If we had no notions but fuch as are furniflied^ ^^ ^• by the external fenfes, and by confcioufnefs, ' ^ ^ it feems to be impollible that we fiiouid ever have anv conception of power. Accordingly, Mr. Hume, who has reafoned the mod accu- rately upon this hypothefis, denies that we have any idea of power, and clearly refutes the ac- count given by Mr. Locke of the origin of this idea.
But it is in vain to reafon from a hypothefis againft a faQ:, the truth of which every man may fee by attending to his own thoughts. It is evident, that all men, very early in Hfe, not only have an idea of power, but a convittion that they have Ibme degree, of it in themfelves: For this conviftion is necefl'arily implied in many operations of mind, which are familiar to every man, and without which no man can ad: the part of a reafonable being.
Firji^ It is implied in every a61: of vohtion. " Volition, it is plain, fays Mr. Locke, is an " act of the mind, knowingly exerting that *' dominion which it takes itfelf to have over " any part of the man, by employing it in, or " with-holding it from any particular action." Every volition, therefore implies a conviction ot power to do the action willed. A man may defire to make a vifit to the moon, or to the planet Jupiter; but nothing but infanity could make him v/iil to do fo. And if even iniaility produced this effect, it miift be by making him think it to be in his power.
Secondly^ This conviction is implied in all deliberation; for no man in his wits deliberates whether he fhail do what he believes not to be in his power. TIArdly^ The fame conviction is implied in every refclution or purpofe formed' 2.So ESSAY VI.
C h A P. in confequence of deliberation. A man may ^- as well form a refoiution to pull the moon out '^ "^""'of her iphere, ns to do the mod infignifi- cant a£lion which he believes not to be in his poV'*er. The fame thing may be laid of every promife or contra'3: wherein a man plights his faith; for he is not an honeft: man who pro- mifes what he does not believe he has power to perform.
As thefe operations imply a belief of fome degree of power in ourfelves; fo there are others equally common and familiar, v/hich imply a like behef with regard to others.
V/hen we impute to a man any action or omiiTion, as a ground of approbation or of blame, we mud believe he had power to do otherwlfe. The fame is implied in all advice, exhortation, command, and rebuke, and in every cafe, in which we rely upon his fidelity in performing any engagement, or executing any trufl.
It is not more evident that mankind have a conviQion of the exiftence of a material world, than that they have the conviction of fome de- gree of povver in themfelves, and in others; every one over his own actions, and the deter- minations of his will: A conviction fo early, fo general, and fo interwoven with the whole of human conduct, that it mud be the natural efFe£t of our conditution, and intended by the Author of our being to guide our actions.
It refembles our conviction of the exidence of a material world in this refpect alfo, that even thofe who rejeft it in fpeculation, find themfelves under a necefTity of being governed by it in their practice; and thus it will always happen when philofophy contradicts firft prin- ciples.
Firjt Principles of Contingent Truths. 281 7. Another firfl principle is, That the na- C H A P. tural faculties, by which we diftinguifh truth from error, are not fallacious. If any man fliould demand a proof of this, it is impollible to fatisfy him. For fuppofe it fhould be ma- thematically demonftrated, this would fignify nothing in this cafe; becaufe, to judge of a demonftration, a man muft truft his faculties, and take for granted the very thing in queftion.
If a man's honefty were called in queftion, it would be ridiculous to refer it to the man's own word, whether he be honeft or not. The fame abfurdity there is in attempting to prove, by any kind of reafoning, probable or demon- ftrative, that our reafon is not fallacious, fmce the very point in queftion is, whether rea- foning may be trufted.
If a Sceptic ftiould build his fcepticifm upon this foundation, that all our reafoning and judging powers are fallacious in ther nature, or ihould refolve at leaft to with-hold aflent until it be proved that they are not; it would be impofiible by argument to beat him out of this ftrong hold, and he muft even be left to enjoy his fcepticifm.
Des Cartes certainly made a falfe ftep in this matter; for having fuggefted this doubt among others, that whatever evidence he might have from his confcioufnefs, his fenfes, his memory, or his reafon; yet pofiibly fome malignant being had given him thpfe faculties on purpofe to impofe upon him; and therefore, that they are not to be trufted without a proper voucher: To remove this doubt, he endea- vours to prove the being of a Deity who is no deceiver j whence he concludes, that the fa- culties C HA P.culties he had given him are true and worthy ,^^__J^__^^^ to be truilec.
