We fee that, in human governments, even thofe that are mofl legal, it is impollible that every ad: of the adminiftration iliould be direded by eftabliflied laws. Some things mufl be left to the diredion of the executive power, and particularly ads of cle- mency and bounty to petitioning fubjeds. That there is no- thing analogous to this in the Divine government of the world, no man Is able to prove.
We have no authority to pray that God would counterad or fufpend the laws of nature in our behalf. Prayer therefore fup- pofes that he may lend an ear to our prayers, without tranf- grefling the laws of nature. Some have thought that the only ufe of prayer and devotion is, to produce a proper temper and difpofition In ourfelves, and that it has no elHcacy with the Deity..
OF ARGUMENTS FOR NECESSITY. 339 Deity. But this is a hypothcfis without proof. It contradids CMAl'. ix. our moll natural fcntiaients, as well as the plain dodrine of fcrip- ture, and tends to damp the fervour of every act of devotion.
It was indeed an article of the fyftcm of Leibmitz, That the Deity, fmce the creation of the world, never did any thing, ex- cepting in the cafe of n^iraclcs; his work being made fo per- feA at firfl, as never to need his interpofition. But, in this, he was oppofed by Sir Isaac Newton, and others of the ableft Philofophers, nor was he ever able to give any proof of this tenet.
There is no evidence, therefore, that there is a fufiiclent rea- fon for every natural event; if, by a "uFicient rcafon, we under- ftand feme fixed law or laws of nature, of which that event is a necelTary confequence.
But what, fhall we fay, Is the fufficient reafon for a truth? For our belief of a truth, I think, the fufficient reafon is our having good evidence; but what may be meant by a fufficient reafon for its being a truth, I am not able to guefs, unlefs the fufficient reafon of a contingent truth be, That it is true; and, of a neceflary truth, that it;«///? l)e true. This makes a man little wifer.
From what has been fald, I think it appears. That this principle of the necelTity of a fufficient reafon for every thing, is very in- definite in its fignlfication. If it mean, That of every event there mufl be a caufe that had fufficient power to produce it, this is true, and has always been admitted as a firft principle in Phi- lofophy, and in common life. If it mean that every event mufl be neceflarily confequent upon fomething (called a fufficient reafon) that went before it; this is a direct aflertion of univcr- fal fatality, and has many (Irangc, not 10 fay abfurd, confe- quences: But, in this fenfe, it is neither fclf-evident, nor has U u 2 any ESSAY IV.
CHAP. IX. jjpy proof of it been offered. And, In general, In every fenfe In which it has evidence, it gives no new information; and, in eve- ry fenfe in which it would give new information, it wants evi- dence.
Another argument that has been ufed to prove Hberty of aftion to be impoflible is, That it implies " an effedl without a *♦ caufe."
To this it may be briefly anfwered. That a free adion is an effe<ft produced by a being who had power and will to pro- duce it; therefore it is not an effedl without a caufe.
To fuppofe any other caufe neceffary to the produdlion of an effed, than a being who had the power and the will to produce it, is a contradidion; for it is to fuppofe that being to have power to produce the effed, and not to have power to produce it.
But as great ftrefs is laid upon this argument by a late zea- lous advocate for neceility, we Ihall conllder the light in which: he puts it.
He' introduces this argument with an obfervatlon to which I entirely agree: It is, That to eftablifli this dodrine of necef- fity, nothing is neceffary but that, throughout all nature, the fame confequences ihould invariably refult from the fame cir- cumftances^ I know nothing more that can be def] red to eftablifh univer- fal fatality throughout the univerfe. When it is proved that, through all nature, the fame confequences invariably refult from the fame circumltances, the dodrine of liberty mufl: be given up.
To prevent all ambiguity, I grant, that, in reafoning, the fame f;ime confeqiicnces, throughout all nature, will Invariahly follow CHUMX. from the fame prenilfes: Hecaufe good reafonlnjif mud be good reafoning in all times and places. But this has nothing to do with the dodrine of necelllty. The thing to be proved, there- fore, in order to eftablilli that dodrine, is, That, through all na- ture, the fame events invariably refult from the fame circum- flances.
