In aniwer to this objedlon, it may be obfcrved, That, as tlicrc is a flrid notion of juflice, in which it is diflinguifhed from hu- manity and cliarity, fo there is a more exteniive fignification of it, in which it includes thole virtues. The ancient moralifls, both Greek and Roman, under the cardinal virtue of juflice, in- cluded beneficence; and, in this exteniive fcnfe, it is often ufed in common language. The like may be faid of right, which, in a fenfc not uncommon, is extended to every proper claim of humanity and charity, as well as to the claims of flricft juftice. But, as it is proper to dillinguilli thefe two kinds of claims by different names, writers in natural jurifprudence have given the name of pcrfeH rights to the claims of llrid; juftice, and that of mperfe^l rights to the claims of charity and humanity. Thus all the duties of humanity have imperfed rights correfponding to them, as thofe of Ihict juflice have pcrfecl rights.
Another objedion may be, That there is flill a clafs of duties to which no right, perfect or imperfcd, correfponds.
We are bound in duty to pay due refped, not only to what is truly the right of another, but to what, through ignorance or miftake.
CHAP. Ill, iiilftake, we believe to be his right. Thus, if my neighbour iS pofleiled of a horfe which he ftole, and to which he has no right 5 while I believe the horfe to be really his, and am igno- rant of the theft, it is my duty to pay the fam-e refpedl to this conceived right as if it were real. Here, then, is a moral obli- gation on one party, without any correfponding right on the other.
To fupply this defe(5l in the fyftem of rights, fo as to make right and duty correfpond in every Inftance, writers in jurifpru- dence have had recourfe to fomething like what is called a fidl:ion of law. They give the name of right to the claim which even the thief hath to the goods he has ftolen, while the theft is unknown, and to all limilar claims grounded on the igno- rance or miflake of the parties concerned. And to diflinguifli this kind of right from genuine rights, perfedt or imperfed:, they call it an external right.
Thus it appears, That although a fyflem of the perfed: rights of men, or the rights of ftrid juftice, would be a lame fubftitute for a fyftem of human duty; yet when we add to it the imper- fed and the external rights, it comprehends the whole duty we owe to our fellow-men.
But it may be afked, Why fhould men be taught their duty in this indirect way, by refledlion, as it were, from the rights of other men?
Perhaps it may be thought, that this indiredl way may be more agreeable to the pride of man, as we fee that men of rank like better to hear of obligations of honour than of obligations of duty (although the didates of true honour and of duty be- the fame); for this reafon that honour puts a man in mind of what he owes to himfelf, whereas duty is a more humiliating idea. For a like reafon, men may attend more willingly to their rights, OF SYSTEMS OF NATURAL JURISPRUDENCE. 39^ rights, which put them in mind of their dignity, than to their CHAP. iii. duties, which fuggefl their dependence. And we fee that men may give great attention to their rights who give but little to their duty.
Whatever truth there may be in this, I believe better reafons can be given why fyflems of natural jurifprudence have been contrived and put in the place of fyftems of njorals.
Syftems of civil law were invented many ages before we had any iyftem of natural jurifprudence 5 and the former feem to have fuggefled the idea of the latter.
Such is the weaknefs of human underflanding, that no large body of knowledge can be eafily apprehended and remembered, unlefs it be arranged and methodifed, that is, reduced into a fyftem. When the laws of the Roman people were multiplied to a great degree, and the ftudy of them became an honourable and lucrative profefTion, it became neceflary that they fliould be methodifed into a fyftem. And the moft natural and obvious way of methodifing law was found to be according to the divi- iions and fubdivifions of mens rights, which it is the intention of law to protedl.
The fludy of law produced not only fyftems of law, but a language proper for exprelTlng them. Every art has its terms of art for exprefling the conceptions that belong to it; and the Civilian inuft have terms for exprelling accurately the divifions and fubdivifions of rights, and the various ways whereby they may be acquired, transferred, or extinguiihed, in the various tranfacftions of civil fociety. He muft have terms accurately de- fined, for the various crimes by which mens rights are violated, not to fpcak of the terms which exprefs the dilTerent forms of adions at law, and the various ftcps of the procedure of judica- tories.
