The principle he reafons from is. That every fimple idea is a copy of a preceding impreffion; and therefore, in its precifion and accuracy, can never go beyond its original. From which he reafons in this manner: No man ever faw or felt a line fo ftraight, that it might not cut another, equally ftraight, in two or niore points. Therefore there can be no idea of fuch a line.
The ideas that are moft elfential to geome- try, fuch as, thofe of equality, of a ftraight line, and of a fquare furface, are far, he fays, from being diftinQ: and determinate; and the definitions dellroy the pretended deinonftrations.
<wV^ CHAP, ors. Thus, mathematical demonflratlon is ^ ^' found to be a rope of fand.
I agree with this acute author, that, if we could form no notion of points, lines, and furfaces, more accurate than thofe we fee and Jiandle, there could be no mathematical de- monilration.
But every man that has underftanding, by analyfmg, by abilracting, and compounding the rude materials exhibited by his fenfes, can fabricate, in his own mind, thofe elegant and accurate forms of mathematical lines, furfaces, and folids.
If a man finds himfelf incapable of forming a precife and determinate notion of the figure which Mathematicians call a cube, he not on- ly is no Mathematician, but is incapable of be- ing one. But, if he has a precife and deter- minate notion of that figure, he mud perceive, that it is terminated by fix mathematical fur- faces, perfedly fquare, and perfectly equal. He rnufl perceive, that thefe furfaces are ter- minated by twelve mathematical lines, per- fedlly flraight, and perfectly equal, and that thofe lines are terminated by eight mathema- tical points.
When a man is confcious of having thefe conceptions diftindt and determinate, as every Mathematician is, it is in vain to bring meta- phyfical arguments to convince him that tbey are not diftintt. You may as well bring argu- ments to convince a man racked with pain, that he feels no pain.
Every theory that is inconfiftent with our having accurate notions of mathematical hues, iurfaces, and folids, mull be falie. Therefore it Firjl Principles of Necejfary Truths. 299 it follows, that they are not copies of our im- ^ ^^ ^• prellions. ^...^v-^-' The Medicean Venus is not a copy of the block of marble from which it was made. It is true, that the elegant itatue was formed out of the rude block, and that too by a ma- nual operation, which, in a hteral fenfe, we may call abftraclion. Mathematical notions are formed in the underilanding by an ab- ftraftion of another kind, out of the rude per- ceptions of our fenfes.
As the truths of natural philofophy are not necelTary truths, but contingent, depending upon the will of the Maker of the world, the principles from which they are deduced mud be of the fame nature, and therefore belong not to this clafs.
4. I think there are axioms, even In mat- ters of tafte. Notwithftanding the variety found among men, in tafte, there are, I ap- prehend, fome common principles, even in matters of this kind. I never heard of any man who thought it a beauty in a human face to want a nofe, or an eye, or to have the mouth on one fide. How many ages have pafled fmce the days of Homer! Yet, in this long traft of ages, there never was found a man who took Thersites for a beauty.
The Jine arts are very properly called the arts of tafte ^ becaufe the principles of both are the fame; and in the fine arts, we find no lefs agreement among thofe who praftife them than among other artills.
No work of tafte can be either reHflied or underftood by thofe who do not agree with the author in the principles of tafte.
Homer, %m jco ESSAY VI.
HoMERj and Virgil, and Shakespeare, and Milton, had the lame tafte; and all men who have been acquainted with their writings, and agree in the admiration of them, muft have the fame tafle.
The fundamental rules of poetry and mufic and painting, and dramatic adion and elo- quence, have been always the fame, and will be fo to the end of the world.
The variety we find among men in matters of tafle is eafily accounted for, confiftently ■with what we have advanced.
There is a tafte that is acquired, and a tafle that is natural. This holds with rcfped: both to the external fenfe of tafte and the internal. Habit and falhion have a powerful influence upon both.
Of taftes that are natural, there are fome that may be called rational, others that are merely animal.
Children are delighted with brilliant and gaudy colours, with romping and noify mirth, with feats of agility, ftrength, or cunning; and favages have much the fame tafte as chil- dren.
But there are taftes that are more intellec- tual. It is the didate of our rational nature, that love and admiration are mifplaced when there is no intrinfic worth in the objeft.
In thofe operations of tafte which are ratio- nal, we judge of the real worth and excellence of the objecl, and our love or admiration is guided by that judgment. In fuch operations there is judgment as well as feehng, and the feeling depends upon the judgment we form of the objecl.
