This will be more evident, when we confider what is meant by the moral goodnefs which we afcribe to a man for doing an aft ion, and what by the goodnefs which belongs to the adion confidered abftradlly. A good adion in a man is that in which he applied his intelledual powers properly, in order to judge what he ought to do, and adted according to his beft judgment. This Is all that can be required of a moral agent j and in this his moral goodnefs, in any good adion, confifts. But is this the goodnefs which we afcribe to an adion confidered abllradly? No, furely. For the adion, confidered abfliradly, is neither endowed with judgment nor with adive power; and, therefore, can have none of that goodnefs which we afcribe to the man for doing it.
But what do we mean by goodnefs in an adion confidered abftradly? To me it appears to lie in this, and in this only. That it is an adion which ought to be done by thofe who have the power and opportunity, and the capacity of perceiving their obligation to do it. I would gladly know of any man, what other moral goodnefs can be in an adion confidered abftradly. And this goodnefs Is inherent in its nature, and infeparable from it. No opinion or judgment of an agent can in the leaft alter its nature.
Suppofe the adion to be that of relieving an innocent perfon out of great dlftrefs. This furely has all the moral goodnefs that an adion confidered abftradly can have. Yet it Is evident, that an agent, in relieving a perfon in diftrefs, may have no moral OBJECT OF MORAL APPROBATION. 405 moral goodnefs, may have great merit, or may have great de- chap. iv. merit.
Suppofe, yfr/?, That mice cut the cords which bound the di- ftreflcd peribn, and fo bring him relief. Is there moral good- nefs in this aft of the mice?
Suppofe,y?foff^/)', That a man malicioufly relieves the diflrefled perfon, in order to plunge him into greater diftrefs. In this ac- tion, there is furely no moral goodnefs, but much malice and in- humanity.
If, in the lajl place, we fuppofe a perfon, from real fympathy and humanity, to bring relief to the diflrefled perfon, with con- fiderable cxpence or danger to himfelf j here is an ad ion of real worth, which every heart approves and every tongue praifes. But wherein lies the worth? Not in the action confi- dered by itfelf, which was common to all the three, but in the man who, on this occafion, aded the part which became a good man. He did what his heart approved, and therefore he is ap- proved by God and man.
Upon the whole, if we diftinguifli between that goodnefs which may be afcribed to an adion confidered by itfelf, and that goodnefs which we afcribe to a man when he puts it in ex- ecution, we fliall find a key to this metaphyfical lock. \Ve ad- mit, that the goodnefs of an adion, confidered abftradly, can have no dependence upon the opinion or belief of an agent, any more than the truth of a propofition depends upon our believing it to be true. But, when a man exerts his adive power well or ill, there is a moral goodnefs or turpitude which we figuratively impute to the adion, but which is truly and properly imputable to the man only; and this goodnefs or turpitude depends very much upon the intention of the agent, and the opinion he had of his adion.
This This CHAP. IV. This cliftlncllon has been underftood in all ages by thofe who gave any attention to morals, though it has been varioully ex- prefled. The Greek moralifts gave the name of xxBwev to an adion good in itfelf j fuch an adtion might be done by the moft worthlefs. But an adllon done with a right intention, which implies real worth in the agent, they called xarcfS-w/xa. The di- flindion is explained by Cicero in his OfRces. He calls the firfl officium medium, and the fecond officium perfe£lum^ or reBum. In the fcholaftic ages, an adlion good in itfelf was faid to be ma- terially good, and an a6lion done with a right intention was ciX- ledi formally good. This laft way of exprefling the diftindion is ftill familiar among Theologians; but Mr Hume feems not to have attended to it, or to have thought it to be words with- out any meaning.
Mr Hume, in the fedlion already quoted, tells us with great afliirance, " In fhort, it may be eftabllfhed as an undoubted *' maxim, that no adion can be virtuous or morally good, un- " lefs there be in human nature fome motive to produce it, di- " flindt from the fenfe of its morality," And upon this maxim he founds matiy of his reafonings on the fubjed of morals.
Whether it be confiftent with Mr Hume's own fyftem, that an adion may be produced merely from the fenfe of its mora- lity, without any motive of agreeablenefs or utility, I Ihall not now enquire. But, if it be true, and I think it evident to eve- ry man of common underllanding, that a judge or an arbiter ads the moft virtuous part when his fentence is produced by no other motive but a regard to juftice and a good confcience; nay, when all other motives diftind from this are on the other fide: If this I fay be true, then that undoubted maxim of Mr Hume muft be falfe, and all the concluiions built upon it muft fall to the ground.
