It has been faid, ** That all thofe confeqaences follow from " the Divine prefcience which are thought moft alarming in the " fcheme of neceility j and particularly God's being the proper " caufe of moral evil. For, to fuppofe God to forefee and per- " mlt what it was in his power to have prevented, is the very " fame thing, as to fuppofe him to will, and diredly to caufe " it. He diitindlly forefees all the adions of a man's life, and " all the confequences of them: If, therefore, he did not think " any particular man and his condud: proper for his plan of " creation and providence, he certainly would not have in- ** troduced him into being at all."
In this reafoning we may obferve, that a fuppofition Is made which feems to contradidt itfelf.
That all the adions of a particular man (hould be diftindly forefeen, and, at the fame time, that that man fhould never be brought into exiftence, feems to me to be a contradidion: And the fame contradidion there is, in fuppofing any adion to be diftindly forefeen, and yet prevented. For, if it be forefeen, it Ihall happen; and, if it be prevented, it (hall not happen, and therefore could not be forefeen.
The knowledge here fuppofed is neither prefcience nor fciencc, Y y 3 but C?IAP. XL but fomefhing very different from both. It is a kind of know- ledge, which fome metaphyfical divines, in their controverfies about the order of the Divine decrees, a fubject far beyond the limits of human underftanding, attributed to the Deity, and of which other divines denied the poffibility, while they firmly maintained the Divme prefcience.
It was cciUed fciefifia media, to diftinguifh it from prefcience j^ and by this fdentia media was meant, not the knowing from eternity all things that fhall exill, which is prefcience, nor the knowing all the connexions and relations of things that exift or may be conceived, which is (cience, but a knowledge oF things contingent, that never did nor fhall exifl. For inftance, the knowing every action that would be done by a man who is barely conceived, and fhall never be brought mto exiflence.
Agalnft the pofTibllity of the fcieinla media arguments may be urged, which cannot be applied to prefcience. Thus it may be faid, that nothing can be known but what is true. It is true that the future adions of a iv(t& agent fliall exift, and there- fore we fee no impoflibility ia its being known that they fhall' exifl: But with regard to the free adtions of an agent that ne- ver did nor fhall exifl, there is nothing true, and therefore nothing can be known. To fay that the being conceived, would- certainly ad in fuch a way, if placed in fuch a fituation, if it have any meaning, is to fay, That his adling in that way is the confequence of the conception j but this contradicts the fuppo- fitioii of its being a free adiona Things merely conceived have no relations or connexions but fuch as are implied in the conception, or are conlequent. from it. Thus I conceive two. circles in the fame plane. If this be all I conceive, it is not true that thefe circles are equal or unequal, becaufe neither of thefe relations is implied in the conception 3 yet if the two circles really exifled, they mufl be either OF THE PERMISSION OF EVIL. 357 either equal or uuc'iikiI. A^ain, I conceive two circles in the C^HAI' xi. fame i)hinc, the diftancc of whofe centres Is equal to the fum of their feniidiamctcrs. It Is true of thefe circles, that they will touch one another, becaufe this follows from the conception; but it Is not true that they will be equal or unequal, becaufe neither of thefe relations is implieil in the conception, nor is con- fcquent from it.
In like manner, I can conceive a being who has power to do an inditTercnt adion, or not to do It. It Is not true that he would do it, nor is it true that he would not do It, becaufe nei- ther is implied in my conception, nor follows from it; and what is not true cannot be known.
Though I do not perceive any fallacy In this argument agalnfl a fcicntia media, I am fenfible how apt we are to err in applying what belongs to our conceptions and our knowledge, to the con- ceptions and knowledge of the Supreme Being; and, therefore, without pretending to determine for or againfl a fcientia media, I only obferve, that, to fuppofe that the Deity prevents what he forefees by his prefcience, is a contradidion, and that to know that a contingent event which he fees fit not to permit would certainly happen if permitted, is not prefcience, but the fcientia media, whofe exigence or poilibillty we are under no neceility of admitting.
Waving all dlfpute about fcientia media., we ackno\vIedge, that nothing can happen under the adminillratlon of the Deity, which he does not fee fit to permit. The permillion of natural and moral evil. Is a phenomenon which cannot be cMfputed. To account for this phaeiiomenon under the government of a ileing of infinite gooilnefs, jufiice, wifdom and power, has, hi all ages been confidercd as difficult to human reafon, whether we em- brace the fyflem of liberty or that of necellity. Bat, If the difficulty of accounting for this phacnomenon upon the fvfleiji cf cf CHA?. XI. of neceflity, be as great as it is upon the fyilem of liberty, it can have no weight when ufed as an argument againft liberty.
