By that part of our fabric which we call the facidty of feeing y we judge of vifible objects; by tafle^ another part of our fabric, we judge of beauty and deformity j by that part of our fabric, which enables us to form abllradt conceptions, to compare them, and perceive their relations, we judge of abflracl truths; and by that part of our fabric which we call the moral faculty ^ we judge judge of virtue and vice. If wc fuppofe a being uithoiit any chap. vii. moral faculty in his fabric, 1 grant that he could not have the " ' Icntiincnts of blame and nioral approbation.
There are, therefore, judgments, as ^vell as feelings, tliat are excited by the particular ftrudurc and fabric of tjie mind. But there is this remarkable diflerence between them. That every judgment is, in its own nature, true or falfe j and though it de- pends upon the f\\bric of a mind, whether it have fuch a judg- ment or not, it depends not upon tliat fabric whether the judg- ment be true or not. A true judgment will be true, whatever be the fabric of the mind; but a particular ftrutlure and fabric is neceffary, in order to our perceiving that truth. Nothing like this can be faid of mere feelings, becaufe the attributes of true or falfe do not belong to them.
Thus I think it appears, that the hypothefis which Mr H[u:\iE oppofes is not unintelligible, when applied to the particular in- ilance of ingratitude; becaufe the account of ingratitude which he himfelf thinks true and intelligible, is perfectly agree- able to it.
The /tffoW argument amounts to this: That in moral delibe- ration, we mufl be acquainted before-hand with all the objcifls and all their relations. After thefe things are known, the un- dcrllanding has no farther room to operate. Nothing remains but to feel, on our part, fome fentiraent of blame or approba- tion.
Let us apply this reafoning to the office of a judge. In a caufc that comes before him, he mufl be made acquainted with all the objeds, and all their relations. After this, his underftanding has no fiirther room to operate. Nothing remains, on his part, but CHAP. VII. but to feel the right or the wrong; and mankind have, very ab- furdly, called him ^ judge; he ought to be called ^feeler.
To anfwer this argument more diredtly: The man who dell- berates, after all the objedls and relations mentioned by Mr Hume are known to him, has a point to determine; and that is, whether the adion under his deliberation ought to be done or ought not. In moll: cafes, this point will appear felf-evident to a man who has been accuftomed to exercife his moral judgment; in fome cafes it may require reafoning.
In like manner, the judge, after all the circumftances of the caufe are known, has to judge, whether the plaintiff has a juft plea or not.
The third argument is taken from the analogy between moral beauty and natural, between moral fentlment and tafte. As beauty is not a' quality of the objedt, but a certain feeling of the fpedator, fo virtue and vice are not qualities in the perfons to whom language afcribes them, but feelings of the fpedator.
But is it certain that beauty is not any quality of the objed? This is indeed a paradox of modern philofophy, built upon a philofophical theory; but a paradox fo contrary to the common language and common fenfe of mankind, that it ought rather to overturn the theory on which it ftands, than receive any fup- port from it. And if beauty be really a quality of the objed, and not merely a feeling of the fpedator, the whole force of this argument goes over to the other fide of the queflion.
" Euclid, he fays, has fully explained all the qualities of " the circle, but has not, in any propofition, faid a word of its *' beauty. The reafon is evident. The beauty is not a quality " of the circle."
By APPROBATION IMPLIES JUDGMENT. 487 By the qualities of the circle, he muft mean its properties; and CHAP.VIL there are here two miftakes.
Firjl, Euclid has not fully explained all the properties of the circle. Many have been difcovered and demonflratcd which he never dreamt of.
Secondly, The reafon why Euclid has not faid a word of the beauty of the circle, is not, that beauty is not a quality of the circle; the reafon is, that Euclid never di^relTcs from his fubjed. His purpofc was to demonftrate the mathematical properties of the circle. Beauty is a quality of the circle, not demonftrable by mathematical reafoning, but immediately perceived by a good tafte. To fpeak of it would have been a digreflion from his fubjedl f and that is a fault he is never guilty of.
The fourth argument is, That inanimate objects may bear to each other all the fame relations which we obferve in moral agents.
If this were true, it would be very much to the purpofe; but it feems to be thrown out raftily, without any attention to its evidence. Had I\Ir Hume reflected but a very little upon this dogmatical aflertion, a thoufand inftances would iiave occurred to him in diredt contradiction to it.
