine could be made to fpeak and to ad rationally, we might indeed conclude with cer- tainty, that the maker of it had both reafon and adlive power 5 but if we once knew, that all the motions of the machine were purely mechanical, we fhould have no reafon to conclude that the man had reafon or thought.
The conclufion of this argument is. That, If the adlions and fpeeches of other men give us fufficient evidence that they are reafonable beings, they give us the fame evidence, and the fame degree of evidence, that they are free agents...There is another conclufion that may be drawn from this rea- foning, which it Is proper to mention.
Suppofe a fiitalift, rather than give up the fcheme of neceillty, Ihould acknowledge that he has no evidence that there Is thought and reafon In any of his fellow-men, and that they may be mechanical engines for all that he knows j he will be forced to acknowledge,, that there raufh be adlive power, as well as uur derftanding, in the maker of thofe engines, and that the firft caufc is a free agent. We have the fame reafon to believe this, as to believe his exiftence and liis wifdom. And, if the Deity ads freely, every argument brought to prove that freedom of adion Is Impoflible, mull fall to the ground.
The THIRD ARGUMENT. 333 The Firft Cuufe gives us evidence of his power by every ef- C?lAP.viif. feci that gives us evidence of his wirdom. And, if he is jileafed to communicate to the work of his hands fonie degree of his Nvifdom, no reafon can be afligned why he may not communi- cate fome degree of his power, as the talent which wifdom is to employ.
That the firft motion, or the firft effecfl, whatever It be, can- not be produced necefl'arily, and, confequently, that the Firft Caufe muft be a free agent, has been demouftrated fo clearly and unanfwerably by Dr Clarke, both in his Demonftration of the Being and Attributes of God, and in the end of his Remarks on Collin's Philofophical Enquiry concerning Human Liberty, that I can add nothing to what he has faid; nor have I found any objection made to his reafoning, by any of the defenders of neceflltv.
Of Arguments for Neceffity.
SO M E of the arguments that have been offered for necef- fity were already confidered in this eflay.
It has been faid. That human liberty refpecls only the adions that are fubfequent to volition j and that power over the deter- minations of the will is inconceivable, and involves a contra- diction. This argument was confidered in the firft chapter.
It has been faid, That liberty is inconfiftent with the influence of motives, that it would make human atflions capricious, and man ungovernable by God or man. Thefe arguments were confidered in the fourth and fifth chapters.
I ESSAY IV.
CHAF.IX. I am now to make fome remarks upon other arguments that ^ " ' have been urged in this caufe. They may, 1 think, be reduced to three clafies. They are intended to prove, either that liberty of determination is impoffible, or that it would be hurtful, or that, in fad, man has no iuch liberty.
To prove that liberty of determination is impoffible, it has been faid, That there mufl; be a fufEcient reafon for every thing. For every exijlence^ for every evenly for every truths there mtiji be afuf- ficknt reafon.
The famous German Philofopher Leibnitz boafted much of having firfl: applied this principle to philolbphy, and of having, by that means, changed metaphyfics from being a play of un- meaning words, to be a rational and demonftrative fcience. On this account it deferves to be confidered.
A very obvious objection to this principle was, That two or more means may be equally fit for the fame end; and that, in fuch a cafe, there may be a fufficient reafon for taking one of the number, though there be no reafon for preferring one to another, of means equally fit.
To obviate this objeftion Leibnitz maintained, that the cafe fuppofed could not happen -, or, if it did, that none of the means could be ufed, for want of a fufficient reafon to prefer one to the reft. Therefore he detennined, with fome of the fchoolmen. That if an afs could be placed between two bundles of hay, or two fields of grafs equally inviting, the poor beaft would cer- tainly ftand ftill and flarve; but the cafe, he fays, could not happen without a miracle.
When it was objedted to this principle. That there could be no reafon but the will of God why the material world was placed in one part of unlimited fpace rather than another, or created OF ARGUMENTS FOR NECESSITY. 335 created at one point of unliipite4 duration ratlicr than another, CHAV. IX: or why the planets Hiould move from weft to eaft, rather than in a contrary diredion; thefe ohjedions Leibnitz, obviated hy maintaining, That there is no fueh thing as unoccupied fpace or duration; that fpace is nothing but the order of things coexlfting, and duration is nothing but the order of things fucceffive; that all motion is relative, fo that if there were only one body in the univerfe, It would be immoveable; that it is inconfiftent with the perfection of the Deity, that there fliould be any part of fpace unoccupied by body; and, I fiippofe, he underftood the fame of every part of duration. So that, according to this fyftcm, the world, like its Author, muft be infinite, eternal, and immoveable; or, at leaft, as great in extent and duration as it is poflible for it to be.
