In this jnvcfligation, if indeed they can yet be Hiid to be brought CUAP^il. into it. What innumerable errors rude ages mufl fall into, with regard to caufes, from impatience to judge, and inability to judge right, we may conje«5ture from reafon, and may fee from experi- ence; from which I think, it is evident, that fuppofing adivc verbs to have been originally intended to exprefs what is properly cal- led adion, and their nominatives to exprefs the agent; yet, in the rude and barbarous ftate wherein languages are formed, there muft be innumerable mifapplications of fuch verbs and nomina- tives, and many things fpoken of as adlive, which have no real adivity.
To this we may add, that it is a general prejudice of our early years, and of rude nations, when we perceive any thing to be changed, and do not perceive any other thing which we can be- lieve to be the caufe of that change, to impute it to the thing itfelf, and conceive it to be adive and animated, fo far as to have the power of producing that change in itfelf. Hence, to a child, or to a favage, all nature feems to be animated; the fea, the earth, the air, the fun, moon, and ftars, rivers, fountains and groves, are conceived to be adive and animated beings. As this is a fentiment natural to man in his rude flate, it has, on that account, even in polilhed nations, the verifimilitude that is required in poetical fic- tion and fable, and makes perfonification one of the moft agreeable figures in poetry and elofjuence.
The origin of this prejudice probably is, that we judge of other things by ourfelves, and therefore are difpofed to afcribe to them that life and adivity which we know to be in ourfelves.
A little girl afcribes to her doll, the pafTions and fentiments flie feels in herfclf. Even brutes feem to have fomething of this nature. Ayoung cat, when (he fees any brifk motion in a feather or a draw, is prompted, by natural inftind, to hunt it as (he would hunt a moufe.
C Whatever v.
CHAP. II. Whatever be the origin of this prejudice in mankind, it has a. powerful influence upon language, and leads men, in the ftruc- ture of language, to afcribe action to many things that are merely paflive; becaufe, when fuch forms of fpeech were invented, thofe things were really believed to be adive. Thus we fay, the wind blows, the fea rages, the fun rifes and fets, bodies gravitate and move.
When experience difcovers that thefe things are altogether in- adlive, it is eafy to correal our opinion about them; but it is not fo eafy to alter the efbablifhed forms of language. The moft perfe6l and the mofl: poliHied languages are like old furniture, which is never perfedlly fuited to the prefent tafte, but retains fomething of the fafliion of the times when it was made.
Thus, though all men of knowledge believe, that the fuccef- fion of day and night is owing to the rotation of the earth round Its axis, and not to any diurnal motion of the heavens; yet we find ourfelves under a neceility of fpeaking in the old flyle, of the fun's rifing and going down, and coming to the meridian. And this fliyle is ufed, not only In converfing with the vulgar, but when men of knowledge converfe with one another. And if we ihould fuppofe the vulgar to be at laft fo far enlightened,, as to have the fame belief with the learned, of the caufe of day and night, the fame ftyle would ftlll be ufed.
From this inftance we may learn, that the language of man- kind may furnlfh good evidence of opinions which have been early and unlverfally entertained, and that the forms contrived for expreiling fuch opinions, may remain In ufe after the opinions which gave rife ta them have been greatly changed.
Adllve verbs appear plainly to have been firft contrived to ex- prefs adion. They are Hill In general applied to this purpofe. And though we find many inllances of the application of adive verbs OF THE NOTION OF ACTIVE POWER. 19 verbs to thinj^s which we now believe not to be adive, this one;ht to be afcribed to mens having once had the belief that thofe things are adive, and perhaps, in fome cafes, to this, that forms of exprelhon are commonly extended, in courfc of time, beyond their original intention, either from analogy, or hecanfe more proper forms for the purpofe nre not found in lan- guage.
Even the mifapplication of this notion of adtion and adlive power fliews that there is fuch a notion in the human mind, and flaews the neceiTity there is in philofophy of diftinguifhing the proper application of thefe words, from the vague and improper application of them, founded on common language, or on po- pular prejudice.
Another argimient to fliew that all men have a notion or idea of adive power is, that there are many operations of mind com- mon to all men who have reafon, and neceflary in the ordinary conduct of life, which imply a belief of adive power in our- felves and in others.
All our volitions and efforts to ad, all our deliberations, our purpofes and promifes, imply a belief of adive power in our- felves; our counfcls, exhortations and commands, imply a belief of adive power in thofe to whom they are addrefled.