May not one animal be more tame, or more docile, or more cunning, or more fierce, or more ravenous, than another? Are thefe relations to be found in inanimate objeds? May not one man be a better painter, or fculptor, or Ihip-builder, or tailor, or fhoemaker, than another? Are thefe relations to be found in inanimate objects, or even in brute-animds? May not one moral agent be more jud, more pious, more attentive to any moral du- ty, or more cmineut in any uioral virtue, than auother? Are not CHAP. VII. iiot tlicfe relations peculiar to moral agents? But to come to the relations raofi: eflentlal to morality.
When I fay that / ought to dofiich an aHlon, that it is my diityy do not thefe words exprefs a relation between me and a certain adion in my power; a relation which cannot be between inani- mate objects, or between any other objects but a moral agent and his moral aftions; a relation which is well underftood by all men come to years of underftanding, and exprefled in all languages?
Again, when in deliberating about two actions In my power, which cannot both be done, 1 fay this ought to be preferred to the other; that juftice, for inllance, ought to be preferred to generolity; I exprefs a moral relation between two adtions of a moral agent, which is well underftood, and which cannot exift between objedts of any other kind.
There are, therefore, moral relations which can have no ex- iftence but between moral agents and their voluntary adtions. To determine thefe relations is the objedt of morals; and to de- termine relations is the province of judgment, and not of mere feeling.
The laft argument is a chain of feveral propofitions, which de- ferve diftindt confideration. They may, I think, be fummed up in thefe four: i. There mufl be ultimate ends of adtion, beyond which it is abfurd to afk a reafon of adting. 2. The ultimate ends of human adtions can never be accounted for by reafon; 3. but recommend themfelves entirely to the fentiments and af- fedtions of mankind, without any dependence on the intelledtual faculties. 4. As virtue is an end, and is defirable on its own ac- count, without fee or reward, merely for the immediate fatisfac- tion it conveys; it is requifite, that there ihould be fome fentiment APPROBATION IMPLIES JUDGMENT. 489 mcnt which it touches, fome internal tafte or feelinj^, or whnt- CHAP vii. ever you pleafe to call it, which (liltinguilhcs moral good and evil, and which embraces the one and rejcds the other.
To iUc Jirji df thcfe propofitions I entirely agree. The ulti- mate ends of adion are what I have called the principles of aElion^ •which I have endeavoured, in the third ElTiiy, to enumerate, and to clafs under three heads of mechanical, animal and rational.
The fecond propofition needs fome explication. I take its meaning to be. That there cannot be another end, for the fake of which an ultimate end is purfued: For the reafon of an adtiou means nothing but the end for which the adlion is done; and the reafon of an end of adtion can mean nothing but another end, for the fake of which that end is purfued, and to which it is the means.
That this is the author's meaning is evident from his reafon- ing in confirmation of it. " Aflc a man, why he iifcs exercife? " he will anfwer, becaufe he defires to keep his health. If you then " enquire, ivhy he defires health? he will readily reply, becaufe " ficknefs is painful. If you pufti your enquiries further, and de- *' fire a reafon why he hates pain, it is impoilible he can ever " give any. This is an ultimate end, and is never referred to " any other objedl." To account by reafon for an end, there- fore, is to Hiow another end, for the fake of which that end is defired and purfued. And that, in this fenfe, an ultimate end can never be accoimted for by reafon, is certain, becaufe that cannot be an ultimate end which is purfued only for the fake of another end.
I agree therefore with Mr Hume in this fecond propofition, which indeed is implied in the firft.
Qji\ q The ESSAY V.
CHAP. VII. The third propofition is. That ultimate ends recommend themfelves entirely to the fentiments and afFedlions of mankind, without any dependence on the intelledual faculties.
By fentiments he muft here mean feelings without judgment, and by affeElions, fuch affedlions as imply no judgment. For furely any operation that implies judgment, cannot be independ- ent of the intellectual faculties.
This being underftood, I cannot aflent to this propofition.
The Author feems to think it implied in the preceding, or a neceffary confequence from it, that becaufe an ultimate end cannot be accounted for by reafon j that is, cannot be purfued merely for the fake of another end; therefore it can have no dependence on the intelledual faculties. I deny this confe- quence, and can fee na force in it.
