He ESSAY VI.
P- He gives fome criticifms upon the vjoxd/en- fus communis in Juvenal, Horace, and Se- neca; and after fliewing, in a facetious way throughout the Treatife, that the fundamental principles of morals, of poHtics, of criticifm, and of every branch of knowledge, are the dictates of common fenfe, he fums up the whole in thefe words: " That fome moral and philofophical truths there are fo evident in themfelves^ that it would be eafier to ima- gine half mankind run mad, and joined pre- cifely in the fame fpecies of folly, than to admit any thing as truth, which fhould be advanced againll fuch natural knowledge, fundamental reafon, and common fenfe.'* And, on taking leave, he adds: " And now, my friend, fliould you find 1 had moralifed in any tolerable manner, according to com- mon fenfe, and without canting, I fhould be fatisfied with my performance.'* Another eminent writer who has put the quefhion what common fenfe is, is Fenelon, the famous Archbilhop of Cambray.
That ingenious and pious author, having had an early prepofTeffion in favour of the Car- tefian philofophy, made an attempt to eftablifh, on a fure foundation, the metaphylical argu- ments which Des Cartes had invented to prove the being of the Deity. For this pur- pofe, he begins with the Cartefian doubt. He proceeds to find out the truth of his own exift- ence, and then to examine wherein the evi- dence and certainty of this and other fuch pri- mary truths confiiled. This, according to Cartefian principles, he places in the clearnefs ^nd diHintlnefs of the ideas. On the contrary, he OF COMMON SENSE. 205 he places the abfurdity of the contrary propo-^ HAP. fitions, in their being repugnant to his clear ^ and diftindl ideas.
To illuftrate this, he gives various examples of queftions manifeftly abfurd and ridiculous, which every man of common underflanding would at firil fight perceive to be io, and then goes on to this purpofe.
" What is it that makes thefe queftions ri- " diculous? Wherein does this ridicule pre- " cifely confift? It will perhaps be rephed, " that it confiits in this, that they ihock com- " mon fenfe. But what is the fame common " fenfe? It is not the firft notions that all " men have equally of the fame things. This " common fenfe, which is always and in all " places the fame; which prevents enquiry; " which makes enquiry in fome cafes ridicu- " lous; which, inftead of enquiring, makes a " man laugh whether he will or not; which " puts it out of a man's power to doubt; this " fenfe, which only waits to be confulted; " which fhows icfelf at the firft glance, and *' immediately difcovers the evidence or the *' abfurdity of a queftion; is not this the fame " that I call my ideas?
" Behold then thofe ideas or general no- *' tions which it is not in my power either to " contradid or examine, and by which I " examine and decide in every cafe, infomuch " that I laugh inftead of anfwering, as often " as any thing is propofed to me, which is " evidently contrary to what thefe immutable " ideas reprefent."
I ftiall only obferve upon this paflage, that the interpretation it gives of Des Cartes cri- terion aoG ESSAY VL C H A P.tenon of truth, whether jufl or not, is the ^^- moft intelligible and the moft favourable I have met with.
I beg leave to mention one paflage from Cicero, and to add two or three from late writers, which fliov/ that this word is not be- come obfolete, nor has changed its meaning.
De Oratore, lib. 3. " Omnes enim tacito " quodam fenfu, fine ulla arte aut ratione, " in artibus ac rationibus, recta ac prava " dijudicant. Idque cum faciant in piciuris, et in fignis, et in aliis operibus, ad quorum intclligentiam a natura minus habent in- ftrum.enti, turn multo oftendunt magis in verborum, numerorum, vocumque judi- *' cio; quod ea fmt in communibus infixa " fenfibus; neque earura rerum quemquam " funditus natura voluit expertem.'* Hume's EfTays and Treatifes, vol. i. p. 5. *• But a Philofopher who propofes only to re- " prefent the common fenfe of mankind in " more beautiful and more engaging colours, *' if by accident he commits a mift ake, goes " no farther, but renewing his appeal to com- " mon fenfe, and the natural fentiments of *' the mind, returns into the right path, and " fecures himfelf from any dangerous illu- " fion.
Hume's Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, p. 2. " Thofe who have refufed " the reality of moral difliniftions may be " ranked among the difmgenuous difputants. " The only way of converting an antagonifl " of this kind is to leave him to himfelf: For, " finding that nobody keeps up the controver- " fy with him, 'tis probable he will at laft, of " himfelf.