The defenders of neceility, to reconcile it to the principles of Theifm, find themfelves obliged to give up all the moral attri- butes of God, excepting that of goodnefs, or a defire to produce happinefs. This they hold to be the fole motive of his making and governing the univerfe. Juftice, veracity, faithfulnefs, are only modifications of goodnefs, the means of promoting its pur- pofes, and are exercifed only fo far as they ferve that end. Virtue is acceptable to him and vice difpleafing, only as the firft tends to produce happinefs and the laft mifery. He is the pro- per caufe and agent of all moral evil as well as good > but it is for a good end, to produce the greater happinefs to his creatures. He does evil that good may come, and this end fandlifies the ■worft adions that contribute to it. All the wickednefs of men being the work of God, he muft, when he furveys it, pronounce it, as well as all his other works, to be very good.
This view of the Divine nature, the only one confiftent with the fcheme of neceffity, appears to me much more fhocking than the permiilion of evil upon the fcheme of liberty. It is faid, that it requires on\j Jirejigth of mind to embrace it: To me it feems to require much ftrength of countenance to profefs it.
In this fyfiem, as in Cleanthes' Tablature of the Epicurean fyftem, pleafure or happinefs is placed upon the throne as the queen, to whom all the virtues bear the humble office of menial fervants.
As the end of the Deity, in all his adions, is not his own good, which can receive no addition, but the good of his crea- tures 5 and, as his creatures are capable of this difpofition in fome degree, is he not pleafed with this image of himfelf in his creatures, and difpleafed with the contrary? Why then fliould he OF THE PERMISSION OF EVIL. 359 he be the author of malice, envy, revenge, tyranny and oppref- CHA? xf.. {ion, in their hearts? Other vices that have no malevolence in them may pleafe fuch a Deity, but furcly malevolence cannot plcafe him.
If we form our notions of the moral attributes of the Deity from what we fee of his government of the world, from the didates of reafon and confcience, or from the dodlrine of revelation, jullice, veracity, faith fulnefs, the love of virtue and diflike of vice, appear to be no lefs eflential attributes of his nature than goodnefs.
In man, who is made after the Image of God, goodnefs or benevolence is indeed an eflential part of virtue^ but it is not the whole.
I am at a lofs what arguments can be brought to prove good- nefs to be eflential to the Deity, which will not, with equal force, prove other moral attributes to be fo; or what objections can be brought againfl the latter, which have not equal Itrength againft the former, unlefs it be admitted to be an objcdion againft other moral attributes, that they do not accord with the dodrine of necellity.
If other moral evils maybe attributed to the Deity as the means of promoting general good, why may not falfe declara- tions and falfe promifes? And then what ground have we left to believe the truth of what he reveals, or to rely upon what he promifes?
Suppofing this ftrange view of the Divine nature were to be adopted in favour of the dodrine of necelEty, there is flill a great difliculty to be refolved.
Since it is fuppofed, that the Supreme Being had no other end in jGo ESSAY IV.
.CHAP. XI J,-) making and governing the univerfe, but to produce the great- eft degree of happinefs to his creatures in general, how comes it to pafs, that there 's To much mifery in a fyfteni made and governed by infinite wifdom and power for a contrary purpofe?
The fohition of this difficulty leads us neceflarily to another hypothecs, That all the mifery and vice that is in the world is a neceifary ingredient in that f)ftem which produces the greatefl: fum of happinefs upon the whole. This connection betwixt the greatefl fum of happinefs and all the mifery that is in the uni- verfe, mufl be fatal and neceffary in the nature of things, fo that even Almighty power cannot break It: For benevolence can never lead to iaflid mifery without neceility.
This neceffary connexion between the greatefl Cam of happinefs upon the whole, and all the natural and moral evil that is, or has been, or fhall be, being once ellablifhed, it is impofUble for mor- tal eyes to difcern how far this evil may extend, or on whom it may happen to fall j whether this fatal connexion may be tem- porary or eternal, or what proportion of the happinefs may be balanced by it.