From the principle I have endeavoured to eftablifh, I think fome OBJECT OF MORAL APPROBATION. 407 fonic confequcnces may be drawn with regard to the theory of CfiAP. iv.
morals.
Firji, If there be no virtue without the behef that what we do Is right, it follows. That a moral faculty, that is, a j)ower of difceniing moral goodnefs and turpitude in human condudl, is eflcjitial to every being capable of virtue or vice. A being who has no more conception of moral goodnefs and bafenefs of right and wrong, than a blind man hath of colours, can have no regard to it in his condud:, and therefore can neither be virtuous nor vicious.
He may have qualities that are agreeable or difagreeable, ufe- ful or hurtful; fo may a plant or a machine. And we fome- times ufe the word virtue in fuch a latitude as to fignify any agreeable or ufeful quality, as when we fpeak of the virtues of plants. But we are now fpeaking of virtue in the llridl and proper fenfe, as it fignifics that quality in a man which is the objed of moral approbation.
This virtue a man could not have, if he had not a power of difcerning a right and a wrong in human condudt, and of being influenced by that difcernment. For in fo far only he is virtu- ous as he is guided in his conduft by that part of his conftitu- tion. Brutes do not appear to have any fuch power, and there- fore are not moral or accountable agents. They are capable of culture and difcipline, but not of virtuous or criminal condudl. Even human creatures, in infancy and non-age, are not moral agents, becaufe their moral faculty is not yet unfolded. Thcfe fentiments are fupported by the common fenfe of mankind, which has always determined, that neither brutes nor infants can be indidted for crimes.
It is of fmall confequence what name we give to this moral power of the human mind^ but it is fo important a part of our conftitution, 4o8 E S S A Y V.
CFIAP. IV. conftitution, as to deferve an appropriated name. The name of confdence^ as it is the moft common, feems to me as proper as any that has been given it. I find no fault with the name moral fetife, although I conceive this name has given occafion to fome miftakes concerning the nature of our moral power. Modern Philofophers have conceived of the external fenfes as having no other office but to give us certain fenfations, or fimple concep- tions, which we could not have without them. And this no- tion has been applied to the moral fenfe. But it feems to me a miftaken notion in both. By the fenfe of feeing, I not only have the conception of the different colours, but I perceive one body to be of this colour, another of that. In like manner, by my moral fenfe, I not only have the conceptions of right and wrong in condudl, but I perceive this conduct to be right, that to be wrong, and that indifferent. All our fenfes are judging faculties, fo alfo is confcience. Nor is this power only a judge of our own adlions and thofe of others, it is likewife a princi- ple of adlion in all good men j and fo far only can our condud: be denominated virtuous, as it is influenced by this principle.
A fecond confequence from the principle laid down in this chapter is, That the formal nature and effence of that virtue which is the objed: of moral approbation confifts neither in a prudent profecution of our private intereft, nor in benevolent affedions towards others, nor in qualities ufeful or agreeable to ourfelves or to others, nor in fympathizing with the pailions and affedions of others, and in attuning our own condudt to the tone of other mens paflions; but it confifts in living in all good confcience, that is, in ufing the befl means in our power to know our duty, and adling accordingly.
Prudence is a virtue, benevolence is a virtue, fortitude is a virtue; but the eflence and formal nature of virtue muft lie in fomething.that is common to all thefe, and to every other vir- tue. And this I conceive can be nothing elfe but the reditude of of fuch conducl and tvirpltude of the contrary, which is difccrn- CHAP. v. ed by a good man. And Co far only he is virtuous as he pur- fucs the former and avoids the latter.
Whether Juji'ice be a Natural or an Artificial Virtue.
MR Hume's philofophy concerning morals was firft prc- fented to the world in the third volume of his Treatife of Human Nature, in the year 17405 afterwards in his Enquiry con- cerning the Principles of Morals, which was firft publifhed by itfelf, and then in feveral editions of his EJfays and Treatfes, In thefe two works on morals the fyftem is the fame. A more popular arrangement, great embcUiflmient, and the omiilion of fome metaphyfical reafonings, have given a preference in the public efteem to the laft; but I find neither any new principles in it, nor any new arguments in fupport of the fyftem common to both.