I do ^H Firjl Principles of Neceffary Truths, 301 I do not maintain that tafle, fo far as it is C H A P. acquired, or fo far as it is merely animal, can ^ *• be reduced to principles. But as far as it is '^"^^ founded on judgment, it certainly may.
The virtues, the graces, the mufes, have a beauty that is intrinhc. It lies not in the feel- ings of the fpedator, but in the real excel- lence of the object. If v/e do not perceive their beauty, it is owing to the defe£l or to the perverfion of our faculties.
And a?, there is an original beauty in cer- tain moral and intelledlual qualities, fo there is a borrowed and derived beauty in the natural figns and exprelTions of luch qualities.
The features of the human face, the modu- lations of the voice, and the proportions, atti- tudes, and geuare of the body, are all natural expreflions of good or bad qualities of the per- fon, and derive a beauty or a deformity from the qualities which they exprefs.
"W'orks of cst exprefs fome quality of the ar- tift, and often d'='rive an additional beauty from their uti.ity or fitncfs lor their end.
Of fuch things there are fome that ought to pleafe, and others that ought to difpleafe. If they do not, it is owing to fome defect in the fpettator. But v'hat has real excellence will always pleafe thole who have a corredt judg- ment and a found heart.
The fum of what has been faid upon this fubje6l is, that, fetting afide the taftes which men acquire by habit and falhion, there is a na- tural tafte, which is partly animal, and partly rational. With regard to the firPc, all we can fay is, that the Author of Nature, for wife realons, has formed us fo as to receive pleafure from the contemplation of certain objefts, and difguil difguil C HA P. difgufl from others, before we are capable of _ perceiving any real excellence in one, or defed: ' ' in the other. But that tafte which we may call rational, is that part of our conflitution by which we are made to receive pleaiure from the contemplation of what we conceive to be excellent in its kind, the pleafure being an- nexed to this judgment, and regulated by it. This tafte may be true or falfe, according as it is founded on a true or falfe judgment. And if it may be true or falfe, it muft have firft principles.
5. There are alfo firft principles in morals.
That an unjuft aftion has more demerit than an ungenerous one: That a generous a£lion has more merit than a merely juft one: That no man ought to be blamed for what it was not in his power to hinder: That we ought not to do to others what we would think unjuft or unfair to be done to us in like circumftances: Thefe are moral axioms, and many others mi^ht be named which appear to me to have no lefs evidence than thofe of mathematics.
Some perhaps may think, that our deter- minations, either in matters of tafte or in mo- rals, ought not to be accounted necefl'ary truths: That they are grounded upon the conftitution of that faculty which we call tafte, and of that which we call the moral fenfe or confcience; which faculties might have been fo conftituted as to have given determinati- ons different, or even contrary to thofe they now give: That as there is nothing fweet or bitter in itfelf, but according as it agrees or difagrecs with the external fenfe called tafte; fo there is nothing beautiful or ugly in itfelf, but according as it agrees or difagrees with the Firjl Principles of Necejfary Truths. 303 the internal fenfe, which we alfo call tafle; and nothing morally good or ill in itfelf, but according at it agrees or dilagrees with our moral fenfe.
This indeed is a fyftem, with regard to mo- rals and tafle, which hath been fupported in modern times by great authorities. And if this fyftem be true, the conlequence muft be, that there can be no principles, either of taftc or of morals, that are neceiTary truths. For, according to this fyftem, all our determinati- ons, both with regard to matters of tafte, and with regard to morals, are reduced to matters of fadl. I mean to fuch as thefe, that by our conftitution we have on fuch occafions certain agreeable feelings, and on other occafions cer- tain difagreeable feelings.
But I cannot help being of a contrary opini- on, being perfuaded, that a man who deter- mined that polite behaviour has great defor- mity, and that there is great beauty in rude- ncfs and ill breeding, would judge wrong whatever his feelings were.
In like manner, I cannot help thinking, that a man who determined that there is more moral worth in cruelty, perfidy, and injuftice, than in generofity, juftice, prudence, and temperance, would judge wrong whatever his conftitution was.
And if it be true that there is judgment in our determinations of tafte and of morals, it muft be granted, that what is true or falfe in morals, or in matters of tafte, is neceffarily fo. For this reafon, I have ranked the firft principles of morals and of tafte under the clafs of ncceffary truths.