If a man (hould make an efTort to fly to the moon; if he fhould even deliberate about it, or refolve to do it, we fliould conclude him to be lunatic; and even lunacy would not account for his condud, unlefs it made him believe the thing to be in his power.
If a man promifes to pay me a fura of money to-morrow, with- out believing that it will then be in his power, he is not an ho- neft man; and, if 1 did not believe that it will then be in his power, I fliould have no dependence on his proniife.
C 2 All CHAP. II.
20 CHAP. 11. All our power is, without doubt, derived from the Author of our being, and, as he gave it freely, he may take it away when he will. No man can be certain of the continuance of any of his powers of body or mind for a moment; and, therefore, in every promife, there is a condition underflood, to wit, if we live, if we retain that health of body and foundnefs of mind which is neceflary to the perfoi-mance, and if nothing happen-, in the providence of God, which puts it out of our power. The rudefl; favages are taught by nature to admit thefe condi- tions in all promifes, whether they be exprefTed or not; and na man is charged with breach of promife, when he fails through the failure of thefe conditions.
It is evident, therefore, that, without the belief of fome ac- tive power, no honefl man would make a promife, no wife man would trufi; to a promife; and it is no lefs evident, that the be- lief of adlive power, in ourfelves or in others, implies au idea or notion of adive power.
The fame reafoning may be applied to every inftance wherein we give counfel to others, wherein we perfuade or command. As long, therefore, as mankind are beings who can deliberate and refolve and will, as long as they can give counfel, and exhort, and command, they muft believe the exiftence of axSive power in themfelves, and in others, and therefoi-e muft have a notion or idea of adive power.
It might farther be obferved, that power is the proper and immediate object of ambition, one of the moft univerfal paf- fions of the human mind, and that which makes the greateft fi- gure in the hiftory of all ages. Whether Mr Hume, in defence of his fyftem, would maintain that there is no fuch pallion in mankind as ambition, or that ambition is not a vehement defire of power, or that men may have a vehement defire of power, without having any idea of power, I will not pretend to divine.
I OF THE NOTION OF ACTIVE POWER. 21 I cannot help repeating my apology for infifting fo long in the CHAP, ii.^ refutation of fo great an abfiirdity. It is a capital dodrine in a late celebrated fyfteni of human nature, that we have no idea of power, not even in the Deity; that we are not able to difco- ver a fingle inftance of it, either in body or fpirit, either in fuperior or inferior natures; and that we deceive ourfclves when we imagine that we are poffefled of any idea of this kind.
To fupport this important doclrine, and the out-works that are railed in its defence, a great part of the firft volume of the Treatife of Human Nature is employed. That fyftem abounds with conclufions the moft abfurd that ever were advanced by any Philofopher, deduced with great acutencfs and ingenuity from principles commonly received by Philofophers. To rejed: fuch conclufions as unworthy of a hearing, would be difrefpedl- ful to the ingenious author; and to refute them is difficult, and appears ridiculous.
It is difficult, becaufe we can hardly find principles to reafon from, niore evident than thofe we wifli to prove; and it appears ridiculous, becaufe, as this author juftiy obfervcs, next to the ridicule of denying an evident truth, is that of taking much pains to prove it.
Proteflants complain, with juftice, of the hardfhip put upon them by Roman Catholics, in requiring them to prove that bread and wine is not flefh and blood. They have, however, fubmit- tcd to this hardfhip for the fake of truth. I think it is no lefs hard to be put to prove that men have an idea of power.
What convinces myfelf that I have an idea of power is, that I am confcious that 1 know what I mean by that word, and, while I have this confcioufnefs, I difdain equally to hear argu- ments for or againft my having fuch an idea. But if we would convince thofc, who, being led away by prejudice, or by autho- rity.
CHAP. IL rify^ deny that they have any fuch idea, we muft condefcend to ufe fuch arguments as the fubjed will afford, and fuch as we fhould ufe with a man who fliould deny that mankind have any idea of magnitude or of equality.
The arguments I have adduced are taken from thefe five to- pics: I. That there are many things that we can affirm or deny concerning power, with underflanding. 2. That there are, In all languages, words fignlfying, not only power, but fignifying many other things that imply power, fuch as, adion and paffion, caufe and effed, energy, operation, and others. 3. That in the llruc- ture of all languages, there is an adive and pafllve form in. verbs and participles, and a different conftrudion adapted to thefe forms, of which diverfity no account can be given, but that it has been intended to diftinguifli adlion from paffion. 4. That there are many operations of the human mind familiar to every man come to the ufe of reafon, and neceflary in the ordinary con- dud of life, which imply a convidlon of fome degree of power in ourfelves and In others. 5. That the defire of power is one of the ftrongeft paffions of human nature.