In this fyftem, the proper objed of moral approbation is not adions or any voluntary exertion, but qualities of mind 5 that is, natural affedions or paflions, which are involunta- ry, a part of the conftitution of the man, and common to us with many brute-animals. When we praife or blame any vo- luntary adion, it is only confidered as align of the natural af- fedion from which it flows, and from which all its merit or de- merit is derived.
Moral approbation or difapprobatlon is not an ad of the judgment, which, like all ads of judgment, muft be true or falfe, it is only a certain feeling, which, from the conftitution of hu- F f f man 410 E S S A Y V.
CHAP. V. jj^an nature, arifes upon contemplating certain characters or qualities of mind coolly and impartially.
This feeling, when agreeable, is moral approbation; when difagreeable, difapprobation. The qualities of mind which produce this agreeable feeling are the moral virtues, and thofe that produce the difagreeable, the vices.
Thefe preliminaries being gi*anted, the queflion about the foundation of morals is reduced to a fimple queftion of fafl, to wit, What are the qualities of mind which produce, in the difinterefted obferver, the feeling of approbation, or the con- trary feeling?
In anfwer to this queflion, the author endeavours to prove, by a very copious indudlion, That all perfonal merit, all virtue, all that is the obje6l of moral approbation, confifts in the qua- lities of mind which are agreeable or i/Jlfitl to the pei'fon who poflefTes them, or to others.
The t:/i/Ice and the ufi/e is the whole fum of merit in every charad:er, in every quality of mind, and in every adion of life. There is no room left for that hcnejlum which Cicero thus de- fines, Honejlum igitur id intelligmus, quod tale ejl, tit detraHa omni uti- Ihate^fme ullis prern'us frtiEltbufve, per fe ipjum pojfit jure landari.
Among the ancient moralifts, the Epicureans were the only {^Gi who denied that there is any fuch thing as honejium, or mo- ral worth, diftindl from pleafure. In this Mr Hume's fyflem agrees with theirs. For the addition of utility to pleafure, as a foundation of morals, makes only a verbal, but no real diffe- rence. What is ufeful only has no value in itfelf, but derives all its merit from the end for which it is ufeful. That end, in this fyftem, is agreeablenefs or pleafure. So that, in both fy- ftems, pleafure is the only end, the only thing that is good in itfelf, itftlf, and tlefirablc for its own fake; and virtue derives all its CHAP, v^ merit from its tendency to produce plcafurc.
Ai^^recablencfs and utility arc not moral conceptions, nor have they any connexion with morality. What a man does, merely becaufe it is agreeable, or ufeful to procure what is agreeable, is not virtue. Therefore the Epicurean fyftem was juftly thought by Cicero, and the beft moralifts among the an- cients, to fubvert morality, and to fubftitutc another principle in its room; and this fyftem is liable to the fame cenfure.
In one thing, however, it differs remarkably from that of Epicu- rus. It allows, that there are difinterefted affedions in human na- ture; that the love of children and relations, friendlhip, grati- tude, companion and humanity, are not, as Epicurus maintain- ed, different modifications of felf-love, but fimple and original parts of the human conftitution; that when intereft, or envy, or revenge, pervert not our difpofition, we are Inclined, from natural philanthropy, to dcfirc, and to be pleafed with the hap- pinefs of the human kind.
All this, in oppofition to the Epicurean fyflem, Mr Hume maintains with great ftrength of reafon and eloquence, and, in this refped, his fyftcm is more liberal and difintercrted than that of the Greek Philofopher. According to Epicurus, virtue is whatever is agreeable to ourfelves. Accorditig to INIr Hume, every quality of mind that is agreeable or ufeful to ourfelves or to others.
This theory of the nature of virtue, it mufl be acknowledged, enlarges greatly the catalogue of moral virtues, by bringing in- to that catalogue every cpiality of mind that is ufeful or agree- able. Nor does there ajipear any good reafon why the ufeful and agreeable qualities of body and of fortune, as well as tiiofe of the mind, fhould not have a place among moral viriaci in F f f 2 this CHAP. V. t}^|s fyftem. They have the eiTence of virtue j that Is, agreca- blenefs and utility, why then Ihould they not have the name?
