In this way it is that we form diftinct notions even of the objects of fenfe; but this analyfis and compofition, by habit, becomes fo eafy, and is performed fo readily, that we are apt to overlook it, and to impute the diftind notion we have form.ed of the object to the fenfes alone; and this we are the more prone to do, becaufe, when once we have diftinguiflied the fenfible OF JUDGMENT IN GENERAL. 185 fenfible qualities of the objed from one ano-C HAP. ther, the fenfe gives teftimony to each of ' them.
You perceive, for inftance, an objed white, round, and a foot in diameter: 1 grant that you perceive all thefe attributes of the obje£t by fenfe; but if you had not been able to dif- tinguifli the colour from the figure, and both from the magnitude, your fenfes would only have given you one complex and confufed no- tion of all thefe mingled together.
A man who is able to fay with underftand- ing, or to determine in his own mind, that this objed is white, muft have diftinguifhed v/hitenefs from other attributes. If he has not made this diftinction, he does not underftand what he fays.
Suppofe a cube of brafs to be prefented at the fame time to a child of a year old and to a man. The regularity of the figure will attradt the attention of both. Both have the fenfes of fight and of touch in equal perfedtion; and therefore, if any thing be difcovered in this object by the man, which cannot be difcovered by the child, it mufl be owing, not to the fen- fes, but to fome other faculty which the child has not yet attained.
Firjl^ then, the man can eafily diftinguifli the body from the furface which terminates it; this the child cannot do. Secondly^ The man can perceive, that this furface is made up of fix planes of the fame figure and magnitude; the child cannot difcover this. Thirdly^ The man perceives, that each of thefe planes has four equal fides, and four equal angles; and that the oppofite fides of each plane, and the oppofite planes are parallel.
It It P. It will furely be allowed, that a man of or- dinary judgment may obferve all this in a cube which he makes an objed of contemplation, and takes time to confider; that he may give the name of a fquare, to a plane terminated by four equal fides and four equal angles; and the name of a cube, to a folid terminated by fix equal fquares; all this is nothing elfe but analyling the figure of the object prcfented to his fenfes into its fimpleft elements, and again compounding it of thofe elements.
By this analyfis and compofition, two effecls are produced. Firji^ From the one complex objedl which his fenfes prcfented, though one of the mod fimple the fenfes can p relent, he educes many fimple and diftind notions of right hnes, angles, plain furface, fohd, equa- lity, parallelifm; notions which the child has not yet faculties to attain. Secondly^ When he confiders the cube as compounded of thefe elements, put together in a certain order, he has then, and not before, a diilincl; and fcien- tific notion of a cube. The child neither con- ceives thofe elements, nor in what order they mull be put together, in order to make a cube; and therefore has no accurate notion of a cube, which can make it a fubject of reafon- ing.
Whence I think we may conclude, that the notion which we have from the fenfes alone, even of the fimpleft objects of fenfe, is indif- tind and incapable of being either defcribed or reafoned upon, until it is analyfed into its fim- ple elements, and confidered as compounded of thofe elements.
If we fhould apply this reafoning to more complex objeds of fenfe, the conclufion would be OF JUDGMENT IN GENERAL. 187 be ftill more evident. A dog may be taught CHAP, to turn a jack, but he can never be taught to have a dhtinft notion of a jack. He fees eve- ry part as well as a man; but the relation of the parts to one another, and to the whole, he has not judgment to comprehend.
A dilLincl: notion of an obje£t, even of fenfe, is never got in an iiiftant; but the fenfe per- forms its office in an inftant. Time is not re- quired to fee it better, but to analyfe it, to diftinguifh the different parts, and their relati- on to one another, and to the whole.
Hence it is, that when any vehement pailion or emotion hinders the cool application of judgment, we get no diitinct notion of an ob- je6t, even though the fenfe be long direfted to it. A man who is put into a panic, by thinking he fees a ghoft, may (tare at it long, without having any diftinct notion of it; it is his underflanding, and not his fenfe that is difturbed by his horror. If he can lay that afide, judgment immediately enters upon its office, and examines the length and breadth, the colour, and figure, and difhance of the objeft. Of thefe, while his panic lalled, he had no diftind notion, though his eyes were open all the time.
When the eye of fenfe is open, but that of judgment fhut by a panic, or any violent emo- tion that engrolfes the ipind, we fee things confufedly, and probably much in the fame manner that brutes and perfect idiots do, and infants before the ufe of judgment.