It is ilr.ange that fo acute a reafoner did not perceive, that in this realoning thers is evi- dently a begging of the queflion.
For if our facuUies be fiillacious, why may they not deceive us in this reafoning as well as in o*:hers? And if they are to be trulied ill this inilance without a voucher, why not in others?
Every kind of reafoning for the veracity of Gur faculties, amounts to no more than taking their owa teftimony for their veracity; and this we muil do implicitly, until God give us new faculties to ht in judgment upon the old; and the reafon why»DES Cartes fatisfied him- felf with fo weak an argument tor the truth of his faculties, molt probably was, that he never ferloufly doubted of it.
If any truth can be faid to be prior to all others in the order of nature, this feems to have the bed claim; becaufe in every inftance of aifent, whether upon intuitive, demonftra- tive, or probable evidence, the truth of our faculties is taken for granted, and is, as it were, one of the premifes on which our affent is grounded.
How then come we to be affured of this fundamental truth on which all others reft? Perhaps evidence, as in ma?iy other refpefts it refembles light, fo in this alfo, that as light, which is the difcoverer of all vihble objects, diibovers itfelf at the fame time; fo evidence, which is the voucher for all truth, vouches for itfelf at the fame time.
This, however, is certain, that fuch is the conftitution of the human mind, that evidence difcerned Firji Principles of Centin^ent Truths. 283 difcerned by us, forces a correfponding degree CHAP, of aifent. And a man who perfeftly under- ^• flood a jufl fyllogifm, without believing that the conclufion follows from the premifes, would be a greater monfter than a man born without hands or feet.
We are born under a neceffity of trufting to our reafoning and judging powers; and a real belief of their being fallacious cannot be maintained for any confiderable time by the greateft Sceptic, becaufe it is doing violence to cur conftitution. It is Hke a man's walking upon his hands, a feat which fome men upon occafion can exhibit; but no man ever made a long journey in this manner. Ceafe ro admire his dexterity, and he will, like, other men, betake himfelf to his legs.
We may here take notice of a property of the principle under confideration, that feems to be common to it with many other firft: prin- ciples, and which can hardly be found in any principle that is built folely upon reafoning; and that is, that in mod m.en it produces its effecl without ever being attended to, or made an objedt of thought. No man ever thinks of this principle, unlefs when he confiders the grounds of fcepticifm; yet it invariably go- verns his opinions. When a man in the com- mon courfe of life gives credit to the teftimony of his fenfes, his memory, or his reafon, he does not put the queftion to himfelf, whe- ther thefe faculties may deceive him; yet the trufi he repofes in them fuppofes an inward convidion, that, in that inff ance at leaft, they do not deceive him.
It is another property of this and of many jEirft principles, that they force aifent in par- ticular CHAP.ticuIar inftances, more powerfully than when they are turned into a general propofition. Many Sceptics have denied every general prin- ciple of fcience, excepting peihaps the exif- tence of our preient thoughts; yet thefe men reafon, and refute, and prove, they aiTent and diiient in particular c'lies. 1 hey ufe reafoning to overturn ail reafoning, and judge that they ought to have no judgment, and fee clearly that they are blind. Pviany have in general maintained that the fenfcs are fallacious, yet there never was found a man fo fceptical as not to trufc his fenies in particular inftances when his fafety required it; and it may be ob- ferved of thofe who have profeifed fcepticifm, that their fcepticifm lies in generals, while in particulars they are no lefs dogmatical than others.
8. Another firft principle relating to exif- tence, is, That there is life and intelligence in our fellow-men with whom w^e converfe.
As foon as children are capable of alking a queilion, or of anfwering a queftion, as foon as they fhew the figns of love, of refentment, or of any other aiTetlion, they muft be con- vinced, that thofe with whom they have this intercourfe are intelligent beings.
It is evident they are capable of fuch inter- courfe long before they can reafon. Every one knows, that there is a focial intercourfe be- tween the nurfe and the child before it is a year old. It can, at that age, underftand many things that are faid to it.
It can by figns afk and refufe, threaten and fupplicate. It clings to its nurfe in danger, enters into her grief and joy, is happy in her foothing and carelfes, and unhappy in her difpleafure: F'lrjl Principles of Contingent Truths, 285 pleafure: That thefe things cannoi. be withoutCH A P. a conviction in the child that the inurfe is an ^'■ intelligent being, I think muft be granted. '~' '' Now I would afk how a cbild of a year old comes by this conviction? Not by reafoning furelv, for children do not reafon at that ao-e. Nor is it by external fcnfts, for life and in- telligence are not objects of the external fen- fes.