OF COMMON SENSE. 207 " himfelf, from mere wearinefs, come overCHAP. " to the fide of common fenfe and reafon." ^^^ Priestly's Inftitutes, Prelim. EiTay, vol. ^""^^"^ I. p. 27. " Becaufe common fenfe is a fuf- " ficient guard againfl many errors in religion, " it feems to have been taken for granted, " that that common fenfe is a fufficient inftruc- " tor alfo, whereas in faft, without pofitive in- " ftru£tion, men would naturally have been " mere favages with refpeft to religion; as, " without fimilar inftrudion, they would be *' favages with refpe^l to the arts of life and " the fciences. Common fenfe can only be " compared to a judge; but what can a judge " do without evidence and proper materials " from which to form a judgment?
Priestly's Examination of Dr. Reid, hfc. page 127. " But fhouldwe, out of complai- " fance, admit that what has hitherto been *' called judgment may be called fenfe, it is *' making too free with the eftablifhed figni- " fication of words to call it common fenfe, *' which, in common acceptation, has long *' been appropriated to a very different thing, B*' •viz. To that capacity for judging of com- *' mon things that perfons of middling capa- *' cities are capable of." Page 1:9. "I fliould " therefore exped, that if a man was fo totally *' deprived of common fenfe as not to be able " to diftinguifli truth from falfehood in one " cafe, he would be equally incapable of dif- ** tinguifhing it in another."
From this cloud of teftimonies, to which hundreds might be added, I apprehend, that whatever cenfure is thrown upon thofe who have fpoke of common fenfe as a principle of know- 2oS ESSAY VI.
^ ^r^ ^' I^-Howledge, or who have appeald to it In mat- ^^:^^ ters that are felf-evident, will fall light, when there are fo many to fhare in it. Indeed, the authority of this tribunal is too Hicred and ve- nerable, and has prefcription too long in its favour to be now -ucifely called in queftion. Thofe who are difpofed to do fo, may rem.em- ber the fhrewd faying oi, Mr. Hobbes, " When reafon is againft a man, a man \\\\\ " be againil reafon." This is equally appU- cable to common fenfe.
From the account I have given of the mean- ing of this term, it is eafy to judge both of the proper ufe and of the abufe of it.
It is abfurd to conceive that there can be any oppofition between reafon and common fenfe. It is indeed the firfl-born of reafon, and as they are commonly joined together in fpeech and in writing, they are infeparable in their nature.
AVe afcribe to reafon two offices, or two de- grees. The firft is to judge of things felf- evident; the fecond to ilraw conclufions that are not felf-evident from thofe that are. The liid of thefe is the province, and the fole pro- vince of common fenfe; and therefore it coin- cides with reafon in its whole extent, and is only another name for one branch or one de- gree of reafon. Perhaps it may be faid, Why then ihould you give it a particular name, fmce it is acknov.'ledged to be only a degree of rea- fon? It would be a fufficient anfwer to this. Why do you aboiifh a name which is to be found in the language of all civilized nations, and has acquired a right by prefcription? Such an attempt is equally foolifli and ineffectual. Lvcry wile nian will be apt to think, that a name OF COMMON SENSE. 209 name which is found in all languacjes as farCHAP. back as we can trace them, is not without ^^■ fome ufe. ^ But there is an obvious reafon why this de- gree of reafon fliould have a name appropri- ated to it; and that is, that in the greateil part of mankind no other degree of reafon is to be found. Jt is this degree that entitles them to the denomination of reafonable crea- tures. It is this degree of reafon, and this only, that makes a man capable of managing his own affairs, and anfwerable for his conduct towards others. There is therefore the bed reafon why it fhould have a name appropriated to it.
Thefe two degrees of reafon differ in other refpecls, which would be fufficient to entitle them to diftinct names.
The firft is purely the gift of Heaven. And where Heaven has not given it, no education can fupply the want. The fecond is learned by practice and rules, when the firft is not wanting. A man who has common fenfe may be taught to reafon. But if he has not that gift, no teaching will make him able either to judge of firfl principles or to reafon from them.
I have only this farther to obferve, that the province of common fenfe is more extenfive in refutation than in confirmation. A con- clufion dravk^n by a train of juft reafoning from true principles cannot poffibly contradici: any decifion of common fenfe, becaufe truth will always be confiftent with itfelf. Neither can fuch a conclufion receive any confirmation from common fenfe, becaufe it is not within its jurifdidion.