There are therefore notions of the objefts of fenfe which are grofs and indiftind; and there are others that are diftind and fcientific.
The C H A P. The former may be got from the fenfes alone; but the latter cannot be obtained without fome ^^'^''^^'^ degree of judgment.
The clear and accurate notions which geo- metry prefents to us of a point, a right line, an angle, a fquare, a circle, of ratios dired: and inverfe, and others of that kind, can find no admittance into a mind that has not fome degree of judgment. They are not properly ideas of the fenfes, nor are they got by com- pounding ideas of the fenfes; but, by analy- fmg the ideas or notions we get by the fenfes into their fimplefl elements, and again combi- ning thefe elements into various, accurate, and elegant forms, which the fenfes never did nor can exhibit.
Had Mr. Hume attended duly to this, it ought to have prevented a very bold attempt, which he has profecuted through fourteen pa- ges of his Treatife of Human Nature, to prove that geometry is founded upon ideas that are not exact, and axioms that are not precifely true.
A Mathematician might be tempted to thinly, that the man who ferioufly undertakes this has no great acquaintance with geome- try; but I apprehend it is to be imputed to another caufe, to a zeal for his own fyftem. "We fee that even men of genius may be drawn into ftrange^ paradoxes, by an attach- ment to a favourite idol of the underltanding, when it demands fo coftly a facrihce.
We Proteftants think, that the devotees of the Roman church pay no fmall tribute to her authority, when they renounce their five fenfes in obedience to her decrees. Mr. Hume's devotion OF JUDGMENT IN GENERAL. 189 devotion to his fyftem carries him even toCHAP. trample upon mathematical uemouflration.
The fundamental articles of his lyitem are, that all the perceptions of the human mind are either imprcffions or ideas; and that ideas are only faint copies of impreffions. The idea of a right hne, therefore, is only a faint copy of fome line that has been feen, or felt by touch; and the faint copy cannot be more perfed than the original. Now of fuch right lines, it is evident, that the axioms of geometry are not precifely true; for two lines that are flraight to our fight or touch may include a fpace, or they may meet in more points than one. If therefore we cannot form any notion of a ftraight line more accurate than that which we have from the fenfes of fight and touch, geo- metry has no folid foundation. If, on the other hand, the geometrical axioms are pre- cifely true, the idea of a right line is not copied from any impreffion of fight or touch, but muft have a different origin, and a more per- feft ftandard.
As the Geometrician, by reflecting only upon the extenfion and figure of matter, forms a fet of notions more accurate and fcientific than any which the fenfes exhibit; fo the na- tural Philofopher, refleding upon other attri- butes of matter, forms another fet, fuch as thofe of denfity, quantity of matter, velocity, momentum, fluidity, elafticity, centres of gra- vity, and of ofcillation. Thefe notions are ac- curate and fcientific; but they cannot enter in- to a mind that has not fome degree of judgment, nor can we make them intelligible to children, until they have fome ripenefs of underdanding. In navigation, the notions of latitude, lon- gitude, courfe, leeway, cannot be uiade intel- ligible CHAP. ligible to children; and fo it is with regard to the terms of every fcience, and of every art about which we can reafon. They have had their five fenfes as perfect as men, for years before they are capable of diflinguifhing, com- paring, and perceiving the relations of things, fo as to be able to form fuch notions. They acquire the intelledual powers by a flow pro- grefs, and by imperceptible degrees, and by means of them learn to form diftinct and ac- curate notions of things, which the fenfes could never have imparted.
Raving faid fo much of the notions we get from the fenfes alone of the objeds of fenfe, let us next confider what notions we can have from confcioufnefs alone of the operations of our minds.
Mr. Locke very properly calls confcioufnefs an internal fenfe. It gives the like immediate knowledge of things in the mind, that is, of our own thoughts and feelings, as the fenfes give us of things external. There is this differ- ence, however, that an external object may be at reft, and the fenfe may be employed about it for fome time. But the objecls of confcioufnefs are never at reft; the ftream of thought flows like a river, without ftopping a moment; the whole train of thought paffes in fuccellion under the eye of confcioufnefs, which is always employed about the prefent. But is it confcioufnefs that analyfes complex operations, diftinguilhes their different ingre- dients, and combines them in diftind parcels under general names? This furely is not the work of confcioufnefs, nor can it be performed without refiedion, recolleding and judging of what we were confcious of, and diftindly re- member.