By what means, or upon what occafions Nature firft: gives this infornuition to the infant mind, is not eafy to determine. We are not capable of reflecling upon our own thoughts at that period of life, and before we attain this capacity, we have quite forgot how or on what occafion we firfl had this belief; we per- ceive it in thofe who are born blind, and in others who are born deaf; and therefore Na- ture has not conneded it folely either with any object of fight, or with any object of hearing. When we grow up to the years of reafon and reflection, this belief remains. No man thinks of afking himfelf what reafon he has to be- lieve that his neighbour is a living creature. He would be not a little furprifed if another perfon (hould afk him fo abfurd a queltion; and perhaps could not give any reafon which would not equally prove a watch or a puppet to be a living creature.
But, though you fhould fatisfy him of the weaknefs of the reafons he gives for his belief, you cannot make him in the leaft doubtful. This belief (lands upon another foundation than that of reafoning; and therefore, whether a man can give good reafons for it or not, it is not in his power to faake it off.
Setting C H A P. Setting afide this natural convidion, I be- ^ lieve the bcft reafon we can give, to prove that ^^''^*^**^ other men are hving and inteUigent, is, that their words and aftions indicate hke powers of underflanding as we are confcious of in ourfelves. The very fame argument appUed to the works of nature, leads us to conclude, that there is an intelligent Author of nature, and appears equally flrong and obvious in the lad cafe as in the firft; fo that it may be doubt- ed whether men, by the mere exercife of rea- foning, might not as foon difcover the exif- tence of a Deity, as that other men have life and intelligence.
The knowledge of the laft is abfolutely ne- ceffary to our receiving any improvement by means of inflrudion and example; and, with- out thefe means of improvements, there is no ground to think that we fhould ever be able to acquire the ufe of our reafoning powers. This knowledge, therefore, muft be antece- dent to reafoning, and therefore muft be a firft principle.
It cannot be faid, that the judgments we form concerning life and intelligence in other beings are at firft free from error; But the: errors of children in this matter lie on the fafe fide; they are prone to attribute intelHgence to things inanimate. Thefe errors are of fmall confequence, and are gradually corrected by experience and ripe judgment. But the be- lief of life and intelligence in other men, is abfolutely neceffary for us before we are capa* ble of reafoning; and therefore the Author of our being hath given us this belief antecedently to all reafoning.
9. Another Firft Principles of Cojitingent Truths. 287 9. Another firft principle I take to be, That^ ^^.^ ^- .certain features of the countenance, ioimds of the voice, and geftures of the body, indicate certain thoughts and difpofidons of mind» That many operations of the mind have their natural figns in the countenance, voice, and gefture, I fuppofe every m/ui will admit. Qvinis eniai motus animi, fays Cicero, fuum quemdam ha bet a natura vultum^ et vocem eft gejlum. The only queftion is, whether we un- derfland the fignification of thofefigns, by the conftitution of our nature, by a kind of natu- ral perception fmiilar to the perceptions of' fenfe; or whether we gradually learn the fig- nification of fuch iigns from experience, as we learn that fmoke is a fign of fire, or that the freezing of water is a fign of cold? I take the firft to be the truth.
It feems to me incredible, that the notions men have of the expreffion of features, voice, and gefture, are entirely the fruit of experi- ence. Children, almoft as foon as born, may be frighted and thrown into fits by a threaten- ing or angry tone of voice. I knew a man who could make an infant cry, byivhiftlinga melancholy tune in the fame ^r in the next room: and again, by altering his key, and the ftrain of his mufic, could make the child leap and dance for joy.
It is not by experience furely that we learn the exprcfiion of mufic; for its operation is commonly ftro ngeft the firft time we hear it. - One air expreffes mirth and feftivity; fo that, when we hear it, it is with difficulty we can forbear to dance. Another is forrowful and folemn. One infpires with tendernefs and love; another ^with-.rage and fury.
Hear C H A P. Hear how Timotheus yary'd lays furprife, And bid alternate paflions fall and rife; ^^'^'^^^'■'^ While at each change, the fon of Lybian Jove Now burns with glory, and then melts with love. Now his fierce eyes with fparlding fury glow, Now fighs Ileal out, and tears begin to flow. Perfians and Greeks, like turns of Nature, found, And the world*s viftor flood fubdued by found.