Of Mr Locke's Account of our Idea of Power.
THIS author, having refuted the Cartefian dodrlne of innate ideas, took up, perhaps too raflily, an opinion that all our fimple Ideas are got, either by fenfatlon or by refledlon j that Is, by our external fenfes, or by confcloufnefs of the operations of our own minds.
Through the whole of his Effay, he fhews a fatherly affec- tion to this opinion, and often drains very hard to reduce our fimple ideas to one of thofe fources, or both. Of this, feveral inftances Mr LOCKE'S ACCOUNT OF POWER. 43 inftances might be given, in his account of our idea of fub- CHAP. IIL ftance, of duration, of perfonal identity. Omitting thefe, as foreign to the prcfent fubjed, 1 fhall only take notice of the ac- count he gives of our idea of power.
The fum of it is, That obferving, by our fenfes, various changes in objedls, we coUedl a pofllbility in one objedl to be changed, and in another a pofllbihty of making that change, and fo come by that idea which we call power.
Thus we fay the fire has a power to melt gold, and gold has power to be melted; the firfl he calls active, the fecond palHve power.
He thinks, however, that we have the raoft diftindt notion of a<ftive power, by attending to the power which we ourfelves ex- ert, in giving motion to our bodies when at reft, or in directing our thoughts to this or the other objedl as we will. And this ■way of forming the idea of power he attributes to reflexion, as he refers the former to fenfation.
On this account of the origin of our idea of power, I would beg leave to make two remarks, with the refpe(ft* that is moft juflly due to fo great a Philofopher, and fo good a man.
1. Whereas he diftinguifhes power into aHive and pajfive, I con- ceive paflive power is no power at all. He means by it, the pof- fibility of being changed. To call this poiver, feems to be a mifapplication of the word. I do not remember to have met ■with the phrafe pajfive power in any other good autlior. Mr Locke feems to have been unlucky in inventing it; and it de- ferves not to be retained in our language.
Perhaps he was unwarily led into it, as an oppofite to adive po^wer. But 1 conceive we call certain powers acJive, to diftinguifli H ESSAY I.
CHAP. Ill, guifli them from other powers that are called fpeculal'ive. As all mankind diflinguifh action from fpeculation, it is very proper to diftinguifh the powers by which thofe different oper tions are performed, into adive and fpeculative. Mr Locke indeed acknow- ledges that active power is more properly called power j but I fee no propriety at all in pallive power j it is a powerlefs power, and a contradidlion in terms.
2. I would obferve, that Mr Locke feems to have impofed upon hlmfelf, in attempting to reconcile this account of the idea of power to his favourite dodrine. That all our fimple ideas are ideas of fenfation, or of refledion.
There are two fleps, according to his account, which the mind takes, in forming this idea of power; Jirji, It obferves changes in things j and, fecondly, From thefe changes, it infers a caufe of them, and a power to produce them.
If both thefe lieps are operations of the external fenfes, or of confcioufnefs, then the idea of power may be called an idea of fenfation, or of refledion. But, if either of thofe fleps requires the co-operation of other powers of the mind, it will follow, that the idea of power cannot be got by fenfation, nor by reflec- tion, nor by both together. Let us, therefore, conlider each of thefe fteps by itfelf.
Firjl, We obferve various changes in things. And Mr Locke takes it for granted, that changes in external things are obferved by our fenfes, and that changes in our thoughts are obferved by confcioufnefs. ' I grant that it may be faid, that changes in things are ob- ferved by our fenfes, when we do not mean to exclude every other faculty from a fhare in this operation. And it would be ridicu- lous to cenfure the phrafe, when it is fo ufed in popular difcourfe.
But Mr LOCKE'S ACCOUNT OF POWER. 25 But it is neccfHiry to Mr LockIe's purpofe, that changes in chap, iir^ external things fliould be obferved by the fenfes alone, excluding every other faculty; becaufe every faculty that is ncceflary in order to obferve the change, will claim a fliarc in the origin of the idea of power.
Now, it is evident, that memory is no Icfs neccfTIiry than the fenfes, in order to our obferving changes in external things, and therefore the idea of power, derived from the changes obferved, may as jullly be afcribed to memory as to the fenfes.