OF JUDGMENT IN GENERAL. 191 member. This refleclion does not appear in^ ^ -^ ^• children. Of all the powers of the mind, it feems to be of the lateft growth, whereas con- ^""^ ^ fcioufnefs is coeval with the earlieft.
Confcioufnefs, being a kind of internal fenfe, can no more give us dillinct and accurate no- tions of the operations of our minds, than the external fenfes can give of external objeds. Reflection upon the operations of our minds is the fame kind of operation with that by which we form diftincl notions of external objefts. They differ not in their nature, but in this only^ that one is employed about external, and the other about internal objects; and both may, with equal propriety, be called re- flexion.
Mr. Locke has refl:rided the word reflection to that which is employed about the operations of our minds, without any authority, as I think, from cuitom, the arbiter of language: For furely I may reflect upon what I have feen or heard, as v/ell as upon what I have thought. The word, in its proper and common meaning, is equally applicable to objects of fenfe, and to objects of confcioufnefs. He has likewife con- founded reflection with confcioufnefs, and feems not to have been aware that they are different powers, and appear at very different periods of life.
If that eminent Fhilofopher had been aware of thefe miftakes about the meaning of the word reflection, he would, I think, have feen, that as it is by reflection upon the operations of our own minds that we can form any difliind and accurate notions of them, and not by con- fcioufnefs without reflection; fo it is by reflec- tion upon the objects of fenfe, and not by the fenfes CHAP, fenfes without refleftion, that we can form dif- J^ tin6; notions of them. Refledion upon any thing, whether external or internal, makes it an object of our intelledual powers, by which we furvey it on all fides, and form fuch judg- ments about it as appear to be juft and true.
1 propofed, in the third place, to confider our notions of the relations of things: And here I think, that, without judgment we can- not have any notion of relations.
There are two ways in which we get the no- tion of relations. The firft is, by comparing the related objeds, when we have before had the conception of both. By this comparifon, we perceive the relation, either immediately, or by a procefs of reafoning. That my foot is longer than my finger, I perceive immedi- ately; and that three is the half of fix. This immediate perception is immediate and intui- tive judgment. That the angles at the bafe of an ifofceles triangle are equal, I perceive by a procefs of reafoning, in which it will be ac- knowledged there is judgment.
Another way in which we get the notion of relations (which feems not to have occurred to Mr. Locke) is, when, by attention to one of the related objeds, we perceive or judge, that it muft, from its nature, have a certain rela- tion to fomething elfe, which before perhaps we never thought of; and thus our attention to one of the related objects produces the notion of a correlate, and of a certain relation between them.
Thus, when I attend to colour, figure, weight, I cannot help judging thefe to be qua- lities which cannot exift without a fubjed; that is, fomething which is coloured, figured, heavy.
OF JUDGMENT IN GENERAL. 193 heavy. If I had not perceived fuch things to C H A P. be qualities, I fliould never have had any no- ^• tion of their fubjecl or of their relation to it.
By attending to the operations of thinking, memory, reafoning, v/e perceive or judge, that there mufl be fomething which thinks, re- members, and reafons, which we call the mind. When we attend to any change that happens in Nature, judgment informs us, that there mufl be a caufe of this change, which had povv^er to produce it; and thus we get the notions of caufe and eft'ecl, and of the relation between them. When we attend to body, we perceive that it cannot exlft without fp.ace; hence we get the notion of fpace, (which is neither an object of fenfe nor of con- fcioufnefs), and of the relation which bodies have to a certain portion of unhmited fpace, as their place.
I apprehend therefore, that ail our notions of relations may more properly be afcribed to judgment as their fource and origin, than to any other power of the mind. We mufl firit perceive relations by our judgment, be- fore we can conceive them without judging of them; as we mufl firfl perceive colours by fight, before we can conceive them without fee- ing them. I think Mr. Locke, when he comes tofpeak of the ideas of relations, does not fay that they are ideas of fenfation or refledllon, but only that they terminate In and are concerned about ideas of fenfation or re- flexion.
The notions of unity and number are fa abflracl, that it is ImpolTible they fhould enter into the mind until it has fome degree of judg- VoL. II. O ment.
CHAP. ment. We fee with what difficulty, and how ,^^J^^ llowly, children learn to ufe, with underftand- ing, the names even of fmall numbers, and how they exult in this acquifition when they have attained it. Every number is conceived by the relation which it bears to unity, or to known combinations of units; and upon that account, as well as on account of its abftraft nature, all diftinft notions of it require fome degree of judgment.