6, The CHAP. 6. The laft clafs of firft principles I Ihall ^^- mention, we may call metaphyfical. ^'^'^^ I fhall particularly confider three of thefe, becaufe they have been called in queflion by Mr. Hume.
The jirjl is. That the qualities which we perceive by our fenfes mufl have a fubjeft, which we call body, and that the thoughts we are confcious of mufl have a fubject, which we call mind.
It is not more evident that two and two make four, than it is that figure cannot exift, unlefs there be fomething that is figured, nor motion without fomething that is moved. I not only perceive figure and motion, but I perceive them to be qualities: They have a neceflary relation to fomething in which they exift as their fubjed:. The difficulty which fomePhilofophershave found in admitting this, is entirely owing to the theory of ideas. A fubjed of the fenfible qualities which we per- ceive by our fenfes, is not an idea either of fenfation or of confcioufnefs; therefore fay they, we have no fuch idea. Or, in the ftyle of Mr. Hume, from what impreffion is the idea of fubftance derived? It is not a copy of any impreifion; therefore there is no fuch idea.
The diftin<5lion between fenfible qualities, and the fubftance to which they belong, and between thought, and the mind that thinks, is not the invention of Philofophers; it is found in the ftru£ture of all languages, and therefore muft be common to all men who fpeak with underftanding. And 1 believe no man, how- ever fceptical he may be in fpeculation, can talk on the common affairs of life for half an hour, Firjl Principles of Necejfary Truths. 305 hour, without faying things that imply hisCHAP. belief of the reality of thefe diftinftions. vJv-^ Mr Locke acknowledges, " That we can- " not conceive how fimple ideas offenfible " qualities fhould fubfifl alone; and therefore " we fuppofe them to exift in, and to be fup- *' ported by, fome common fubjeft," In his Eflay, indeed, fome of his expreflions feem to leave it dubious, whether this belief, that fen- fible qualities mud have a fubje6t, be a true judgment, or a vulgar prejudice. But in his firfl letter to the Biihop of Worci;st;;r, he removes this doubt, and quotes many paffages of his EfTay, to fhew that he neither denied, nor doubted of the exiftence of fubflances, both thinking and material; and that he be- lieved their exiftence on the fame ground the Bifhop did, to wit, " on the repugnancy to " our conceptions, that modes and accidents " fhould fubfifl by themfelves.'* He offers no proof of this repugnancy; nor, I think, can any proof of it be given, becaufe it is a lirft principle.
It were to be wifhed that Mr. Locke, who enquired fo accurately and fo laudably into the origin, certainty, and extent of human know- ledge, had turned his attention more particu- larly to the origin of thefe two opinions which he firmlv believed; to wit, that fenfible qua- lities mufl: have a fubjeft which we call body, and that thought mull have a fubjed which we call mind. A due attention to thefe two opi- nions which govern the belief of all men, even of Sceptics in the practice of life, would pro- bably have led him to perceive, that fenfation and confcioufnefs are not the only fources of human knowledge; and that there are princi- VoL. IL X pies CHAP pies of belief in human nature, of which we ^I- can give no other account but that they necef- ^•^^'^'"'^ farily refult from the conftitution of our facul- ties; and that if it were in our power to throw off their influence upon our practice and con- duel, we could neither fpeak nor acl like rea- fonable men.
We cannot give a reafon why we believe even our fenfations to be real and not fallaci- ous; why we believe what we are confcious of; why we trufl any of our natural faculties. We fay, it mufl be fo, it cannot be otherwife. This exprelTes only a flrong belief, which is indeed the voice of Nature, and which there- fore in vain we attempt to refill:. But if, in fpite of Nature, we refolve to go deeper, and not to trull our faculties, without a reafon to fliew that they cannot be fallacious, I am afraid, that feeking to become wife, and to be as gods, we fhall become foolifh, and being unfatisfied with the lot of humanity, we Ihall throw off common fenfe.
The fecond m.etaphyfical principle I mention is. That whatever begins to exift, mufl have a caufe which produced it.