Every change fuppofes two ftates of the thing changed. Both ihefe ftates may be part; one of them at leafl muft be part; and one only can be prefent. By our fenfes we may obferve the pre- fent ftate of the thing; but memory muft fupply us with the part; and, unlefs we remember the paft ftate, we can perceive no change.
The fame obfervation may be applied to confcioufnefs. The truth, therefore, is, that, by the fenfes alone, without memory, or by confcioufnefs alone, without memory, no change can be obferved. Every idea, therefore, that is derived from obferving changes in things, muft have its origin, partly from memory, and not from the fenfes alone, nor from confcioufnefs alone, nor from both together.
The fecond ftep made by the mind in forming this idea of pov.cr is this: From the changes obferved we colledl a caufe of thofe changes, and a power to produce them.
Here one might afk Mr Locke, whether it is by our fenfes that we draw this conclufion, or is it by confcioufnefs? Is rea- foning the province of the fenfes, or is it the province of con- fcioufnefs? If the fenfes can draw one conclufion from premifes, D they CHAP. IV. they may draw five hundred, and demonflrate the whole ele- ments of Euclid.
Thus, I think, it appears, that the account which Mr Locke himfelf gives of the origin of our idea of power, cannot be re- conciled to his favourite dodrine, That all our fimple ideas have their origin from fenfation or refledion; and that, in attempting to derive the idea of power from thefe two fources only, he un- awares brings in our memory, and our reafoning power, for a {hare in its origin.
Of Mr Hume's Opinion of the Idea of Power.
THIS very ingenious author adopts the principle of Mr Locke before mentioned. That all our fimple ideas are de- rived either from fenfation or refledlion. This he feems to un- derftand, even in a ftrider fenfe than Mr Locke did. For he will have all our fimple ideas to be copies of preceeding impref- fions, either of our external fenfes or of confcioufnefs. " After " the moft; accurate examination," fays he, " of which I am " capable, I venture to affirm, that the rule here holds without " any exception, and that every fimple idea has a fimple im- " prefilon which refembles it, and every fimple imprellion a " correfpondent idea. Every one may fatisfy himfelf in this " point, by running over as many as he pleafes."
I obferve here, by the way, that this conclufion is formed by the author rafhly and unphilofophically. For it is a conclufion that admits of no proof, but by indudion; and it is upon this ground that he himfelf founds it. The indudion cannot be per- fedl till every fimple idea that can enter into the human mind be examined, and be fhewn to be copied from a refembling imprefilon Mr HUME'S OPINION OF POWER. 27 prcffion of fcnCc or of confcioufnefs. No man can pretend to CHAP, iv. have made this examination of all our funple ideas without ex- ception; and, therefore, no man can, confidently with the rules of philofophifniG;-, afllire us, that this conclufion holds without any exception.
The author profelles, in his title-page, to introduce into moral fuhjeds the experimental method of reafoning. This was a very laudahle attempt; but he ought to have known, that it is a rule in the experimental method of reafoning, That conclufions efta- bliflied by indudion ought never to exclude exceptions, if any fuch fliould afterwards appear from obfervation or experiment. Sir Isaac Newton, fpeaking of fuch conclufions, fays, " Et fi " quando in experiundo poflea reperiatur aliquid, quod a parte " contraria faciat; tum demum, non fine iftis exceptionibus af- " firmetur conclufio opportebit." " But," fays our author, " I " will venture to afiirm, that the rule here holds without any ex- " ception."
Accordingly, throughout the whole treatife, this general rule is confidered as of fufficient authority, in itfelf, to exclude, even from a hearing, every thing that appears to be an exception to it. This is contrary to the fundamental principles of the ex- perimental method of reafoning, and therefore may be called rafli and unphilofophical.
Having thus cftabliflied this general principle, the author does * great execution by it among our ideas. He finds, that we have no idea of fubllance, material or fpiritual; that body and mind are only certain trains of related imprelTions and ideas; that we have no idea of fpace or duration, and no idea of power, adlive or intelledive.
Mr Locke ufed his principle of fenfation and refledion with greater moderation and mercy. Being unwilling to thrufi the D 2 ideas CHAP. IV. ideas we have mentioned into the limbo of non-exiftence, he ftretches fenfation and refledion to the very utmoft, in order to receive thefe ideas within the pale; and draws them into it, as it were by violence.