But, to compenfate this addition to the moral virtues, one clafs of them feems to be greatly degraded and deprived of all intrinfic merit. The ufeful virtues, as was above obferved, are only minirtering fervants of the agreeable, and pur%'eyors for them j they mufl, therefore, be fo far inferior in dignity, as hardly to deferve the fame name.
Mr Hume, how^ever, gives the name of virtue to both; and to diflinguifh them, calls the agreeable qualities natural virtues, and the ufeful artificial.
The natural virtues are thofe natural affedions of the human conflitution which give immediate pleafure in their exercife. Such are all the benevolent afledions. Nature difpofes to them, and from their own nature they are agreeable, both when we exercife them ourfelves, and when we contemplate their exercife in others.
The artificial virtues are fuch as are efleemed folely on ac- count of their utility, either to promote the good of fociety,. as juflice, fidelity, honour, veracity, allegiance, chaftlty; or on account of their utilty to the poflefTor, as indufiry, difcretion, frugality, fecrecy, order, perfeverance, forethought, judgment, and others, of which, he fays, many pages could not contain the catalogue.
This general view of Mr Hume's fyilem concerning the foundation of morals, feemed neceffary, in order to underftand diftlndly the meaning of that principle of his, which Is to be the fubjedt of this chapter, and on which he has beftowed much labour, to wit, that juftice is not a natural but an artifi- cial virtue.
Thi^ OF JUSTICE. 41.
This fyftcm of the foundation of virtue is fo contraclidlory in CHAi\ v. many of its efTcntial points to the account we have before given of the adlivc powers of liuuKin nature, tliat, if tlie one be true, the other mufl be faUc.
If God has given to man a power Avhicli we call confcience, the moral faculty, l\\fc fc rife of duty, by wliirli, when he comes to years of underllandincr, he perceives certain things that depend on his will to be his duty, and other things to be bafe and un- worthy; if the notion of duty be a finiple conception, of its own kind, and of a diflercnt nature from the conceptions of utility and agreeablenefs, of intereft or reputation; if this mo- ral faculty be the prerogative of man, and no velHge of it be found in brute-animals; if it be given us by God to regulate all our animal affections and paflions; if to be governed by it be the glory of man and the image of God in his foul, and to difrcgard its didlates be his didionour and depravity: I fliy, if thefe things be fo, to feek the foundation of morality in the affections which we have in common with the brutes, is to feek the living among the dead, and to change the glory of man and the image of God in his foul, into the llmilitude of an ox that cateth grafs.
If virtue and vice be a matter of choice, they muft confift in vcjluntary actions, or in fixed purpofes of arting according to a certain rule when there is opportunity, and not in qualities of mind which arc involuntary.
It is true, that every virtue is both agi-eeablc and ufeful in the higheft degree; and that every quality that is agreeable or ufeful, has a merit upon that account. But virtue has a merit peculiar to itlelf, a merit which does not arife from its beinrr ufeful or agreeable, but from its being virtue. This merit is difcerned by the fame faculty by which we dilcern it to be vir- tue, and by no other.
4H ESSAY V.
CHAP. V. We e;Ive the name of ejleftn both to the regard we have for tilings ufeful and agreeable, and to the regard we have for vir- tue; but thefe are different kinds of elleem. I erteem a man for his ingenuity and learning. 1 efteem him for his moral worth. The found of tjleem in both thefe fpeeches is the fame, but its meaning is very different.
Good breeding is a very amiable quality j and even if I knew that the man had no motive to it but its pleafure and utility to himfelf and others, I fliould like it flill, but I would not in that cafe call it a moral virtue.
A dog has a tender concern for her puppies; fo has a man for his children. The natural affedlion is the fame in both, and is amiable in both. But why do we impute moral virtue to the man on account of this concern, and not to the dog? The rea- fon furely is, That, in the man, the natural afFedion is accom- panied with a fenfe of duty, but, in the dog, it is not. The fame thing may be faid of all the kind affedions common to us with the brutes. They are amiable qualities, but they are not moral virtues.
What has been faid relates to Mr Hume's fyftem in general. We are now to confider his notion of the particular virtue of juftice, that its merit confifts wholly in its utility to foclety.