Thofe ESSAY V.
CHAP, in. Thofe who have been bred to any profefTion are very prone to ufe the terms of their profeflion in fpeaking or writing on fubjeds that have any analogy to it. And they may do fo with advantage, as terms of art are commonly more precife in their fignification, and better defined, than the words of common language. To fuch perfons it is alio very natural to model and arrange other fubjedts, as far as their nature admits, into a me- thod fimilar to that of the fyftem which fills their minds.
It might, therefore, be expedled, that a Civilian, intending to give a detailed fyftem of morals, would ufe many of the terms of civil law, and mould it, as far as it can be done, into the form of a fyftem of law, or of the rights of mankind.
The necefl^ary and clofe relation of right to duty, which we before obferved, juftified this: And moral duty had long been confidered as a law of nature j a law, not wrote on tables of ftone or brafs, but on the heart of man; a law of greater anti- quity and higher authority than the laws of particular ftates; a law which is binding upon all men of all nations, and therefore is called by Cicero the taw of nature and of nations.
The idea of a fyftem of this law was worthy of the genius of the immortal Hugo Grotius, and he was the firft who exe- cuted it in fuch a manner as to draw the attention of the learn- ed in all the European nations; and to give occafion to feveral princes and ftates to eftabliili public profeftions for the teaching of this law.
The multitude of commentators and annotators upon this work of Grotius, and the public eftablifhments to which it gave occafion, are fufficient vouchers of its merit.
It is, indeed, a work fo well defigned, and fo fkllfully exe- cuted; fo free from the fcholaftic jargon which infeded the learned OF SYSTEMS OF NATURAL JURISPRUDENCE. 393 learned at that time, fo miicli acldrcfrLd to the common fcnfe CHA?. in. and moral judi^mcnt of mankind, and fo agreeably illiiftratcd by examples from ancient biftory, and authorities from the fcnti- mcnts of ancient authors, Heathen and Chrlitian, that it muft always be efteemed as the capital work of a great genius upon a moil important fubjccl.
The utility of a juft fyflcm of natural jurifprudcncc appears, I. As it is a fyftem of the moral duty we owe to men, which, by the aid they have taken from the terms and divifions of the civil law, has been given more in detail and more fyftematically by writers in natural jurifprudence than it was formerly. 2. As it is the beil preparation for the fludy of law, being, as it were, calt in the mould, and ufing and explaining many of the terms of the civil law, on which the law of mofl; of tlie European na- tions is grounded. 3. It is of ufe to lawgivers, who ought to make their laws as agreeable as poflible to the law of nature. And as laws made by men, like all human works, muft be im- perfedl, it points out the errors and imperfedions of human laws. 4. To judges and interpreters of the law it is of ufe, be- caufc that interpretation ought to be preferred which is founded in the law of nature. 5. It is of ufe in civil controverlles be- tween ftates, or between individuals who have no common fupc- rior. In fuch controverfies, the appeal muft be made to the law of nature; and the ftandard fyftems of it, particularly that of Grotius, have great authority. And, 6. to fay no more upon tliis point. It is of great ufe to foverelgns and ftates who arc above all human laws, to be folemnly admonillied of the con- dud they are bound to obferve to their own fubjecis, to the fubjedls of other Jhites, and to one another, in peace and in war. The better and the more generally the law of nature is under- ftood, the greater difhonour, in public eftimation, will follow every violation of it.
Some authors liavc imagined, that fyftems of natura.1 jurifiiru- D d d dcnce » 94 ESSAY V.
» 94 ESSAY V.