Vol. II. P But 2IO ESSAY VI.
But it is poflible, that, by fetting out from falfe principles, or by an error in reafoning, a man may be led to a conclufion that contra- dids the decifions of common fenfe. In this cafe, the conclufion is within the jurifdidion of common fenfe, though the reafoning on which it was grounded be not; and a man of common fenfe m.ay fairly reject the conclufion, without being able to fhew the error of the reafoning that led to it.
Thus, if a Mathematician, by a procefs of intricate demonftration, in which fome falfe ftep was made, fhould be brought to this con- clufion, that two quantities, which are both equal to a third, are not equal to each other, a man of common fenfe, without pretending to be a judge of the demonftration, is well en- titled to rejecl: the conclufion, and to pronounce it abfurd.
CHAP.
CHAP.
SENTIMENTS concerning JUDGMENT. 211 CHAP. III.
Sentiments of Philofophers concerning Judgment.
A DIFFERENCE about the meaning of JTx^ ^ word ought not to occafion difputes among Philofophers: But it is often very pro- per to take notice of fuch differences, in order to prevent verbal difputes. There are, indeed, no words in language more liable to ambiguity than thofe by which we exprefs the operations of the mind; and the mod candid and judici- ous may fometimes be led into difierent opini- ons about their precife meaning.
I hinted before what I take to be a peculiarity in Mr. Locke with regard to the meaning of the word judgment, and mentioned what I ap- prehend may have led him into it. But let us hearhimfelf; Eflay, book 4. chap. 14. " The " faculty which God has given to man to fup- " ply the want of clear and certain knowledge, " where that cannot be had, is judgment; " whereby the m.ind takes its ideas to agree " ordifagree; or, which is the fame, any pro- '^ pofition to be true or falfe, without perceiv- " ing a demonftrative evidence in the proofs. " Thus the mind has two faculties, converfant " about truth and falfehood. Firji, Know- " ledge, whereby it certainly perceives, and " is undoubtedly fatisfied of the agreement • " or difagreement of any ideas. Secondly, " Judgment, which is the putting ideas to- " gether, or feparating them from one another " in the mijid, when their certain agreement ESSAY VI.
C H A P:" or difagreement is not perceived, but pre- ' "* Knowledge, I think, fometimes fignifies things known; fometimes that acl of the mind by which we know them. And in Hke man- ner opinion fometimes fignifies things believed; fometimes the acb of the mind by v^hich webe- Heve them. But judgment is the faculty which is exercifed in both thefe a£l:s of the mind. In knowledge, we judge without doubting; in opinion, with fome mixture of doubt. But I know no authority, befides that of Mr. Locke, for calling knowledge a; faculty, any more than for calling opinion a faculty.
Neither do I think that knowledge is confi- ned vi'ithin the narrow limits which Mr. Locke affigns to it; becaufe the far greateft part of what all men call human knowledge, is in things which neither admit of intuitive nor of demonftrative proof.
I have all along ufed the word judgment in a more extended fenfe than Mr. Locke does in: the pafiage above mentioned. I underftand by it that operation of the mind, by which, we de- termine, concerning any thing that may be exprefled by a propofition, v/hether it be true or falfe. Every propofition is either true or falfe; fo is every judgment. A propofition may be fimply conceived without judging of it. But when there is not only a conception of the propofition, but a mental affirmation or nega- tion, an alTent or diflent of the underftanding, whether weak or ilrong, that is judgment.
I think, that fince the days of xAristotle, Logicians have taken the word in that fenfe, and other writers, for the mofl part, though there SENTIMENTS concerning JUDGMENT. 213 there are other meanings, which there is noC HA P. danger of confounding with this. ^,J.!L^ We may take the authority of Dr. Isaac Watts, as a Logician, as a man who under- ftood EngHfii, and who had a juft efleem of Mr. Locke's Effay. Logic. Introd. page 5. " Judgment is that operation of the mind, " wherein we join two or more ideas together ** by one affirmation or negation; that is, we " either affirm or deny ibis to be tbnt. So " this tree is high; that borfe is not fwift; the " mind of man is a thinking being; mere matter " has no thought belonging to it; God is juft; " good men are often mif enable in this world; a " righteous governor will make a difference be- *' twixt the evil and the good; which fentences " are the effisd: of judgment, and are called *' propofitions." And part 2. chap. 2. feci. 9. " The evidence of fenfe is, when we frame a " propofition according to the dictate of any " of our fenfes. So we judge, that grafs is " green; that a trumpet gives a pie af ant found; " that fire burns wood; %vater is foft; and " iron hard.*'' In this meaning, judgment extends to every kind of evidence, probable or certain, and to every degree of affent or difient. It extends to all knowledge as well as to ail opinion; with this difference only, that in knowledge it is more firm and fteady, like a houfe founded upon a rock. In opinion it flands upon a weaker foundation, and is more liable to be iliaken and overturned.
