M 2 There- There is therefore an indiflincl notion of re- femblance when we compare the objects only in grofs; and this 1 beheve brute animals may have. There is alfo a diilinct notion of re- femblance, when we analyfe the obje£ls inta their different attributes, and perceive them to- agree in fome, while they differ in others. It is in this cafe only that we give a name to the attributes wherein they agree, which muft be a common name, becaufe the thing fignified by it is commoh. Thus, when I compare cubes of different matter, I perceive them to have this attribute in common, that they are comprehended under fix equal fquares; and this attribute only, is fignified by applying the name of cube to them all. When I compare clean linen with fnow, I perceive them to agree in colour; and when I apply the name of white to both, this name fignifies neither fnow nor clean linen, but the attribute which is common to both.
2. The author fays, that when we have found a refemblance among feveral objects, we apply the fame name to all of them.
It muft here be obferved, that there are two kinds of names which the author feems to con- found, though they are very different in nature^ and in the power they have in language. There are proper names, and there are common names or appellatives. The firft are the names of individuals. The fame proper name is ne- ver applied to feveral individuals on account of their fimihtude, becaufe the very intention of a proper name is to diftinguifh one individual from all others; and hence it is a maxim in grammar, that proper names have no plural number.
OPINIONS ABOUT UNIVERSALS. 165 number. A proper name fignifies nothing but CHAP, the individual whofe name it is; and when we ^^• apply it to the individual, we neither affirm ^-"'v""' nor deny any thing concerning him.
A common name or appellative is not the name of any individual, but a general term, fignifying fomething that is or may be common to feveral individuals. Common names there- fore fignify common attributes. Thus, when I apply the name ot fon or brother to feveral perfons, this fignifies and affirms that this at- tribute is common to all of them.
From this it is evident, that the applying the fame name to feveral individuals, on account of their refemblance, can, in confiflence with grammar and common fenfe, mean nothing elfe than the expreffing by a general term fome- thing that is common to thofe individuals, and which therefore may be truly affirmed of them all.
3. The author fays, '' It is certain that we *' form the idea of individuals, whenever wc *' ufe any general term. The word raifes up *' an individual idea, and makes the imagina- *' tion conceive it, with all its particular cir- ^' cumftances and proportions."
This fa6i: he takes a great deal of pains to ac- count for, from the effect of cuflom.
But the fact fhould be afcertained before we take pains to account for it. I can fee no rea- fon to believe the fact; and I think a farmer can talk of his fheep, and his black cattle, without conceiving, in his imagination one in- dividual, with all its circumfcances and pro- portions. If this be true, the whole of his theory of general ideas falls to the ground.
To C H A P.To me it appears, that when a general term is ^^- well underftood, it is only by accident if it ~^~ fuggeft fome individual of the kind; but thi§ effe6: is by no means conftant.
I underftand perfectly what Mathematicians call a line of the fifth order; yet I never con- ceived in my imagination any one of the kind in all its circumllances and proportions. Sir Isaac Newton hrfl formed a diftincl general conception of lines of the third order; and af- terwards., by great labour and deep penetra- tion found out and defcribed the particular fpecies comprehended under that general term. According to Mr. Hume's theory, he mufl firil have been acquainted with the particulars, and then have learned by cullom to apply one general name to all of them.
The author obferves, " That the idea of an *' equilateral triangle of an inch perpendicu- " lar, may ferve us in talking of a figure, a " rectilinear figure, a regular figure, a trian- ," gle, and an equilateral triangle."
I anfwer. The man that ufes thefe general terms, either underflands their meaning, or he does not. If he does not underftand their meaning, all his talk about them will be found only without fenfe, and the particular idea mentioned cannot enable him to fpeak of them with underftanding. If he underftands the meaning of the general terms he will find no ufe for the particular idea.