Philofophy is indebted to Mr. Hume in this refpedl among others, that, by calling in quef- tion many of the firfl principles of human knowledge, he hath put fpeculative men upon enquiring more carefully than was done before, into the nature of the evidence upon which they reft. Truth can never fuffer by a fair enqui- ry; it can bear to be feen naked and in the fullefl light; and the ftriclefl examination will always turn out in the iifue to its advantage. I believe Mr. Hume was the firfl who ever called called Firji Principles of Necejfary Truths, 307 called in queftion whether things that begin toC H A P. exift mufl have a caufe. ^ ^• With regard to this point, we mud hold one of thefe three things, either that it is an opinion, for which we have no evidence, and which men have fooliihly taken up without ground; or, fccondly. That it is capable of di- reft proof by argument; or, thirdly. That it is felf-evident, and needs no proof, but ought to be received as an axiom, which cannot by reafonable men be called in queftion.
The firft of thefe fuppofitions would put an end to all philofophy, to all religion, to all reafoning that would carry us beyond the ob- jects of fenfe, and to all prudence in the con- duct of life.
As to the fecond fuppofuion, that this prin- ciple may be proved by direct reafoning, I am afraid we fhall find the proof extremely diffi- cult, if not altogether impoffible.
I know only of three or four arguments that have been urged by Philofophers, in the way of abftract reafoning, to prove, that things which begin to exift muft have a caufe.
One is offered by Mr. Hobbes, another by Dr. Samuel Clarke, another by Mr. Locke. Mr. Hume, in his Trcatife of Human Nature, has examined them all; and, in my opinion, has fhewn, that they take for granted the thing to be proved; a kind of falfe reafoning, which men are very apt to fall into when they at- tempt to prove what is felf-evident.
It has been thought, that, although this principle does not admit of proof from abftra£t reafoning, it may be proved from experience, and may be juftly drawn by induction, from inftances that fall within our obfervation.
X 2 I conceive I conceive this method of proof will leave us in great uncertainty, for thefe three reafons: ly?, Becaufe the propofition to be proved is not a contingent but a neceflary propofition. It is not, that things which begin to exift com- monly have a caufe, or even that they always in fa£t have a caufe; but they muft have a caufe, and cannot begin to exift without a caufe.
Proportions of this kind, from their nature, are incapable of proof by induftion. Expe- rience informs us only of what is or has been, not of what muft be; and the conclufion muft be of the fame nature with the premifes.
For this reafon, no mathematical propofition can be proved by induction. Though it ftiould be found by experience in a thoufand cafes, that the area of a plane triangle is equal to the reftangle under the altitude and half the bafe, this would not prove that it muft be fo in all cafes, and cannot be otherwife j which is what the Mathematician afarms.
In like manner, though we had the moft ample experimental proof, that things which have begun to exift had a caufe, this would not proA c that they muft have a caufe. Expe- rience may flievv us what is the eftabliflied courfe of nature, but can never ftiew what con- nections of things are in their nature neceflary. 2dh\ General maxims, grounded on expe- rience, have only a degree of probability pro- portioned to the extent of our experience, and ought alv/ays to be underftood fo as to leave room for exceptions, if future experience ftiall difcover any fuch.
The law of gravitation has as full a proof from experience and induction as any principle can Firji Principles of Neceffliry Truths. 309 can be fuppofed to have. Yet, if any Philofo- C H ^^ P. pher Ihould, by clear experiment, fhew that ^^• there is a kind of matter in fome bodies which ' ' ^ does not gravitate, the law of gravitation ought to be limited by that exception.
Now it is evident, that men have never con- fidered the principle of the neceiTity of caufes, as a truth of this kind which may admit of li- mitation or exception; and therefore it has not been received upon this kind of evidence.
3<i/y, 1 do not fee that experience could fatisfy us that every change in nature actually has a caufe.
In the far greateft part of the changes in na- ture that fall within our obfervation, the caufes are unknown; and therefore, from experience, we cannot know whether they have caufes or not.
Caufation is not an objedt of fenfe. The only experience we can have of it, is in the confcioufnefs we have of exerting fome power in ordering our thoughts and actions. But this experience is fureiy too narrow a founda- tion for a general conclufion, that all things that have had or (hall have a beginning muil have a caufe.
For thefe reafons, this principle cannot be drawn from experience any more than from abftrad reafoning.
The third fuppofition is, That it is to be admitted as a firft or felf-evident principle. Two reafons may be urged for this.
I/?, The univerfal confent of mankind, not of Philofophers only, but of the rude and un- learned vulgar.
Mr. Hume, as far as I know, was the firft that ever expreffed any doubt of this principle.