Thefe differences about the meaning of words are not mentioned as if truth was on one fide, and error on the other, but as an apolo- gy for deviating in this inftance from the phrafeology i« C H A P.feology of Mr. Locke, which is for the mod part accurate and diftinft; and becaufq atten- tion to the different meanings that are put up- on words by different authors is the beft way to prevent our miflaking verbal differences for real differences of opinion.
The common theory concerning ideas natu- rally leads to a theory concerning judgment, which may be a proper teft of its truth; for as they are neceffarily connected, they muff ftand or fall together: Their connection is thus ex- preffed by Mr. Locke, book 4. chap. i. " Since the mind, in all its thoughts and rea- " fonings, hath no other immediate objeft " but its own ideas, which it alone does, or " can contemplate, it is evident that our " knowledge is only converfant about them. " Knowledge then ieems to me to be nothing " but the perception of the connexion, and agree- " ment or difagreement and repugnancy of any " of our ideas. In this alone it confifis.^' There can only be one objedion to the juf- tice of this inference; and that is, that the an- tecedent proportion from which it is inferred, feems to have fome ambiguity: For, in the firft claufe of that propofition, the mind is faid to have no other immediate object but its own ideas; in the fecond, that it has no other object at all j that it does or can contemplate ideas alone.
If the word immediate in the lirfl claufe be a mere expletive, and be not intended to limit the generality of the propofition, then the two claufes will be perfectly confident, the fecond being only a repetition or explication of the firft; and the inference that our knowledge is only converfant about ideas, will be perfectly juft and logical.
But SENTIMENTS concerning JUDG:>IENT. 215 But if the word immediate in the firfl claufe CHAP, be intended to limit the general propofition, and to imply, that the mind has other cbjcds befides its own ideas, though no other imme- diate objeds; then it will not be true that it does or can contemplate ideas alone j nor will the inference be juflly drawn, that our know- ledge is only converfant about ideas.
Mr. Locke muft either have meant his an- tecedent propofition, without any limitation by the word immediate^ or he muft have meant to limit it by that word, and to fignify that there are objedls of the mind which are not ideas.
The firfl of thefe fuppofitions appears to me mofl probable, for feveral reafons.
Firji^ Becaufe, when he purpofely defines the word idea^ in the introdudion to the EiTay, he fays it is whatfoever is the object of the un- derftanding when a man thinks; or whatever the mind can be employed about in thinking. Here there is no room l^ft for objects of the mind that are not ideas. The fame definition is often repeated throughout the Effky. Some- times, indeed, the word immediate is added, as in the palTage now under confideration; but there is no intimation made that it ought to be underftood when it is not exprefled. Now if it had really been his opinion, that there are objects of thought which are not ideas, this definition, which is the ground work of the whole Effay, would have been very improper, and apt to miflead his reader.
Secondly, He has never attempted to fliow how there can be obje£ts of thought, which are not immediate objects; and indeed this feems impoihble. For whatever the obje£t be, the ii6 ESSAY VI.
CH A P. the man either thinks of it, or he does not. I^^- There is no medium between thefe. It he thinks of it, it is an immediate object of thought while he thinks of it. If he does not think of it, it is no objecl of thought at alh Every object of thought, therefore, is an im- mediate objecl of thought, and the word inune- diatc^ joined to objects of thought, feems to be a mere expletive.
Thirdly^ Though Malebranche and Bi- fhop Berkeley beheved, that we have no ideas of minds, or of the operations of minds, and that we may think and reafon about them without ideas, this was not the opinion of Mr. Locke. He thought that there are ideas of minds, and of their operations, as well as of the objects of fenfe; that the mind perceives nothing but its own ideas, and that all words are the figns of ideas.