A world made by perfecft wifdom and Almighty power, for no other end but to make it happy, prefents the moll pleafing profpedl that can be imagined. We expe6l nothing but uninter- rupted happinefs to prevail for ever. But, alas! When we con- lider that in this happiell fyflem, there mufl be neceflarily all the mifery and vice we fee, and how much more we know not, how is the profpecT; darkened!
Thefe two hypothefes, the one limiting the moral charaderof the Deity, the other limiting his power, feem to me to be the nc' eflary confequences of neceility, when it is joined with Theifm; and they have accordingly been adopted by the ablefl defenders of tiiat Uodlrine.
If If Come defenders of liberty, by limiting too rafhiy the Divine CHAP. xi. prefciencc, in order to defend that fylkm, have raifed hij^h in- dignation in their opponents; have they not equal ground of indignation againft thofe, who, to defend nccefTity, limit the mo- ral perfection of the Deity, and his Almighty power?
Let us confider, on the other hand, what confequenccs may be fairly drawn from God's permitting the abufe of liberty in agents on whom he has beftowed it.
If it be alked. Why does God permit fo much fin in his crea- tion? I confefs I cannot anfwer the qneftion, but mufl lay my hand upon my mouth. He giveth no account of his conduct to the children of men. It is our part to obey his commands, and not to fay unto him. Why dofl thou thus?
Hypothefes might be framed; but, while we have ground to be fatisfied, that he does nothing but what is right, it is more becoming us to acknowledge that the ends and reafons of his univerfal government are beyond our knowledge, and perhaps beyond the comprehenfion of human underftanding. We can- not penetrate fo far into the counfel of the Almighty, as to know all the reafons why it became him, of whom are all things, and to whom are all things, to create, not only machines, which are folely moved by his hand, but fervants and children, who, by obeying his commands, and imitating his moral jjerfedions, might rile to a high degree of glory and happinefs in nis favour, or, by perverfc difobedience, might incur guilt and jull puniHi- ment. In this he appears to us awful in his juftice, as well as amiable in his goodnefs.
But, as he difdains not to appeal to men for the equity of his proceedings towards them when his character is impeached, we may, with humble reverence, plead for God, and vindicate Z z that CHAP. XI. that moral excellence which is the glory of his nature, and of which the image is the glory and the perfed:ion of man.
Let us obferve firil: of all, that to permit hath two meanings. It fignifies not to forbid; and it fignifies not to hinder by fupe- rior power. In the firii of thefe fenfes, God never permits fin. His law forbids every moral evil. By his laws and by his go- vernment, he gives every encouragement to good condudt, and every difcoui-agement to bad. But he does not always, by his fuperior power, hinder it from being committed. This is the ground of the accufation; and this, it is faid, is the very fame thing as diredly to will and to caufe it.
As this is afTerted without proof, and is far from being felf- evldent, it might be fufficient to deny it until it be proved. But, without refting barely on the defenfive, we may obferve, that the only moral attributes that can be fuppofed inconfiftent with the permillion of fin, are either goodnefs or juftice.
The defenders of necefHty, with whom we have to do In this point, as they maintain that goodnefs is the only eflential moral attribute of the Deity, and the motive of all his atftions, muft, if they will be confiftent, maintain. That to will, and diredly to caufe fin, much more not to hinder It, is confiftent with perfedl goodnefs, nay, that goodnefs Is a fufEcient motive to juftify the willing and diredly caufing it.
With regard to them, therefore, It Is furely unnecefTary to at- tempt to reconcile the permillion of fin with the goodnefs of God, fince an inconfiftency between that attribute and the caufing of fin would overturn their whole fyftem.
If the caufing of moral evil, and being the real author of It, be confiftent with perfect goodnefs, what pretence can there be to OF THE PERMISSION OF EVIL. 363 to fay, that not to hinder it is inconfiftent with perfe<5l good- P^^J; ^[' nefs?
What is Incumbent upon them, therefore, to prove, Is, That the permlfllon of fin is inconfiftent with jiiftice; and, upon this point, we are ready to join ifllie witli them.
But what pretence can there be to fay, that the perminion of fin Is perfedly confillent with goodnefs in the Deity, but incon- fiflent with juftice?
Is it not as eafy to conceive, that he fliould permit fin, though virtue be his delight, as that he infllcfls mifery, when his fole de- light is to bellow happlnefs? Should it appear Incredible, that the permilTion of fin may tend to promote virtue, to them who believe that the infliction of jnifery is necelTiiry to promote happlnefs?