That juftice is highly ufeful and neceffary in fociety, and, on that account, ought to be loved and efteeraed by all that love mankind, will readily be granted. And as juftice is a foclal vir- tue, it is true alfo, that there could be no exercife of it, and perhaps we fliould have no conception of it, without fociety. But this is equally true of the natural affections of benevolence, gratitude, friendihip and compaffion, which Mr Hume makes to be the natural virtues.
It may be granted to Mr Hume, that men have no concep- tion tiou of the ^•il•tue of jullice till they have lived fome time in fo- Cliw. v. ciety. It is purely a moral conce|)tion, and our moral concep- tions and moral judgments are not born with us. They grow up by degrees, as our reaion docs. Nor do I pretend to know how early, or in wluit order we acquire the conception of the feveral virtues. The conception of juflice fuppofes fome exer- cife of the moral faculty, which, being the nobleft part of the human conllitution, and that to which all its other parts are fub- fervient, appears latell.
It may likewife be granted, that there is no animal atTeclion in human nature that prompts us immediately to ads of juflice, as fuch. We have natural aflecflions of the animal kind, which immediately prompt us to acts of kindnefs; but none, that I know, that has the fame relation to juftice. The very concep- tion of juftice fuppofes a moral faculty; but our natural kind atfeclions do not; othcrwife w'e mufl allow that brutes have this faculty.
What I maintain \s,Jiijl, That when men come to the exer- cife of their nu)ral faculty, they perceive a turpitude in inju- ftice, as they do in other crimes, and confequcntly an obliga- tion to juftice, abftrading from the confideration of its utility. hxvCi^fecojidly, That as foon as men liave any rational conception of a favour, and of an injury, they muft have the conception of juflice, and perceive its obligation dillind from its utility.
The firft of thefe points hardly admits of any other proof, but an appeal to the fentiments of every honefl man, and eve- ry man of honour. Whether his indignation is not immediately inflamed againfl an atrocious ad of villany, without the cool confideration of its diflant confequences upon the good of Ib- ciety?
We might appeal even to robbers and pirates, Whether they have CHAP. V. iijive not had 'great ftruggles with their confcience, when they firft reiblved to break through all the rules of juflicc? And whether, in a folitary and ferious hour, they have not frequent- ly felt the pangs of guilt? They have very often confeiled this at a time when all difguife is laid afide.
The common good of fociety, though a pleafing objedl to all men, when prefented to their view, hardly ever enters' into the thoughts of the far greatefl part of mankind; and, if a regard to it were the fole motive to juftice, the number of honeft men mufl be fmall indeed. It would be confined to the higher ranks, who, by their education, or by their office, are led to make the public good an objed; but that it is fo confined, I believe no man will venture to affirm.
The temptations to injuflice are firongeft in the loweft clafs of men j and if nature had provided no motive to oppofe thofe temptations, but a fenfe of public good, there would not be found an honeft man in that clafs.
To all men that are not greatly corrupted, injuftice, as well as cruelty and ingratitude, is an objedl of difapprobation on its own account. There is a voice within us that proclaims it to be bafe, unworthy, and deferving of punifhment.
*That there is, in all ingenuous natures, an antipathy to ro- guery and treachery, a reluctance to the thoughts of villany and bafenefs, we have the teftimony of Mr Hume himfelf j who, as I doubt not but he felt it, has exprefl'ed it very ftrongly in the conclufion to his enquiry, and acknowledged that, in fome cafes, without this reludiance and antipathy to difhonefty, a fen- fible knave would find no fufficient motive from public good to be honeft.
I I fliiill give the paflage at large from the Enquiry concerning CHAP, v. the Principles of Morals, fection 9. near the end.
" Treating vice with the greatcfl: candour, and making it all • poflible concellions, we muft acknowledge that there is not, ' in any inftance, the fmallefl pretext for giving it the preference ' above virtue, with a view to felf-interefl j except, perhaps, * in the cafe of juftice, where a man, taking things in a certain light, may often feem to be a lofer by his integrity. And though it is allowed that, without a regard to property, no fo- ciety could fubfifl^ yet, according to the imperfedl way in which human affairs are conducted, a fenfible knave, in particular in- cidents, may think, that an adl of iniquity or infulelity will make a coniiderable addition to his fortune, without caufing any confiderablc breach in the focial union and confederacy. That bottejiy is the bejl policy, may be a good general rule, but it is liable to many exceptions: And he, it may perhaps be thought, conduds himfelf with moft wifdom, who obferves the general rule, and takes advantage of all the exceptions.