CHAP. III. (lence ought to be confined to the perfeft rights of men, be- caiife the duties which correfpond to the imperfed rights, the duties of charity and humanity cannot be enforced by human hiws, but nuifl: be left to the judgment and confcience of men, free from compulfion. But the fyftems which have had the greatefl applaufe of the pubUc, have not follovired this plan, and, I conceive, for good reafons. Firjl, Becaufe a fyllem of perfect rights could by no means ferve the purpofe of a fyftem of mo- rals, which furely is an important purpofe. Secondly, Becaufe, in many cafes, it is hardly pollible to fix the precife limit be- tween juftice and humanity, between perfed and imperfedl right. Like the colours in a prifmatic image, they run into each other, fo that the heft eye cannot fix the precife boundary between them. 7'hirdly, As wife legiflators and magiftrates ought to have it as their end to make the citizens good, as well as juft, we find, in all civilized nations, laws that are intended to encourage the du- ties of humanity. Where human laws cannot enforce them by puniihments, they may encourage them by rewards. Of this the wifeft legiflators have given examples; and how far this branch of legiflation may be carried, no man can forefee.
The fubftance of the four following chapters was wrote long ago, and read in a literary fociety, with a view to juftify fome points of morals from metaphyfical objedtions urged againft them in the writings of David Hume, Efq. If they anfwerthat end, and, at the fame time, ferve to illuftrate the account I have given of our moral powers, It is hoped that the reader will not think them improperly placed here j and that he will forgive fome repetitions, and perhaps anachronifms, occafioned by their being wrote at different times, and on different occafions.
CHAP.
OBJECT OF MORAL. APPROBATION. 395 Whether an AElion defervittg Moral Approbation, miijl be done with the belief of its being morally good.
THERE Is no part of phllofophy more fubtilc and intri- cate tlian that whicli is called 7'he Theory of Morals. Nor is there any more plain and level to the apprehenfion of man than the practical part of morals.
In the former, the Epicurean, the Peripatetic and the Stoic, had each his different fyftem of old; and almofl every modern author of reputation has a fyftem of his own. At the fame time, there is no branch of human knowledge, in which there is fo general an agreement among ancients and moderns, learned and unlearned, as in the prad.ical rules of morals.
From this difcord in the theory, and harmony in the pradical part, \vc may judge, that the rules of morality ftand upon ano- ther and a firmer foundation than the theory. And of this it Is eafy to perceive the reafon.
For, in order to know what is right and what is wrong in hu- man condud, we need only liften to the dictates of our con- fcience when the mind is calm and unruffled, or attend to the judgment we form of others in like clrcumftances. P)Ut, to judge of the various theories of morals, we muft be able to ana- lyze and diffed, as it were, the adivc powers of the human mind, and efpecially to analyze accuia ely that confcicnce or moral power by which we difcern right from wrong.
The confcience may be compared to the C} e in this, as in many D d d 2 other CHAP. IV.
ESSAY V.
other refpedls. The learned and the unlearned fee objefts with equal diftinftnefs. The former have no title to didate to the latter, as far as the eye is judge, nor is there any difagreement about fuch matters. But, to difTedl the eye, and to explain the theory of vifion, is a difficult point, wherein the moll fkilful have differed.
From this remarkable difparity between our decifions in the theory of morals and in the rules of morality, we may, I think, draw this conclufion. That wherever we find any difagreement between the pradical rules of morality, which have been re- ceived in all ages, and the principles of any of the theories ad- vanced upon this fubjed, the pradlical rules ought to be the flandard by which the theory is to be corred\ed, and that it is both unfufe and unphilofophical to warp the pradical rules, in order to make them tally with a favourite theory.
The queftion to be confidered in this chapter belongs to the pradlical part of morals, and therefore is capable of a more eafy and more certain determination. And, if it be determined ia the affirmative, I conceive that it may ferve as a touchftone to try fome celebrated theories which are inconfiftent with that de- termination, and which have led the theorifts to oppofe it by very fubtile metaphyfical arguments.
Every queftion about what is or is not the proper objedl of moral approbation, belongs to pratlical morals, and fuch is the queftion now under confideration: Whether a(ftions deferving moral approbation muft be done with the belief of their being morally good? Or, Whether an adtion, done without any regard to duty or to the didlates of confcience, can be entitled to moral approbation?
In every adion of a moral agent, his confcience is either al- together filent, or it pronounces the adion to be good, or bad, or OBJECT OF MORAL APPROBATION. 397 or indiiTcrent. This, I think, is a complete enumeration, cuw iv.