Of this capital point, the proof offered by that author is, That an event not preceded by any circumftanccs that determined it to be what it was, would be an effcEl without a caiifc. Why fo? " For, fays he, a caufc cannot be defined to be any thing but " fuch previous c'lrcumjlanccs as are conjlanlly folloived hy a certain ef~ " fcR; the conflancy of the refult making us conclude, that " there muft be a fiifficient reafoii, in the nature of things, why it " fliould be produced in thofe circumflances."
I acknowledge that, if this be the only definition that can be given of a caufe, it will follow, That an event not preceded by circumflances that determined it to be what it was, would be, not an effcB without a caufe, which is a contradiclion in terms, but an event without a caufe, which I hold to be impollible. The matter therefore is brought to this lllue, \Vhether this be the only definition that can be given of a caufe?
With regard to this point, we may obferve,^r/?. That this defi- nition of a caufe, bating the phrafeology of putting a c<7///^ under the category of circumjlances, which I take to be new, is the fame, in other words, with that which Mr Hume gave, of which he ought to be acknowledged the inventor. For 1 know of no author before Mr Hu.me, who maintained, that we ha\c no other notion of a caufe, but that it is fomething prior to the ef- fc<fl, which has been found by experience to he conftantly fol- lowed by the effecl. This is a main pillar of his fyflcm; and he ESSAY IV.
•CHAP. IX. he has drawn very important confequences fr^m this definition, which I am far from thinking this author will adopt.
Without repeating what I have before faid of caufes in the firft of thefe Eflays, and in the fecond and third chapters of this, I {hall here mention fome of the confequences that may be juftly deduced from this definition of a caufe, that we may judge of it by its fruits.
Ytrjl, It follows from this definition of a caufe, that night is the caufe of day, and day the caufe of night. For no two things have more conflantly followed each other fince the be- ginning of the world.
Secondly, It follows from this definition of a caufe, that, for what we know, any thing may be the caufe of any thing, fince nothing is eflential to a caufe but its being conftantly followed by the effed. If this be fo, what is unintelligent may be the caufe of what is intelligent; folly may be the caufe of wifdom, and evil of good; all reafoning from the nature of the effecft to the nature of the caufe, and all reafoning from final caufes, muft be given up as fallacious.
Thirdly, From this definition of a caufe, it follows, that we have no reafon to conclude, that every event muft have a caufe: For innumerable events happen, when it cannot be fliewn that there were certain previous circumftances that have conftantly been followed by fuch an event. And though it were certain, that every event we have had accefs to obferve had a caufe, it would not follow, that every event muft have a caufe: For it is contrary to the rules of logic to conclude, that, becaufe a thing has always been, therefore it muft be j to reafon from what is contingent, to what is neceflary.
Fourthly^ From this definition of a caufe, it would follow, that we OF ARGUMENTS FOR NECESSITY. 343 we have no reafon to conclude that there was any caufe of the CiTMv ix. creation of tliis world: For there were no previous clrcum- ftances that had been conllantly followed by fuch an eflcd:. And, for the fame reafon, it would follow from the definition, that whatever was fmgular in its nature, or the firft thing- of its kind, could have no caule.
Several of thefe confequences were fondly embraced by Mr Hume, as necefliirily following from his definition of a caiifc, and as favourable to his fyllem of abfolute fcepticlfin. Thofe who adopt the definition of a caufe, from which they follow may chufe whether they will adopt its confequences, or Hiew that they do not follow from the definition.
A fecond ohfervation with regard to this argument is, That a definition of a caufe may be given, which is not burdened with fuch untoward confe-. uences.
Why may not an efficient caufe be defined to be a being that had power and will to produce the cffed? The produdion of an etfecl requires adive power, and adive power, being a qua- lity, muft be in a being endowed with that power. Power without will produces no effed 3 but, where thefe are conjoined, the effed muft be produced.
This, I think, is the proper meaning of the word caufe, when it is ufed in mttaphyfics; and particularly when we affirm, that every thing that begins to exift muft have a caufe; and when, by rrjafonlng, we prove, that there muft be an eternal Firft Caufe of all things.
Was the world produced by previous circumftances wiiich are conftantly followed by fuch an effied? or, Was it produced by a Being that had power to produce it, and willed its produdion?
In ESSAY IV.