When it was objeded to the principle of a fuflicient reafon, That of two particles of matter perfectly fimilar, there can be no reafon but the will of God for placing this here and ibat there; this objection Leibnitz obviated by maintaining, That it is impoinble that there can be two particles of matter, or any two things perfedly fimilar. And this feems to have led him to another of his grand principles, which he calls, The Identity of indifcernibles.
When the principle of a fufficient reafon had produced fo many furprifing difcoveries in philofophy, it is no wonder that it fhould determine the long difputed queftion about human li^ berty. This it does In a moment. The determination of the will is an event for which there mult be a fulBcient reafon, that is, fomething previous, which was neceiTarily followed by that determination, and could not be followed by any other deter- mination; therefore it was neceflury.
Thus we fee, that this principle of the neceffity of a fufHcient reafon for every thing, is very fruitful of confequences; anrl by its fruits CHAP. IX. fruits we may judge of it. Thofe who will adopt it, muft adopt "^'""^ all the confequences that hang upon it. To fix them all be- yond difpute, no more is neceflary but to prove the truth of the principle on which they depend.
I know of no argument offered by Leibnitz in proof of this principle, but the authority of Archimedes, who, he fays, makes ufe of it to prove, that a balance loaded with equal weights on both ends will continue at reft.
I grant it to be good reafoning with regard to a balance, or with regard to any machine, That, when there is no external caufe of its motion, it muft remain at reft, becaufe the ma- chine has no power of moving itfelf. But to apply this reafoii- ing to a man, is to take for granted that the man is a machine, which is the very point in queftion.
Leibnitz, and his followers, would have us to take this prin- ciple of the neceftity of a fufficient reafon for every exiftence, for every event, for every truth, as a firft principle, without proof, without explanation; though it be evidently a vague pro- pofition, capable of various meanings, as the word reafon is. It muft have different meanings when applied to things of fo dif- ferent nature as an event and a truth; and it may have diffe- rent meanings when applied to the fame thing. We cannot therefore form a diftind: judgment of it in the grofs, but only by taking it to pieces, and applying it to different things, in a precife and diftin6l meaning.
It can have no connection with the difpute about liberty, ex- cept when it is applied to the determinations of the will. Let us therefore fuppofe a voluntary action of a man j and that the queftion is put, Whether was there a fufficient reafon for this iidion or not?
The OF ARGUMENTS FOR NECESSITY. 337 The natural aiul obvious meaning of this qucllion is, Was CHAP. IX. there a inotive to the adion fullkient to jultify it to be wife and good, or, at Icafl, innocent? Surely, in this fenfe, there is not a fufficient reafon for every human adion, becaufe there are ma- ny that are foolilh, unreafonable and unjuftitiable.
If the meaning of the qucflion be, 'Was there a caufe of the action? Undoubtedly there was: Of every event there muft be a caufe, that had power fnfhcient to produce it, and that exert- ed that power for the purpofe. In the prefent cafe, either the man was the caufe of the adion, and then it was a free adlion, and is juftly imputed to him; or it mufl have had another caufe, and cannot juftly be imj)uted to the man. In this fenfe, therefore, it is granted that there was a fufficient reafon for the action; but the queftion about liberty is not in the Icaft affeded by this concelllon.
If, again, the meaning of the queftion be, Was there fomc- thlng previous to the adion, which made it to be neceftarily produced? Every man, who believes that the adlion was free, will anfwer to this queftion in the negative.
I know no other meaning that can be put upon the principle of a fufficient reafon, when applied to the determinations of the human will, befides the three I have mentioned. In the firfl:, it is evidently falfe; In the fecond, it is true, but does not affircfl the queftion about liberty; in the third, it is a mere aflertion of neceffity without proof.
Before we leave this boafted principle, we may fee how it ap- plies to events of another kind. When we fay that a Philofo- pher has afllgned a fufficient reafon for fuch a phetnomenon. What is the meaning of this? The meaning furely is. That he has accounted for it from the known laws of nature. The fuffiicient reafon of a phenomenon of nature muft therefore be fomc law U u or CHAP. IX. or la^vs of nature, of which the phaenomenon Is a neccHary confequence. But are we fure that, in this fenfe, there is a fuf- ficient reafon for every phenomenon of nature? I think we are not.
For, not to fpeak of inlraculous events, hi which the laws of nature are fufpended, or counteradted, we know not but that, in the ordinary courfe of God's providence, there may be parti- cular adls of his adminiftration, that do not come under any general law of nature.
Eftablilhed laws of nature are necefTary for enabling Intelli- gent creatures to condudl their affairs with wifdom and pru- dence, and profecute their ends by proper means; but ftill It may be fit, that fome particular events fhould not be fixed by general laws, but be diredted by particular adls of the Divine government, that fo his reafonable creatures may have fufficient inducement to fupplicate his aid, his protedlion and direction, and to depend upon him for the fuccefs of their honefl de- figns.