If it be jjcrfedly iHent, the adion mult be very trifling, or appear lb. For confcience, in ihofe who have exercifcd it, is a very pragmatical faculty, and meddles with every part of our condudt, whether we defire its counfel or not. And ■what a man does in perfedl fimplicity, without the leaf! fufpicion of its being bad, his heart cannot condemn him for, nor \vill he that knows the heart condemn him. If there was any previous culjxible negligence or inattention which led him to a wrong judgment, or hindered his forming a right one, that I do not exculpate. I only confider the adion done, and the difpofition with which it w^as done, without its previous circumflances.
And in this there appears nothing that merits difapprobation.
As little can it merit any degree of moral approbation, becaufe there was neither good nor ill intended. And the fame may be faid when confcience pronounces the adion to be indifferent.
If, in the fecond place, I do what my confcience pronounces to be bad or dubious, I am guilty to myfelf, and juftly deferve the difapprobation of others. Nor am I lefs guilty in this cafe, though what I judged to be bad fhould happen to be good or indifferent. I did it believing it to be bad, and this is an im- morality.
Lcijlly, If I do what my confcience pronounces to be right and ray duty, either 1 have fome regard to duty, or I have none. The lafi: is not fuppofible; for I believe there is no man fo abantloncd, but that he does what he believes to be his duty, with more affurancc and alacrity upon that account. The more weight the reclltude of the adion has in determining me to do it, the more I approve of my own condud. x\n(.l if my worldly intereft, my appetites or inclinations draw me ftrongly the contrary way, my following the didates of my confcience, in oppolition to thefe motives, adds to the moral worth of the ad ion.
When When CHAP. IV. When a man ads from an erroneous judgment, if his error be invincible, all agree that he is inculpable: But if his error be owing to fome previous negligence or inattention, there fcems to be fome dlfrerence among moralifts. This difference, however, is only fceming, and not real. For wherein lies the fault in this cafe? It muil: be granted by all, that the fault lies in this, and folely in this, that he was not at due pains to have his judgment well informed. Thofe moralifts, therefore, who confider the action and the previous conduct that led to it as one whole, find fomething to blame in the whole; and they do fo mort juftly. But thofe who take this whole to pieces, and confider what is blameable and what is right in each part, find all that is blameable In what preceded this wrong judgment, and nothing but what is approvable in what followed it.
Let us fuppofe, for Infiiance, that a man believes that God has indifpenfably required him to obferve a A'ery rigorous fafl In Lent; and that, from a regard to this fuppofed Divine com- mand, he fafts in fiich manner as is not only a great mortifica- tion to his appetite, but even hurtful to his health.
His fuperftitlous opinion may be the effed of a culpable ne- gligence, for which he can by no means be juftified. Let him, therefore, bear all the blame upon this account that he deferves. But now, having this opinion fixed in his mind, fhall he act according to It or agalnfl; it? Surely we cannot hefitate a mo- ment in this cafe. It is evident, that. In following the light of his judgment, he a6ls the part of a good and pious man; where- as, in acting contrary to his judgment, he would be guilty of wilful difobedience to his Maker.
If my fervant, by miftaking my orders, docs the contrary of wdiat 1 commanded, believing, at the fame time, that he obeys my orders, there may be fome fault in his miftake, but to charge him OBJECT OF MORAL APPROBATION. 399 hiin %\ iih the crime of difobcdicncc, would be Inhuman and CHAF. iv. unjulh Thefe deternunations appear to me to have hitultive evidence, no lefs than that of mathematical axioms. A man who is come to years of underdanding, and who has excrcifed his fa- culties in judging of right and wrong, fees their truth as he fees day-light. Mctaphyfical argmncnts brought againft them have the fame efFed as when brought againll the evidence of fenfe; they may puzzle and confound, but they do not convince. It appears evident, therefore, that jhofe adions only can truly be called virtuous, or deferving of moral approbation, which the agent believed to be right, and to which he was intluenced, more or lefs, by that belief.