In its proper place, I fhall have occafion to fliow, that judgment is an ingredient in all determinations of tafte; in all moral determi- nations; and in many of our paffions and af- fe&ions. So that this operation, after we come to have any exercife of judgment, mixes with mod of the operations of our minds, and, in analyfmg them., cannot be overlooked without confufion and error.
CHAP.
OF COMMON SENSE. 195 CHAP.
Of Common Senfe, TH E word fenfe, in common language, feems to have a different meaning from, that which it has in the writings of Philofo- phers; and thofe different meanings are apt to be confounded, and to occafion embarraf- ment and error.
Not to go back to ancient philofophy upon this point, modern Philofophers confider fenfe as a power that has nothing to do with judg- ment. Senfe they confider as the power by which we receive certain ideas or impreflions from obje6ts; and judgment as the power by which we compare thofe ideas, and perceive their neceffary agreements and difagreements.
The external fenfes give us the idea of co- lour, figure, found, and other qualities of bo- dy, primary or fecondary. Mr. Locke gave the name of an internal fenfe to confcioufnefs, becaufe by it we have the ideas of thought, memory, reafoning, and other operations of our own minds. Dr. Hutcheson of Glaf- gow, conceiving that we have fimple and ori- ginal ideas which cannot be imputed either to the external fenfes, or to confcioufnefs, intro- duced other internal fenfes; fuch as the fenfe of harmony, the fenfe of beauty, and the mo- ral fenfe. Ancient Philofophers alfo fpake of internal fenfes, of which memory was account- ed one.
But all thefe fenfes, whether external or in- ternal, have been reprefented by Philofophers, as the means of furnifliing our minds with O 2 ideas, C H A P, ideas, without including any kind of judg- ^^- ment. Dr. Hutcheson defines a fenfe to be a determination of the mind to receive any idea from the prefence of an objed independent on our will.
*>' By this term (fenfe) Philofophers in ge- " neral have denominated thofe faculties, in " confequence of which we are liable to feel- " ings relative to ourfelves only, and from " which they have not pretended to draw any " conclufions concerning the nature of things; '' whereas truth is not relative, but abfolute " and real. Dr. Priestly's Exam, of Dr. " Reid, 'bfc. page 123.
On the contrary, in common language, fenfe always implies judgment. A man of fenfe is a man of judgment. Good fenfe is good judgment. Nonfenfe is what is evi- dently contrary to right judgment. Common fenfe is that degree of judgment which is com- mon to men vidth whom we can converfe and tranfadl bufmefs.
Seeing and hearing by Philofophers are cal- led fenfes, becaufe we have ideas by them; by the vulgar they are called fenfes, becaufe we judge by them. We judge of colours by the eye: of founds by the ear; of beauty and deformity by tafte; of right and wrong in condud, by our moral fenfe or confcience.
Sometimes Philofophers, who reprefent it as the fole province of fenfe to furnifli us with ideas, fall unawares into the popular opinion, that they are judging faculties. Thus Locke, book. 4. chap. 11. " And of this, (that the '• quality or accident of colour doth really ex- " ill, and hath a being without me,) the grea- " teft aifurance I can poffibly have, and to *' which OF COMMON SENSE. 197 " which my faculties can attain, is the tefli- CHAP. *' mony of my eyes, which are the proper and ^^• *' fole judges of this thing." ""^ ■" ' This popular meaning of the word jhifc is not peculiar to the EngHfh language. The correlponding words in Greek, Latin, and I believe in all the European languages, have the fame latitude. The Latin words fenfire^ fententia^ fenfa, fenfus, from the laft of which the Englifh word fenfe is borrowed, exprefs judgment or opinion, and are applied indiffe- rently to objecis of external fenfe, of tafLe, of morals, and of the underflanding.
I cannot pretend to affign the reafon why a word, which is no term of art, which is fami- liar in common converfation, (hould have fo different a meaning in philofophical writings. I fhall only obferve, that the philofophical meaning correfponds perfectly with the account which Mr. Locke and other modern Philofo- phers give of judgment. For if the fole pro- vince of the fenfe?, external and internal, be to furniili the mind with the ideas about which we judge and reafon, it feems to be a natural confequence, that the fole province of judg- ment (hould be to compare thofe ideas, and to perceive their neceffary relations.