4. He tells us gravely, " That in a globe of " white marble the figure and the colour " are undiftinguiihable, and are in effed the " fame.'* How foolifh have mankind been to give different names, in all ages and in all OPINIONS ABOUT UNIVERSALS.
all languages, to things undiflinguifhable,^ HAP. and in effect the fame? Henceforth, in all,^JfLj books of fcience and of entertainment, we may fubftitute figure for colour, and co- lour for figure. By this we fhall make numberlefs curious difcoveries without dan- ger of error.
ESSAY ESSAY VI.
OF JUDGMENT, CHAP. I.
Of judgment in generaL UD G IN G is an operation of the mind fo^ familiar to every m.an who hath under- ftanding, and its name is fo common and fo well underftood, that it needs no definition.
As it is impoffible by a definition to give a notion of colour to a man who never favv co- lours; fo it is impoffible by any definition to give a diftinct notion of judgment to a man who has not often judged, and who is not ca- pable of reflefting attentively upon this aft of his mind. The befl ufe of a definition is to prompt him to that refieciion; and without it the befl definition will be apt to miflead him.
The definition commonly given of judgment, by the more ancient writers in logic, was, that it is an aft of the mind, whereby one thing is affirmed or denied of another. ' I believe this is as good a definition of it as can be given. Why 1 prefer it to fome later definitions, will afterwards appear. Without pretending to give any other, I fhall make two remarks upon it, and then offer fome general obfervations on this fubjeft.
I, It OF JUDGMENT IN GENERAL. 169 1. It is true, that it is by affirmation or denial CHAP, that we exprefs our judgments; but there may, be judgment which is not expreffed. It is a folitary act of the mind, and the expreffion of it by affirmation or denial is not at all eifential to it. It may be tacit, and not exprefTed, Nay, it is well known that men may judga contrary to what they affi.rm or deny; the de- finition therefore muil be underflood of mental affirmation or denial, which indeed is only another name for judgm.ent.
2. Affirmation and denial is very often the expreffion of tcflimony, which is a different a£l of the mind, and ought to be diftinguifhed from judgment.
A JLidge afks of a witnefs what he knows of fuch a matter to which he was an eye or ear witnefs. He anfwers, by affirming or denying fomething. But his anfwer does not exprefs his judgment; it is his teftimony. Again, I afk a man his opinion in a matter of fcience or of criticifm. His anfwer is not teftimony; it is the expreffion of his judgment.
Teftimony is a fecial aft, and it is effential to it to be expreffed by words or figns. A tacit teftimony is a contradidion: But there is no <:ontradiction in a tacit judgment; it is com- plete without being expreffed.
Jn teftimony a man pledges his veracity for what he affirms; fo that a falfe teftimony is a .lie: But a wro];g,j,ud^ment is not a lie; it is I believe, in all languages teftimony and judgment are expreffed by the fame form of fpeech. A propofition affirmative or negative, with a verb in what is called the indicative mood, expreffes both. To diftinguilh them by C H A Pby the form of fpeech, it would be neceflary that verbs fliould have two indicative moods, *one for teftimony, and another to exprefs judgment. I know not that this is found in any language. And the reafon is, (not furcly that the vulgar cannot diftinguifh the two, for every man knows the difference between a lie and an error of judgment), but that, from the matter and circumftances, we can eafily fee whether a man intends to give his teftimony, or barely to exprefs his judgment.
Although men muft have judged in many cafes before tribunals of juftice were erected, yet it is very probable that there were tribunals before men began to fpeculate about judgment, and that the word may be borrowed from the practice of tribunals. As a judge, after taking the proper evidence, paifes fentcnce in a caufe, and that fentence is called his judgment; fo the mind, with regard to whatever is true or falfe, paifes fentence, or determines according to the evidence that appears. Some kinds of evi- dence leave no room for doubt* Sentence is pafled immediately, without fecking or hear- ing any contrary evidence, becaufe the thing is certain and notorious. In other cafes, there is room for weighing evidence on both fides before fentence is pafled. The analogy be- tv/een a tribunal of juftice and this inward tri- bunal of the mind, is too obvious to efcape the notice of any man who ever appeared be- fore a judge. And it is probable, that the word judgment, as well as many other words we ufe in fpeaking of this operation of min(J, are grounded on this analogy.