If it fliould be objected, Tliat this principle makes it to be of no confequence to a man's morals, what his opinions may be, providing he ads agreeably to them, the anfwer is eafy.
IVIorality requires, not only that a man fliould ad according to his judgment, but that he fliould ufe the bell means in his power that his judgment be according to truth. If he fail in either of thefe points, he is worthy of blame j but, if he fail in neither, I fee not wherein he can be blamed.
When a man muft ad, and has no longer time t6 deliberate, he ought to ad according to the lii^ht of his confcience, even •when he is in an error. But, when he has time to deliberate, he ought furely to ufe all the means in his power to be rightly informed. When he has done fo, he may ftill be in an error j but it is an invincible error, and cannot juftly be imputed to him as a fault.
A fecond objedion is, That we immediately approve of bene- volence, gratitude, and other primary virtues, without enquiring whether -40-0 E S S A Y V.
CHAP, iv.^ whether they are pradifed from a perfuafion that they are our duty. And the laws of God place the fum of virtue in loving God and our neighbour, without any provifion that we do it from a perfuafion that we ought to do To.
The anfvver to this objedion is, That the love of God, the love of our nei;',hbour, jultice, gratitude, and other primary vir- tues, are, by the conftitution of human nature, neceffarily ac- companied with a conviction of their being morally good. We may therefore fafely prefume, that thele things are never dif- joined, and that every man who pradifes thefe virtues does it with a good confcience. In judging of mens condud, we do not fuppofe things which cannot happen, nor do the laws of God give decifions upon impoflible cafes, as they muft have done, if they fuppofed the cafe of a man who thought it contra- ry to his duty to love God or to love mankind.
But if we wifh to know how the laws of God determine the point in queftion, we ought to obferve their decifion with regard to fuch acflions as may appear good to one man and ill to ano- ther. And here the decifions of fcripture are clear: Let every man be petfoaded in bis own mind. He that doubt eth is condemned if he eat, becaufe he eateth not of faith, for •whatfuever is not rf faith is fin. 1^0 him that efeemeth any thing to be unclean, it is unclean. The fcripture often placeth the fum of virtue in living in all good con- fcience, in a<5ting fo that our hearts condemn us not.
The laft objedion I fhall mention is a metaphyfical one urged by Mr Hume.
It is a favourite point In his fyftem of morals. That jufiice is not a natural but an artificial virtue. To prove this, he has ex- erted the whole itrength of his reafon and eloquence. And as the principle we are confidering flood in his way, he takes pains to relate it.
" Suppofe, OBJECT OF MORAL APPROBATION. 401 " Suppofe, (i\ys he, a perfon to have lent mc a fum of ino- CHAP. iv. " ney, on coiulitioii that it be rcftored in a few days. After " the expiration of the term he demands the fum. I afk, what " reafon or motive have I to reftore the money? It will per- " haps be faid, That my regard to juftice and abhorrence of " villany and knavery are funkicnt reafons for me." And this, he acknowledges, would be a fatisfactory anfwer to a man in his civilized ftatc, and when trained up according to a certain difciplinc and education. " But in his rude and more natural " condition, fays he, if you are pleafed to call fuch a condition " natural, this anfwer would be rejeded as perfectly unintelli- " gible and fophillical.
" For wherein confifts this honefty and juftice? Not furely " in the external adion. It muft, therefore, confift in the " motive from which the external adlion is derived. This mo- " tive can never be a regard to the honefty of the action. For •' it is a plain fallacy to fay. That a virtuous motive is requifite " to render an adtion honeft, and, at the fame time, that a re- " gard to the honefty is the motive to the adion. We can " never have a regard to the virtue of an adtion, unlcfs the ac- " tion be antecedently virtuous."
And, in another place, " To fuppofe that the mere regard to " the virtue of the action is that which rendered it virtuous, is " to reafon in a circle. An action muft be virtuous, before we " can have a regard to its virtue. Some virtuous motive, there- " fore, muft be antecedent to that regard. Nor is this merely " a metaphyfical fubtilty," 6v. Trcat'tfe of Hum. Nature, book 3. Ptirl 2. fen. I.