And 3IO ESSAY VI.
CHAP, ^nd when we confider that he has rejeded every principle of human knowledge, except- ing that of confcioufnefs, and has not even fpared the axioms of mathematics, his authority is of fmall weight.
Indeed, with regard to firft principles, there is no reafon why the opinion of a Philofopher fliould have more authority than that of ano- ther man of common fenfe, who has been ac- cuftomed to judge in fuch cafes. The illiterate vulgar are competent judges; and the Philofo- pher has no prerogative in matters of this kind; but he is more liable than they to be mifled by a favourite fyftem, efpecially if it is his own.
Setting afide the authority of Mr. Hume; what has philofophy been employed in, fmce men firft began to philofophife, but in the in- veftigation of the caufes of things? This it has always profeiTcd, when we trace k to its cradle. It never entered into any man*s thought, before the Philofopher we have men- tioned, to put the previous queftion, whether things have a caufe or not? Had it been thought poflible that they might not, it may be prefumed, that, in the variety of abfurd and contradictory caufes ailigned, fome one would have had recourfe to this hypothefis.
They could conceive the world to arife from an effg-, from a ftruorjile between love and ftrife, between moifture and drought, between heat and cold; but they never fuppofed that it had no caufe. We know not any Atheiftic fe6l that ever had recourfe to this topic, though by it they might have evaded every argument that could be brought againfl them, and anfwered all objections to their fyflem.
But Firjl Principles of Neccffary Truths. 31,1 But rather than adopt fuch an abfurdity,^ "^^ P- they contrived Ibme imaginary caufe; iuch as ^ chance, a concourfe of atom?, or necellity, as the caufe of the univerfe.
The accounts which Philofophers have given of particular phsenomena, as well as of the uni- verfe in general, proceed upon the fame prin- ciple. That every phcenomenon mud have a caufe, was always taken for granted. Nil turpiits phyfico, fays Cicero, quam fieri fine caufia quicquam dicere. Though an Acade- mic, he was dogmatical in this. And Pla- to, the Father of the academy, was no lefs fo.
" US." It is impoffible that any thing fhould have its origin without a caufe.
I believe Mr. Hume was the firfl who ever held the contary. This, indeed, he avows, and aflumes the honour of the difcovery. " It is, fays he, a maxim in philofophy, that *' whatever begins to exift, mull have a caufe " of exiftence. This is commonly taken for " granted in all reafonings, without any proof *' given or demanded. It is fuppofed to be *' founded on intuition, and to be one of thofe " maxims, which, though they may be denied " with the lips, it is impoOibk for men in " their hearts really to doubt of. But, if we *' examine this maxim by the idea of know- " ledge, above explained, we (hall difcover in " it no mark of fuch intuitive certainty." The meaning of this feems to be, that it did not fuit with his theory of intuitive certainty, and therefore he excludes it from that pri- vilege.
The vulgar adhere to this maxim as firmly and univerfally as the Philofophers. Their fuperoi2 ESSAY VI.
CHAP, fuperflitions have the fame origin as the fyftems ^^- of Philofophers, to wit, a defire to know the 'caufes of things. Felix qui potuit rerum cognof- cere caiifas^ is the univerfal fenfe of men; but to fay that any thing can happen without a caufe, fhocks the common fenfe of a favage.
This univerfal belief of mankind is eafily ac- counted for, if we allow that the neceffity of a caufe of every event is obvious to the rational powers of a man. But it is impoffible to ac- count for it otherwife. It cannot be afcribed to education, to fyftems of philofophy, or to prieftcraft. One would think, that a Philofo- pher who takes it to be a general delufion or prejudice, would endeavour to fhow from what caufes in human nature fuch a general error may take its rife. But I forget that Mr. Hume might anfwer upon his own principles, that fince things may happen without a caufe, this error and delufion of men may be univerfal without any caufe.
A fecond reafon why I conceive this to be a firft principle, is. That mankind not only aflfent to it in fpeculation, but that the pradice of life is grounded upon it in the moft import- ant matters, even in cafes where experience leaves us doubtful; and it is impoffible to aft with common prudence if we fet it afide.