It is not necefiary that a man have fludied either mufic or the palfions, in order to his feeling thefe effedls. The mod ignorant and unimproved, to whom Nature has given a good ear, feel them as ftrcngly as the mofl' knowing.
The countenance and geflure have an ex- preffion no lefs flrong and natural than the voice. The firfl: time one fees a flern and fierce look, a contracted brow, and a menac- ing pofture, he concludes that the perfon is inflamed with answer. Shall we fay, that, pre- vious to experience, the moft hoftile counte- nance has as agreeable an appearance as the moil gentle and benign? This furely would contradict ail experience; for we know that an angry countenance will fright a child in the cradle. Who has not obferved, that children, very early, are able to diftinguifh what is faid to them in jeft from what is faid in earneft, by the tone of the voice, and the features of the face? 1 hey judge by thefe natural figns, even when they feem to contradidt the arti- ficial.
If it were by experience that we learn the meaning of features, and found, and geflure, it Firji Principles of Contingent Truths. 289 it might be expefted that we fhould recoiled CHAP, the time when we firft learned thole leiTons, or, ^■ at lead, fome of iuch a multitude.
Thofe who give attention to the operations of children, can eafily discover the time when they have their earlieft notices from experience, fuch as that flame will burn, or that knives will cut. But no man is able to recollect in himfelf, or to obferve m others, the time when the exprellion of the face, voice, and gefture, were learned.
Nay, I apprehend that it is impoffible that this fhould be learned from experience.
When we fee the fign, and fee the thing fignified alwavs conjoined with it, experience may be the inflrucior. and teach us how that fign is to be interpreted. But hov/ fiiall expe- rience inflru61: us when we fee the fign only, when the thing fignified is invifiblei Now this is the cafe here; the thoughts and paflions of the mind, as wrl' as th^ mind itfelf, are invi- flble, and therefore their coimstlion with any fehfible fign cannot be firfl difcovered by ex- perience; there mufl be fome earlier fource of this knowledge.
Nature ieems to have given to men a faculty or fenfe, by which this connection is perceived. And the operation of this fenfe is very analo- gous to that of the external fenfes.
When 1 grafp an ivory ball in my hand, I feel a certain ienfation of touch- In the fen- fation, there is nothing external, nothing cor- poreal. 'Ihe fcniation is neither round nor hard; it is an atr of feeling of the mind, from which I cannot, by reaioning, infer the exif- tence of any body. But, by the crnftirution of my nature, the fenfation carries along with Vol. II. U it ESSAY VI.
P. it the conception and belief of a round hard body really exifting in my hand.
In like manner, when I fee the features of an exprelTive face, I fee only figure and colour varioufly modified. But, by the conftitution of my nature, the vifible objeft brings along with it the conception and belief of a certain paflion or fentiment in the mind of the perfon.
In the former cafe, a fenfation of touch is the fign, and the hardnefs and roundnefs of the body I grafp is fignified by that fenfation. In the latter cafe, the features of the perfon is the fign, and the pafTion or fentiment is figni- fied by it.
The power of natural figns, to fignify the fentiments and pafTions of the mind, is feen in the figns of dumb perfons, who can make themfelves to be underftood in a confiderable degree, even by thofe who are wholly unexpe- rienced in that language.
It is feen in the traffic which has been fre- quently carried on between people that have no common acquired language. They can buy and fell, and afk and refufe, and fhew a friend- ly or hoftile difpofition by natural figns.
It was feen fiill more in the a£tors among the ancients who performed the gefticulation upon the ftage, while others recited the words. To fuch a pitch was this art carried, that we are told Cicero and Roscius ufed to contend whether the orator could exprefs any thing by word^, which the a6:or could not exprefs in dumb (how by gefliculation; and whether the fame fentence or thought could not be afted in all the variety of ways in which the orator could exprefs it in words.
But firji Principles of Contingent Truths. 291 But the moft furprifing exhibition of this CHAP, kind, was that of the pantomimes among the v^-^Z^ Romans, who aded plays, or fcenes of plays, without any recitation, and yet could be per- fectly underftood.