Having premifed thefe things, that it may be clearly underftood what I mean by judg- ment.
OF JUDGMENT IN GENERAL. 171 ment, I proceed to make fome general obferr CHAP, vations concerning it. IivVy?, Judgment is an a£l of the mind fpe-* clfically different from fmiple apprehenfion, or the bare conception of a thing. It would be unneceffary to obferve this, if fome Philofo- phers had not been led by their theories to a contrary opinion.
Although there can be no judgnient without a conception of the things about which we judge; yet conception may be without any judgment. Judgment can be expreffed by a proportion only, and a proportion is a com- plete fentence; but fimple apprehenfion may be expreffed by a word or words, which make no complete fentence. When fimple appre- henfion is employed about a propofition, every man knows that it is one thing to apprehend a propofition, that is, to conceive what it means; but it is quite another thing to judge it to be true or falfe.
It is felf-evident, that every judgment mufl- be either true or falfe; but fimple apprehen- iion or conception can neither be true nor falfe, as was fliewn before.
One judgment may be contradictory to an- other; and it is impoffible for a man to have two judgments at the fame time, which he perceives to be contradictory. But contradic- tory propofitions may be conceived at the fame time without any difficulty. That the fun is greater than the earth, and that the fun is not greater than the earth, are contradidory pro- pofitions. He that apprehends the meaning of one, apprehends the meaning of both. But it is impoffible for him to judge both to be true at the fame time. He knows that if the one is C H A P. is true, the other mufl be falfe. For thefe rea- ^' fons, i hold it to be certain, that judgment and limple apprehenfion are adls of the mind fpecifically different.
Secondly, There are notions or ideas that ought to be referred to the faculty of judgment as their fource; becaufe, if we had not that faculty, they could not enter into our minds j and to thofe that have that faculty, and are ca- pable of reflecting upon its operations, they are obvious and familiar.
Among thefe we may reckon the notion of judgment itfelf; the notions of a propofition, of its fubject, predicate, and copula; of af- fimation and negation, of true and falfe, of knowledge, belief, difbelief, opinion, affent, evidence. From no fource could we acquire thefe notions, but from reflecting upon our judgments. Relations of things make one great clafs of our notions or ideas; and we cannot have the idea of any relation without fom.e exercife of judgment, as will appear af- terwards.
Thirdly, In perfons come to years of under- ftanding, judgment neceflarily accompanies all fenfation, perception by the fenfes, confciouf- nefs, and memory, but not conception.
I rellrift this to perfons come to the years of underllanding, becaufe it may be a quefti- cn, whether infants, in the firfl period of Hfe, have any judgment or belief at alL The fame queilion may be put with regard to brutes and fome idiots. This quefl:ion is foreign to the prefent fubjeCt; and I fay nothing here about it, but fpeak only of perfons who have the ex- ercife of judgment.
In OF JUDGMENT IN GENERAL. i^S In them it is evident, that a man who feels ^ HAP. pain, judges and believes that he is really. _' jpained. The man who perceives an object, believes that it exifts, and is what he diftinftly perceives it to be; nor is it in his power to avoid fuch judgment. And the like may be faid of memory, and of confcioufnefs. Whe- ther judgment ought to be called a neceifary concomitant of thefe operations, or rather a part or ingredient of them, I do not difpute; but it is certain, that all of them are accom- panied with a determination that fomething is true or falfe, and a confequent belief. If this determination be not judgment, it is an ope-> ration that has got no name; for it is not fim-» pie apprehenfion, neither is it reafoning; it is a mental affirmation or negation; it may be expreffed by a proportion affirmative or nega- tive, and it is accompanied with the firmed belief. Thefe are the chara£teriftics of judg- ment; and I muft call it judgment, till I can find another name to it.