In natural philofophy, the word caufe is often ufed in a very different fenfe. "When an event is produced according to a known law of nature, the law of nature is called the caufe of that event. But a law of nature is not the efBcient caufe of any event. It is only the rule, according to which the efficient caufe adts. A law is a thing conceived in the mind of a rational being, not a thing that has a real exiflence; and, therefore, like a motive, it can neither adt nor be adted upon, and confequent- ly cannot be an efficient caufe. If there be no being that adls according to the law, it produces no effedl.
This author takes it for granted, that every voluntary aftion of man was determined to be what it was by the laws of nature, in the fame fenfe as mechanical motions are determined by the laws of motion; and that every choice, not thus determined, " is " juft as impolTible, as that a mechanical motion fliould depend " upon no certain law or rule, or that any other effedl fliould " exifl without a caufe."
It ought here to be obferved, that there are two kinds of laws, both very properly called laws of nature, which ought not to be confounded. There are moral laws of nature, and phyli- cal laws of nature. The firfl: are the rules which God has pre- fcribed to his rational creatures for their condudl. They re- fpedl voluntary and free adlions oiily \ for no other actions can be fubjedl to moral rules. Thefe laws of nature ought to be al- ways obeyed, but they are often tranfgrefled by men. There is therefore no impofllbility in the violation of the moral laws of nature, nor is iuch a violation an effed: without a caufe. The tranfgreffor is the caufe, and is juftly accountable for it.
The phyfical laws of nature are the rules according to which the Deity commonly adls in his natural government of the world; and, whatever is done according to them, is not done by man, but by God, either immediately or by inftruments un- der or ARGUMENTS FOR NECESSITY. 345 der his direcftion. Thefc laws of nature neither reflrain the crJAP. IX. power of" the Author of nature, nor bring him under any obhga- tion to do nothing beyond their fjjhere. He has fomctimes adled contrary to them, in the cafe of miracles, and perhaps of- ten adls without regard to them, in the ordinary courfe of his providence. Neither miraculous events, which are contrary to the phyfical laws of nature, nor fuch ordinary ads of the Di- vine adminiftration as are without their fphere, arc impollible, nor are they effcEls without a catije. God is the caufe of them, and to him only they are to be imputed.
That the moral laws of nature are often tranfgrefled by man, is undeniable. If the phyfical laws of nature make his obedi- ence to the moral law> to be impoflible, then he is, in the li- teral fenfe, born under one law, bound unto another, which contra- dicts every notion of a righteous government of the world.
But though this fuppofition were attended with- no fuch (hocking confequence, it is mei'ely a fuppofition; and until it be proved, that every choice or voluntary adion of man is deter- mined by the phyfical laws of nature, this argument for necefli- ty is only the taking for granted the point to be proved.
Of the fame kind is the argument for the impoflibility of li- berty, taken from a balance, which cannot move but as it is moved by the weights put into it. This argument, though urged by aimoft every writer in defence of neceflity, is fo piti- ful, and has been fo often anfwered, that it fcarce delerves to be mentioned.
Every argument in a difpute, which is not grounded on prin- ciples granted by both parties, is that kind of fophifm which lo- gicians call pctitio prtncipn\ and fuch, in my apprehenfion, are all the arguments oflered to prove that liberty of adion is im- poflible.
CHAP. X. jj. n^jiy farther be obferved, that every argument of this clafs, if it were really conclufive, inufl extend to the Deity, as well as to all created beings; and neceflary exiftence, which has always been confidered as the prerogative of the Supreme Being, muft belong equally to every creature and to every event, even the moft trifling.
This I take to be the fyftem of Spinosa, and of thofe among the ancients who carried fatality to the higheft pitch.
I before referred the reader to Dr Clarke's argument, which profelTes to demonftrate, that the Firft Caufe is a free* agent. Until that argument fhall be ftiewn to be fallacious, a thing which I have not feen attempted, fuch weak arguments as have been brought to prove the contrary, ought to have little weight.
'The fame SuhjeEl.
WITH regard to the fecond clafs of arguments for necef- iity, which are intended to prove, that liberty of ac- tion would be hurtful to man, I have only to obferve, that it is n fad too evident to be denied, whether we adopt the fyflem of liberty or that of necefllty, that men adually receive hurt from their own voluntary adions, and from the voluntary adions of other men j nor can it be pretended, that this fad is inconfiftent with the dodrine of liberty, or that it is more unaccountable upon this fyftem than upon that of neceffity.