Thefe two opinions feem to be fo connected, that one may have been the caufe of the other. I apprehend, however, that if both be true, there is no room left for any knowledge or judgment, either of the real exiftence of con- tingent things, or of their contingent relations.
To return to the popular meaning of the word fenfe. I believe it would be much more difficult to find good authors who never ufe it in that meaning, than to find fuch as do.
We ESSAY VI.
CHAP. We mav take IMr. Pope as good authority ^^- for the meaning of an Englifh word. He ufes ^"^""^"^ it often, and in his Epiftle to the Earl of Bur- lington, has made a little defcant upon it.
" Oft have you hinted to your brother Peer, " A certain truth, which many buy too dear; " Something there is more needful than ex- " fenfe. " Good fenfe, which only is the gift of Hea- " ven; " And though no fcience, fairly worth the " fcven; *' A light, which in yourfelf you mull perceive, " Jones and Le Notre have it not to give.
This inward light or fenfe is given by Heaven to different perfons in different degrees. There is a certain degree of it which is neceffary to our being fubjecls of law and government, ca- pable of managing our own affairs, and an- fwerable for our conduct towards others: This is called common fenfe, becaufe it is common to all m.en with whom we can tranfact bufmefs, or call to account for their conduct.
The laws of all civilifed nations diftinguifh thofe v. ho have this gift of Heaven, from thofe who have it not. The lafl miay have rights which ought not to be violated, but having no undeiflanding in themfelves to direct their ac- tions, the laws appoint them to be guided by the underftanding of others. It is eafilv dif- cerned by its effects in mens actions, in their fpeeches, and even in their looks j and when ir OF COMMON SENSE. 199 it Is made a queflion. whether a man has thIsC H A P. natural gift or not, a judge or a jury, upon a,_^..^ fhort converfation with him, can, for the mod part, determine the queflion with great aflu- rance.
The fame degree of underftanding which makes a man capable of ading with common prudence in the conduct of Hfe, makes him capable of difcovering what is true and what is falfe in matters that are felf-evident, and which he diftindly apprehends.
All knowledge, and all fcience, mufl be built upon principles that are felf-evident; and of fuch principles, every man who has common fenfe is a competent judge, when he conceives them diftinclly. Hence it is, that difputes very often terminate in an appeal to common fenfe.
While the parties agree in the firft principles on which their arguments are grounded, there is room for reafoning; but when one denies what to the other appears too evident to need, or to admit of proof, reafoning feems to be at an end; an appeal is made to common fenfe, and each party is left to enjoy his own opinion.
There feems to be no remedy for this, nor any way left to difcufs fuch appeals, unlefs the decifions of common fenfe can be brought into a code, in which all reafonable men Ihall ac- quiefce. This indeed, if it be poffible, would be very defirable, and would fupply a defide- ratum in logic; and why (liauld it be thought impoffible that reafonable men fhould agree in things that are felf-evident?
All that is intended in this chapter, is to ex- plain the meaning of common fenfe, that it may ESSAY VI.
C H A P.may not be treated, as It has been by fome, as a new principle, or as a word without any "~^ meamng. I have endeavoured to fhew, that fenie, in its mofl: common, and therefore its moil proper meaning, fignlfies judgment, though Philofophers often ufe It in another meaning. From this it is natural to think, that common fenfe fliould mean common judg- ment; and fo it really does.
What the preclfe limits are which divide com- mon judgment from what Is beyond it on the one hand, and from what falls Ihort of it on the other, may be difficult to determine; and men may agree In the meaning of the word who have different opinions about thofe limits, or who even never thought of fixing them. This is as intelligible as, that all Engllflimen fhould mean the fame thing by the county of York, though perhaps not a hundredth part of them can point out Its preclfe limits.
Indeed, It feems to me, that common fenfe is as unambiguous a word, and as well under- ftood as the county of York. We find it in innumerable places in good writers; we hear it on innumerable occafions in converfation; and, as far as I am isble to judge, always in the fame meaning. And this Is probably the reafon why it is fo feldom defined or explained.
Dr. Johnson, in the auihorlttes he gives, to {hew that the word fenfe fignlfies underltand- ing, foundnefs of faculties, firength of natu- ral reafon, quotes Dr. Bentley for what may be called a definition of com.mon fenfe, though probably net intended for that purpofe, but mentioned acQidentally: " God hath endowed " mankind with power and abilities, which w^e " call OF COMMON SENSE. 201 ** call natural light and reafon, and common C II A P.