The judgments we form, are either of things neceffary, or of things contingent. That three times three are nine; that the whole is greater than a part; are judgments about things neceifary. Our affent to fuch neceffary proportions is not grounded upon any opera- tion of fenfe, of memory, or of confcioufnefs, nor does it require their concurrence; it is un- accompanied by any other operation but that of conception, which mufl accompany all judgment; we may therefore call this judg- ment of things neceffary pure judgment. Our judgment of things contingent mufl: always reft upon fome other operation of the mind, fuch us fenfe, or memory, or confcioufnefs, or cre- dit ESSAY VI.
C H A P.dit In teflimony, which is itfelf grounded upon That I now write upon a table covered with green cloth, is a contingent event, which I judge to be mod undoubtedly true. My judg- ment is grounded upon my perception, and is a neceflary concomitant or ingredient of my perception. That I dined with fuch a compa- ny yefterday, I judge to be true, becaufc I re- member it; and my judgment neceflarily goes along with this remembrance, or makes a part of it.
There are many forms of fpeech in common language which iliew that the fenfes, memory and confcioufnefs, are confidered as judging faculties. We fay that a man judges of co- lours by his eye, of founds by his ear. We fpeak of the evidence of fenfe, the evidence of memory, the evidence of confcioufnefs. Evi- dence is the ground of judgment, and when we fee evidence, it is impoffible not to judge.
When we fpeak of feeing or remembering any thing, we indeed hardly ever add that we judge it to be true. But the reafon of this; appears to be, that fuch an addition would be mere fuperfluity of fpeech, becaufe every one knows, that what I fee or remember, 1 mufl judge to be true, and cannot do otherwife.
And for the fame reafon, m fpeaking of any thing that is felf evident or flriftly demonflrat- ed, we do not fay that we judge it to be true. This would be fuperfluity of fpeech, becaufe every man knows that we mufl judge that to be true which we hold felf-evident or demon- flrated.
When you fay you faw fuch a thing, or that you diftindly remember it, or when you fay of OF JUDGMENT IN GENERAL. 175 of any propofitlon that it Is felf-evident, or C H A P, ftridlly demonftrated, it would be ridiculous after this to afk whether you judge it to be true; nor would it be lefs ridiculous in you to inform us that you do. It would be a fuperfluity of fpeech of the fame kind as if, not content with faying that you faw fuch an objedl, you fliould add that you faw it with your eyes.
There is therefore good reafon why, in fpeaking or writing, judgment (hould not be exprefsly mentioned, when all men know it to be neceflarily implied; that is, when there can be no doubt. In fuch cafes, we barely men- tion the evidence. But when the evidence mentioned leaves room for doubt, then, with- out any fuperfluity or tautology, we fay we judge the thing to be fo, becaufe this is not implied in what was faid before. A woman with child never fays, that, going fuch a jour- ney, Ihe carried her child along with her. We know that, while it is in her womb, fhe mufl carry it along with her. There are fome ope- rations of mind that may be faid to carry judg- ment in their womb, and can no more leave it behind them than the pregnant woman can leave her child. Therefore, in fpeaking of fuch operations, it is not exprelTed.
Perhaps this manner of fpeaking may have led Philofophers into the opinion, that in per- ception by the fenfes, in memory, and in con- fcioufnefs, there is no judgment at all. Be- caufe it is not mentioned in fpeaking of thefe faculties, they conclude that it does not accom- pany them; that they are only different modes of fimple apprehenfion, or of acquiring ideas j and that it is no part of their office to judge.
I ap- I ap- C HA P. I apprehend the fame caufe has led Mr. Locke ^^,,^^ into a notion of judgment which I take to be peculiar to him. He thinks that the mind has two faculties converfant about truth and falfe- hood. Firjl^ knowledge; and, fecondly, judg- ment. In the firft, the perception of the agree- ment or difagrecment of the ideas is certain; In the fecond, it is not certain, but probable only.