And here it deferves our notice, that al- though it required much fludy and pradice in the pantomimes to excel in their art; yet 'vi re- quired neither ftudy nor practice in the fpeda- tors to underftand them. It was a natural lan- guage, and therefore underflood by ail men, whether Romans, Greeks, or Barbarians, by the learned and the unlearned.
LuciAN relates, that a King, whofe domi- nions bordered upon the Euxine fea, happen- ing to be at Rome in the reign of Nero, and having feen a pantomime act, begged him of Nero that he might ufe him in his intercourfe with all the nations in his neigh bo arhood: For, faid he, I am obliged to employ I don't know how many intepreters, in order to keep a correfpondence with neighbours who fpeak many languages, and do not underfland mfne; but this fellow will make them all underfland him.
For thefe reafons, I conceive, it mufl be granted, not only that there is a connection eilabUfhed by Nature between certain figns in the countenance, voice, and geflure, and the thoughts and pafTions of the mind; but alio, that, by our conflitution, we underftand the meaning of thofe figns, and from the fign con- clude the exigence of the thing fignified.
10. Another firfl principle appears to me to be. That there is a certain regard due to human teftimony in matters of faft, and even to hu- man authority in matters of opinion.
U 2 Before ESSAY VI.
Before we are capable of reafoning about tcftimony or authority, there are many things which it concerns us to know, for which we can have no other evidence. The wife Author of nature hath planted in the human mind a propenfity to rely upon this evidence before we can give a reafon for doing fo. This, indeed, puts our judgment almoft entirely in the power of thofe that are about us, in the firll period of life; but this is neceifary both to our preferva- tion and to our improvement. If children "were fo framed, as to pay no regard to telli- mony or to authority, they muft, in the literal fenfe, perifh for lack of knowledge. It is not more neceffary that they fhould be fed before they can feed themfelves, than that they fliould be inftructed in many things, before they can difcover them by their own judgment.
But when our faculties ripen, we find reafon to check that propenfity to yield to teftimony and to authority, which was fo neceifary and fo natural in the firft period of life. We learn to reafon about the regard due to them, and fee it to be a chiidiih weaknefs to lay more flrefs upon them than reafon juilifies. Yet, I believe, to the end of life, moil men are more apt to go into this extreme than into the con- trary; and the natural propenfity ftill retains fome force.
The natural principles, by which our judg- ments and opinions are regulated before we come to the ufe of reafon, feem to be no lefs neceifary to fuch a being as man, than thofe natural inilinfts which the Author af nature hath given us to regulate our anions during thut period.
II. There Firji Principles of Coniingent Truths. 293 1 1. There are many events depending uponC HAP. the will of man, in which there is a felf-evi- V. dent probabiHty, greater or lefs, according to * circumflances.
There may be in fome individuals fuch a de- gree of phrenzy and madnefs, that no man can fay what they may or may not do. Such per- foDs we find it neceflary to put under reflraint, that as far as poffible they may be kept from doing harm to themfelves or to others. They are not confidered as reafonable creatures, or members of fociety. But, as to men who have a found mind, we depend upon a certain de- gree of regularity in their conduct; and could put a thoufand different cafes, wherein we could venture, ten to one, that they will ad in fuch a way, and not in the contrary.
If we had no confidence in our fellow men that they will aft fuch a part in fuch circum- flances, it would be impoffible to live in fociety with them: For that which makes men capa- ble of living in fociety, and uniting in a politi- cal body under government, is, that their acti- ons will always be regulated in a great meafure by the common principles of human nature.
It may always be expected, that they will regard their own interefi; and reputation, and that of their families and friends; that they will repel injuries, and have fome fenfe of good offices; and that they will have fome regard to truth and juftice, fo far at leaft as not to fwerve from them without temptation.
It is upon fuch principles as thcfc, that all political reafoning is grounded. Such reafon- ing is never demonftrative; but it may have a very great degree of probability, efpecially when applied to great bodies of men.
294 E S S x-l Y VI.
CHAP. 12. The laft principle of contingent truths ^)j;^ I mention, is, That, in the phcenomena of njiture, what is to be, will probably be like to "what has been in fimilar circumftances.
We mufl: have this conviclion as foon as we are capable of learning any thing from experi- ence; for all experience is grounded upon a belief that the future will be like the pad. Take away this principle, and the experience of an hundred years makes us no wifer with re- gard to what is to come.