A fourth reafon is. That to fuppofe that he intended to limit the antecedent propofition by the word i?n?uediate, is to impute to him a blunder in reafoning, which I do not think Mr. Locke could have committed: for what can be a more glaring paralogifm than to infer, that fince ideas are partly, though not folely, the objects of thought, it is evident that all our knowledge is only converfant about them. If, on the contrary, he meant that ideas are the only objeds of thought, then the conclufion drawn is perfectly juil and obvious; and he might very well fay, that fmce it is ideas only that the mind does or can contemplate^ it is evi- dent that our knoivledge is only converfant about them.
As to the conclufion itfelf, I have only to obferve, that though he extends it only to what SENTIMENTS concerning JUDGMENT. 217 what he calls knowledge, and not to what heC H A P^, calls judgment, there is the fame reafon for ^^^• extending it to both. *'*^ It is true of judgment, as well as of know- ledge, that it can only be converfant about ob- jects of the mind, or about things which the mind can contemplate. Judgment, as well as knowledge, fuppofes the conception of the ob- ject about which we judge; and to judge of objects that never were nor can be objefts of the mind, is evidently impoffible.
This therefore we may take for granted, that if knowledge be converfant about ideas only, becaufe there is no other object of the mind, it muft be no lefs certain, that judg- ment is converfant about ideas only, for the fame reafon.
Mr. Locke adds, as the refult of his rea- foning. Knowledge then feems to me to be nothing but the perception of the connettion and agreement, or difagreement and repug- nancy, of any of our ideas. In this alone it confifts.
This is a very important point, not only on its own account, but on account of its necef- fary connection with his fyflem concerning ideas, which is fuch, as that both muft ft and or fall together; for if there is any part of human knowledge which does not confift in the perception of the agreement or difagree- ment of ideas, it muft "follow, that there are objeds of thought and of contemplation which are not ideas.
This point, therefore, deferves to be care- fully examined. With this view, let us firft attend to its meaning, which I think can hardly C H A P.ly be miflaken, though it may need fome ex- ^^I- plication.
Every point of knowledge, and every judg- ment, is exprcfled by a propofition, wherein fomething is affirmed or denied of the fubjedt of the propofition.
By perceiving the conne6tion or agreement of two ideas, I conceive is meant perceiving the truth of an affirmative propofition, of which the fubject and predicate are ideas. In like manner, by perceiving the dMagreement and repugnancy of any two ideas, I conceive is meant perceiving the truth of a negative propofition, of which both fubjed: and predi- cate are ideas. This I take to be the only meaning the words can bear, and it is confir- med by what Mr. Locke fays in a paflage al- readed quoted in this chapter, that " the " mind, taking its ideas to agree or difagree, " is the fame as taking any propofition to be " true or falfe." Therefore, if the definition of knowledge given by Mr. Locke be a juft one, the fubjed, as well as the predicate of every propofition, by which any point of know- ledge is expreffed, mud be an idea, and can be nothing elfe; and the fame mud hold of every propofition by which judgment is ex- preffed, as has been fhown above.
Having afcertained the mtaiiing of this de- finition of human knowledge, we are next to confider how far it is jufl.
Firft^ I would obferve, that if the word idea be taken in the meaning which it had at firft among the Pythagoreans and Platonills, and if by knowledge be meant only abdrad and general knowledge, (which I believe Mr. Locke had chiefly in his view,) I think the propofition is true.
SENTIMENTS concerning JUDGMENT. 219 true, that fuch knowledge confifls f^'dy ir perceiving the truth oF propofitions whofc fub- jedt and predicate are ideas, By ideas here I mean things conceived ab- flradly, without regard to their exiflence: We commonly call them abflrai!^ notions, ab- ftract conceptions, abfhrad: ideas; the Peripa- tetics called them univerfals; and the Plato- nifts, who knew no other ideas, called them ideas without addition.
Such ideas are both fubjedl and predicate in every propofition which expreffes abftracl knowledge.