According to this notion of judgment, It is not by judgment that I perceive that two and three make five; it is by the faculty of know- ledge. I apprehend there can be no knowledge without judgment, though there may be judg- ment without that certainty which we common- ly call knowledge.
Mr. Locke, in another place of his Eflayj tells us, " That the notice w-e have by our " fenfes of the exiflence of things without uSj " though not altogether fo certain as our in- *' tuitive knowledge, or the deduftions of our " reafon about abilraQ: ideas^ yet is an affu- " ranee that deferves the name of knowledge.'* I think, by this account of it, and by his de- finitions before given of knowledge and judg- ment, it deferves as well the name of judgment.
That I may avoid difputes about the meaning of words, I wifli the reader to underfland, that I give the name of judgment to every de- termination of the mind concerning what is true or what is falfe. This, I think, is what Logicians, from the days of Aristotle, have called judgment. Whether it be called one faculty, as I think it has always been, or whe- ther a Philofopher chufes to fpht it into two, feems not very material. And if it be granted, that by our fenfes, our memory and confci- Gufnefs, OF JUDGMENT IN GENERAL. 177 oufnefs, we not only have ideas or fiinple ap-C prehenfions, but form determinations concern- ing what is true, and what is falfe: whether thefe determinations ought to be called know- ledge or judgment^ is of fmall moment.
The judgments grounded upon the evidence of fenfe, of memory, and of confcioufnefs, put all men upon a level. The Philofopher, with regard to thefe, has no prerogative above the illiterate, or even above the favage.
Their reliance upon the teftimony of thefe faculties is as firm and as well grounded as his. His fuperiority is in judgments of another kind; in judgments about things abflra£l and necef- fary. And he is unwilling to give the name of judgment to that wherein the mod ignorant and unimproved of the fpecies are his equals.
But Philofophers have never been able to give any definition of judgment which does not apply to the determinations of our fenfes, our memory, and confcioufnefs, nor any definition of fimple apprehenfion which can comprehend thofe determinations.
Our judgments of this kind are purely the gift of Nature, nor do they admit of improve- ment by culture. The memory of one man may be more tenacious than that of another; but both rely with equal affurance upon what they diflinctly remember. One man's fight may be more acute, or his feehng more deli- cate than that of another; but both give equal credit to the difliind teftimony ot their fight and touch.
And as we have this belief by the confti- tution of our nature, without any effort of our own, fo no effort of ours can overturn it.
Vol. II. N The ESSAY VI.
The Sceptic may perhaps perfuade himfelf in general, that he has no ground to believe his fenfes or his memory: But, in particular cafes that are interefting, his difbelief vaniflies, and " he finds himfelf under a neceffity of be- lieving both.
Thefe judgments may, in the fhri^left fenfe, be called judgnmits of nature. Nature has fubjeded us to them whether we will or not. They are neither got, nor can they be loft by any ufe or abufe of our faculties; and it is evi- dently neceflary for our prefervation that it fliould be fo. For if belief in our fenfes and in our memory were to be learned by culture, the race of men would perifh before they learned this leflbn. It is neceffary to all men for their being and prefervation, and therefore is un- conditionally given to all men by the Author of Nature.
I acknowledge, that if we were to reft in thofe judgments of Nature of which we now fpeak, without building others upon them, they would not entitle us to the denomination of reafonable beings. But yet they ought not to be defpifed, for they are the foundation upon which the grand fuperftrufture of human knowledge muft be raifed. And as in other fuperftrudlures the foundation is commonly overlooked, fo it has been in this. The more fublime attainments of the human mind have attradled the attention of Philofophers, while they have beftowed but a carelefs glance upon the humble foundation on which the whole fa- bric reils.
A fourth obfervation is, that fome exercife of judgment is neceflary in the formation of all abftradt and general conceptions, whether more OF JUDGMENT IN GENERAL. 179 more fimple or more complex; in dividing, C H A P. in defining, and in general, in forming all ^• clear and diftinft conceptions of things, which'"* * "^ are the only fit materials of reafoning.