It is true, that common fenfe is a popular, and not a fcholaflic word; and by moft of thofe who have treated fyflematically of the powers of the underlianding, it is only occafionally mentioned, as it is by other writers. But I re- coiled two philofophical writers, who are ex- ceptions to this remark. One is Buffier, who treated largely of common fenfe, as a principle of knowledge, above fifty years ago. The other is Bifliop Berkeley, who, I think, has laid as much ftrefs upon common fenfe, in oppofition to the doctrines of Philo- fophers, as any Philofopher that has come after him. If the reader chufes to look back to PZffay II. chap. io.~ he will be fatisfied of this, from the quotations there made for another purpofe, which it is unnecelfary here to re- peat.
Men rarely afk what common fenfe is; be- caufe every man believes himfelf poffeiTcd of it, and would take it for an imputation upon his underftanding to be thought unacquainted with it. Yet I remember two very eminent authors who have put this queflion; and it is not improper to hear their fentiments upon a fubjed: fo frequently mentioned, and fo rarely canvalfed.
It is well known, that Lord Shaftesbury gave to one of his Treatifes the title of Senfus Communis; an EJJay on the freedom of wit and humour^ in a letter to a friend; in which he puts his friend in mind of a free converfation with fome of their friends on the fubjeds of morality and religion, i^midfl the different opinions darted and maintained with great life ii (« life ii (« C H A F life and ingenuity, one or other "would every ^ ■ now and then take the liberty to appeal to com- ^ ^ rnon fenfe. F very one allowed the appeal; no one would offer to call the authority of the court in queflion, till a gentleman, whofe good underftanding was never, yet brought in doubt, defired the company very gravely that they would tell him what common lenfe was. If, faid he, by the word fefife, we were to underftand opinion and judgment and by the word common^ the generality, or any confiderable part of niankind, it would be " hard to difcover where the fubjecl of com- " men lenfe could lie; for that which w^as ac- " cording to ihe fenfe of one part of mankind, *' was againfl the fenfe of another: And if " the majority were to determine common '' fenfe, it would change as often as men '* changed. That in religion, common fenfe " was as hard to determine as catholic ox ortho- " dox. W hat to one was abfurdity, to ano- " ther was demonftration.
" In policy, if plain Britifh or Dutch fenfe " were right, Turkiih and French muft cer- tainly be wrong. And as mere nonfenfe, as paffive obedienccr feemed, w^e found it to " be the common fenfe of a great party " amongft ourfelves, a greater party in Europe, ^' and perhaps the greateft part of all the " world befides. As for morals, the differ- *' ence was flill wider; for even the Philofo- *' phers cculd never agree in one and the fame " fyilem. And fome even of our mofl admi- " red modern Philofophers had fairly told us, ''' that virtue and vice had no other law or meafure than mere falhion and vogue."
This €( OF COMMON SENSE. 203 This is the fubftance of the genrleman's - H A P fpeech, which, I apprehenc], explains the meaning of the word perfectly, and contains ^■'^•' all that has been faid, or can be faid againit the authority of common fenfe, and the pro- priety of appeals to it.
As there is no mention of any anfwer imme- diately to this fpeech, we might be apt to con- clude, that the noble author adopted the fen- timents of the intelligent gentleman, whofe fpeech he recites. But the contrary is manifed, from the title of Senfus Coiiununis given to his EiTay, from his frequent ufe of the word, and from the whole tenor of the Efl'ay.
The author appears to have a double inten- tion in that Effay, correfponding to the double title prefixed to it. One intention is, tojuftify the ufe of wit, humour, and ridicule, in dif- cufling among friends the graved fubjeds. " I can very well fuppofe, fays he, men may *' be frighted out of their wits; but I have no " apprehenfion they ihould be laughed out of " them. I can hardly imagine, that, in a " pleafant way, they fliould ever be talked out " of their love for fociety, or reafoned out of " humanity and common fenfe."
The other intention fignified by the title Senfus Co?nmunis, is carried on hand in hand with the firft, and is to fhew, that common fenfe is not fo vague and uncertain a thing as it is reprcfented to be in the fceptical fpeech before recited. "I will try," fays he, " what " certain knowledge or alfurance of things " may be recovered in that very way, (to wit, '' of humour,) by which all certainty, you " thought, was loft, and an endlefs fcepticifm ^' introduced."
He ESSAY VI.