In order, therefore, to draw any folid argument againft liber- ty, from its hurtfulnefs, it ought to be proved, That, if man were OF ARGUMENTS FOR NECESSITY. 3+7 were a free agent, he would do more hurt to himfclf, or to ^ others, than he actually does.
To this purpofe it has been faid, That liberty woidd make men's actions capricious; that it would deftroy the influence of motives; that it would take away the effe<5t of rewards and pu- nilhments; and that it would make man abfolutely ungovern- able.
Thefe arguments have been already confulered in the fourth and fifth chapters of this Eflay; and, therefore, I fliall now proceed to the third clafs of arguments for necefllty, which are intended to prove, that, in faft, men are not free agents.
The moft formidable argument of this clafs, and, I think, the only one that has not been confidered in fome of the preceding chapters, is taken from the prefcience of the Deity.
God forefees every determination of the human mind. It muft therefore be what he forefees it fhall be; and therefore muft be necefTary.
This argument may be underflood three different ways, each of which we fliall confider, that we may fee all its force.
The necefllty of the event may be thought to be a juft confe- quence, either barely from its being certainly future, or barely from its being forefeen, or from the impofllbility of its being forefeen, if it was not neceffary.
Fir^, It may be thought, that, as nothing can be known to be future which is not certainly future; fo, if it be certainly future, it muft be neceflary.
This opinion has no lefs authority in its favour than tliat of X x 2 Akistotjle, CFIAr. X.
I CHAF. X. Aristotle, who indeed held the doctrine of liberty, but be- lieving, at the lame time, that whatever is certainly future muft be neceflary, In order to defend the liberty of human actions, maintained, That contingent events have no cenain futurity; but I know of no modern advocate for liberty, who has put the defence of it upon that ifllie.
It muft be granted, that as whatever was, certainly was, and whatever is, certainly is, fo whatever fhall be, certainly fhall be. Thefe are identical propofitions, and cannot be doubted by thofe who conceive them diftinclly.
But I know no rule of reafoning by which it can be inferred, that, becaufe an event certainly (hall be, therefore its produc- tion muft be neceflary. The manner of its produdion, whe- ther free or neceflary, cannot be concluded from the time of its production, whether it be paft, prefent or future. That it fhall be, no more implies that it fliall be neceflarily, than that it fliall be freely produced; for neither prefent, paft nor future, have any more connection with necefllty than they have with freedom.
I grant, therefore, that, from events being forefeen, it may be juftly concluded, that they are certainly future; but from their being certainly future, it does not follow that they are ne- ceflary.
Secondly, If it be meant by this argument, that an event muft be neceflary, merely becaufe it is forefeen, neither is this a juft confequence: For it has often been obferved, That prefcience and knowledge of every kind, being an immanent act, has no effect upon the thing known. Its mode of exiftence, whether it be free or neceflary, is not in the leaft affedted by its being known to be future, any more than by its being known to be paft or prefent. The Deity forefees his own futuxe free adions, but OF ARGUMENTS FOR NECESSITY. 349 but neither his forefight nor his purjiofc makes them ncceflliry. CH-y--^- The arji;inncnt, therefore, taken in this view, as well as in the former, is inconclufive.
A third way in which this argument may he underftood, is this: It is impoirihle that an event which is not necefTary ihould be forefeen; therefore every event that is certainly foreieen, muft be necellary. Here the conchiiion certainly follows from the antecedent propofition, and therefore the wliole ftrels of the argument lies upon the proof of that propofition.
Let us confider, therefore, whether it can be proved, That no free adion can be certainly forefeen. If this can be proved, it will follow, either that all adlions are neceflary, or that all ac- tions cannot be forefeen.
With regard to the general propofition. That it is impofllble that any free adion can be certainly forefeen, I obferve, FirJ}, That every man who believes the Deity to be a free agent, muft believe that this propofition not only is incapable of proof, but that it is certainly falle: For the man himfelf fore- fees, that the Judge of all tlie earth will always do what is right, and that he will fulfd whatever he has promifed j and, at the fame time, believes, that, in doing what is right, and in fulfilling his promifes, the Deity a(fts with the mort perfed: freedom.