Thefe operations are allied to each other, and therefore I bring them under one obfer- vation. They are more allied to our rational nature than thofe mentioned in the laft obfer- vation, and therefore are confidered by them- felves.
That I may not be miftaken, it may be ob- ferved, that I do not fay that abftrad: notions, or other accurate notions of things, after they have been formed, cannot be barely conceived without any exercife of judgment about them, I doubt not that they may: But what I fay, is, that, in their formation in the mind at firft, there muft be fome exercife of judgment.
It is impolTible to diftinguifh the different attributes belonging to the fame fubjecl, with- out judging that they are really different and diflinguifhable, and that they have that relati- on to the fubject which Logicians exprefs, by faying that they may be predicated of it. We cannot generalife, without judging that the fame attribute does or may belong to many individuals. It has been fhewn, that our fim- plefl general notions are formed by thefe two operations of diftinguifliing and generalifing; judgment therefore is exercifed in forming the fimplefl general notions.
In thofe that are more complex, and which have been fhewn to be formed by combining the more fimple, there is another aft of the judgment required; for fuch combinations are not made at random, but for an end; and judgment is employed in fitting them to that N 2 end.
i8o ESSAY VI.
CHAP. end. We form complex general notions for ^- conveulency of arranging our thoughts in dif- ' " courfe and rcafoning; and therefore, of an infinite number of combinations that might be formed, we chufe only thofe that are ufeful and necelfary.
That judgment mud be employed in divid- ing as well as in diftinguifliing, appears evi- dent. It is one thing to divide a fubjeft pro- perly, another to cut it in pieces. Hoc non eji divider e^ fed f rangers rem^ faid Cicero, when he cenfured an improper divifion of Epicurus. Reafon has difcovered rules of divifion, which have been known to Logicians more than two thoufand years.
There are rules likewife of definition of no lefs antiquity and authority. A man may no doubt divide or define properly without at- tending to the rules, or even without knowing them. But this can only be, when he has judgment to perceive that to be right in a par- ticular cafe, v/hich the rule determines to be right in all cafes.
I add in general, that, without fome degree of judgment, we can form no accurate and difiinct notions of things; fo that, one pro- vince of judgment is, to aid us in forming clear and diftincl conceptions of things, which are rhe only fit materials for reafoning.
'Lhis will probably appear to be a paradox to Philofophers, who have always confidered the formation of ideas of every kind as be- longing to fimple apprehenfion; and that the fole province of judgment is to put them to- gether in affirmative or negative propofitions j and therefore it requires fome confirmation.
lirjl.
OF JUDGMENT IN GENERAL. i8i Firjl^ I think it neceflarily follows, fromCHAP. what has been already faid in this obfervation.,/;_^ For if, without fonie degree of judgment, a man can neither diftihguifh, nor divide, nor define, nor form any general notion, fimple or complex, he furely, without fome degree of judgment, cannot have in his mind the ma- terials neceffary to reafoning.
There cannot be any propofition in language which does not involve fome general concep- tion. The propofition, that I exijl^ which Des Cartes thought the firfl of all truths, and the foundation of all knowledge, cannot be conceived without the conception of exiftence, one of the moft abllrad: general conceptions. A man cannot believe his own exiftence, or the exiftence of any thing he fees or remem- bers, until he has fo much judgment as to dif- tinguifh things that really exifl from things which are only conceived. He fees a man fix feet high; he conceives a man fixty feet high; he judges the firfl objett to exift, becaufe he fees it; the fecond he does not judge to exift, becaufe he only conceives it. Now, I would afk. Whether he can attribute exiftence to the firfl: objeft, and not to the fecond, without knowing what exiftence means? It is impofTi- ble.
How early the notion of exiftence enters in- to the mind, I cannot determine; but it muft certainly be in the mind, as foon as we can affirm of any thing, with underflanding, that it exifts.
In every other propofition, the predicate at leaft muft be a general notion; a predicable and an univerfal being one and the fame. Be- fides this, every propofition either affirms or denies.