In great families there are fo many bad things done by a certain perfonage called wo- hody^ that it is proverbial, that there is a no- body about every houfe who does a great deal of mifchief; and even where there is the ex- adeft infpeftion and government, many events will happen of which no other author can be found: So that, if we truft merely to expe- rience in this matter, nobody will be found to be Firfl Principles of Necejfary Truths, 313 be a very aftive perfon, and to have no incon-C HAP. fiderable fhare in the management of affairs. But whatever countenance this fyftem may have from experience, it is too fhocking to common fenfe to impofe upon the moft igno- rant. A child knows, that when his top, or any of his play-things are taken awav, it muft be done by fomebody. Perhaps it would not be difficult to perfuade him that it was done by fome invifible being, but that it fhould be done by nobody he cannot believe.
Suppofe a man's houfe to be broken open, his money and jewels taken away. Such things have happened times innumerable with- out any apparent caufe; and were he only to reafon from experience in fuch a cafe, how muft he behave? He muft put in one fcale the inftances wherein a caufe was found of fuch an event, and in the other fcale, the inftances where no caufe was found, and the preponde- rant fcale muft determine, whether it be moft probable that there was a caufe of this event, or that there was none. Would any man of common underftanding have recourfe to fuch an expedient to direct his judgment?
Suppofe a man to be found dead on the high- way, his (kull fradured, his body pierced with deadly wounds, his watch and money carried off. The coroners jury fits upon the body, and the queftion is put, what was the caufe of this man's death, was it accident, or felo de fe, or murder by perfons unknown? Let us fuppofe an adept in Mr. Hume's philofophy to make one of the jury, and that he infifts upon the previous queftion, whether there was any caufe of the event, and whether it happened with- out a caufe?
Surely, Surely, P. Surely, upon Mr. Hume's principles, a great deal might be faid upon this point j and, if the matter is to be determined by pad expe- rience, it is dubious on which fide the weight of argument might fland. But we may ven- ture to fay, that, if Mr. Hume had been of fuch a jury, he would have laid afide his philo- fophical principles, and a6led according to the dictates of common prudence.
Many paffages might be produced, even in Mr. Hume's philofophical writings, in which he, unawares, betrays the fame inward con- viction of the neceility of caufes, which is common to other men. I fhall mention only one, in the Treatife of Human Nature, and in that part of it where he combats this very principle. " As to thofe imprellions, fays he, *' which arife from the fenies, their ultimate " caufe is, in my opinion, perfectly inexpli- *' cable by human reafon; and it will always " be impoffible to decide with certainty, whe- " ther they arife immmediately from the ob- " jcd, or are produced by the creative power " of the mind, or are derived from the Au- " thor of our being."
Among thefe alternatives, he never thought of their not arifing from any caufe.
The arguments which Mr. Hume offers to prove that this is not a felf-evident principle, are three. FirJ}^ That all certainty arifes from a comparifon of ideas, and a difcovery of their unalterable relations, none of which relations imply this propofition, That whatever has a beginning mult have a caufe of exiftence. This theory of certainty has been examined before.
The Tirjl Principles of Necejfary Truths. 3 1 5 The fecond argument is, That whatever we CHAP, can conceive is poffible. This has Hkewife ^'^• been examined. v-.— v-^-j The third argument is, That what we call a caufe, is only fomething antecedent to, and always conjoined with the effcft. This is alfo one of Mr. Hume's peculiar \io6lrines, which we may have occafion to confider afterwards. It is fufficient here to obferve, that we may learn from it that night is the caufe of day, and day the caufe of night: For no two things have more conftantly followed each other fmce the beginning of the world.
The lajl metaphyfical principle I mention, which is oppofed by the fame author, is. That dcfign, and intelligence in the caufe, may be inferred, with certainty, from marks or figns of it in the effect.
Intelligence, defign, and fkill, are not ob- jefts of the external fenfes, nor can we be con- fcious of them in any perfon but ourfelves. Even in ourfelves, we cannot, v/ith propriety, be faid to be confcious of the natural or acqui- red talents we pofiefs. We are confcious only of the operations of mind in which they are ex- erted. Indeed, a man com.es to know his own mental abilities, jufl as he knows another man's, by the effefts they produce, when there is occafion to put them to exercife.
A man's wifdom is known to us only by the figns of it in his condudt; his eloquence by the figns of it in his fpeech. In the fame manner we judge of his virtue, of his fortitude, and of all his talents and virtues.
Yet it is to be obferved, that we judge of mens talents with as little doubt or hefitation as we judge of the immediate objeds of fenfe.
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