1 think it not only does not follow from the preceding propo- fition, but that it is contrary to trutli.
A man may axSt from gratitude as an ultimate end; but gra- titude implies a judgment and belief of favours received, and therefore is dependent on the intelledtual faculties. A man may adt from refped to a worthy charader as an ultimate end; but this refped neceflarily implies a judgment of worth in the peribn, and therefore is dependent on the intelledual facul^ ties.
I have endeavoured in the third Eflay before mentioned, to Ihew that, befide the animal principles of our nature, which require will and intention, but not judgment, there are alfo in human nature rational principles of adion, or ultimate ends, which have, in all ages, been called rational, and have a jufl title APPROBATION IMPLIES JUDGMENT. 491 title- to that name, not only from the authority of language, chap, vii but becaufe they can have no exigence hut in beings endowed with reafon, and becaufe, in all thtir exertions, they require not only intention and will, but judgment or reafon.
Therefore, until it can be proved that an ultimate end cannot be dependent on the intelled;ual faculties, this third propofitioD, and all that hangs upon it, muft fail to the ground.
The /a/i ^propolhion alTumes, with very good reafon, That virtue is an ultimate end, and dellrable on its own account. From which, if the third propofition were true, the conclufion would undoubtedly follow, That virtue has no dependence on the intelleftual faculties. But as that propofition is not granted, nor proved, this conclufion is left without any fupport from the v?hole of the argument.
I fliould not have thought it worth while to infifl fo long upon this controverfy, if I did not conceive that the confe- quences which the contrary opinions draw after them are im- portant.
If what we call moral judgment be no real judgrnent, but mere- ly a feeling, it follows, that the principles of morals which we have been taught to confider as an immutable law to all intelli- gent beings, have no other foundation but an arbitrary ftruc- ture and fabric in the conftitution of the human mind: So that, by a change In our flrudure, what Is immoral might be- come moral, virtue might be turned into vice, and vice into virtue. And beings of a different ftrudure, according to the variety of their feelings, may have different, nay oppofite, mea- fures of moral good and evil.
It follows that, from our notions of morals, we can conclude CLq q 2 nothing ESSAY V.
.• nothing concerning a moral character in the Deity, which is the foundation of all religion, and the ftrongeft fupport of vir- tue.
Nay, this opinion feems to conclude flrongly againil a m6ral charadler in the Deity, fince nothing arhitrary or mutable can be conceived to enter into the defcription of a nature eternal, immutable, and neceflarily exiftent. Mr Hume feems perfedly confiftent with himfelf, in allowing of no evidence for the mo- ral attributes of the Supreme Being, whatever then; may be for his natural attributes.
On the other hand, if moral judgment be a true and real judgment, the principles of morals ftand' upon the immutable foundation of truth, and can undergo no change by any diffe- rence of fabric, or ilrudiure of thofe who judge of them. There may be, and there are, beings, who have not the faculty of conceiving moral truths, or perceiving the excellence of mo- ral worth, as there are beings incapable of perceiving mathe- matical truths 'y but no defedt, no error of imderftanding, can- make what is true to be falfc.
If it be true that piety, juflice, benevolence, wifdom, tempe- rance, fortitude, are in their own nature the moll excellent and mofl amiable qualities of a human creature; that vice has an in- herent turpitude, which merits difapprobation and dillike; thefc truths cannot be hid from him whofe underftandlng is infinite, whofe judgment is always according to truth, and who muft efteem every thing according to its real value.
The Judge of all the earth, we are fure, will do right. He has given to men the faculty of perceiving the right and the wrong in condud;, as far as is neceffary to our prefent flate, and of perceiving the dignity of the one, and the demerit of the other; y APPROHATION IMPLIES JUDGMENT. 493 other; and fu rely there can be no real knowledge or real ex- ciiAi'. vii. ccllence in man, which is not in his Maker. ' We may therefore juflly conclude, That what we know In part, and fee in j^art, of right and wrong, he fees pcrfedly; that the moral excellence which we fee and admire in fome of our fellow-creatures, is a faint hut true copy of that moral ex- cellence, which is effential to his nature; and that to tread the path of virtue, is the true dignity of our nature, an imitation of God, and the way to obtain his favour.
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