The juftlce, as well as the goodnefs of God's moral govern- ment of mankind, appears In this: That his laws are not arbi- trary nor grievous, as it is only by the obedience of them that our nature can be perfected and qualified for future happlnefs; that he Is ready to aid our weaknefs, to help our Infirmities, and not to fufFer us to be tempted above what we arc able to bear; that he is not Ihid to mark Iniquity, or to execute judgment fpeedily againft an evil work, but is long-fuflering, and waits to be gracious; that he is ready to receive the humble penitent to his favour; that he Is no refpedler of perfons, but in every na- tion he that fears God and works rlQ;liteoufiiefs Is accepted of him; that of every man he will require an account, proportion- ed to the talents he hath received; that he delights in mercy, but hath no pleafure in the death of the wicked j and therefore in ixmliliing will never go beyond the demerit of the criminal, Dor beyond what the rules of his univcrfil government re- quire.
Z. z 2 There ESSAY IV.
There were, in ancient ag;es, fome who faid, the way of the Lord is not equal; to whom the Prophet, in the name of God, makes this reply, which, in all ages, is fufEcient to repel this ac- cufation. Hear now, O houfe of Ifrael, Is not my way equal, are not your ways unequal? When a righteous man turneth away from his righteoufnefs, and committeth iniquity, for his iniquity which he hath done fliall he die. Again, when a wicked man turneth away from his wickednefs that he hath committed, and doth that which is lawful and right, he fliall fare his foul alive. O houfe of Ifrael, are not my ways equal, are not your ways unequal? Repent, and turn from all your tranfgrellions, fo iniquity fliall not be your ruin. Cafl: away from you all your tranfgreflions whereby you have tranfgreflTed, and make you a new heart and a new fpirit, for why will ye die, O houfe of Ifrael? For I have no pleafure in the death of him that dieth, faith the Lord God.
Another argument for necefllty has been lately offered, which we fliall very briefly confider.
It has been maintained, that the powder of thinking is the re- fult of a certain modification of matter, and that a certain con- figuration of brain makes a foul; and, if man be wholly a ma- terial being, it is faid, that it will not be denied, that he muft be a mechanical being; that the dodlrine of necefllty is a dired: in- ference from that of materialifm, and its undoubted confe- quence.
As this argument can have no weight with thofe who do not fee reafon to embrace this fyftem of materialifm; fo, even v/ith thofe who do, it feems to me to be a mere fophifm.
Phllofophers have been wont to conceive matter to be an In- ert paflive being, and to have certain properties Inconfiftent with the power of thinking or of adling. But a Philofopher arifes.
01- THE PERMISSION OF EVIL. 5<'5 drill's, who proves, we ftiall fiippofe, that we were quite mirtaKcn ^ ' './ in our notion of matter; that it has not the properties we fup- polcd, and, in fad, has no properties but thofe of attradion and rcpulfion; but ftill he thinks, tliat, being matter, it will not be denied that it is a mechanical being, and that the dotflrine of necelTIty is a diretft inference from that of materialllin.
Herein, however, he deceives himfelf. If matter be what we conceived it to be, it is equally Incapable of thinking and of acftlng freely. But if the properties, from which wc drew this conclufion, have no reality, as he thinks he has proved; if it have the powers of attradlion and repulfion, and require only a certain configuration to make it think rationally. It will be im- poirihlc to (hew any good reafon why the fame configuration may not make it adl rationally and freely. If its reproach of folldity, inertnefs and fluggiflinefs be wiped off; and if it be raifed in our efteem to a nearer approach to the nature of what we call fplrltual and immaterial beings, why fliould it flill be nothing but a mechanical being? Is its folidity, inertnefs and fluggiflinefs, to be firfl removed to make it capable of thinking, and then reftored in order to make it incapable of adling?
Thofe, therefore, who reafon juftly from this fyftcm of ma- terlalifm will eafily perceive, that the dodrine of neceflity is fo far from being a direct inference, that it can receive no fupport from it.
To conclude this Effay: Extremes of all kinds ought to be avoided; yet men are prone to run into them j and, to fhun one extreme, we often run into the contrary.
Of all extremes of opinion, none are more dangerous than thofe that exalt the powers of man too high, on the one hand, or fink them too low, on the other.