But this author, inflead of fhewing them any favour, feems fond to get rid of them.
Of the ideas mentioned, it is only that of power that con- cerns our prefent fubjed. And, with regard to this, the author boldly affirms, " That we never have any idea of power; that " we deceive ourfelves when we imagine we are poflefTed of any " idea of this kind."
He begins with obferving, " That the terms efficacy, agency, " power, force, energy, are all nearly fynonymous ^ and therefore " it is an abfurdlty to employ any of them in defining the reft. " By this obfervation," fays he, " we rejed at once all the vul- " gar definitions which Philofophers have given of power and " efficacy.^^ Surely this author was not ignorant, that there are many things of which we have a clear and diftindl conception, which are fo fimple in their nature, that they cannot be defined any other way than by fynonymous words. It is true that this is not a logical definition, but that there is, as he affirms, an abfurdity in ufing if, when no better can be had, I cannot perceive.
He might here have applied to power and ejficacy what he fays, in another place, of pri^le and humility. " The pafllons of pride " and humility" he fays, " being fimple and uniform impref- , " fions, it is impofiible we can ever give a jufi definition of " them. As the words are of general ufe, and the things they ** reprefent the mod common of any, every one, of himfelf, •• will Mr HUME'S OPINION OF POWER.
39 " will he able to form a jufl notion of them without danger of CHAP. IV. " miftake." ' He mentions Mr Locke's account of the idea of power, That, obferving various changes in things, we conclude, that there mull be fomewhere a power capable of producing them, and fo arrive at laft, by this real'oning, at the idea of power and effi- cacy.
" But," fays he, " to be fatisfied that this explication is more " popular than philofophical, we need but refled: on two very " obvious principles; fifjl. That reafon alone can never give " rife to any original idea j and, fecondly. That reafon, as dl- " ftinguifhed from experience, can never make us conclude, " that a caufe, or produdive quality, is abfolutely requifite to " every beginning of exiftence."
Before v/e confider the two principles which our author op- pofes to the popular opinion of Mr Locke, I obferve, Firjl, That there are fome popular opinions, which, on that very account, deferv-e more regard from Philofophers, than this author is willing to bellow.
That things cannot begin to cxifl, nor undergo any change, without a caufe that hath power to produce that change, is in- deed fo popular an opinion, that, 1 believe, this author is the firft of mankind that ever called it in queflion. It is fo popular, that there is not a man of common prudence who does not ad from this opinion, and rely upon it every day of his life. And any man who fliould condud himfelf by the contrary opinion would foon be confined as infane, and continue in that flate till a fuHkicnt caufe was found for his enlargement.
Such a popular opinion as this, (lands upon a higher authori- ty 3° CHAP. IV. ty than that of philofophy, and philofophy muft ftrike fail to it, if fhe would not render herfelf contemptible to every man of com- mon underftanding.
For though, in matters of deep (peculation, the multitude muft be guided by Philofophers, yet, in things that are within the reach of every man's underftanding, and upon which the whole condudt of human life turns, the Philofopher muft fol- low the multitude, or make himfelf perfedly ridiculous.
Secondly, I obferve, that whether this popular opinion be true or falfe, it follows from mens having this opinion, that they have an idea of power. A falfe opinion about power, no lefs than a true, implies an idea of power; for how can men have any opinion, true or falfe, about a thing of which they have no idea?
The Jirji of the very obvious principles which the author op- pofes to Mr Locke's account of the idea of power, is, Thatrea- fon alone can never give rife to any original idea.
This appears to me fo far from being a very obvious princi- ple, that the contrary is very obvious.
Is it not our reafoning faculty that gives rife to the idea of reafoning itfelf? As our idea of fight takes its rife from our be- ing endowed with that faculty; fo does our idea of reafoning. Do not the ideas of demonftration, of probability, our ideas of a fyllogifm, of major, minor and conclufion, of an enthymeme, dilemma, forites, and all the various modes of reafoning, take their rife from the faculty of reafon? Or is it poilible, that a being, not endowed with the faculty of reafoning, fliould have thefe ideas? This principle, therefore, is fo far from being ob- vioufly true, that it appears to be obvioufly falfe.
The Mr HUME'S OPINION OF POWER.
The fccond obvious principle is, That reafon, as diftinguifhed CHAP. IV. from experience, can never make us conchidc, that a caufe, or produdlive quality, is abiblutely requifite to every beginning of exiftence.