This is one of thofe principles, which, when we grow up and obferve the courfe of nature, we can confirm by reafoning. We perceive that Nature is governed by fixed laws, and that if it were not fo, there could be no fuch thing as prudence in human condudt; there would be no fitnefs in any means to promote an end; and what, on one occafion, promoted it, might as probably, on another occafion, obflrucl it.
But the principle is neceffary for us before we are able to difcover it by reafoning, and therefore is made a part of our conftitution, and produces its effeds before the ufe of rea- fon.
This principle remains in all its force when we come to the ufe of reafon; but we learn to be more cautious in the application of it. We obferve more carefully the circumftances on W'hich the paft event depended, and learn to diftinguifh them from thofe which were acci- dentally conjoined with it.
In order to this a number of experiments, varied in their circumftances, is often neceffa- ry. Sometimes a fingle experiment is thought fufficient to eftablifn a general conclufion. Thus, when it was once found, that, in a cer tain Firjl Principles of Contingent Truths » 295 tain degree of cold, quickfilver became a hardC HAP. and malleable metal, there was good rcalbn ^ • to think, that the fame degree of cold \viir *'"-^ always produce this efFecl to the end of the world.
I need hardly mention, that the whole fa- bric of natural philofophy is built upon this principle, and, if it be taken away, muit tum- ble down to the foundation.
Therefore the great Newton lays it down as an axiom, or as one of his laws of philo- fophifmg, in thefe words, Effeduumnaturalium ejufdem generis eafdern ejfe caiifas. This is what every man affents to as foon as he under- flands it, and no man afks a reafon for it. It has therefore the moft genuine marks of a firfl principle.
It is very remarkable, ttiat although all our expectation of what is to happen in the courfe of nature is derived from the belief of this principle, yet no man thinks of afk- ing what is the ground of this belief.
Mr. Hume, I think, was the firft who put this quellion; and he has fliewn clearly and invincibly, that it is neither grounded upon reafoning, nor has that kind of intuitive evi- dence which mathematical axioms have. It is not a neeeifary truth.
He has endeavoured to account for it upon his own principles. It is not my bufmefs at prefent to examine the account he has given of this univerfal belief of mankind; becaufe, whether his account of it be jufl or not, (and I think it is not), yet, as this belief is univer- fal among mankind, and is not grounded upon any antecedent reafoning, but upon the con- flitution of the mind itfelf, it mufl be ac- knowledged CHAP, knowledged to be a firft principle, in the fenfe ^^1 in which I ufc that word.
I do not at 3II affirm, that thofe I have meii- tioned are all the firfl principles from which we may reafon concerning contingent truths. Such enumerations, even when made after much re- flection, are feldom perfect.
CHAP. VI.
Tirjt Principles of nccejfary Truths.
BOUT mofl of the firft principles of neceflary truths there has been no dif- pute, and therefore it is the lefs neceffary to dv/ell upon them. It will be fufficicnt to di- vide them into different claifes; to mention fome, by way of fpecimen, in each clafs; and to make fome remarks on thofe of which the truth ha^ been called in queflion.
They may, I think, mofl properly be di- vided according to the fciences to which they belong.
1. Ihere are fome firfl principles that may be called grammatical; fuch as, that every adjedive in a fentence muif belong to fome fubfhantive exprefled or underflccd; that every complete fentence mufi: have a verb.
Thofe who have attended to the ffructure of language, and formed diftindl notions of the nature and ufe of the various parts of fpeech, perceive, v/ithout reafoning, that thefe, and many ether fuch principles, are neceffarily true.
2. There are logical axioms; fuch as, that any contexture of words which does not make a pro- Firjl Principles of Neceffary Truths. 297 a propofition, is neither true nor falfe; that CHAP, every propofition is either true or falfe; that ' no propofition can be both true and falfe at the fame time; that reafoning in a circle proves nothing; that whatever may be truly affirmed of a genus, may be truly affirmed of all the fpecies, and all the individuals belonging to that genus.
3. Every one knows there are mathematical axioms. Mathematicians have, from the days of Euclid, very wifely laid down the axioms or firft principles on which they reafon. And the effect which this appears to have had upon the (lability and happy progrefs of this fcience, gives no fmall encouragement to attempt to lay the foundation of other fciences in a fimilar manner, as far as we are able.
Mr. Hume hath difcovered, as he appre- hends, a weak fide, even in mathematical axioms; and thinks, that it is not ftridly true, for inilance, that two right lines can cut one another in one point only.