Secondly, I obfen'e, That every man who believes that it is an abfurdity or contraditflion, that any free acftion fliould be certain- ly forefeen, mud believe, if he will be confident, either that the Deity is not a free agent, or that he does not forcfee his own actions; nor can we forefee that he will do what is right, and will fulfil his promifes.
rbirdh, ESSAY IV.
rbirdh, ESSAY IV.
CHAP. X. Thirdly^ Without confidering the confequences which this ge- neral propofition carries in its bofom, which give it a very bad afpecl, let us attend to the arguments offered to prove it.
Dr Priestley has laboured more in the proof of this propo- fition than any other author I am acquainted with, and main- tains it to be, not only a difficulty and a myftery, as it has been called, that a contingent event Ihould be the objedl of know- ledge, but that, In reality, there cannot be a greater abfurdity or contradiction. Let us hear the proof of this.
" For, fays he, as certainly as nothing can be known to ex- " ift, but what does exift; fo certainly can nothing be known to " ar'ifefrom what does ex'ifi, but what does arife from it or de- " pend upon it. But, according to the definition of the terms, " a contingent event does not depend upon any previous known " circumftances, fmce fome other event might have arifeninthe " fame circumftances."
This argument, when ftripped of incidental and explanatory claufes, and affedled variations of exprefllon, amounts to this: Nothing can be known to arife from what does exift, but what does arife from it: But a contingent event does not arife from what does exift. The conclufion, which is left to be drawn by the reader, muft, according to the rules of reafoning, be: There- fore a contingent event cannot be known to arife from what does exift.
It is here very obvious, that a thing may arife from what does exift, two Avays, freely or neceffarily. A contingent event a- rifes from its caufe, not neceftarily but freely, and fo, that ano- ther event might have arifen from the fxme caufe, in the fame circumftances.
The fecond propofition of the argument is, That a contingent event OF ARGUMENTS FOR NECESSITY. 33 event does not ilcpcncl upon any previous known circumrtances, which 1 lake to be only a variation of the term of «&/ ar'ifmg from •what does exijl. Therefore, in order to make tlie two propofi- tions to correfpond, we mull underftand by arifing from what does extfl, arifing neceflarily from what does cxift. When this ambiguity is removed, the argument ftands thus: Nothing can be known to arife neceflarily from what does exift, but what does necellarily arife from it: But a contingent event does not arife neceflarily from what docs exilt j therefore a contingent event cannot be known to arife necelTarily from what docs exift.
1 grant the whole; but the conclufion of this argument is not what he undertook to prove, and tlierefore the argument Is that kind of fophifiii which logicians call ignoratitia elenchi.
The thing to be proved is not, That a contingent event can- not be known to arife neceflarily from what exillsj but that a contingent future event cannot be the object of knowledge.
To draw the argument to this conclufion, it muft be put thus: Nothing can be known to arife from what does exifl:, but w hat arifes necefllirily from it: But a contingent event does not arife neceflarily from what does exifl: j therefore a contingent event cannot be known to arife from what does exifl.
The conclufion here is what it ought to be j but the \ix^ pro- pofltion ailumes the thing to be proved, and therefore the argu- ment is what logicians call pcth'io principll.
To the fame purpofe he fays, " That nothing can be known " at prefent, except itfelf or its neceflary caufe exifl at prc- " fent."
This is afllrmed, but I find no proof of it.
Again CHAP. X.
ESSAY IV.
Again he fays, " That knowledge fiippofes an object, which, " iu this cafe, does notexift." It is true that knowledge fuppofes an objed, and every thing that is known is an objed of know- ledge, whether paft, prefent, or future, whether contingent or neceflary.
Upon the whole, the arguments 1 can find upon this point, bear no proportion to the confidence of the aflertion, that there cannot be a greater abfurdity or contradidion, than that a con- tingent event fhould be the objed of knowledge.
To thofe who, without pretending to fliew a manifefl abfurdi- ty or contradidion in the knowledge of future contingent e- vents, are ftill of opinion, that it is impoirible that the future free adions of man, a being of imperfed wifdom and virtue, flioukl be certainly foreknown, I would humbly offer the fol- lowing confiderations.