By ESSAY IV.
By raifing them too high, we feed pride and vain-glory, we lofe the fenfe of our dependence upon God, and engage in at- tempts beyond our abihties. By depreflhig them too low, we cut the finews of adtion and of obligation, and are tempted to think, that, as we can do nothing, we have nothing to do, but to be carried pafllvely along by the flream of neceffity.
Some good men, apprehending that, to kill pride and vain- glory, our active powers cannot be too much deprefTed, have been led, by zeal for religion, to deprive us of all ad:ive power.
Other good men, by a like zeal, have been led to depreciate the human underflanding, and to put out the light of nature and reafon, in order to exalt that of revelation.
Thofe weapons which we/e taken up in fupport of religion, are now employed to overturn it; and what was, by fome, ac- counted the bulwark of orthodoxy, is become the ftrong hold of atheifm and infidelity.
Atheifls join hands with Theologians, In depriving man of all ad:Ive power, that they may deflroy all moral obligation, and all fenfe of right and wrong. They join hands with Theolo- gians, in depreciating the human underftanding, that they may lead us into abfolute fcepticlfm.
God, in mercy to the human race, has made us of fuch a frame, that no fpeculative opinion whatfoever can root out the fenfe of guilt and demerit when we do wrong, nor the peace and joy of a good confcience when we do what is right. No fpecu- lative opinion can root out a regard to the teftimony of our fenfes, of our memory, and of our rational faculties. But we have reafon to be jealous of opinions which run counter to thofe natural fentiments of the human mind, and tend to fhake„ though they never can eradicate them.
There OF THE PERMISSION OF EVIL. 367 There is little reafon to fear, that the condud of men, with CHAR X[. regard to the concerns of the prefent life, will ever be much af- feded, either by the dodrine of necefllty, or by fcepticifm. It were to be wiflied, that men's condud, with regard to the con- cerns of another life, were in as little danger from thofe opinions.
In the prefent flate, we fee fome who zealoufly maintain the dodrine of neceflity, others who as zealoufly maintain that of liberty. One would be apt to think, that a practical belief of thefe contrary fyftems fliould produce very different conduct in them that hold them; yet we fee no fuch difference in the af- fairs of common life.
The fatalifl deliberates, and refolves, and plights his faith. He lays down a plan of conduct, and profecutes it with vigour and induftry. He exhorts and commands, and holds thofe to be anfwerable for their condudl to whom he hath committed any charge. He blames thofe that are falfe or unfaithful to him as other men do. He perceives dignity and worth in fome charac- ters and adions, and in others demerit and turpitude. He re- fents injuries, and is grateful for good offices.
If any man fhould plead the do(flrine of necefllty to excul- pate murder, theft, or robbery, or even wilful negligence in the difcharge of his duty, his judge, though a fatalifl, if he had common fenfe, would laugh at fuch a plea, and would not allow It even to alleviate the crime.
In all fuch cafes, he fees that it would be abfurd not to acl and to judge as thofe ought to do who believe themfelves and other men to be free agents, juft as the fceptic, to avoid abfur- dity, muft, when he goes into the world, ad and judge like other men who are not fceptics.
If CHAP. XL If the fatalifl: be as little influenced by the opinion of necef- fity in his moral and religious concerns, and in his expedations concerning another world, as he is in the common affairs of life, his fpeculative opinion will probably do him little hurt. But, if he trufl fo far to the do(5lrine of necellity, as to indulge lloth and inadivity in his duty, and hope to exculpate himfelf to his Maker by that dodlrine, let him confider whether he fuflains this excufe from his fervants and dependants, when they are ne- gligent or unfaithful in what is committed to their charge.
Bifliiop Butler, in his Analogy, has an excellent chapter upon the opinion of necejjity confidered as iiifluencing praElice, which I think highly deferring the confideration of thofe who are inclined to that opinion.
ESSAY M ESSAY V.
OF MORALS.
Of the Firji Principles of Morals.
ORALS, like all other fciences, mufl have firft principles, on which all moral reafoning is grounded.
In every branch of knowledge where difputes have been raifed, it is ufeful to diftinguifh the firft: principles from the fuperftrudture. They are the foundation on which the whole fabric of the fcience leans; and whatever is not fupported by this foundation can have no {lability.