I am not to confider at this time, how this reafoning is ap- plied to fupport the author's opinion, That juftice is not a natu- ral but an artificial virtue. I conlidcr it only as far as it 0{> pofes the principle I have been endeavouring to eftabliHi, That, E e e to ESSAY V.
E e e to ESSAY V.
CHAP. IV. to render an adion truly virtuous, the agent mufl: have fome regard to its reditude. And I conceive the whole force of the reafoning amounts to this: 'o When we judge an adion to be good or bad, it muft have been fo in its own nature antecedent to that judgment, other- wife the judgment is erroneous. If, therefore, the adlion be good in its nature, the judgment of the agent cannot make it had, nor can his judgment make it good if, in its nature, it be bad. For this would be to afcribe to our judgment a flrange magical power to transform the nature of things, and to fay, that my judging a thing to be what it is not, makes it really to be what I erroneoufly judge it to be. This, I think, is the ob- jedlion in Its full ftrength. And, in anfwer to it, T'srjl, If w^e could not loofe this metaphyfical knot, I think we might fairly and honertly cut it, becaufe it fixes an abfurdity upon the clearefl and moft indifputable principles of morals and of common fenfe. For I appeal to any man whether there be any principle of morality, or any principle of common fenfe, more clear and indifputable than that which we juft now quoted from the Apoftle Paul, That although a thing be not unclean in itfelf, yet to him that efteemeth it to be unclean, to him it is unclean. But the metaphyfical argument makes this abfiard. For, fays the metaphyfician. If the thing was not unclean in itfelf, you judged wrong in efteeming it to be unclean; and what can be more abfurd, than that your efteeming a thing to be what it is not, fliould make it what you erroneoufly efteem it to be?
Let us try the edge of this argument in another inftance. Nothing is more evident, than that an acftion does not merit the name of benevolent, unlefs it be done from a belief that it tends to promote the good of our neighbour. But this is ab- furd, fays the metaphyfician. For, if it be not a benevolent adlion OBJECT OF MORAL APPROBATION. 403 adion In itfelf, your belief of Its tendency cannot chan2;e its CHAP. iv. nature. It is abfnrd, that your erroneous belief fliould make the adion to be what you believe it to be. Nothing is more evi- dent, than that a man who tells the truth, believing it to be a lie, Is guilty of falfehood; but the metaphyfician would make this to be abfurd.
In a word, if there be any ftrength in this argument, it would follow. That a man might be, in the higheft degree, vir- tuous, without the leaft regard to virtue j that he might be very benevolent, without ever intending to do a good office; very malicious, without ever intending any hurt; very revengeful, without ever intending to retaliate an injury j very grateful, without ever intending to return a benefit; and a man of ftrld: veracity, with an intention to lie. We might, therefore, rejcdl this reafoning, as repugnant to felf-evldent truths, though we were not able to point out the fallacy of It.
2. But let us try, in the fecond place, whether the fallacy of this argument may not be difcovered.
We afcribe moral goodnefs to adions confidered abftradly, without any relation to the agent. We likewife afcribe moral goodnefs to an agent on account of an adlion he has done; we call it a good adion, though, in this cafe, the goodnefs Is pro- perly in the man, and is only by a figure afcribed to the adlion. Now, it is to be confidered, whether moral goodnefs^ when applied to an action confidered abftradlly, has the fame meaning as when we apply it to a man on account of that adion j or whe- ther we do not unawares change the meaning of the word, ac- cording as we apply it to the one or to the other.
The a(flion, confidered abflradly, has neither underflanding nor will; it is not accountable, nor can it be under any moral obligation. But all thefe things are elTential to that moral good- E e e 2 nefs CHAP. IV. ji(.fs which belongs to a man; for, if a man had not underftand- ing and will, he could have no moral goodnefs. Hence it fol- lows neceflarily, that the moral goodnefs which we afcribe to an aftion confidered abftracflly, and that which we afcribe to a per- fon for doing that adtion, are not the fame. The meaning of the word is changed when it is applied to thefe different fubjeds.