" I muft confefs that, if a man think that this reafoning much " requires an anfwer, it will be a little difficult to find any, ", which will to him appear fatisfadory and convincing. If his " heart rebel not againfl: fuch pernicious maxims, if he feel no " reludance to the thoughts of villany and bafenefs, he has in- " deed loft a coniiderable motive to virtue, and we may expecT: " that his pradice will be anfwerable to his fpeculation. But " in all ingenuous natures, the antipathy,to treachery and ro- " gucry is too ftrong to be counterbalanced by any views of " profit or pecuniary advantage. Inward peace of mind, confci- " ouliiefs of integrity, a fatisfaclory review of our own conducl; " thefe are circumftances very requifite to happinefs, and will " be cheriflied and cultivated by every honeft man who feels " the importance of them."
G g g The G g g The CHAP. V. xhe reafonlng of the fenftble knave in this pafTuge, feenis to me to be juftly founded upon the principles of the Enquiry and of the Treatife of Human Nature, and therefore it is no wonder, that the Author fliould find it a little difficult to give any an- fwer which would appear fatisfadory and convincing to fuch a man. To counterbalance this reafoning, he puts in the other fcale a reludance, an antipathy, u rebellion of the heart againfl: fuch pernicious maxims, which is felt by ingenuous natures.
Let us confider a little the force of Mr Hume's anfwer to this fenfible knave, who reafons upon his own principles. I think it is either an acknowledgment, that there is a natural judgment of confcience in man, that injuftice and treachery is a bafe and unworthy praftice, which is the point I would efta- blilh; or it has no force to convince either the knave or an ho- neft man.
A clear and intuitive judgment, refulting from the conftitu- tion of human nature, is fufficient to overbalance a train of fubtile reafoning on the other fide. Thus, the tefiiimony of our fenfes is fufficient to overbalance all the fubtile arguments brought againfl their teflimony. And, if there be a like tefi:imo- «y of confcience in favour of honefl:y, all the fubtile reafoning of the knave againfl; it ought to be rejedled without examina- tion, as fallacious and fophifl:ical, becaufe it concludes againfl a felf-evident principle; jufl: as we rejedl the fubtile reafoning of the metaphyficlan againfl the evidence of fenfe.
If, therefore, the reluElance, the antipathy, the rebellion of the heart againfl: injuftice, which Mr Hume fets againfl the reafon- ing of the knave, include in their meaning a natural intuitive judgment of confcience, that injuftice is bafe and unworthy, the reafoning of the knave is convincingly anfwered; but the principle..
principle, Thai jujlice is an artificial •virtue, approved folely for its CHAP, v. utility, is given up.
If, on the other liand, the antipathy, reluctance and rebellion of heart, imply no judgment, but barely an uneafy feeling, and that not natural, but acquired and artificial, the anfwer is indeed very agreeable to the principles of the Enquiry, but has no force to convince the knave, or any other man.
The knave is here fuppofed by Mr Hume to have no fucli feelings, and therefore the anfwer does not touch hib cafe in the leaft, but leaves him in the full poneilion of his reafoning. And ingenuous natures, who have thefe feelings, are left to delibe- rate whether they will yield to acquired and artificial feelings, in oppofition to rules of condudl, which, to their beft judgment, appear wife and prudent.
The fecond thing I propofed to fliew was, That, as foon as men have any rational conception of a favour and of an injury, they mufl have the conception of juftice, and perceive its obli- gation.
The power with which the Author of nature hath endowed us, may be employed either to do good to our fellow-men, or to hurt them. When we employ our power to promote the good and happinefs of others, this is a benefit or favour; when we employ it to hurt them, it is an injury. Juftice fills up the middle between thefe two. It is fuch a conduct as does no in- jury to others; but it does not imply the doing them any fa- vour.
The notions of a favour and of an injury, appear as early in the mind of man as any rational notion whatever. They are difcovercd, not by language only, but by certain alTcclions of G g g 2 mind, CHAP. V. mind, of which they are the natural objedls. A favour natu- rally produces gratitude. An injury done to ourfelves produces^ refentment j and even when done to another, it produces indig- nation.
I take it for granted that gratitude and refentment are no lefs natural to the human mind than hunger and thirfl; and that thofe affedlions are no lefs naturally excited by their proper ob- jedls and occafions than thefe appetites.