The whole body of pure mathematics is an abftratt fcience; and in every mathematical propofition, both fubjeft and predicate are ideas, in the fenfe above explained. Thus, when I fay the fide of a fquare is not commen- furable to its diagonal: In this propofition the fide and the diagonal of a fquare are the fub- jecls, (for being a relative propofition it muft have two fubjefts.) A fquare, its fide, and its diagonal, are ideas or univerfals; they are not individuals, but things predicable of many individuals. Exiftence is not included in their definition, nor in the conception we form of them. The predicate of the propofition is com- menfurahle^ which mud be an univerfal, as the predicate of every propofition is ^o. In other branches of knowledge many abftract truths may be found, but, for the moft part, mixed with others that are not abilrad.
I add, that I apprehend that what is flriclly called demonflrative evidence, is to be found in abflraft knowledge only. This was the opinion of Aristotle, of Plato, and I think of all the ancient Philofophers; and I believe in C H A P.in this they judged right. It Is true, we often ^"' meet with demonilration in agronomy, in me- '"^^"''^^ chanics, and in other branches of natural phi- lofophy; but I believe we fhall always find that fuch demonftrations are grounded upon prin- ciples or fuppofitions, which have neither inr> tuitive nor demonftrative evidence.
Thus when we demonftrate, that the path of a projedile in vacuo is a parabola, we fuppofe that it is acted upon with the fame force, and in the fame direction through its whole path by gravity. This is not intuitively known, nor is it demonftrable: And in the demonftra- tion, we reafon from the laws of motion, which are principles not capable of demonflra- tion, bait grounded on a diiferent kind of evi- dence.
Ideas, in the fenfe above explained, are creatures of the mind; they are fabricated by its rational powers; we know their nature and their eifence; for they are nothing more than they are conceived to be: And becaufe they are perfectly known, we can reafon about them with the highefl degree of evidence.
And as they are not things that exift, but things conceived, they neither have place nor time, nor are they liable to change.
When we fay that they are in the mind, this can mean no more but that they are conceived by the mind, or that they are objec'rs of thought. The ad: of conceiving them is no doubt in the mind; the things conceived have no place, be- caufe they have not exiftcnce. Thus a circle, confidered abftractly, is faid figuratively to be in the mind of him that conceives it; but in no other fenfe than the city of London or the kingdom of France is faid to be in his min4 when he thinks of thofe objects.
Place SENTIMEKTS concerning JUDGMENT. 221 Place and time belong to finite things that^ HAP. exift, but not to things that are barely con- ceived. They may be objeds of conception to intelligent beings in every place, and at all times. Hence the Pythagoreans and Platonifts were led to think that they are eternal and omniprefent. If they had exiftence, they muft be fo; for they have no relation to any one place or time, which they have not to every place and to every time.
The natural prejudice of mankind, that what we conceive muft have exiftence, led thofe an- cient Philofophers to attribute exiftence to ideas; and by this they were led into all the extravagant and myfterious parts of their fyf- tem. When it is purged of thefe, 1 apprehend it to be the only intelligible and rational fyftem concerning ideas.
I agree with them, therefore, that ideas are immutably the fame in all times and places: For this means no more but that a circle is always a circle, and a fquare always a fquare.
I agree with them, that ideas are the pat- terns or exemplars, by which every thing was made that had a beginning: For an intelligent artificer muft conceive his work before it is made; he makes it according to that concep- tion; and the thing conceived, before it ex- ifts, can only be an idea.
I agree with them, that every fpecies of things confidered abftraclly is an idea: and that the idea of the fpecies is in every indivi- dual of the fpecies, without divifion or multi- plication. This indeed is expreHed fomewhat myfterioufly, according to the manner of the fed J but it may eafily be explained.
Every Every Every idea is an attribute; and it is a com- mon way of fpeaking, to fay, that the attri- bute is in every fubjecl of which it may truly be affirmed. Thus, to be above jifty years of age, is an attribute or idea. This attribute may be in, or affirmed of,' fifty diffisrent indi- viduals, and be the fame in all, without divi- fion or multiplication.
I think, that not only every fpecies, but every genus, higher or lower, and every at- tribute confidered abflractly, is an idea. Thefe are things conceived without regard to exifl- cncc: they are univerfals, and therefore ideas, according to the ancient meaning of that word.
It is true, that, after the Platonifts entered into difputes with the Peripatetics, in order to defend the exiftence of eternal ideas, they found it prudent to contraft the line of defence, and maintained only that there is an idea of every fpecies of natural things, but not of the genera, nor of things artificial. They were unvviUing to multiply beings beyond what was neccffary; but in this I think they departed from the genuine principles of their fyftem.