In fome Eflays on the Intelledual Powers of Man, I had occafion to treat of this principle, That every change in nature muft have a caufe; and, to prevent repetition, I beg leave to refer the reader to what is faid upon this fubjedl, EJfay VT. chap. 6. I endeavoured to fhew that it is a firft princi- ple, evident to all men come to years of underftanding. Be- fides its having been univerfally received, without the lead doubt, from the beginning of the world, it has this fure mark of a fir ft principle, that the belief of it is abfolutely neceflary in the ordinary affairs of life, and, without it, no man could adl with common prudence, or avoid the imputation of inJanity. Yet a Philofopher, who ac^ed upon the finn belief of it every day of his life, thinks fit, in his clofet, to call it in queftion.
He infinuates here, that we may know it from experience. I endeavoured to (hew, that we do not learn it from experience, for two reafons.
Fir^, Becaufe it is a necefHiry truth, and has always been re- ceived as a neceflary truth. Experience gives no information of what is necelTary, or of what muft be.
We may know from experience, what is, or what was, and from that may probably conclude what (hall be in like circum- ftances; but, with regard to what muft; necefl^arily be, exjjeri- ence is perfectly filent.
Thus we know, by unvaried experience, from the beginning of the world, that the fun and ftars rife in the eaft and fet in the weft. But no man believes, that it could not polTibly have been otherwife, 32 ESSAY I.
CHAP, iv^ otherwife, or that it did not depend upon the will and power of him who made the world, whether the earth fliould revolve to the eaft or to the wefl.
In like manner, if we had experience, ever fo conftant, that every change in nature we have obferved, actually had a caufe, this might afford ground to believe, that, for the future, it fhall be fo; but no ground at all to believe that it muft be fo, and cannot be otherwife.
Another reafon to fhew that this principle is not learned from -experience is, That experience does not fliew us a caufe of one in a hundred of thofe changes which we obferve, and therefore can never teach us that there muft be a caufe of all.
Of all the paradoxes this author has advanced, there is not one more Ihocking to the human underftanding than this, That things may begin to exift without a caufe. This would put an end to all fpeculation, as well as to all the bufmefs of life. The employment of fpeculative men, lince the beginning of the world, has been to inveftigate the caufes of things. What pity is it, they never thought of putting the previous quellion, Whe- ther things have a caufe or not? This queftion has at laft been ftarted j and what is there fo ridiculous as not to be maintained by fome Philofopher?
Enough has been faid upon it, and more, I think, than it de- ferves. But, being about to treat of the adlive powers of the human mind, 1 thought it improper to take no notice of what has been faid by fo celebrated a Philofopher, to fhew, that there is not, in the human mind, any idea of power.
CHAP.
OF BEINGS THAT HAVE NO UNDERSTANDING. 33 CHAP. V.
Whether Beings that have no Will nor Under/landing may have A&ive Power?
THAT adive power is an attribute, which cannot exifl: but in fome being poflelTed of that power, and the fubjed; of that attribute, I take for granted as a felf-evident truth. Whe- ther there can be adtive power in a fubjed which has no thought, no underdanding, no will, is not fo evident.
The ambiguity of the words power, caufe, agent, and of all the words related to thefe, tends to perplex this queftion. The weaknefs of human underftanding, which gives us only an in- dirccl: and relative conception of power, contributes to darken our realbning, and Ihould make us cautious axid modeft in our detenninations.
We can derive little light in this matter from the events which we obferve in the courfe of nature. We perceive changes innu- mer:ible in things without us. We know that thofe changes mufl be produced by the adive power of fome agent; but we neither perceive the agent nor the power, but the change only. Whether the things be adlive, or merely pallive, is not eafily dif- covered. And though it may be an objedl of curiofity to the fpeculative few, it does not greatly concern the many.
To know the event and the circumftances that attended it, .ind to know in what circumrtances like events may be expeded, may be of confequence in the condud of life; but to know the real efficient, whether it be matter or mind, whether of a fupe- rior or inferior order, concerns us little.
E Thus CHAP. V. Thus it is with regard to all the effedls we afcribe to na- ture.
Nature is the name we give to the efficient caufe of innumera- ble effedls which fall daily under our obfervation. But if it be afked what nature is? Whether the firft unlverfal caufe, or a fubordinate one, whether one or many, whether intelligent or unintelligent? Upon thefe points we find various conjedures and theories, but no folid ground upon which we can reil. And I apprehend the wifeft men are they who are fenfible that they know nothing of the matter.