CHAP, denies. And no man can have a diftindt con- ception of a propofition, who does not under- ftand diftindly the meaning of affirming or de- nying: But thefe are very general concepti- ons, and, as was before obferved, are derived from judgment, as their fource and origin.
I am fenfible that a (Irong objection may be made to this reafoning, and that it may feem to lead to an abfurdity, or a contraditlion. It may be faid, that every judgment is a men- tal affirmation or negation. If therefore fome previous exercife of judgment be necelTary to underftand what is meant by affirmation or negation, the exercife of judgment muft go before any judgment, which is abfurd.
In like manner, every judgment may be ex- prcfTed by a propofition, and a propofition muft be conceived before we can judge of it. If therefore we cannot conceive the meaning of a propofition without a previous exercife of judgment, it follows that judgment muft be previous to the conception of any propolition, and at the fame time that the conception of a propofition muft be previous to all judgment, which is a contradidion.
The reader may pleafe to obferve, that I have limited what I have faid to diftinCl con- ception, and fome degree of judgment; and it is by this means I hope to avoid this laby- rinth of abfurdity and contradiction. The fa- culties of conception and judgment have an infancy and a maturity as man has. What I have faid is limited to their mature ftate. I be- lieve in their infant ftate they are very weak and indiftincl; and that, by imperceptible de- grees, they grow to maturity, each giving aid to the other, and receiving aid from it. But which OF JUDGMENT IN GENERAL. 183 which of them firfl began this friendly inter-^H AP. courfe, is beyond my ability to determine. It is like the queflion concerning the bird and the egg- In the prefent ftate of things, it is true that every bird comes from an egg^ and every egg from a bird; and each may be faid to be pre- vious to the other. But if we go back to the origin of things, there muff have been fome bird that did not come from any egg, or fome egg that did not come from any bird.
In like manner, in the mature ftate of man, diftincl conception of apropofitionfuppofes fome previous exercife of judgment, and difhinfi: judgment fuppofes diflind conception. Each may truly be faid to come from the other, as the bird from the egg, aud the egg from the bird. But if we trace back this fucceflion to its origin, that is, to the firfl propofition that was ever conceived by the man, and the firfl judgment he ever formed, I determine nothing about them, nor do I know in what order, or how they were produced, any more than how the bones grow in the womb of her that is with child.
The firfl exercife of thefe faculties of con- ception and judgment is hid, like the fources of the Nile, in an unknown region.
The neceffity of fome degree of judgment to clear and diflin£l conceptions of things, may, 1 think, be illuftrated by this fimihtude.
An artift, fuppofe a Carpenter, cannot work in his art without tools, and thefe tools mufl be made by art. The exercife of the art therefore is neceffary to make the tools, and the tools are neceffary to the exercife of the art. There is the fame appearance of contradidion.
f didion.
f C H A P. diction, as in what I have advanced concerning ^^ the neceffity of fome degree of judgment, in order to form clear and diflincl conceptions of things. Thefe are the tools we mufl ufe in judging and in reafoning, and without them mufl make very bungling work; yet thefe tools cannot be made without fome exercife of judgment.
The neceffity of fome degree of judgment in forming accurate and diftinct notions of things will farther appear, if we confider attentively what notions we can form, without any aid of judgment, of the objects of fenfe, of the ope- rations of our own minds, or of the relations of things.
To begin with the objefts ef fenfe. It is ac- knowledged on all hands, that the firft notions we have of fenfible objects are got by the ex- ternal fenfes only, and probably before judg- ment is brought forth; but thefe firft notions are neither fimple, nor are they accurate and diftinft: They are grofs and indiftinft, and like the chaos^ a rudis indigejiaque moles. Be- fore we can have any diftinft notion of this mafs, it muft be analyfcd; the heterogeneous parts muft be feparated in our conception, and the fimple elements, w^hich before lay hid in the common mafs, muft firft be diftinguiftied, and then put together into one whole.