In all rational belief, the thing believed is either itfelf a firft principle, or it is by juft reafoning deduced from firft prin- ciples. When men differ about dcdudions of reafoning, the appeal muft be to the rules of reafoning, which have been very unanimoufly fixed from the days of Aristotle. But when they differ about a firft principle, the appeal is made to another tri- bunal; to that of common fenfe.
How the genuine decifions of common fenfe may be diftin- guifhed from the counterfeit, has been confidered in eflay fixth, on the Intellcdual Powers of Man, chapter founh, to which the reader is referred. What I would here obferve is, That as firft principles differ from dedudtions of reafoning in the nature A a a of CHAP. I. of their evidence, and muft be tried by a different ftandard when they are called in queftion, It is of importance to know to which of thefe two clalTes a truth which we would examine, belongs. When they are not diftinguilhed, men are apt to demand proof for every thing they think fit to deny: And when we attempt to prove by diredl arg-ument, what is really felf-evldent, the reafoning will always be inconclufive; for it will either take for granted the thing to be proved, or fomething not more evident; and fo, inflead of giving flrength to the conclufion, will rather tempt thofe to doubt of It, who never did fo before.
I propofe, therefore, In this chapter, to point out fome of the firft principles of morals, without pretending to a complete enu- meration.
The principles I am to mention, relate either to virtue In ge- neral, or to the different particular branches of virtue, or to the comparifon of virtues where they feem to interfere.
1. There are fome things in human condud, that merit ap- probation and praife, others that merit blame and punifhment; and different degrees either of approbation or of blame, are due to different adlions.
2. What Is In no degree voluntary, can neither deferve moral approbation nor blame 3. What Is done from unavoidable neceffity may be agreeable or dlfagreeable, ufeful or hurtful, but cannot be the objedl either of blame or of moral approbation.
4. Men may be highly culpable in omitting what they ought to have done, as well as In doing what they ought not.
5. We ought to ufe the befl means we can to be well inform^ ed OF THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF MORALS. 371 ed of our duty, by ferious attention to moral inftrudion; by ob- Pl^Jl_j' fervin^- what we approve, and what wc dilapjirove, in other men, whether our accjuaintance, or thofe whofe adlions are re- corded in hillory; by reflecl:ing often, in a calm and difpaffion- ate hour, on our own paft condudl, that we may difcern what was wrong, what was right, and what might have been better j by deliberating coolly and impartially upon our future condu(fl. as far as we can forefee the opportunities we may have of doing good, or the temptations to do wrong; and by having this prin- ciple deeply fixed in our minds, that as moral excellence is the true worth and glory of a man, fo the knowledge of our duty is to every man, in every ftation of life, the moft important of all knowledge.
6. It ought to be our mofl ferious concern to do our duty as far as we know it, and to fortify our minds againfl; every temp- tation to deviate from it; by niaintaining a lively fenfe of the beauty of right condud, and of its prefent and future reward, of the turpitude of vice, and of its bad confequences here and hereafter; by having always in our eye the noblell examples; by the habit of fubjedling our palTions to the government of rea- fon; by firm purpofes and refolutions with regard to our coa- dud; by avoiding occafions of temptation when we can; and by imploring the aid of him who made us, in every hour of temptation.
Thefe principles concerning virtue and vice in general, mud appear felf-evident to every man who hath a confcience, and who hath taken pains to exercife this natural power of his mind. I proceed to others that are more particular.
I. We ought to prefer a greater good, though more diftant, to a lefs; and a Icfs evil to a greater.
A regard to our own good, though we had no confcience, A a a 2 didate?
w^-Z_i didates this principle; and we cannot help difapproving the man that ads contrary to it, as deferving to lofe the good which he wantonly threw away, and to fuffer the evil which he know- ingly brought upon his own head.
We obferved before, that the ancient moralifts, and many among the modern, have deduced the whole of morals from this principle, and that when we make a right eftimate of goods and evils according to their degree, their dignity, their duration, and according as they are more or lefs in our power, it leads to the practice of every virtue: More direcfhly, indeed, to the vir- tues of felf- government, to prudence, to temperance, and to for- titude; and, though more indiredly, even to juftice, humanity, and all the focial virtues, when their influence upon our happi- nefs is well underllood.
Though it be not the nobleft principle of conduit, it has this peculiar advantage, that its force is felt by the mofl ignorant, and even by the moft abandoned.