I. I grant that there is no knowledge of this kind In man j and this is the caufe that we find it fo difficult to conceive it in any other being.
All our knowledge of future events is drawn either from their necefiliry connedion with the prefent courfe of nature, or from their connedion with the charader of the agent that produces them. Our knowledge, even of thofe future events that necef- farily refult from the eftablifhed laws of nature, is hypothetical. It fuppofes the continuance of thofe laws with which they are conneded. And how long thofe laws may be continued, we have no certain knowledge. God only knows when the pre- fent courfe of nature lliall be changed, and therefore he only has certain knowledge even of events of this kind.
The charader of perfed wifdom and perfed reditude in the Deity, OF ARGUMENTS FOR NECESSITY. ^53 Deity gives us certain knowledge th.it he will always be true CHA" x. in all his declarations, faithful in all his pro nifes, and juft in ail his difpenfations. But when we reafon from the character of men to their future adions, though, in many cafes, we have fucli probability as we reft upon in our moft important worldly concerns, yet we have no certainty, becaufe men are imperfett in wifdoni and in virtue. If we had even the moft pcrfed: know- ledge of the charader and fituation of a man, this would not be fulBcient to give certainty to our knowledge of his future adions; becaufe, in fonie adions, both good and bad men de- viate from their general charader.
The prefcience of the Deity, therefore, muft be different not only in degree, but in kind, from any knowledge we can attain of futurity.
2. Though we can have no conception how the future free adions of men may be known by the Deity, this is not a fufii- cient reafon to conclude that they cannot be known. Do we know, or can we conceive, how God knows the fecrets of mens hearts? Can we conceive how God made this world without any pre-exiftent matter? All the ancient Philofophers believed this to be impolTible: And for what reafon but this, that they could not conceive how it could be done. Can we give any better reafon for believing that the adions of men cannot be certain- ly forefeen?
3. Can we conceive how we ourfelves have certain knowledge by thofe fixculties with which God has endowed us? If any man thinks that he underftands diftindly how he is confcio'is of his own thoughts; how he perceives external objeds by his fenfes i how he remembers paft events, I am afraid that he is not yet fo wile as to underftand his own ignorance.
4» There feems to me to be a great analogy between the pre- Y y fcience ESSAY IT.
CHAP. X. fclence of future contingents, and the memory of pafl: contln- gents. We polTefs the laft in fome degree, and therefore find no difficulty in believing that it may be perfed in the Deity. But the firfl we have in no degree, and therefore are apt to think it impoflible.
In both, the objed of knowledge is neither what prefently ex- ifts, nor has any neceflary connedion with what prefently exifts. Every argument brought to prove the impoffibility of prefcience, proves, with equal force, the impoflibiHty of memory. If it be true that nothing can be known to arife from what does exift, but what neceflarily arifes from it, it muft be equally true, that nothing can be known to have gone before what does exift, but what muft neceflarily have gone before it. If it be true that nothing future can be known unlefs its neceflary caufe exift at prefent, it muft be equally true that nothing paft can be known unlefs fomething confequent, with which it is necefl^arily connedt- ed, exift at prefent. If the fatalift fliould fay. That paft events are indeed neceflarily conneded with the prefent, he will not furely venture to fay, that it is by tracing this neceflary con?- nedion, that we remember the paft.
Why then fliould we think prefcience impoflible In the Al- mighty, when he has given us a faculty which bears a ftrong analogy to it, and which is no lefs unaccountable to the human underftanding, than prefcience is. It is more reafonable, as well as more agreeable to the facred writings, to conclude with a pious father of the church, " Qnocirca nullo mode cogimur, aut ** retenta prsefclentia Dei tollere voluntatis arbitrium, aut retento ." voluntatis arbitrio, Deum, quod nefas eft, negare praefcium fu- " turorum: Sed utrumque arapledimur, utrumque fideliter et " veraciter confitemur: Illud ut bene credamus j hoc ut bene " vivamus," Aug.
CHAP.
OF THE PERMISSION OF EVIL.
Of the Perni'ijfion of EviL ANOTHER ufe has been made of Divine prefcience by the advocates for necefllty, which it is proper to confider be- fore wc leave this fubject.